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Abstract 
Within the medical profession, disciplinary proceedings and other regulatory mechanisms aim to 
protect the public by having robust systems to remedy identified problems with doctors’ 
performance, conduct or health. One in five doctors will have a complaint during their careers, and 
many of these say it is one of the most stressful events they have experienced, while others carry 
a fear of complaints even if they have not experienced one. The experience leaves many 
emotionally and psychologically harmed, some suffer ill-health and many undergo behavioural 
changes. These effects can cascade down to family, friends and colleagues, and the worry and 
anxiety can affect their work. This means patients may also suffer, when a doctor who is tired, 
distracted or anxious can make mistakes and errors of judgement, or is not practising optimally. 
The existing literature on this topic, from international and national studies, has consistently found 
these adverse impacts on doctors, at both the professional and personal level and regardless of 
the actual regulatory mechanism in place. The purpose of this qualitative study is to build on this 
knowledge by undertaking an in-depth exploration of the underlying reasons for these impacts for 
Australian doctors who have experienced complaints, thereby adding to the understanding of what 
it is about doctors and the process that causes such distress. To find these reasons, the study 
invited doctors to share their experience and to explore what it was about the process that caused 
them consternation and distress, and how they deal with it. The aims were: 
1. To understand doctors’ experience of complaints; 
2. To understand what support, if any, doctors seek during the complaints process and if it 
makes a difference. 
In order to reach a deeper understanding, the study also asked these questions: 
1. What can be learned about the complaints process through doctors’ accounts about the 
impact of complaints on doctors, their health, sense of self and practice? 
2. What can be learned from doctors’ perceptions about how law and regulation interact 
with medicine and the impact of these interactions on medical practice? 
These questions were explored through in-depth semi-structured interviews with individual doctors. 
Part One of the thesis examines the context for the study, through exploring the reasons for 
regulating the profession of medicine, and the manner in which it is regulated. A review of the 
literature will show how this component of the regulatory landscape impacts on individuals who 
have experienced it. 
Part Two presents the empirical component of the study. A qualitative research methodology was 
the most appropriate method of examining the experience of doctors who have received a 
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complaint. Using semi-structured, in-depth interviews with seventeen self-selected doctors, a 
narrative approach enabled a deep examination of doctors’ personal reactions, perceptions and 
attitudes to the complaints process, and to their values and beliefs in respect of being a member of 
the medical profession. Speaking of what had brought them into medicine and their aspirations, 
doctors reflected on how the complaint experience affected them, their practice and their 
anticipated future. They considered what aspects of the process had been of significance, and how 
it could be different. They reflected on how they endured the process, whether they told others, 
whether they obtained informal or formal support, and if it made a difference. The deeper meaning 
of why the experience had significance for them provided a clue to explaining what it is about the 
process that these doctors found so distressing and fearful. 
For a second phase of the empirical component of the study, five expert informants agreed to be 
interviewed in order to obtain their professional perspective on how doctors respond to complaints 
and how they deal with the process. This group consisted of experts who provide professional 
support to doctors, for psychiatric care or for medico-legal advice and assistance. 
The individual narratives told how doctors reacted to the receipt of a complaint, and how they 
explained their reaction. Initial shock, fear, dismay and distress turned to sleeplessness, loss of 
concentration, tears and worry, to depression and deep anxiety. Worry about being competent 
enough to work, fear of what others may think of them and thoughts about giving up medicine 
endured throughout the process, and for some, well beyond it even if the complaint was not 
substantiated. Experts’ accounts of how doctors react were very similar, adding terror and fear 
when facing a disciplinary hearing, and behavioural symptoms such as being belligerent, 
defensive, and obstructive, and some becoming profoundly distressed or depressed. 
Talking about what was so distressing about having a complaint identified many aspects of the 
process that had contributed to doctors’ concerns. These included the style of communication from 
the complaints body, delays, uncertainty of the outcome and how decisions were being made, by 
whom and on what basis, to perceptions of unfairness brought about by these issues. Many 
perceived that the process holds them guilty until they prove themselves innocent, and is weighted 
towards complainants. The adversarial nature of the process makes them defensive and cautious, 
and such defensiveness can be long-lasting, resulting in changes to their practice which are not all 
for positive reasons. 
All participants had told their partners or a close friend, but most had not told anyone else. Those 
who confided in supervisors, colleagues or employers found it helpful and affirming, but those 
whose colleagues or employers abandoned them, sidelined them or forced them out fared badly, 
and recovery was difficult. What was also confronting was when doctors felt unfairly judged by their 
peers, and especially when this affected how a complaint was assessed and its outcome. Threat to 
reputation was very real and fearing what others may think of them was a significant reason given 
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for not telling others. Media exposure was also a real threat, and actual reporting of matters was 
deeply distressing. 
Those whose distress became critical often avoided psychological help, until others stepped in to 
recommend it. Emotions rose to the surface in the interviews as participants recalled how they felt 
at the time, and some poignant moments were shared as they spoke of what it was like, how they 
got through it, and how they felt about it now. Most of the participants continued to work, but it was 
not quite the same, and the interviews were an opportunity for them to reflect on this. Others had 
retired early, some were not practising, one resigned and another wanted to. 
The value of using a narrative approach was that it was able to identify that there was a deeper 
meaning to having a complaint. In this way, using in-depth interviews enabled the study to extend 
well beyond what most previous research had found, reaching into areas that may have been 
touched on but without the depth that this approach achieved. For participants, this meant not just 
recounting events and how they reacted, but for some it involved reflecting beyond the allegations 
raised in the complaint and how they had contributed to the patients’ dissatisfaction, and what they 
had changed as a result. Others offset these thoughts by considering what it was about that 
person, on that day, with that presentation, that made them so upset with them. Or, more often, 
reflecting on what it all meant in terms of their own image of themselves caused some to wonder if 
they were actually not the good doctor they thought they were, with some fearing the authorities 
had treated them as one of the “bad guys”. In this respect, a doctor’s moral identity was critical in 
understanding this deeper meaning, which went beyond fear for their reputation, to questioning 
their own value and worth professionally, and personally. Threats to one’s moral identity were at 
the heart of doctors’ consternation. 
All participants believed there should be a system for dealing with complaints and a robust 
regulatory environment to maintain standards of practice and to deal with those doctors who were 
a risk to the public. They were well aware of who those are, and did not identify with them. Yet 
there was a doubt for participants that perhaps there was substance to the complaint, even if the 
complaint had not been substantiated. If it had, participants were aware of their deficiencies, and 
none believed they were irremediable. 
This study has provided insights into why having a complaint is confronting and why the process is 
so stressful. There is a consistent message that regulatory processes have an adverse impact on 
doctors, but in spite of knowing this for some decades, little has been achieved to address the 
underlying reasons why the process causes such a degree of harm. While there is no doubt there 
is some concern, the focus has been on individuals to cope and to seek support if they cannot. It is 
now time to look more broadly at what in the process contributes to the distress, and to consider 
what can be changed to mitigate these adverse effects. The regulators responded constructively to 
dissatisfaction from complainants by making systems changes and being more communicative. 
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This study indicates where changes could be made to ameliorate the impact on doctors. This may 
mean a re-think of the principles behind the approach that is taken in protecting the public. From 
the time complaints were recognised as an integral component of the regulatory process, for their 
value in identifying deficiencies and inadequacies in the health system and with health providers, 
the medical profession railed against the intrusion into their autonomy. The system became part of 
the regulatory landscape, but the early days of fear and resistance remained, while medical 
defence organisations stepped in to take care of the “cases” and legalistic procedures took a firm 
hold. The adverse impacts were little recognised or known about. Doctors suffered silently, or 
raged vociferously, but all would have to capitulate to the requirements of the system, eventually 
including the failure to cooperate with an investigation as grounds for disciplinary action as a 
breach of the Code of Good Medical Practice. 
It took some very large studies in Australia and overseas to make it public that doctors suffer from 
the experience, and that the suffering is so widespread and profound that it was clear that the 
“collateral damage” was no longer acceptable. It not only harmed doctors, it had the potential to 
harm patients because people who are not well do not function well. Defensive medicine can harm 
patients, it can harm the public purse, and it can undermine a doctor’s judgement. 
Yet, in spite of this, it is not clear how significantly the process contributes to the reduction of the 
quantum of adverse outcomes, measured elsewhere, in health care. Complaints are just one 
element of the regulatory landscape, and they cannot be relied on to improve the general quality of 
care – the majority of adverse outcomes do not result in complaints, nor do complaints necessarily 
reveal the worst of care. Certainly, the complaints system has resulted in some positive changes in 
practice in individual practitioners, and as a risk strategy, taking timely and appropriate action to 
protect the public against unsafe care is an essential part of the regulatory process. However, the 
adverse effects and what causes them need to be better understood so that doctors can survive 
and recover when they are being called to account, instead of their being diminished further. 
This study not only confirms the findings of previous research, it provides additional value by 
explaining the underlying reasons for these findings. The findings are contextualised in today’s 
medico-legal environment – why it was created, how it was created and by whom – and it is shown 
that the law, once introduced to protect the profession, now exists to protect the public. The 
consequences of this shift have enhanced the goals of public protection, trust and confidence, but 
they have also had a profound effect on those doctors who are directly impacted by it when a 
complaint is made against them.  
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Preface 
When people ask me what my thesis topic is, they invariably conclude that I am about to expose 
another parade of scandalous stories about that privileged profession of doctors who are all in it for 
the money and status. Everyone seems to have a “bad doctor” story, and they love to tell it. When I 
tell them I am actually studying what it is like to be a doctor whom someone in the public has 
accused of being bad, or not good enough, the baffled silence begs the question, ‘Why the 
interest?’ This is why: 
Some years ago, I left my fourteen-year career with the Commonwealth Government, where I had 
worked as an education officer in Education, and as a regional coordinator in Disability Services. I 
took a one-year position as policy officer with the NSW Council of Social Service, responsible for 
the health portfolio. That was the year that heated debates, public meetings, media exposés and 
furious demonstrations were happening, where the victims of Chelmsford Private Hospital were 
fighting for justice, and the public of NSW was demanding an independent authority to investigate 
complaints against health services and providers. NCOSS was enjoined in the lobby group, 
heralded by the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, to advocate for the bill before the NSW 
Parliament that would pass legislation to provide for such a body. The year passed, the bill was 
passed, and I joined the newly minted Health Care Complaints Commission in 1994 as a senior 
investigation officer, the first “lay” person to have done so, and remained for over seven years. 
The value of this work cannot be underestimated, in spite of the fear, criticism and sometimes fury 
that this institution engendered. I took a keen interest in why things go wrong in health care and 
why people complain, and it was rewarding when we were able to provide information and 
explanations for events, and had a say in how things could be remedied. But it was a very 
bureaucratic and largely desk-bound process, and we were often frustrated by the delays caused 
by these processes and by large caseloads. In those days, the investigator became prosecutor 
when a doctor was summonsed to a Professional Standards Committee at the NSW Medical 
Board. This was a precarious procedure as we stumbled through formal proceedings where a 
doctor’s future could lie in the balance. I was struck by the fear and trepidation that many suffered. 
With a reputation for fairness, I was airlifted to the “other side”, and worked for United Medical 
Protection, later to become Avant, for eight years, as a medico-legal risk adviser and later national 
manager, risk advisory services. Part of the role was working with doctors in trouble, providing 
advice, support and advocacy through performance assessments or Medical Board disciplinary 
interviews. Again I was struck by doctors’ trepidation and apprehension when facing these 
proceedings. I developed a long-standing interest in doctors’ health and was instrumental in 
establishing a service for doctors suffering distress whilst the subject of a complaint. 
After leaving Avant, I took a position as risk adviser and educator with MDA National, during which 
time I co-authored the Partnering your Professionalism program, with a particular interest in 
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leadership in medicine and professional relationships, as well as understanding complaints and 
how to deal with them. I then left the industry and began my doctoral studies. 
While working in medical defence, I completed a Masters Degree in Medical Humanities, with a 
focus on ethics and law in medicine. I also participated in a large national University of Sydney 
study led by A/Professor Louise Nash on the psychological impact of complaints and claims on 
doctors’ health and behaviour. The results were so worrying that I wanted to understand what lies 
beneath the findings of that study, and from what I had observed from my work with doctors. This 
is why I have undertaken this study, with the added hope that it may make a difference to some 
doctors who believe they are alone in feeling fearful or anxious when they receive a complaint, and 
those who prefer to keep it to themselves. I also hope that it may make a difference to those 
decision-makers who may forget that doctors are human too, and that threats to their livelihood, 
reputation and career are very real, and very frightening, regardless of being blameworthy or 
blameless. 
I am a community member of the Human Research Ethics Committee (Medical Sciences) at 
Macquarie University, am a tutor in health sociology at The University of Sydney, and a hearing 
panel member for the Medical Council of NSW. I will add that having worked in the three arms of 
the regulatory process, I have a strong commitment to upholding standards in health care, for 
patients to have access to an independent authority to deal with their grievances, and for health 
practitioners to be held accountable for their conduct and performance. But I am also committed to 
the principle that when they are called to account, they are treated with fairness and the 
recognition that a complaint, per se, does not mean they are wrong or bad. The hard work and 
commitment that most dedicate to the public deserves to be recognised, and their alleged failures 
not be cause for blame and shame. This thesis aims to present the doctors’ perspective of what it 
is like to be on the receiving end. 
 
Elizabeth van Ekert 
BA DipEd, Masters in Medical Humanities  
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Introduction: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow 
“As everywhere else in the universe, so also in society, the yesterday is contained in the 
today, and the today in the tomorrow. In the sphere of law, justice is the idea of today which 
has grown out of the idea of yesterday and the idea of tomorrow which is growing out of the 
idea of today. In order to become a legal proposition, the legal today and the legal 
tomorrow, born in society, must be given form and shape by a personality who thinks and 
senses what the future will bring.” 
(Eugen Ehrlich, 1936: p. 243). 
 
 
(Bruncelsia pauciflora: “Yesterday, today and tomorrow”) 
The lovely scent of Yesterday, today and tomorrow is not what this thesis is about, nor is it about 
botanicals and what grows in my garden. It is about the narratives that this simple idea unfolds: 
what happened yesterday affects what happens today, which affects what will happen in the future. 
It is an account of the law and its impact on the profession of medicine; what shaped and 
influenced the law; what shaped and influenced the profession of medicine, and how each shaped 
the other. 
This is presented as the backdrop to what has shaped the lives of medical professionals, and in 
particular, those aspects of legal and regulatory processes that have a direct impact on a doctor’s 
life and career. While many aspects of law and regulation relating to medicine affect how medicine 
is practised in order to ensure standards are maintained and the public is kept safe, this thesis 
focuses on complaints as a means of resolving grievances by patients and as indicators of risk. For 
the doctor who is on the receiving end of a complaint, this may mean as little as writing an 
explanatory letter that clarifies a misunderstanding, to being required to face a disciplinary tribunal 
to answer allegations of professional misconduct, a finding of which may result in the loss of their 
registration, reputation and livelihood. 
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The study traces back to what brought a doctor into medicine, their interests, aspirations and 
values, and how their career unfolded, to the point when a critical incident happened that had the 
potential to bring this all crashing down. The testimony of doctors relates their accounts of how 
they reacted when receiving a complaint against them, how they endured what happened next, 
how they were supported and how it shaped their future. It examines the changes that may have 
emerged as a consequence of the complaint, how they responded to their patients, their 
colleagues, how they felt now about themselves as doctors and how it differed from what they 
envisaged when they went into medicine. It also considers their perceptions of the medico-legal 
process itself, what was expected of them, how they navigated their way through it, if they thought 
it was fair, and reflections on how it could have been different. 
Why Care? 
A common question asked of me as a researcher was why I am so interested, and why do I care? 
Throughout my career assisting doctors in trouble, whether guilty or not, brilliant or mediocre, 
“impaired” or just not their normal selves, I became critically aware of the anxiety many of them 
suffered, and the effect on their families, staff and colleagues. Some were so concerning that I 
either strongly advised them to seek immediate professional help, or enlisted the intervention of 
doctors with expertise in managing a dangerous crisis. I am relieved to say that as far as I am 
aware, most doctors recovered, most continued in their work and most survived, even in the face 
of possible or actual suspension or de-registration. It is sad to note however that a small number, 
but far too many, of doctors in this country decide to quit medicine altogether, or even to end their 
lives. A full account of my own background in relation to this topic is listed in the preface. 
My study has revealed that the recovery of many doctors has been a painful one, and in some 
cases, a protracted one. The critical issue, however, is why the complaints process has such an 
impact on doctors: is it the very processes themselves, is it more a matter of hurt pride or is there 
something else that has challenged the very heart of being a doctor? 
The next question is why the community might care? 
There is no doubt that the public has a right to expect safe care when it is needed and to feel it can 
trust that those on whom it relies for care are skilled and competent and that they have patients’ 
best interests at the heart of their practice. We are also aware that things do go wrong in health 
care, and the public needs to know that such incidents can be learned from to minimise future risk. 
While many such adverse outcomes can be attributed to errors and systems breakdowns, or just 
bad luck, some can be attributed to health practitioners. Not everything that does not go to plan is 
due to wrongdoing, or that someone can be found to be blameworthy, because people do die or 
succumb to their illness or injury even in the best of hands. But patients want to know and 
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understand, all the same. Sometimes, the only way to find out is through making a complaint, or 
lodging a claim for compensation. 
Yet many complaints are not about adverse events, although it is often assumed that they arise 
because of harm or an unexpected outcome. Some complaints arise because people wish to know 
what happened to them or their loved one, or they wish to understand why decisions were made. 
Other complaints may have no adverse outcome, yet the patient’s expectations were not met, or 
they feel aggrieved about the quality of communication, the services provided, the time they were 
kept waiting or someone’s abrupt manner. The function of the complaints process is to assess all 
complaints and deal with matters according to how best they can be resolved. Anyone who 
receives a complaint is asked to respond to it. This may mean a simple letter of explanation that 
will resolve the grievance or, if the concerns raised in the complaint suggest there is an issue of 
public health or safety, the respondent to the complaint will face further inquiry. 
This means that someone is generally held to be responsible. This does not mean they actually 
are, or that they are liable or blameworthy, but the role of the complaints body is to find out. To be 
that identified someone means having to respond to an allegation that generally involves 
suggested inadequacies in their care, judgement, competence or conduct. This study is about the 
doctor who may have been that someone. 
What is already known is that being on the receiving end is stressful (Bourne et al., 2016; 
Cunningham, 2004a; Nash, Daly, van Ekert & Kelly, 2013; Schattner & Coman, 1998; Saberi, 
Sheikhazadi, Joghataei, Mohammadi & Fallahian, 2009), and more than this, for some it can result 
in depression, anxiety, loss of confidence, and adverse changes in practice and attitude towards 
patients and to their work. When a complaints process is prolonged, with an uncertain outcome, it 
can add to the anxiety and become debilitating. What is also known is that doctors suffer mental 
health symptoms at a higher rate than the general population, and that they tend not to seek 
professional help nor divulge their anxieties to others (BeyondBlue, 2013; Clode, 2004; Kay, 
Mitchell, Claravino & Doust, 2008). Doctors who are not functioning properly are more likely to be 
distracted, pre-occupied, and can make mistakes, overlook essential steps and are not adequately 
focused on their patients (Fahrenkopf, 2008; Wallace & Lemaire, 2009). In other words, they may 
not be practising safely. Having a complaint does not mean they are not good doctors, and in fact, 
of all the complaints against doctors, few are substantiated. Even if they are, there are few doctors 
whose practice cannot be remediated with support, targeted education and monitoring. A complaint 
does not mean they are “bad” and should not be practising, and our attitudes should not be tainted 
by those very few who have brought the profession into disrepute by their notorious deeds. What is 
important to remember is that complaints, although serious to a complainant, may be of minor 
consequence in terms of risk to the public, although it is also true that a doctor who attracts several 
complaints of a minor nature may suggest a pattern of practice worthy of taking more notice of in 
terms of public protection. These considerations need to bring balance to how complaints are 
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viewed. Overall, there is no doubt complaints have value in that they bring to notice matters that 
may mean less than satisfactory practice, and that they play an important part in protecting the 
public against unsafe care. But it should also be acknowledged that the process of dealing with 
them may cause harm. 
This is an issue of public interest: the complaints process has the potential to harm the individuals 
involved in it, and if they are harmed, they may harm their patients. A vital question hangs in the 
air: has the drive to protect the public been at the cost of the wellbeing of doctors, and if so, could 
there be a different approach to keeping the profession accountable while promoting public safety? 
The very quality that we want to see in doctors – their humanity – is the quality that I aimed to draw 
out in this study: where did the hurt that so many feel come from, what is it about and what 
consequences has it meant for them and their practice and career? 
How this is presented is a narrative in itself. As will be explained, a narrative is not just an account, 
a chronology of events or a simple story of what event led to another. A narrative has a point to it 
and how it unfolds is how the narrator chooses to tell it, selecting events, ideas and concepts that 
the narrator deems to have a meaning that goes beyond the incident or idea in and of itself. What 
gives it meaning is the context in which it occurred, its historical, social and political environment, 
taking account of how it would have been viewed in its day, not how we would interpret it today. 
If the underlying contributors of harm to doctors are better understood, we can more effectively 
advocate for regulators and complaints-handling bodies to take account of the adverse impacts. To 
better understand these contributors, and the context in which they arise, the following thesis 
presents my approach to seeking out an explanation. The thesis is presented in two parts: 
 Part One, Shaping the profession, provides the background, or the context in which the 
medico-legal environment was shaped and currently operates, and the impact this has on 
the individual doctor; 
 Part Two, Why do complaints hurt so much? presents the findings of my empirical 
research and its conclusions. 
Part One: Shaping the Profession 
Chapter One, The law and medicine, traces the history of the interrelationship between the law 
and medicine, and the genesis of the profession of medicine and of the regulatory environment in 
which it functions. While medicine has been practised for millennia, the account presented here 
commences with the beginnings of the modern profession of medicine in nineteenth century Great 
Britain and Australia as its colony. It considers the various interests that sought to define the 
profession, and who was to belong within it, and why the boundaries around medicine became 
important to address and resolve. This occurred in the social and political context of the developing 
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industrial economy, where science and medicine offered chances of survival and cure never before 
possible, and society became increasingly enamoured with what they had to offer. 
The guiding principles of the medical profession were not just about the special interests of elite 
groups vying with each other to be recognised as legitimated doctors with power and prestige. 
There was another reason for the fight for exclusivity: to protect patients against those “quacks” 
and other pretenders who might harm patients through their mistaken remedies or by denying 
patients access to real, legitimate doctors. The outcome was a compromise of sorts, but one that 
was sanctioned by new legislation which enabled the profession to exist as an elite institution and 
in doing so, defined who was to belong by virtue of their exclusive training and knowledge. 
The decades that followed saw the expansion of the profession into a highly technological and 
specialised institution with considerable power and influence that enabled it to flourish as an 
autonomous self-regulating body (McKinley & Marceau, 2002). While it enjoyed the considerable 
advantages of such exclusivity, society was also moving along, and some important events 
occurred that meant the profession was exposed to various turning points that challenged these 
advantages. This chapter traces some of these turning points, of which the Chelmsford Private 
Hospital scandal in NSW in the later part of the twentieth century was one of the most significant, 
in terms of challenging the autonomy of the profession, but also challenging the capacity of the 
existing regulatory mechanisms to recognise and effectively deal with the egregious actions of a 
few doctors who brought death, harm and lasting trauma to scores of patients. Some big questions 
demanded answers, and unless these were satisfactory, the confidence and trust of the public in 
health care providers and the institutions whose role was to protect patients against unsafe care, 
would be severely at risk. This was a turning point for the people of NSW, and from the judicial 
inquiry that followed the revelations of what had been happening, the Health Care Complaints 
Commission (HCCC) came into existence, whose primary objective was to protect the public. It 
would do so by receiving complaints about health care providers – private and public hospitals and 
clinics, registered and unregistered health practitioners – and assessing how best to deal with such 
complaints, based on their significance for public protection. Protection of the public was not 
assured, however, by this institution, and in NSW as elsewhere, there continues to be a 
succession of scandals, health practitioners found to be guilty of various misdeeds, poor or 
dangerous performance, unsatisfactory conduct, and other events that continue to undermine the 
public’s trust. One thing stands out and that is that doctors are the ones who are most often sued, 
are most often complained about, and most often have to otherwise account for their conduct. 
Chapter Two, Shaping the profession, examines the nature of the profession, and what it is 
about the profession that is held so highly that the public is less tolerant when it breaches its trust. 
The chapter looks at what is expected of the profession, and what it expects of itself. If a patient is 
seeking a “good doctor”, what characteristics are they looking for, and is this the same as what the 
regulators demand, their colleges define and the educators prepare doctors for? Such questions 
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lead into the next chapter which goes beyond the principles and codes which guide the profession, 
to how the profession is actually regulated in terms of the standards by which it must practise. 
Chapter Three, The law in action, describes the mechanisms that provide structure and 
legislative authority to obligate the profession to comply with regulations, codes of conduct, 
principles and policy guidelines. The system that until recently functioned independently in each 
state and territory became a national body, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Authority 
(AHPRA), in 2010 with the aim of ensuring greater consistency and mobility in regulatory 
processes. This aim has not been fully achieved, with NSW and Queensland retaining different 
systems although also cooperating in a co-regulatory arrangement with the national body. This is a 
national study, though it focuses more on the NSW system as this is where statutory authority for 
complaints-handling was first introduced. 
Chapter Four, The impact of regulatory processes, sets the foundation for my own study. It 
presents an overview of what is known about how doctors respond to the regulatory processes that 
are described in Chapters One to Three. To put it simply, it examines what it is like to be on the 
receiving end of complaints. What is shown is that many doctors suffer adverse emotional and 
psychological harms, may suffer physical effects through illness, and may experience behavioural 
changes that affect how they practise, their attitudes towards their patients, the regulators, their 
administrations, colleagues and even themselves. It challenges the very core of what it means to 
be a doctor. The questions are: is it remediable, and why does it matter? 
Part Two: Why Do Complaints Hurt So Much? 
Chapter Five, Methodology, introduces the study, which consists of interviews conducted with 
doctors with experience of at least one complaint or other medico-legal intervention, whom I will 
refer to as “Doctors in trouble” (DiTs), and a small group of experts, or informants, in their capacity 
of providing professional support to doctors. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured, open 
and narrative style, transcribed and analysed to identify key concepts which were then constructed 
into a framework, or structural analysis, which became the basis for a critical interpretation. This 
chapter explains the selection of methods and my interpretation of narrative. 
Chapter Six, Findings, presents the outcome of the interviews, in two sections: 
Part One is a detailed summary of the testimonies of the doctors in trouble, based on the 
transcripts of their interviews and pertinent observations that I add as the interviewer and 
researcher, set out in a framework constructed under these broad domains: 
 The complaint experience: reactions, responses to receipt of a complaint 
 The law in action: perceptions of the complaints process 
 Getting through it, telling others: seeking support from others, or not 
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 Moral legitimacy: being a good doctor, or not, or what the complaint represents 
 Changes: practice changes, career changes, attitude changes. 
Part Two is a more descriptive presentation of the observations of the expert informants, based on 
the above framework. They provide a broad perception of what doctors experience, and some of 
their perspectives of why this is so. 
Chapter Seven, Silent narratives, is the Discussion, or critical interpretation, that brings together 
the concepts and literature introduced in Part One, Shaping the profession, with the testimonies 
presented in both parts of the Findings, and based on the framework above. This will reach deeper 
into the underlying causes of doctors’ responses to complaints, to explain the findings of previous 
research and to add greater depth and understanding to what has already been written about by 
others. These are the silent narratives that little is known about, probably not thought about, rarely 
spoken about, but now, I hope, will be cared about. 
Finally, the discussion will present a critique of how the objective of public protection is served by 
the complaints process, and by referring to the perceptions of the participants on this very topic, 
how it could be different. 
The conclusion will bring a close to this study, but I hope not to a continuing recognition of the 
hidden and unintended consequences of the complaints system. This system grew out of an aim to 
balance the power of the health professions against the rights and expectations of patients to have 
not only safe care, but also a mechanism for harms, wrongs and grievances to be resolved, and for 
the public to have greater trust and confidence in its health system as a public good and necessity. 
What was not anticipated was that this very system may cause harm, and suggests that the 
balance may have tipped a little the other way. At least, this is how participants see it, and feeling 
this way, they feel diminished and powerless. The question about doctors’ personal moral 
legitimacy then becomes critical, and the value they place on themselves, and that is placed on 
them by others and the regulatory process, as worthy instead of being forever blameworthy, is a 
key to how they reconcile and recover. 
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Part One: 
Shaping the Profession 
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Introduction: History and Narrative Explanation 
By understanding the past we can better understand the present, and so we may ask what 
happened in history that shaped our current institutions, laws and regulations. We may also ask 
what shaped the way we as a society define and then deal with issues that concern us. For 
instance, we now accept that the public expects greater accountability and effective mechanisms 
for seeking redress for perceived and actual wrongs; this idea did not just appear, it developed out 
of a specific nexus of social, legal and professional actions. 
Chapter One will discuss the interrelationship of the law, its institutions and the medical profession. 
It seeks to identify and explain the factors that contributed to the demand for greater accountability 
by the profession, and how these factors resulted in institutional, regulatory and professional 
change from being the closed, self-regulating and autonomous profession of the past, to being 
subject to open scrutiny and public opinion. It is against this background that my study examines 
how the activities of the institutions that resulted from these changes impact on the individual 
practitioners who work within this regulatory environment (Mink, 1970, p. 544). 
This examination is not just a chronology of events. It identifies events that were significant as 
catalysts to the changes which are discussed in this chapter. This is presented in the form of a 
narrative aimed at examining how these events led to the changes that followed. As Polkinghorne 
states, “Narrative explanation….explains by clarifying the significance of events that have occurred 
on the basis of the outcome that has followed. In this sense, narrative explanation is retroactive.” 
(Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 21). 
This narrative highlights an underlying theme that identifies the contextual as well as the factual 
accounts of events, which Polkinghorne (1988) terms as “a process of emplotment”. He says: “By 
recounting the connections between events and actions that have led to a particular occurrence, 
the researcher arrives at an appropriate statement of the reasons for the event.” (Polkinghorne, 
1988, p. 174). Accordingly, the underlying theme, or plot, of this chapter is to identify why it was 
that the objectives of law and regulation moved over time from protection of the profession to 
protection of the public.  
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Chapter One: The Law and Medicine 
The law is a living thing, responsive to changing socio-political and economic needs, but also 
reactive to challenges brought before it. In the words of the Austrian legal scholar, Eugen Ehrlich, 
regarded as one of the founders of the field of sociology of the law: 
The investigation of the living law will of course render neither the historical nor the 
ethnological method superfluous; for we can learn the laws governing the development 
of society only by studying the historical and the prehistoric (ethnological) facts. But the 
historical and ethnological methods are indispensible, too, for the understanding of the 
state of the law of the present time. It is true we shall never understand the past but 
through the present; but the path to the understanding of the innermost nature of the 
present lies through the understanding of the past. Within every part of the present lies 
its entire past, which can be clearly discerned by the eye that is able to look into these 
depths. 
In order to understand the actual state of the law we must institute an investigation as 
to the contribution that is being made by society itself as well as by state law, and also 
as to the actual influence of the state upon social law. (Ehrlich, 1962, p. 504) 
Following this reasoning, the discussion of the law will be presented within a contextual framework 
that traces how events and societal factors have impacted on medicine as a profession and how 
the interconnection between law and medicine has effected these changes. Medicine grew as a 
profession enabled by the law, and with this growth came expectations from within the profession 
but also external to it. By setting itself up as an institution of exclusive expertise, knowledge and 
selectiveness, medicine developed great power and prestige (Freidson, 1970). Having both meant 
much was expected of it and of those who practise within it. Therefore, as the capabilities of 
medicine grew, so did the public’s expectations of what it could deliver. While law once existed to 
protect the profession, the pressures of the world outside of medicine to deliver its magic required 
the profession to become accountable, and here the law responded in the gradual shift of 
protection to that of the public. 
The fundamental issue here is that law does not stand alone, but is responsive to the society in 
which it exists. To understand the law, what created it and why, we need to understand the 
historical, social, political and economic circumstances in which new law comes into being, or for 
existing laws to be revised. In other words, there must have been a reason for laws to be 
introduced and later amended. 
The law is both responsive and reactive: in health care, it can respond to calls for greater 
safeguards when information is revealed relating to therapeutic goods, diagnostic tools, 
treatments, safety measures and accreditation standards by introducing legislation and new or 
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revised regulations. Or it can react when new events and challenges occur, such as laws of 
consent following civil proceedings1, or the passage of Health Care Complaints legislation in 19932 
in NSW following the inquiry in 1988-89 into Deep Sleep Therapy from 1963-1979 at the 
Chelmsford Private Hospital3. The law has not branched out on its own to dictate how medicine 
should function, but as Windeyer (in Jordens, Kerridge, & Selgelid, 2004) stated, “The law marches 
with medicine but in the rear and limping a little”. It comes along after in response or reaction to 
events, limping a little behind events that stimulate the need for action. 
Nor does the law achieve change on its own – as a living thing, it responds and reacts to what the 
community and governments deem to be important. As Amsterdam and Bruner (2000, p. 2) 
explain: “If law is to work for the people in a society, it must be (and must be seen to be) an 
extension or reflection of their culture”. It is part of society’s culture, but does not define it. Instead, 
it provides boundaries and protections by which society can flourish. 
As responsive in health care, law is protective of public safety by providing legitimate authority to 
institutions and practices, when for instance the existing authority is inadequate for dealing with 
actions that have threatened, or are likely to threaten, public safety. The Chelmsford Hospital 
inquiry, for example, determined that there was major deficiency that needed to be addressed 
before the underlying problem could be remedied: that of effectively dealing with infamous conduct 
in the practice of medicine. More will be said of this in the section The infamy of Harry Bailey to 
follow shortly that explains how an identified problem was examined and remedied for the safety of 
future patients. 
How Does the Law Do It? 
It is important to be mindful that not all human conduct is regulated by the law. Associations within 
society are kept in order, generally, by social norms which are the understood rules of conduct 
between people and groups, as well as by moral and ethical norms (Ehrlich, 1962). The law is 
responsive to situations where social and ethical norms are insufficient to deal with aspects of 
social behaviour and organisation. Where associations are part of the legal order, they will be 
regulated according to legal norms, and decisions will be made according to those legal norms. 
The rule of law is the basis of legal norms. “One of the most basic principles in the Australian legal 
system is the recognition of the rule of law” (Raz, 1977, in Kerridge, Lowe, & Stewart, 2013), 
defined as encompassing two features: 
 that all people (including the government) should be ruled by the law and obey it; and 
                                                          
1 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914): it was a judge, and not the profession, that 
determined the standard for valid consent.  
2 Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW) 
3 Judicial Inquiry into Chelmsford Report of the Royal Commission into Deep Sleep Therapy / The Honourable Mr 
Acting Justice J.P. Slattery, Royal Commissioner. New South Wales. Royal Commission into Deep Sleep Therapy (1991) 
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 that the law should be such that people should be able to be guided by it. 
The law is therefore both enabling, and protective. There are two main sources of law in Australia: 
the common law and legislation (Kerridge et al., 2013). Common law is what is derived from cases 
before the courts, in which judicial decisions become precedents for determining reasons for 
decisions in other cases that are substantially the same. Legislation consists of laws, or statutes, 
that are passed by Parliament, or through parliamentary delegation. 
What is the Public Good? 
The role of the governments of the Commonwealth, states and territories is to protect the public 
good. The law is responsive to the needs of society, and in respect to health care, it exists largely 
to protect the safety of the public. Throughout the law and associated regulations are the terms “in 
the public interest” or “the public good”. But it is not always clear what is meant by that. The 
question is: what is the public good, how is it determined, and who determines it? 
The public good, or the public interest, is not easily defined as it is seen as either representing the 
rights of individuals or the rights of the collective of individuals, the public. 
Former Deputy NSW Ombudsman Chris Wheeler (2006, p. 34) stated that it is “widely accepted 
that the ‘public interest’ can extend to certain private rights of individuals – rights that in many 
societies are regarded as being so important or fundamental that their protection is seen as being 
in the public interest, for example privacy, procedural fairness and the right to silence”. On the 
other hand, he noted that the common view is that “public interest” extends beyond the community 
as a whole. His own view was that “public interest must also be able to apply to the interests of 
groups, classes or sections of a population between those two ends of the spectrum” (Wheeler, 
2006, p. 34). A useful explanation comes from the Supreme Court of Victoria (1991) which said: 
[t]he public interest is a term embracing matters, among others, of standards of human 
conduct and of the functioning of government and government instrumentalities tacitly 
accepted and acknowledged to be for the good order of society and for the wellbeing of 
its members. The interest is therefore the interest of the public as distinct from the 
interest of an individual or individuals4. 
Johnston (2017) advises that the public interest should not be defined as “It has no overarching 
definition because it is contextually determined in scope and purpose”5, which means that “in any 
particular instance, political, legal and regulatory authorities make judgement calls. And what may 
                                                          
4 Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63 (at 75), per 
Kaye, Fullagar and Ormiston JJ. 
5 The Conversation, Johnston, J. Whose interests? Why defining the ‘public interest’ is such a challenge. September 22, 
2017 5.42am AEST. 
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be deemed in the public interest today may not be in a decade; it changes with social mores and 
values” (Johnston, 2017). 
The essential point is that the public interest is at the heart of much of our law and regulation, as a 
protective and enabling framework that guides not only the law but the administration of the law. As 
Wheeler (2006, p. 34) stated: 
Public officials have an overarching obligation to act in the public interest. They must 
perform their official functions and duties, and exercise any discretionary powers, in a 
way that promotes the public interest that is applicable to their official functions. 
From this statement, the onus of determining and protecting the public interest is on public officials. 
However, this relates to the administration of the law, not to its genesis. Does the government act 
in the public interest when drafting legislation? A statement made in a 1981 judgement of the High 
Court of Australia stated that “executive Government…acts, or is supposed to act… in the public 
interest”6. This does not mean, of course, that what is in the interest of executive government 
should automatically be considered to be in the public interest.7 
As this decision demonstrates, there may be times when governments determine that their own 
interests override the public interest, which raises another point: the government may not always 
be seen to represent the public’s interests. It is therefore important to understand who the public is, 
because it seems logical to see that the government, in representing the public, stands for the 
public. However, McKinlay and Marceau (2002) argue that sometimes the state does act 
independently to shape social behaviour, and increasingly this is on the ascendant, being shaped 
by the interests of an increasingly concentrated cluster of powerful institutions and individuals. By 
contrast, a pluralist perspective views governments as acting with neutrality, in the interests of all 
citizens, and is therefore representing the common good or public interest (McKinlay & Marceau, 
2002). 
The principle of universal health care is an example, where the public may want or demand free 
health care, but a government may determine that this is fiscally and/or ideologically unreasonable. 
It could then be surmised that, while the government has an overriding obligation to protect the 
public’s interest, it must balance this with a broader interest which is to govern prudentially by 
protecting the overarching interest of the economy. While some would deem this irrelevant 
because a healthy society demands a healthy, educated population, others do not share this same 
value. Politics, then, is a contest between the values held by different parties both within 
Parliament and in response to representations from external sectional interests to determine, and 
                                                          
6 Mason J in Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd & Ors (1981) ALJR 45 (at 49). 
7 This matter refers to the disclosure of confidential information, about which the defendant Fairfax contested the 
view that the documents contain confidential information and that disclosure would be prejudicial to the national 
interest. 
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act on, what they deem to be in the public interest. The outcome may not satisfy everyone. As I will 
examine a little later, when the public has a different view of its interest from what the legislators 
deem to be the public interest, this can cause significant disquiet. Disquiet can also occur when 
there is more than one public interest, that one segment of the public benefits at another’s 
expense. Jaffe (1976, p. 984) concludes that “the proper function of lawyers is to represent 
significant views that otherwise would go unrepresented in cases affecting the public welfare”. 
If we accept that the public interest extends beyond the rights and interests of the individual, then 
we should consider the role of Public Interest Law, for which Jaffe (1976) provides an explanation. 
He said this derived from a program introduced in USA in 1970 by the Ford Foundation, with the 
purpose of providing “representation of the unrepresented and underrepresented” (Jaffe, 1976, p. 
982). Although this may be appropriate, it could leave the individual with a sense that they are 
being overlooked in the interests of the greater good. How the legislation relating to complaints 
about health care was framed is a good, albeit vexed, example of this. A complaint will be 
investigated if it presents an issue that means the public is at risk, but it may do little to resolve the 
complainant’s grievance. This will be explained further as the thesis unfolds. 
Who is the Public? 
For the purposes of this study, I take the view that “the public”, who will be referred to many times 
throughout this thesis, is the community as a whole, made up of all the individuals within society. 
The community is not an homogeneous group however, being made up of a multitude of sectional 
and at times competing interests. But as health affects everyone, and health care is a service 
essential to the health of the community, the provision of health care is in the public interest. 
Being a sensitive issue for the community means that sometimes political parties are compelled to 
respond to the voice of the community, often represented by various sectional interests. Recent 
history in the past four or so decades demonstrated how the public’s interest in having safe health 
care became a political imperative to resolve when the public trust in government’s capacity to 
provide them with safe care was undermined by the exposure of various scandals. The public can 
become very agitated when they see that their interests are being neglected, damaged or 
betrayed, and so it is when the scandals are found to have been dealt with inadequately, or not at 
all, and fuelled by the media, the public can be unforgiving. McDonald’s (2012, p. 223) examination 
of how some public inquiries come about as a response to scandals explains that they are a way of 
restoring public trust: “If the public comes to believe that regulatory agencies are not sufficiently 
responsive to public scandals, regulators may lose public trust”, without which the regulators may 
lose their legitimacy. Scandals may then result in public inquiries, which may lead to 
recommendations for improved safety and risk minimisation, which may lead to regulatory change. 
The inquiries themselves will enhance the public’s perception of how adequately the regulatory 
mechanisms have been functioning, which will further question their trust. This may “create a 
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demand for greater controls to be imposed on the health professions” (McDonald, 2012, p. 224), 
and in some cases, I would add, on the regulatory authorities themselves. McDonald (2012) adds 
that inquiries into health-related matters directly or indirectly place the spotlight on health 
professionals, the health professions and the health professions regulators. 
The Voice of the Public 
This section focuses in on the public voice through examination of the case of Chelmsford Private 
Hospital in NSW in the period 1960s to 1980s, which saw an emerging scandal slowly played out 
over decades and grow into a crescendo of outrage. This divided the sectional interests of the 
public, the regulators, the watchdogs, Parliament and the medical profession, and finally compelled 
the government to call an inquiry, which led to significant changes in legislation, regulatory 
mechanisms, and greater control of the profession. 
This account provides an example of the political response to the public will, when trust in the 
government to provide safe care was at a critically low point. There have been numerous examples 
of scandals and other outrages that have driven the need for change, but the scandal of the 
Chelmsford Private Hospital was especially egregious. I have elected to discuss this, not for the 
horrors the story contains, but for the chain of events that became a catalyst for the introduction of 
protective legislation, greater government responsiveness to public opinion, and for the significant 
challenge to the traditional power and autonomy of the medical profession. How regulatory 
mechanisms were framed and subsequently structured in NSW to ensure greater accountability 
can be largely attributed to this event. The legislation and mechanisms that were introduced greatly 
influenced similar structures in the other states, and had international influence (Thomas, 2002b). 
What follows are the key aspects that highlight the deficiencies in the regulatory process that 
contributed to the continuing failure to adequately deal with the emerging crisis, and to the eventual 
actions that contributed to remedying these deficiencies. 
Chelmsford Private Hospital: The Infamy of Harry Bailey 
The psychiatrist Dr Harry Bailey took his own life in 1985, leaving a note that said: “Always 
remember that the forces of evil are greater than the forces of good. I always tried to be a good 
doctor, and I think perhaps I was”. Attached to the note was a list of all his degrees and 
qualifications (Anderson, 1991). The “deep sleep” treatment that he had introduced in 1963 had by 
1985 been “completely discredited”, and he was facing criminal charges (John, 1993). 
Dr Bailey thought he was a good doctor. Yet 25 people died under his care between 1963 and 
1979, 24 died by suicide within a year of treatment, and countless others were irreparably harmed. 
The youngest who died was only 14 years old. Together with his colleagues, Dr Bailey’s actions 
became the reason for holding a Royal Commission into Deep Sleep Therapy, conducted by 
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Justice John Slattery from 1988 to 1989. The 4 000 page report was published in December 1990, 
and the above note was published a month later in the New Scientist. 
Box One: Deep Sleep Therapy 
The treatment and its effects  
From 1963-1979 deep sleep therapy (DST) was administered to 1 127 patients for such conditions as 
depression, anorexia nervosa, stress, drug and alcohol addiction, neuroses and schizophrenia. It was 
not an unknown treatment, having been used internationally but then discarded as ineffective. What 
was unique about it was the combination and the high level of drugs administered, and by often 
undertrained or untrained staff (Hansard, 4 December 1991). 
 
Patients were administered a regime of sedative drugs to render them unconscious for an extended 
period of time, from several days to weeks. While sedated, patients were given electro-convulsive 
therapy (ECT). Dosages were increased and some almost doubled from the early 1970s. 
 
Patients were kept naked and some were tied to their beds to prevent falling out. Bodily excretions 
collected onto the sheets. 
 
The first deaths were recorded in 1964: five in that year and thereafter one to two per year. Risks 
included cardio-respiratory, cardio-vascular and neurological problems. Complications included 
infections, pneumonia and deep vein thrombosis, much attributable to being immobilised. Patients 
were often incontinent, suffered falls, had vomiting, skin breakdown and metabolic disturbance, and 
patients awoke with severe weakness, visual disturbance and hallucinations. 
 
The main characters were the psychiatrists Dr Harry Bailey, those who assisted with electro-convulsive 
treatment, Dr John Herron and Dr Ian Gardiner, and Dr John Gill who was a part-owner of Chelmsford. 
Drs Herron and Bailey stopped practising DST in 1979. 
 
The Story Emerges: When Action Could Have Prevented More Harm 
There were numerous opportunities for intervention by the authorities over the two-decade period 
till the Royal Commission commenced in 1988. These are summarised here. 
The coroner 
The first intervention by the state was in 1964, when an inquest was held into the death of a 
patient, certified by the Government Medical Officer (GMO) as being caused by a coronary 
occlusion. This was deemed by the Coroner as sufficient in spite of the baffling statement by the 
GMO that “there were no external signs of any poison having being taken”8, yet the stomach 
contents had not been examined. Justice Slattery opined that as this was the second DST death, 
“Had the coronial system performed properly at the time, it is likely that Health and the medical 
profession would have been alerted to the dangers of the treatment” (Slattery, 1990, p. 3). 
Publicity 
The first story published was in the Sydney Morning Herald on 9 November 1967, reporting a 
Coroner’s concerns about the amount of dangerous drugs that had been administered to 23-year-
old Ronald Carter, who died on 3 May 1967 while undergoing deep sleep treatment  (Walton 
2013). This had been preceded by a patient complaint in June 1967. 
                                                          
8 Extract from Coroner’s report, cited in Slattery, 1990 Vol. 7, p.3 
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NSW Health 
The 1967 complaint led the Private Health Care Branch of NSW Health to conduct an inspection of 
the hospital the following month. In spite of a report relating to the death of another patient that 
noted heavy barbiturate dosage, no expert opinion was obtained, and the report noted “No breach 
of regulations is apparent” (Slattery, 1990, (7), p. 4). A further complaint by a nurse about heavy 
sedation for 21 days and intravenous feeding was dismissed by the Director of State Psychiatric 
Services, regardless of his later admitting that DST had “scared the living daylights out of us” when 
it had been trialled at Parramatta Hospital in 1957 (Slattery, 1990, (7)). That there had already 
been numerous deaths was not correlated until years later when the Royal Commission pieced it 
all together. 
Doctors’ treatment was not to be questioned 
In 1973, a further inspection appeared to have been restricted to comments about the premises, 
such as the number of beds and labelling of bottles of drugs for patients, though there was no 
inquiry into the nature of the drugs themselves. The head of the Private Hospitals Branch 
explained at the Inquiry that their role was to ensure regulations concerning the premises were 
being complied with, but it was beyond their jurisdiction to question the treatment ordered by the 
psychiatrists. In short, treatment to private patients was seen as being “quite outside the ambit of 
Health’s responsibility” (Slattery, 1990, (7) p. 9). 
NSW Medical Board 
It was Thomas’ (2002a) view that the Medical Board, as the chief custodian of medical discipline, 
had responsibility for taking action against the Chelmsford doctors. However, interpretations of the 
descriptors for conduct at that time – “infamous conduct” or “misconduct in any professional 
respect” – were deemed not to apply to practice issues, meaning that the doctors were safe from 
being prosecuted for their actions, and “guaranteed the non-accountability of individual 
practitioners” (Thomas, 2002a, p. 239). 
Legal action 
A coronial inquiry in March 1982 into the death of a patient found cases of negligence against three 
of the doctors and referred the matter to the Attorney-General. Dr Bailey was indicted for 
manslaughter. Committal proceedings began in 1984, were completed in 1985, whereupon Dr 
Bailey was discharged because his actions did not meet the criteria for manslaughter. However, 
several more complaints were lodged against him in that year, and in September, he killed himself. 
Meanwhile, the matter had been discussed in Cabinet in August of that year, and although the 
suggestion for a Royal Commission was rejected, a sub-committee was formed to consider the 
issues. 
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Stirrings of change 
A former patient, the forthright Mr Barry Hart spoke of his experience to the media, and in 1976 he 
commenced civil proceedings against Dr Bailey and the hospital. 
The Minister for Health ordered an investigation in 1978 after departmental officers visited the 
hospital, following a complaint by a nurse that included secretly copied patient files. But “the 
investigation into Chelmsford from October 1978 to August 1980 was perfunctory” and the few 
superficial procedures were performed in a “grossly incompetent manner” (Slattery, 1990 (7), p. 
160). Meanwhile, politics had entered the fray as the public became increasingly concerned about 
the emerging stories. “Zombie Deaths Inquiry” headed a story in a Sydney paper on 24 September 
1978, following the above investigation. Responding to constituent representations about the 
mounting death toll and questionable coronial findings, a local branch of the Labor Party called for 
an inquiry in October 1979. 
In 1986, NSW Health formed an investigating committee which found sufficient cause to refer 
matters against Drs Gill and Herron to a Medical Tribunal, but they applied successfully to the 
NSW Court of Appeal for a stay9, on the grounds of prejudice to them because of the “appalling 
and inexcusable” delay. Action against Dr Gardiner was also stayed as he had retired and was 
said to be very ill. Dr Bailey had died the year before. 
Public disquiet was not stilled by this decision, and it was then that the Government bowed to 
public pressure by calling the Royal Commission, which commenced in September 1988. Among 
many other conclusions, it found that “Deep sleep therapy was an extremely dangerous treatment 
and was carried out with inadequate facilities, staff and equipment to deal with the risks. It was 
therapeutically ineffective.” (Slattery, 1990, (1), p. 219, 220). The judge took careful account of the 
historical context, noting that in the 1960s and 1970s, the public held doctors in high esteem, that 
they “were admired for their ethics, integrity and practice,” and that nurses held them in “awe, even 
fear”, rarely challenging a doctor’s decision or conduct (Slattery, 1990 (1), p. 236). Likewise, he 
held that the Health Department attitude assisted the continuation of the treatment, and the 
reticence to interfere with the treatment of a doctor’s private patients. It was these and other factors 
that enabled the three doctors to avoid scrutiny (Slattery, 1990, (1), p. 237). Along with several 
other recommendations to have come out of this inquiry, the authority of those who may have 
brought these issues to account was addressed by recommending an independent body to 
investigate and take action in response to complaints. The failure to have done so prior to these 
events caused the Justice grave concern, since many harms might have been avoided. 
                                                          
9 Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 
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After the report, further complaints alleged Drs Gardiner, Herron and Gill were guilty of professional 
misconduct, as defined by s.27(1) and (2) of the Medical Practitioners Act 1938 (NSW).10 An 
appeal to the High Court of Australia in 199311 was dismissed because so much more was now 
known because of the Royal Commission. A consideration of particular significance in their 
Honours’ deliberations was the public’s interest versus the doctors’ right to fairness. Having 
concluded that the doctors involved had been engaged in delivering “extremely dangerous 
treatment” which had harmed hundreds of patients and killed 24 of them, the Decision determined 
that the public’s interest would prevail. The Tribunal hearings then proceeded.12 
Public disquiet 
The Royal Commission had astonished the public and disquiet continued to brew. The public 
wanted such incidents to never happen again to others, and the patients wanted justice. The public 
campaign commenced in earnest when the story was aired on the TV show 60 Minutes in that 
year, exposing what they declared to be government inactivity. “What followed was a lamentable 
series of bungles by different parts of the bureaucracy, which ultimately led to the striking out, 11 
years later, of misconduct proceedings against the Chelmsford doctors because of this delay” 
(PIAC, undated).13 
The above words encapsulate the depth of outrage of the people of NSW, incredulous that this 
could happen in its day, not in the horror days of the former insane asylums. In 1983, a group 
calling themselves the Chelmsford Victims’ Action Group had lobbied noisily for an inquiry into the 
scandal, and supported by the Medical Consumers Association, they accused the NSW Health 
Department’s Complaints Unit of failing to act because, amongst other assertions, it was “too busy 
investigating matters such as contaminated goat’s milk”. 
What happened next 
Public unrest generated sufficient energy to threaten a government in power, and threatened the 
status quo of a comfortable medical profession that relished its position of power and prestige 
within the community and that did not wish to relinquish its self-regulatory, semi-autonomous 
status. The government in power was compelled to act, and finding the existing agencies to be 
lacking the authority they needed to take significant action, took the matter to Parliament to debate 
its draft bill to establish an independent statutory authority with the powers to investigate and 
                                                          
10 s.27 (1) refers to a lack of adequate knowledge, experience, skills, judgement and/or care in the practice of 
medicine;  
s.27 (2) refers to improper or unethical conduct relating to the practice of medicine 
11 Walton v Gardiner, Herron and Gill [1993] HCA 77; (1993) 112 ALR 289 
12 Walton v Gardiner, Herron and Gill [1993] HCA 77; (1993) 112 ALR 289: 39 
Estoppel: “the principle by which a person cannot assert something contrary to their previous statements or to a 
relevant judicial determination.” (Compact Oxford English Dictionary: Revised ed. 2003, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford and New York. It could not be asserted the issues were the same in the 1986 case as the 1993 case, so the 
reasons for granting the appeal to stay the proceedings against the doctors in 1986 did not apply in 1993.  
13 Public Interest Advocacy Centre broadsheet Deep sleep tragedy www.piac.asn.au/legal-help/public-interest 
cases/deep-sleep-tragedy (undated) 
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prosecute complaints about health care, as recommended by the Royal Commission. This was the 
first such legislation in Australia, and it was aimed at representing the public interest. 
This demonstrates how the law can be characterised as a reactive and responsive living thing, how 
the functions of government have operated in the past and how they will do so in the future, based 
on the remedies provided by new or revised laws in response to changing public circumstances 
and imperatives. 
The Inquiry had not only exposed the consequences of self-regulation; it had also identified what 
was required to expose the dangers of self-regulation when external scrutiny was not available, or 
was not pursued adequately, to compel individual doctors to be accountable for patient safety. The 
significance of this exposure for the medical profession was profound, in terms of the challenge to 
the profession’s powers and its autonomy, and its accountability beyond the profession but also to 
Parliament, to regulators and to the public. As McDonald (2012, p. 226) states, “The reports of 
public inquiries provide a narrative that informs public perceptions about whether self-regulation is 
effective or not”. 
Secondly, the Inquiry showed what was needed to overturn the limitations of existing regulatory 
provisions. Through the systematic scrutiny of the state health department and complaints body at 
the time, much was revealed about the effectiveness of regulatory procedures and the loss of trust 
and confidence in these provisions by the public. The Complaints Unit (CU) had been established 
in 1984 to address the burgeoning number of complaints being channelled through to the NSW 
Medical Board via its existing mechanism, the Investigating Committee, which had only limited 
powers to deal with cases relating to medical treatment. The Complaints Unit was to have 
overcome the deficiencies of existing mechanisms. Its initial functions were to deal with matters 
relating to fraud and over-servicing, and its staff included police to investigate these matters. In its 
first year there were 500 written complaints, the majority of these against doctors, two thirds of 
whom were in private practice (Thomas, 2002a). As the Chelmsford Inquiry later demonstrated, 
ensuring accountability of those in the private sector was problematic, given that the CU was 
established within the State government. With the Australian health system fragmented into State 
and Federal jurisdictions, the State government had little control over activities in the private 
sector. 
The Unit also lacked the independent statutory powers to fully investigate and deal with major 
threats to public safety, such as the serious misconduct of health professionals, and to effectively 
deal with the numerous systemic problems in health services. The passage of the 1987 Medical 
Practitioners’ Act gave the Unit greater power to investigate and refer matters directly to the 
Tribunal. There is no doubt that the Unit had much success in its years of operation. Under the 
previous system, between 1963 and 1972, just 13 cases in all were referred to a Medical Tribunal. 
By contrast, in 1988, the year after the Medical Practitioners Act had been passed, 15 cases were 
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sent to a Tribunal, and 12 to a Professional Standards Committee (PSC), which was a newly 
established mechanism convened by the NSW Medical Board to hear cases of lesser seriousness, 
with less serious consequences for doctors. They were held in camera, could impose conditions, a 
fine and/or a reprimand, but not suspend or de-register a doctor (Thomas, 2002a). However, after 
the complaints about Chelmsford burgeoned, the necessity to address the constraints on the Unit 
identified through the Commission of Inquiry resulted in the recommendation for an independent, 
statutory body with its own powers to investigate and prosecute complaints in all sectors (Thomas, 
2002a; Pierce, 2017; Donnelly, 1990). 
At the same time, the medical profession was feeling under threat from these steps towards 
greater accountability of doctors. In May 1984, Dr Lindsay Thompson declared “we remain a 
profession under siege” (Donnelly, 1990). The AMA, GPs and surgeons wanted the Unit 
terminated, or its powers limited, and so began a campaign that continued all the while and into the 
period of debate about the need for an independent statutory body, which was to become the 
Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC). Protests and fierce lobbying came from all sides. 
Chelmsford victim Barry Hart’s fight for reasonable compensation for the harm he had endured 
became the focus of the controversy about the purpose and functions of the proposed HCCC. 
Many, supported by consumer activist groups, cried out for an advocacy function, to fight for just 
compensation. Others wanted it to be solely for resolution of their personal grievances, while the 
Unit itself and various public interest groups, whose collective voice was heard through the Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre, lobbied in favour of a body that represented the public interest, not as a 
personal advocacy service. On the third attempt to pass the Bill, which by then had seen numerous 
amendments aimed at appeasing the various interest groups, it was passed by a single vote in 
1993. 
The early days of the new HCCC saw continued wrestling as the new powers began to take effect. 
From the consumers’ perspective, many were not happy with what the HCCC could deliver. Yet it 
was a body established for the public interest, and complaints were a window into what was wrong 
with health services. Trust in the organisation was problematic to foster, and the HCCC has 
remained under intense scrutiny for the decades since then. 
These decades also saw a continuing sequence of events that have tested the authorities’ capacity 
to deal with public safety, and to test the public’s trust, and that continued to demonstrate very 
clearly why regulation of health care is both necessary and expected. The next section shows that 
parallels with the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, are more than a coincidence. The demand for 
greater accountability, and the responsiveness to this expectation by governments and their 
administrations were the common themes for this same period. Not only were there stand-out 
events that occurred, but there was the common backdrop of emerging knowledge about the 
quantum of iatrogenic harms in hospitals throughout the western world. The other backdrop was 
the contemporary rise in consumerism (the rights to have, the right to be heard and the availability 
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of mechanisms for complaint and redress), and the media’s thirst for reporting on contentious 
issues and for amplifying public opinion. The “closed shop” of medicine was having its doors 
opened. 
Chelmsford Was Not the Only Turning Point 
In England, the Bristol Infirmary incident in the late 1980s to early 1990s represented a significant 
turning point in England because it not only led to a major inquiry into the events, it also challenged 
the very heart of the “closed shop” of the medical establishment by exposing the individual 
culpability of the practitioners involved. Exposure had relied on the whistle-blower anaesthetist Dr 
Stephen Bolsin, who was so pilloried for his betrayal that he resigned and moved to Australia. 
There have been many other serious incidents in UK, particularly the mid-Staffordshire Hospital 
scandal14, but as with Chelmsford, Bristol was a new revelation, and the implication for shaking up 
the medical establishment was immense. A week after three doctors at the centre of these events 
had been found guilty of serious professional misconduct, the British Medical Journal’’s Editorial 
declared that the judgement would probably prove much more important to the future of health 
care in Britain than reforms initiated through Parliament. While reform was generally slow to take 
hold in practice, “the Bristol case is a once in a lifetime drama that has held the attention of doctors 
and patients in a way that a white paper can never hope to match” (Smith, 1998, p. 1917). The 
case was described as a tragedy “Shakespearean in its scale and structure”, at the heart of which 
was the trust that patients place in their doctors. The GMC's president, Sir Donald Irvine, told the 
three doctors at the heart of the scandal that: 
A parent placing a child in a doctor's care must have confidence that the doctor will put 
the child's best interests before any other. A doctor who fails to live up to that 
expectation will seriously undermine not only his or her relationship with that particular 
patient or parents, but the confidence of all patients in doctors (Dyer, 1998, p. 7149). 
Events of similar consequence have taken place elsewhere that have become the catalyst for 
major change. In New Zealand, an Inquiry conducted by Justice Silvia Cartwright (the Cartwright 
Report) in 1988 followed a government inquiry into an “unfortunate experiment” (so-named by 
Professor David Skegg in a letter to the NZ Medical Journal in 1986) at the National Women’s 
Hospital. The gynaecologist Dr Herbert Green had followed the progress of women with carcinoma 
in situ (CIS) of the cervix, aiming to find if CIS inevitably developed into invasive cervical cancer. 
But the 100 or so women involved in this study received no treatment in order to attain this end, 
                                                          
14 The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust came under significant criticism for its failures to deliver acceptable standards of 
care to patients, favouring instead to meet business targets, achieve financial balance and to seek foundation trust 
status. Patients were at risk and medical and nursing staff had poor morale. Even when concerns were coming to light 
and an investigation commenced, no intervention was initiated until after the investigation was complete. A public 
inquiry chaired by Robert Francis QC made numerous recommendations, from the: Report of the Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry February 2013. www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com 
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leading to the deaths of several of them. Other allegations were uncovered by the Inquiry, including 
vaginal examinations conducted for teaching purposes while the women were under anaesthesia 
for other reasons, and smears taken from baby girls, all without knowledge or consent of the 
patients (or their parents) (Paterson, 2012). 
The outcome of the Cartwright Report was the passage of the Health and Disability Commissioner 
Act 1994, whose aim was to “promote and protect the rights of health consumers and disability 
services consumers” 15 (from Preamble to the Act), and the appointment of a Commissioner. As 
with the experience of NSW, many doctors saw this as “an unacceptable intrusion by the state into 
the practice of medicine” (Thomas, 2002b, p. 88). 
Significance 
When political sensitivities are touched by events that arouse public outrage, and when existing 
authority is insufficient to deal with deficiencies, legal remedies are employed to resolve the fall-
out. A decade after Chelmsford, the HCCC was itself under scrutiny. An investigation by HCCC 
into allegations by nurses about conduct at the Camden/Campbelltown Hospitals in 2002 made 
numerous recommendations about systems issues (Dunbar, Reddy, Beresford, Ramsey & Lord, 
2007). Dissatisfaction with this outcome resulted in the Minister requesting a Special Commission 
of Inquiry into Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals (the Walker Inquiry), to be conducted by Bret 
Walker SC, to inquire into allegations of unsafe care at the hospitals, into the investigation by the 
HCCC and into the death of a baby. The HCCC investigation was found to have breached its 
statutory requirements to inquire into the conduct of named individual practitioners (Faunce & 
Bolsin, 2004; Wade, 2017).16 
The Inquiry led to the sacking of some senior administrators at the hospitals and the former HCCC 
Commissioner, and the appointment of a District Court judge as acting Commissioner. The final 
report17 dated 30 July 2004 led to strengthening the obligation of the HCCC to ensure 
accountability of individual health practitioners, by passage of amendments to the HCC Act. In 
addition, thirty doctors and nurses were referred to the HCCC for investigation and disciplinary 
action under the oversight of the new Acting Commissioner. 
This incident was not without major criticism, because of the reactiveness of the incident. Retired 
surgeon Tom Hugh pointed out the paradox of the same minister (The Hon. Craig Knowles) having 
demanded this action, yet also having established the Clinical Excellence Commission (CEC) just 
two years before, whose role was to examine systemic issues. He said the success of CEC in 
bringing about systems change had now been jeopardised by the punitive actions of the Inquiry, 
                                                          
15 Preamble, Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 (New Zealand). Note unlike NSW equivalent legislation, this 
Act allows for the establishment of a Consumer Advocacy Service. 
16 Wade, M., Senior Associate, Tresscocks Lawyers, (undated) The Walker Inquiry. FindLaw Australia. 
17 Final Report of Special Commission of Inquiry into Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals; NSW Government, Special 
Commission of Inquiry, 2004. 
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leaving staff demoralised and anxious about “Walker-style inquiries”, and anger in the community 
intense (Hugh, 2004). 
Further commentary by Dunbar, Reddy, Beresford, Ramsey and Lord (2007) reflected on the 
aftermath, following interviews with people directly involved with this and three other inquiries in 
different hospitals. In each case, clinical concerns raised by staff had not been appropriately or 
adequately handled, resulting in concerned staff acting as whistle-blowers escalating their 
complaints to the authorities. Public inquiries resulted in recommendations to improve public 
safety, senior administrators were called to account, and regulatory mechanisms were revised and 
restructured (Dunbar et al., 2007). Themes observed by the authors emerging from these inquiries 
were the loss of trust in management and among clinical colleagues, and loss of trust from patients 
and the community. Although the inquiries may have resulted in constructive change by revealing 
the critical problems within the health system, the demoralisation and fear that this generated were 
said to be counterproductive in protecting public safety. 
Scandals, Doctors and Trust 
Loss of trust in regulators has pervaded the past decades, not only because of these inquiries. 
Alleged failures to deal with individual doctors who had stepped over the line of unprofessional 
conduct have reinforced the public’s opinion that the profession looks after its own, that the 
regulators and doctors cannot be trusted, and that the public is not safe. The following examples 
demonstrate the complexities of “bringing to heel” some of the more notorious characters who 
have both fascinated and appalled public sentiment in recent Australian medical history. What they 
also show is that in spite of the regulatory changes brought about following Chelmsford, there 
continued to be gaps in jurisdictional and regulatory capacity to assure the public of its safety. Out 
of several candidates whose cases could just as aptly have fitted the “notorious character” 
depiction, I have selected the former Dr Graeme Reeves, obstetrician and gynaecologist, and Dr 
Jayant Patel, general surgeon, whose notoriety extends beyond Australia to USA whence he 
came, and to which he was unceremoniously returned. 
Dr Reeves 
Dr Reeves had been found guilty by a Professional Standards Committee (PSC) of serious 
misconduct in 1997, and was no longer allowed to practise obstetrics. As a PSC was not open to 
the public, these facts remained confidential. He subsequently moved to Bega on the south coast 
of NSW and was employed by Bega Hospital as a specialist obstetrician and gynaecologist. The 
scandal came to light in 2008 when he was charged with aggravated sexual assault, indecent 
assault of several patients (grievous bodily harm and genital mutilation) during obstetric and 
gynaecological procedures. He was found to have lied on his application for employment at Bega 
Hospital that he had no conditions on his practice. He was also found guilty of Medicare fraud 
offences, and guilty of two of five assault charges. In 2013, he was charged with manslaughter 
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following the death of a patient in 1996, and found guilty of negligence in 2017 in that it was found 
he did contribute to the woman’s death, but it did not amount to “gross criminal negligence” on 
which a manslaughter finding could be made, or that would require criminal punishment. There 
were dozens of other cases that never went to hearing, so justice for the patients involved in these 
was not served. But he could no longer harm any patients (Wells, 2018). 
The major issue was that Dr Reeves had been able to practise obstetrics and cause much harm, 
after he had been prevented from doing so. An inquiry, conducted by Peter Garling SC into acute 
care in NSW in 2008 included this very question in its brief. Garling was reassured that some of the 
deficiencies in the regulatory system were to be covered by the 2008 amendment to the Medical 
Practice Act which was to introduce mandatory reporting. This would place the onus on health 
practitioners and others to report those practitioners who were believed to be a risk to the public18. 
The Minister, The Hon. Reba Meagher (in Jackson & Parker, 2009), said in a media release of the 
report (the Garling Report) that this would restore trust: she argued that in spite of the current Code 
of Professional Conduct that included a professional and ethical obligation for doctors to report 
others, there remained “the public perception of a ‘closed shop’ culture and of a profession that 
protects its own”19. Jackson and Parker (2009, p. 37) noted the considerable media interest at that 
time about the “abhorrent cover-up”20, of which they said “the public outcry is highly likely to have 
strongly influenced the government’s decision to respond with legislation.” 
The NSW Medical Board had to account for its failure to follow up on the conditions that prevented 
Dr Reeves from practising obstetrics. The Southern Area Health Service was required to account 
for why it had failed to check the veracity of his employment application in 2002. He was struck off 
the register in 2004 for breaching the order that he not practise obstetrics. Thereafter, it has been a 
requirement in medical recruitment to check the credentials of an applicant. A similar failure 
occurred in the case of Dr Jayent Patel in Queensland, discussed below. 
Here was an example of the reactiveness of regulatory authorities when existing mechanisms were 
inadequate, or were applied inadequately, to serve the public interest. “The Reeves saga and 
consequent events leading to this legislation (mandatory reporting) illustrate how not only individual 
                                                          
18 Medical Practice Amendment Act 2008 (NSW), which amended the Medical Practice Act 1992 (NSW). s71a stated: 
(1) A registered medical practitioner commits reportable misconduct in the following circumstances: 
(a) if he or she practises medicine while intoxicated by drugs (whether lawfully or unlawfully administered) or alcohol, 
(b) if he or she practises medicine in a manner that constitutes a flagrant departure from accepted standards of 
professional practice or competence and risks harm to some other person, 
(c) if he or she engages in sexual misconduct in connection with the practice of medicine. 
(2) A registered medical practitioner who believes, or ought reasonably to believe, that some other registered medical 
practitioner has committed reportable misconduct must, as soon as practicable, report the conduct to the Board. 
Note: Pursuant to sections 36(1)(b) and 37, failure to comply with this section will constitute either unsatisfactory 
professional conduct or professional misconduct. 
19 Reba Meagher, NSW Minister for Health, “Landmark Legislation to Deal with Misconduct by Doctors”: Media release 
7 May 2008: quoted in Jackson, K. and Parker, M. (2009), All steam ahead on the SS “External regulator”? JLM, 29(17), 
34. 
20 Sunday Telegraph 16 March 2008. 
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practitioners, but also the health system, can fail patients, and how politicians may respond to 
public outcry for action” (Jackson & Parker, 2009, p. 35). In response to the focus on doctors, The 
Australian Doctors’ Fund declared that “no other health profession will carry this obligation” and 
claimed that doctors were effectively being made scapegoats for administrative and systemic 
health failures in New South Wales (Jackson & Parker, 2009, p. 35). 
The matter of Dr Jayant Patel echoes similar issues, demonstrating that although such flagrant 
cases are rare, they continue to cause dismay21. Dr Patel was employed by Queensland Health 
from the USA to take up a position as surgeon in the regional town of Bundaberg on the north 
coast of Queensland. After a growing list of dead or catastrophically injured patients, and talk of 
staff hiding patients from him, a whistle-blower went to a Member of Parliament after the local 
administration refused to investigate. The furore that followed the disclosure caused an enraged Dr 
Patel to resign and return to the USA. The medical director of the hospital finally checked Patel’s 
history, and a simple Google search found he had been disbarred for incompetence in the USA. 
The scandal had broken, and the whole saga played out over years, and finally, Dr Patel was 
returned to Australia to face charges of manslaughter. 
Two inquiries were conducted into this matter. The Morris Inquiry was dismissed due to perceived 
bias. The Queensland Public Hospitals’ Commission of Inquiry (the Davies inquiry)22 was 
conducted between September and November 2005. The inquiry found that more than 20 
complaints by staff had been ignored by the hospital administration, which declared the complaints 
were “unjustified and largely personality driven… when they raised genuine and concerning 
medical issues” (Davies Inquiry 2005, 3.427(i)). An investigation in 2010 after the inquiry found Dr 
Patel guilty of three charges of manslaughter and one count of grievous bodily harm and 
sentenced to seven years’ gaol. But following an appeal to the High Court in 2012, the convictions 
were quashed and in a retrial, Dr Patel was acquitted of one of the manslaughter charges. There 
followed a plea deal relating to penalties for the fraud charges, and the remaining charges were 
dropped. He was de-registered in May 2015, and after the trial he returned to the USA. 
The scandal engulfed others. Adverse findings were made against the Director of Medical Services 
at Bundaberg Base Hospital for multiple failures to check the credentialing and privileging of Dr 
Patel and for failing to appropriately act on complaints. It was believed that had he acted in a timely 
way, many of the deaths and complications would have been avoided (Davies, 2005, p. 192). The 
fallout continued to plague the Queensland Medical Board, which the Davies Inquiry ruled 
incompetent for its failures in allowing overseas trained doctors, such as Patel, to practise in 
                                                          
21 At the time of writing, an inquiry is under way into the four hospitals where the repeated instances of proven 
professional misconduct occurred, of former obstetrician and gynaecologist Emil Gayed, de-registered on 6 June 2018 
by the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal. 
22 The Queensland Public Hospitals’ Commission of Inquiry, September to November 2005, and transcript of 
proceedings, 29 May 2008 (The Davies Inquiry) 
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Queensland without meeting the Australian standards. In particular, it had failed to inquire further 
into Patel’s history, which he had lied about on his application form (Thomas, 2007, p. 406). 
What It Means 
The spotlight through this sequence of events has been on: (a) the adequacy of existing regulatory 
bodies to maintain standards of care, to protect public safety and to deal with those practitioners 
whose notoriety caused shame and embarrassment, to restore trust that had been betrayed by 
these alleged deficiencies; and: (b) the health professions, mostly nurses and doctors, and most 
particularly, doctors. It was clear from the cases I have outlined as they were examples of 
misconduct of a most serious and egregious kind. But as will be shown in Chapter Three, most 
health practitioners are not like this, and most adverse events in health care are not due to 
negligence, incompetence or wanton neglect. But clearly, there has been sufficient concern that 
public safety has been a challenge to protect, and regulatory mechanisms have been shown to 
have their shortcomings. The impact for the medical profession was that its power had suffered a 
critical blow, and where once the law came into existence to protect the profession, it now existed 
to protect the public. 
The other aspect, alluded to by the fallout from the Walker inquiry into Camden/Campbelltown, was 
the demoralisation and fear generated from these inquiries that speaking up in a blaming culture 
could be counter-productive to patient safety. The spotlight on the professionals was beginning to 
have its effects on those professionals, and not always in a constructive way. For Toni Hoffman, 
the nurse in the Patel case, being a whistle-blower nearly destroyed her, but when found to have 
been vindicated, she was rewarded for her diligence. But the law suit that followed was an 
expensive lesson for the government (Thomas, 2007). 
Taking a step back, we will now return to the origins of the profession, and trace its rise through to 
the levelling that the above accounts allude to, which coincided with other revelations and changes 
happening in the wider society, such as the exposure of the quantum of adverse events in 
hospitals, rising consumerism and a rights-based culture, together with the demand for 
accountability from all institutions. 
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Chapter Two: Shaping the Profession 
Medicine, Professionalism and the Law 
This chapter traces the beginnings of the modern medical profession. It does not delve into the 
practice of medicine itself, much as this is intriguing, given the questions around what medicine is, 
why it selected certain aspects of what we now know as medical practice, and not others. An 
excellent account that explores these questions can be found in the work of David Thomas, in his 
2002 doctoral thesis and subsequent publications (Thomas, 2002a). 
This chapter explores how medicine emerged as a legitimated profession with exclusive 
membership and knowledge, autonomy and self-regulation. This process of professionalisation is 
presented in the context of the historical, social and political period in which other professions were 
likewise emerging with similar authority, such as law, dentistry, and civil administration. As was 
presented in the introduction to Part One, changes take place for a reason. This account considers 
why certain events took on such significance that they became the catalysts for change, and what 
enabled such changes to occur. In considering these changes, we will consider the role of law in 
the creation of the modern profession of medicine, and how it was that it was established as a 
profession of privilege, exclusivity, self-regulation and autonomy. 
The events and their consequences presented in Chapter One could not have been envisaged in 
the early days of the profession and in the laws established then to protect the profession. 
Subsequent events, a changing political environment and a society whose expectations and values 
had substantially changed to demand greater accountability, safety, and protection of its rights, 
compelled the profession to adapt through the introduction of measures that now exist to protect 
the public. This chapter will lead into an examination of what professionalism, and these regulatory 
mechanisms, mean for practising doctors, in respect of what is expected of them in terms of 
professional conduct and performance and how this impacts on the medical identity. 
A Little History: The Professionalisation of Medicine 
The professionalisation of medicine occurred over time in response to and in the context of the 
contemporary structural, political and social environment, and in relation to other professions 
including other healing professions (Abbott, 1988). Abbott (1988) states that we should not be 
studying the history of the medical profession per se, but the work of medicine itself and how the 
work came to be defined, by whom, what structures enabled it, what intentions motivated those 
who practised it, and what determined how it should move ahead. 
Historical accounts of the trend towards professionalism, therefore, must take account of the wider 
context: why this trend arose; the influences that saw the practice of medicine distinguish itself 
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from other healing crafts that existed at the time when other significant societal changes were 
occurring. Professionalisation is responsive to external influences such as structural, social, 
economic, and political imperatives, as well as internal forces such as evolving medical knowledge 
and technology, and changing moral values within the profession. 
Influences on an Evolving Profession 
The regulatory changes that accompanied these influences to enable the professionalisation of 
medicine have had far-reaching consequences for the structure of health service provision, the 
working life of the doctor, the law and its many regulatory controls and enablers. These changes 
saw the move from guilds that protected the surgeons, physicians and apothecaries, to the 
creation of a legitimated “profession” and its existence as a semi-autonomous, self-regulated body, 
to the challenges to its status as a so-called closed shop that looked after its own, to the 
introduction of mechanisms for greater accountability in recent decades that meant the public 
became more aware of how their health system was performing. 
Such developments coincided with the rise in consumerism, commercialisation of medicine, the 
growing trend towards libertarianism and the awareness of individual rights and egalitarianism – 
what some get, we all should get, with the media having played a significant role in informing the 
community what is available. In addition, the quality and safety movement that entered the picture 
in the 1980s to ‘90s after revelations of the scale of adverse events in hospitals pointed to a health 
care system in USA, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and elsewhere that had serious 
deficiencies and had to do better in order to sustain the public’s trust that their health care would 
be safe. For instance, the Harvard Medical Practice study of late 1980s to 1990s showed that 
adverse events occurred in nearly 4% of hospital admissions, most of which were found to have 
been preventable. Nearly 14% had resulted in a death, and 2.6% resulted in a permanent disability 
(Brennan et al., 1991). The results were alarming, and the report recommended significant 
changes. Yet after a decade there was little improvement, as a 1997 study in Colorado and Utah 
showed, estimating that 44,000 people died each year because of medical errors, the costs of 
adverse outcomes were between $17 and $29 billion, with over 50% of this in additional care and 
treatment, as well as loss of employability of patients. “Errors are also costly in terms of loss of 
trust in the system by patients and diminished satisfaction by both patients and health 
professionals” (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, 2000, p. 2). 
Comparable statistics that generated similar alarm were released in Australia, followed by reports 
in other countries. The Quality in Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS) by Wilson, Runciman and 
Gibberd (1995) found 16.6% of hospital admissions were associated with an adverse event, of 
which 51.2% were considered to have been preventable. This study differed from the Harvard 
study in that it focused on the preventability of error, and this approach was replicated in other 
countries including New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, Denmark and the United Kingdom, showing a 
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consistent rate of about 10% of admissions being associated with an adverse event (Hamilton, 
2014). 
Three key observations arise from such revelations: (1) that “systems issues” contributed 
significantly to errors, requiring systematic analysis of adverse events and near misses to be 
undertaken in order to reveal the true cause of errors; (2) individual practitioners shared 
responsibility for errors and needed to be more accountable; and (3) the regulators needed to be 
more vigilant in identifying practitioners whose performance was below standard and in taking 
appropriate action to remedy sub-standard conduct and performance, as well as collecting and 
acting on data about injuries, deaths and other harms. 
While these studies focused on what happens in hospitals, the principles are applicable in private 
practice and other health care facilities. Individual practitioners may find themselves needing to 
account for an adverse event whose contributory factors are inherent systems failures or 
procedural gaps in their practice23. 
Looming Fears, Shifting Power 
The quantum of errors and mistakes became public knowledge from the 1980s onwards. Those 
doctors who had been identified and singled out for disciplinary action were frequently reported on 
in the public media, particularly those whose conduct was at the upper end of outrage. The public 
was becoming more intolerant of a system seemingly beset by the indolence of “the authorities” to 
allay their fears of risk. Protection of the public became the primary objective of the new regulatory 
environment. The entry of the law and regulation into the profession of medicine, once mainly 
protective and enabling of the profession, had now become protective of the public. The message 
was clear that the public was at risk and the system could not be trusted. That there were new 
mechanisms to express one’s dissatisfaction, such as the HCCC, added to the view that the public 
expected better and that the system should become so. This represented a significant shift in 
power away from the profession to the interests of the public, enabled through the authority 
provided by legislation and tougher regulation, as well as greater use of tort law to remedy wrongs. 
The Health Industry Adjusts to Pressure 
The past two decades have also seen changes in the structure of the health industry, two of which 
have significantly impacted on the medical profession. These changes related to greater protection 
not only of the public, but of the industry itself. By the end of 2000, it was becoming clear that the 
costs of indemnity through defence of lawsuits and compensation payouts were escalating. The 
                                                          
23 Kite v Malycha [1998] 71 SASR 321 was an example of a doctor not receiving a cytology report from a pathology 
laboratory after a patient’s needle biopsy. Dr Malycha had arranged for the patient to ring him for the results; she did 
not ring or attend the follow-up appointment, but as he did not have a system in place in the practice to ensure he 
followed her up, he had breached his duty of care and was found negligent. (Skene, L. (2014) Legal issues when a 
doctor’s relationship with a “difficult” patient breaks down. MJA, 201 (6).) 
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Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council’s (AHMAC) report of 200224 found an overall 
significant increase in the payouts for large claims as well as increased costs for all claims. In the 
previous year, the Simpson vs Diamond case had concluded with a $14.2m damages order to the 
patient Calandre Simpson, whose birth had been “botched” by Dr Diamond some twenty years 
previously, leaving her with life-long disabilities25. 
This case, together with the collapse of HIH Insurance26 and the realisation that the indemnity 
industry was unsustainable as it had made insufficient provision for future claims, especially if they 
were to be in the magnitude of Ms Simpson’s, meant a big shake-up was essential. This resulted in 
the consequent transition from mutual, discretionary organisations to insurers subject to prudential 
regulation of the industry in 200127. 
One could argue that these prudential changes contributed to the professionalisation of the entire 
industry, providing better protections for all parties but also bringing the medical indemnity industry 
into a less club-like, mutual world and into the modern, commercial world of insurance. The other 
consequence was that it tied the profession more closely to government, for without the 
arrangement by the Commonwealth at that time to enable United Medical Protection (UMP) to 
come out of voluntary administration and therefore to save the viability of the medical profession, 
this would have certainly been a catastrophe. 
The other step that was taken was Tort Law reform, including the passage of the 2002 Civil 
Liability Act, which included caps on damages for loss of earning capacity and for “reasonable and 
necessary” care. In addition, in NSW the Health Care Liability Act 2001 No. 42 restricted amounts 
payable for non-economic loss, required all medical practitioners to have indemnity insurance as a 
                                                          
24 AHMAC (2002) Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council (AHMAC) Legal Reform Group report Responding to the 
Medical Indemnity Crisis: An Integrated Reform Package. Department of Health and Community Care, Australian 
Capital Territory http://www.health.act.gov.au/c/health?a=da&did=10011741&pid=1054039339. 
 
25 Simpson v Diamond & Anor [2001] NSWSC925 
 
26 After the destruction of the WTC on 11 September 2001, reinsurance rates worldwide were significantly increased; 
the costs to medical defence organisations also increased significantly through the reinsurance of their risks, which 
meant a rise in indemnity insurance premiums. The collapse of the insurance company HIH in Australia in 2001, and 
declining investment returns which had till then subsidised premiums charged, meant there were insufficient funds to 
keep the industry afloat and ensure sufficient future potential costs could be covered. (Luntz, H. (2003) Guest 
editorial: Medical Indemnity and Tort Law Reform. Journal of Law and Medicine, vol. 10. 
27 In 2003, the former mutual medical defence organisation, UNITED Medical Protection (UMP), when facing financial 
catastrophe because of the failure to provide for future indemnity costs, struck a deal with the Commonwealth to 
underwrite high cost claims in return for the industry being required to comply with prudential requirements under 
the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA). The company became an insurance company, and all doctors in 
Australia were then required to have medical indemnity insurance in order to be registered to practise. This was a 
protection for the entire health industry; without indemnified, registered doctors, the health service industry would 
have been unviable, and without indemnity, individual doctors would face financial ruin without the protection of 
their indemnity insurer. There remains to this day a residual fear that a doctor’s financial security – their assets – 
would be lost if they were successfully sued. However, by being indemnified, this is so unlikely except in cases of gross 
breach of the conditions of their insurance, such as criminal conduct. 
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condition of their registration, and indemnity insurers to have risk management and quality 
improvement activities to contain premium costs. 
The Surveillance Society 
It is certainly the case that a series of high-profile medical malpractice cases and cover-ups 
have affirmed the need to reform how medicine as a profession is regulated. As a result, over 
the last two decades or so, there has been a gradual shift in how medical governance is 
practiced (Chamberlain, 2013, p. 2). 
Alongside these developments, all of which have significantly impacted on the medical profession, 
are the governance arrangements that accompanied these changes. Certainly, the events that 
followed Chelmsford saw the establishment of tighter regulatory mechanisms to compel the 
profession to be more accountable. Chamberlain notes the need to recognise how such reforms 
are bound up with broader changes in governance in society, which is “increasingly subject to 
patient-consumerist and managerial-bureaucratic forms of surveillance and control” (Chamberlain, 
2013, p. 2). As an example, he points to the performance appraisal mechanisms in state-appointed 
agencies, such as the National Health Service hospital management. 
The Beginnings of the Modern Profession of Medicine 
The early days of Western medicine commenced in ancient Greece, and the following centuries of 
practice were characterised by inconsistent and unregulated training that was confined to certain 
elites. Legal protection and control of the practice of medicine could be traced back to the days of 
Henry VIII. As King of Britain, he took overall responsibility for the safety of his subjects, and it was 
he who demanded greater order in medical practice. He instigated the Medical Act in 1511-12, 
which opened with the preamble: 
Physic and Surgery is daily within this realm exercised by a great multitude of ignorant 
persons as common artificers, smiths, weavers and women who boldly and customably 
take upon them great cures and things of great difficulty in the which they partly use 
sorcery and witchcraft to the grievous hurt, damage, and destruction of many of the 
King’s liege people. 
The professional body of medical practitioners, the Royal College of Physicians, was established 
soon after in 1523, and was responsible to the King. The College held that it was an offence to 
practise “physic” or surgery without a licence, although the obtaining of such was questionable 
(Cartwright, 1997). 
The foundations of the practice of modern medicine from the nineteenth century were traced by 
Abbott (1988) as attributed to other changes in society: (i) industrialisation, and with it the rapid 
increase in scientific and technological knowledge, demographic shifts, a changing workforce 
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profile, and improvements in public health; (ii) political changes brought about by the increasing 
secularisation of the state and its institutions, the democratisation of government and the 
foundations of parliamentary processes and proceedings, and a growing awareness of people’s 
rights; (iii) philosophical debate and influence – the appeal of nineteenth century utilitarianism and 
scientific answers to life’s tribulations contributed to the diminishing relevance of religion; and (iv) 
access to education resulting in a more educated population as a right and as a need for the 
advanced skills for the expanding bureaucracy and administrations, and for complex industrial and 
scientific development. Importantly for the professions, the sectional interests of the trades and 
occupations, being increasingly protected by the guilds, unions and the rise of professionalism 
amongst the highly skilled professions, saw the rise of societies and associations to protect the 
interests of these professions, supported by the law. 
Primary amongst the latter was the rise of medicine as a defined, exclusive profession whose 
access to specialised knowledge was fiercely protected through restricted recruitment, prolonged 
and advanced training, and special privileges of decision-making power, remuneration and high 
status. It was not an easy rise to glory, as other health professionals fought for similar recognition 
and power. In fact, in Great Britain, “medicine” itself did not represent a cohesive body of 
practitioners: apothecaries were the dispensers of medicine; surgery was a trade until the late 
eighteenth century when the Royal College of Surgeons was founded; and physicians were the 
“real” doctors whose professional body, the Royal College of Physicians, was founded in Great 
Britain in the sixteenth century. After decades of wrangling, these three coalesced under the first 
Medical Act of 1858, although the apothecaries had rejected the chemists in the process (Abbott, 
1988). 
This could be said to be the beginning of the modern profession of medicine. The process of 
working out which bodies were to be included demonstrated how the process of becoming a 
profession involved not only a claiming of the knowledge and content but determining which 
jurisdiction each body of knowledge was to be controlled by. 
Medicine was a particularly powerful jurisdiction because it laid claim to many areas of health care 
traditionally performed by others. For instance, control over childbirth by obstetricians in the 
nineteenth century was largely wrested from midwives because only medical practitioners could 
prescribe early forms of analgesic pain relief, chloroform, which made heavy sedation and general 
anaesthesia possible, and therefore forceps delivery and less traumatic caesarean sections. Such 
activities required the re-location of childbirth from the home to hospitals, where the hierarchy, 
dominated by the new specialists, was able to take control of childbirth from the disempowered 
midwives and labouring mothers (Garcia, 1990). While this technology provided the tools, this was 
not in itself what changed practices or the culture of childbirth. It also needed to gain common 
acceptance in an “ideologically fertile social field” (Arney, 1982, p. 27), which Arney (1982) traced 
 P a g e  | 34 
to the assumption of control of birth by obstetricians taking charge in hospitals, and because 
women wanted pain-free childbirth. 
Of a process of this nature, Abbott (1988, p.316) states: “History is not a simple pattern of trends 
and development, but a complex mass of contingent forces. The system model achieves a theory 
of that contingency”. He argued that this model embraces and explains inter-professional conflicts, 
in that it explains relations between different medical specialties as well as relations with other 
professions. The model also explains the relationship of medicine to law, in which both professions 
have high status and recognition, but one in which the law assumes the greater authority. For 
instance, medical practitioners are bound to practise in accordance with the law, and although the 
profession generally determines its standards of practice, there are occasions when in practice, 
areas once considered to be the province of medical practitioners are determined by the law. For 
example, the standard relating to consent was determined by a judge in the Schloendorff case in 
191428, and in Rogers and Whittaker in 199229. In cases of irresolvable disputes, the law will make 
determinations over treatment or withdrawal of treatment30. The principles by which courts could 
make such determinations were spelled out, as below, relating to determination of the relevant 
standard of care31. 
Abbott’s model for professions postulated: 
(1) that the essence of a profession is its work not its organization; (2) that many 
variables affect the content and control of that work; and (3) that professions exist in an 
interrelated system. Change in professions can therefore best be analyzed by 
                                                          
28 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914): Ms Schloendorff sued the hospital after a 
surgeon removed a fibroid tumour without her consent while she was under anaesthesia for an exploratory 
examination. She suffered gangrene in her arm which she alleged was due to this surgery. The doctor argued that he 
removed the tumour for her best interests, but the judge determined this action constituted assault. 
29 Rogers v Whittaker (1992) 175 CLR 479: the judgement stated that “The law should recognize that a doctor has a 
duty to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk is material if, in the circumstances 
of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned 
of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it (at 490). 
30 Cases such as Bland, Schiavo, Gard, Messiha, Wyatt. 
31 Rogers v Whittaker [1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479: a High Court decision found in their majority judgement, 
Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ rejected the former accepted principle (“the Bolam principle”), 
and noted in relation to standard of care: 
“In Australia, it has been accepted that the standard of care to be observed by a person with some special skill or 
competence is that of the ordinary skilled person exercising and professing to have that special skill … But, that 
standard is not determined solely or even primarily by reference to the practice followed or supported by a 
responsible body of opinion in the relevant profession or trade.” 
In relation to peer professional opinion: 
“…particularly in the field of non-disclosure of risk and the provision of advice and information, the Bolam principle 
has been discarded, and, instead, the courts have adopted … the principle that, while evidence of acceptable medical 
practice is a useful guide for the courts, it is for the courts to adjudicate on what is the appropriate standard of care 
after giving weight to ‘the paramount consideration that a person is entitled to make decisions about his own life’ (F v 
R (1983) 33 SASR 189”. 
(My italics: the law has determined that it may be guided by medical opinion, but that it can override it). 
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specifying forces that affect the content and control of work and by investigating how 
disturbances in that content and control propagate through the system of professions 
and jurisdictions. The proper unit of analysis is the jurisdiction, or more generally, the 
larger task area (Abbott, 1988, p. 112). 
The illustration above concerning childbirth shows how this model played out as a profession 
claiming jurisdiction over the content of health-related tasks: the task of childbirth, once the 
province of women and midwives in the home, was corralled by the medical profession because it 
had the tools of pain relief and surgery, and the interrelationship with the hierarchy of the hospital 
environment made it possible. 
The path to recognition as a unified profession was not a smooth one, but pockmarked along the 
way by internecine struggles. These jurisdictional battles continued all the way into the passage of 
the 1858 Medical Act. The outbreak of cholera in the mid-nineteenth century made passage of this 
Act imperative, given there was no register of qualified medical practitioners. The Act was passed 
with its first role to establish a medical register, and the second to establish the qualifications 
required to be registered. In spite of continuing arguments about who was to be included, the Act 
was the foundational law establishing state recognition of the British medical profession. What it 
did achieve was a single governing body for medical practice, the General Medical Council (GMC), 
which had the right to discipline doctors, including the power to de-register doctors guilty of criminal 
charges or of “infamous conduct in any professional respect” (Roberts, 2009). It also established 
an ethical code which raised the social prestige of the doctor. According to Cartwright: 
We can now observe the paradox that the 1858 Medical Act, intended to protect the 
public rather than the doctors, has in its implementation transformed the medical trade 
into the medical profession and benefited the doctors as much as the public 
(Cartwright, 1977, p. 57). 
Medicine had prevailed, the Colleges flourished, the power of modern medicine assumed 
superiority and the mystique of medicine became glorified. The “secret society” of medical doctors 
was adept at public relations, in promoting its exclusive and unique place in society with a body of 
knowledge and skill inaccessible to common people. In many respects, society lauded this as they 
demanded access to what doctors had to offer: pain relief in childbirth; cures and treatments never 
before available, clinics and hospitals that enabled such treatments to be offered; and finally, the 
chance to beat death and cure diseases never before possible. Freidson (1970, p. 15) asserts, 
“The physician is the symbol of healing whose authority takes precedence over all others”32. 
Roberts (2009) adds that professional authority rests on more than professional assertion, but also 
requires a measure of cultural acceptance. Society wanted what doctors had to offer. He therefore 
                                                          
32 I would add, over all others in health care, except if there is adjudication by the law when the law can take 
precedence over medicine. 
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asserts that the passage of the Medical Act in 1858 represented not only a mediation between 
divergent strands of the “still fluidly defined profession”, but also between professional and lay 
conceptions of the role of the medical practitioner (Roberts, 2009, p. 39). The state and the public 
had an interest in upholding medical privilege because it was given in exchange for the expectation 
of honourable standards of behaviour, which meant putting the needs of patients before one’s 
personal advantage, in an inherently unequal relationship by virtue of the possession of knowledge 
and skills (Roberts, 2009). 
Much as Henry VIII had declared that he did not wish to see his subjects exposed to harm by 
charlatans, the profession argued that their superior knowledge and skill needed to be protected 
from the quacks who purported to have the same ability to treat and cure. These needed to be kept 
out of medical practice to keep the public safe from the harm that they may cause, or the indirect 
harm by denying access to “proper” medical care. Through legitimation of their authority, the 
medical profession was recognised and protected. This is the fight for jurisdiction of which Abbott 
wrote, a phenomenon that persists to this day when we consider the fight to exclude 
complementary medicine, the fight between cosmetic and plastic (the latter being “real” surgeons 
practising “real medicine”) or between doctors and pharmacists or nurse practitioners, both of 
whose roles’ duties are encroaching into medicine, such as prescribing, giving limited medical 
advice and writing medical certificates. 
Legal Protection of the Profession 
As noted, legal protection began with the passage of Great Britain’s first Medical Act 1511-12, 
which placed overall responsibility for public safety with the King (Henry VIII). 
Foucault traces the regulation of medicine in France to the decrees of Marly in 1707 which 
regulated the practice of medicine and training of doctors. This lasted throughout that century, 
when “It was then a matter of struggling against charlatans, quacks, and ‘unqualified’ and 
incapable persons practising medicine” (Foucault, 1973, p. 44). Modern French medicine came 
into being by the end of that century, when “the gaze becomes objective”, that is to say, medicine 
became a scientific endeavour, a “clinical science,” and the patient the object of its gaze. The other 
interesting consideration was the strong social element of medicine’s responsibility to society: a 
breadwinner who was ill could leave his family destitute, so medicine had a social role in keeping 
individuals healthy, and as the individual was part of society, Foucault (1973) states, “medicine 
becomes a task for the nation”. It would be the task of the state “to make sure that a true art of 
curing does exist”. Here we can see that medicine was accepted as a public good and that it was 
the task of the state to ensure its security. 
Medicine, the law and the state had become intertwined not only in France, but elsewhere. The 
1858 Medical Act in Great Britain established a register of legally qualified medical practitioners, 
and defined who was “legally qualified”. This was the foundational step in transforming the medical 
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trade as had existed as a former guild into a recognised profession with its own professional 
regulatory body, the GMC (Little, 1995). 
In Australia, the first Medical Practitioners Act 1838 in NSW likewise established a register of 
medical practitioners so it could keep track of medical witnesses before inquests and inquiries in 
the colony of NSW (Lewis, 2014b). In so doing, it had to identify who was a medical practitioner, 
defining as legally qualified those whose qualifications were attained in Great Britain. An 
amendment in 1855 added qualifications attained from The University of Sydney after it opened in 
1850 (Lewis, 2014b). The register was administered by the NSW Medical Board, and from 1838 
until 1987, the Board, as a specialised body, was not required to be accountable to Parliament. It 
regulated its members by defining how it alone could exercise professional discipline. 
The autonomy of the profession was sustained by “the dominance of its expertise”, and its strength 
based on its “legally supported monopoly over practice, which operates through the system of 
licensing granted by the state” (Freidson, 1970, p. 83). Nevertheless, the profession is not entirely 
autonomous. The profession may control the content of its work, the knowledge it develops and the 
training of doctors, but the state retains an interest in the terms under which it serves to protect the 
profession. In the early days, by determining who would be legally qualified and how they would 
become so, the profession argued that they were protecting the public by ensuring doctors were 
highly trained and that they practised at a high standard. This was, in essence, a “social contract” 
(Thomas, 2002a), though it was somewhat weighted towards protecting the profession, because its 
main purpose at the outset was to keep those it deemed not suitably qualified out of its ranks, by 
its own definition and as sanctioned in law. 
Explaining the concept of “social contract” further, Cruess (2006, p. 170) traces the granting of 
licensing laws in the mid-nineteenth century to society granting the profession: 
a monopoly over the use of medicine’s knowledge base, autonomy in practice, status, 
and the privilege of self-regulation. This was based on the understanding that the 
profession would assure the competence of its members, who would be devoted to 
altruistic service, demonstrate morality and integrity in all of their activities, and address 
issues of societal concern in their domain. This was and remains the essence of the 
social contract, which is based on professionalism. 
Trust was fundamental to the relationship between doctor and patient, and as Cruess (2006) 
explains, patients’ trust in both individual practitioners and in the profession was high from the mid-
nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century. Trust in doctors relied on the belief that 
doctors would act in their patients’ best interest and not their own, that altruism was a basic value 
held by the profession. 
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In the increasingly complex, sophisticated and expensive health system, providing for a society 
with diverse needs, values and beliefs, these traditional values were met with competing interests 
within the profession. For instance, the structure of health care delivery and governance 
arrangements has changed (Cruess, 2006; Cruess & Cruess, 2008), as well as societal 
expectations, meaning that the terms of the social contract have had to continuously evolve. 
Nevertheless, some universal values remain relatively constant (Cruess, 2006, p. 171). 
An evolving social contract meant articulating what is expected of the profession beyond the 
knowledge, skills and competence that are fundamental to their craft. “The new professionalism” 
was a term introduced in the 2000s to explain the evolving notion of professionalism as distinct 
from the traditional definitions. It was one concept that attempted to articulate changing values in 
society which competed with the traditional spirit of altruism in the UK, in which Sir Donald Irvine 
(2001), as the former President of the GMC, wrote with determination that health systems under 
the National Health Service (NHS) had been slow to address the quantum of adverse events in 
health care, a substantial proportion of which were said to be preventable. The quality and safety 
movement had identified that inadequacies of systems significantly contributed to these harms, but 
also acknowledged the responsibility of individual practitioners to contribute to the safety of 
patients, and to be accountable. Sir Donald considered professionalism to be at the “heart of 
doctors’ relationships with patients and the public”, suggesting doctors should provide their 
“expertise and reliable, consistent performance” (Irvine, 2001, p. 66). He lamented the “fading” of 
professionalism in the previous two decades, stating that people wanted more openness from 
doctors and explicit accountability, though not on their own terms as it had been. He considered 
that medicine was becoming more like a job and less like a vocation, and he placed the onus onto 
doctors to change, to be more responsive and to listen better to what people expected. 
The other requirement, Irvine (2001) said, was that regulation must likewise change to meet the 
public’s expectations. In 2001 when this was written, there was pressure for the health system to 
lift its game and to stand behind it to make sure this happened. He declared that the system of 
professional regulation was evolving to deliver the new professionalism, which “must be firmly 
grounded on the public interest – a partnership between the public and the medical profession”. 
There is a theme that underlies the above account: that the medical profession had for too long 
harboured within its ranks some doctors who had breached the public trust, and that as a 
consequence, the profession had to improve to meet public expectations. The reactions by the 
regulators in both the UK and Australia have been significant, as we have seen in the examples 
presented, and the response to this reaction by medical practitioners as equally significant. While 
some had expressed their dismay that the profession was “under siege” (Donnelly, 1990), there 
were indications that the tightening regulatory surveillance was having a personal, and sometimes 
damaging, impact. An alarming report commissioned by the GMC in UK and conducted by 
Sarndrah Horsfall in 2014 discovered that there were 28 reported cases of suicide of doctors 
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between 2005 and 2013 while undergoing Fitness to Practise investigations (Horsfall, 2014). This 
prompted a review of the implications for the GMC’s processes, in particular, how it handles 
vulnerable doctors. In Australia, a report by BeyondBlue in 2013 revealed the worryingly high 
number of doctors suffering depression and other mental health conditions, from a survey of 
almost 13 000 doctors and medical students. This study focused on the general stressors of 
medical work, not just on those undergoing investigations. What is known is that doctors suffer 
significantly higher levels of psychiatric morbidity when involved in a medico-legal matter. An 
examination of these and other impacts will be explored fully in Chapter Four. 
A more gentle approach can be seen in Canada’s response to the perceived need to identify and 
embed the qualities and attributes of professionalism into what doctors were expected to be. 
“CANMeds”, the Physician Competency Framework, was released in October 2015. It identified 
core competencies of professionalism that extended beyond scientific, clinical skills and expertise, 
to include the domains of medical expert, communicator, collaborator, leader, health advocate and 
professional33. This concept was adapted by subsequent Colleges in many other countries 
including Great Britain, New Zealand, USA and Australia. In Great Britain, the GMC published 
Good Medical Practice, a handbook that aimed to set out what was expected of doctors in terms of 
their ethical conduct34. 
In Australia, the Medical Board of Australia introduced Good Medical Practice: a code of conduct 
for doctors in Australia (the code), which makes it clear what the common values of all doctors 
must be: Doctors have a duty to make the care of patients their first concern and to practise 
medicine safely and effectively. They must be ethical and trustworthy. This document sets out not 
only what behaviours doctors are expected to demonstrate, but what patients can expect from their 
doctors. It sets out the principles that characterise good medical practice and makes explicit the 
standards of ethical and professional conduct expected of doctors by their professional peers and 
the community (The code, p. 4). The code can be used to evaluate a doctor’s conduct, which may 
have implications for their registration, although legislation and case law will take precedence 
where there is conflict with the code. 
Doctors as Professionals 
The word profession has a meaning, and a doctor is meant to be the ultimate 
professional. (Dr Michael Steiner, President NSW AMA, 27 September 2010.) 
In this part of the chapter, we have considered the professionalisation of medicine from an 
historical and legal perspective. The professionalisation project had begun in order to define and 
legitimate the modern medical profession, and became an instrument of control, or attempted 
                                                          
33 Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons in Canada (2015). 
34 General Medical Council (2013) Good Medical Practice, UK. 
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control, over the profession, by which the characteristics of being a professional, of being a “good” 
doctor, became the markers by which professional performance was judged. 
The questions now concern what it means to be a professional in the world of medicine, and why 
being a doctor means being the ultimate professional. Does medicine as a profession define every 
aspect of being a doctor, so that doctors know what the rules are, how to behave, how to conduct 
themselves, how to be a doctor? We have seen how professionalism has developed as a response 
to political and social expectations and that the profession does indeed define certain aspects of 
doctors’ behaviour and conduct, which are written into their codes of conduct as essential or 
desirable traits on which doctors may be evaluated. Is there another set of behaviours and values 
that are expected of them as professionals? 
Every doctor will have a sense of what it means to be a doctor, and a sense of themselves as a 
doctor, which will influence what choices they make within medicine, how they practise and how 
they relate to their patients and to their colleagues. What it means to be a doctor will be influenced 
by what is expected of them, and how the individual interprets these expectations, in the light of 
their expectations of themselves. The latter is affected by their own personal values, motivations 
and beliefs, which all arise from the context in which they chose to become a doctor, who and what 
influenced them (Abbott 1981), and what they subsequently experienced. In this next section, I 
map out professionalism in a more personal, individual sense, in thinking about where and how the 
individual practitioner fits into this world of medicine, with its expectations, obligations and 
requirements. 
Profession as Field 
Not happy with the notion that the study of “profession” is about classifications of occupations, and 
while recognising the work of Abbott (1981) and others, including Larson (1977) and Freidson 
(1986) which see professionalism in terms of the power inherent in these classifications, Bourdieu 
(in Schinkel & Noordegraaf, 2011) prefers to replace the concept of profession with “field”. One 
way of usefully expressing the placement of the individual within their professional medical 
environment or field is by reference to Bourdieu’s concepts of Habitus, representing the subjective 
element within the objective world. Field is that environment, such as the world of medicine. 
Schinkel and Noordegraaf (2011, p. 67) regard professionalism as “a form of symbolic capital, the 
substance of which is constantly at stake in power-driven contexts, both internally and externally”. 
Professional fields relate to other fields as a “general field of power”, whose content is constantly 
subject to renegotiation. This seems somewhat akin to Abbott’s (1981) jurisdictional contests, as 
above, although while jurisdictional contests are also about content and the power to assume 
proprietorship over same, symbolic capital suggests something more: the status that accompanies 
each particular field of expertise. 
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Habitus is the space occupied within the field by the individual and is an acquired system of 
dispositions. The field structures the habitus by conditioning experiences that help to shape one’s 
perceptions, influenced by one’s past and present circumstances, such as one’s upbringing and 
education, but also by one’s dispositions. It explains how people learn to behave in certain ways 
without reference to obedience to rules. Both concepts are interrelated, explaining in part how the 
individual relates to their social environment. Practice, or one’s actions, results from the relation 
between one’s dispositions, or habitus, and one’s position in a field, or capital (Grenfell, 2008, p. 
51). Symbolic capital is like a token of status. So if an individual practitioner learns to “play the 
game” well, this has the potential to enhance their status (Grenfell, 2008). “The better adjusted 
one’s habitus is to the field in which one occupies a position, the better one’s ‘sense of the game’ 
and hence one’s ability to acquire symbolic capital and a dominant position in this specific field” 
(Schinkel & Noordegraaf, 2011, p. 78). Being a doctor and being like a doctor will earn a special 
place in the field of power. Not being like a doctor can mean the opposite, and such a person may 
struggle for acceptance. This is demonstrated in the case referred to previously of the whistle-
blower Dr Stephen Bolsin who became an outlier for having publicly revealed the failings of his 
own, was shunned and vilified by senior colleagues, and on the point of resigning, sought refuge in 
Australia, where he remains (Faunce & Bolsin, 2004, p. 44). In fact, to publicly criticise the 
profession was considered by the GMC in the UK to be “serious professional misconduct” until 
1985, when the GMC began to emphasise responsibility to act in patients’ best interest and 
required that dangerous practitioners be reported to the regulator (Jorm, 2012). Being a medical 
professional is difficult terrain, understanding one’s place as either “special”, or as a vilified outcast, 
or as any variety in between. 
Being a Medical Professional 
What a doctor brings to medicine will shape how they respond to the professional environment and 
culture, and will therefore strongly influence the nature of their practice. Reconciling the autonomy 
of the individual doctor with that environment may not be straightforward, and likewise, it can be 
difficult to reconcile what the standard of practice should be in a given circumstance, in the best 
interest of patients. Moral distress is a phenomenon experienced by doctors (and other 
professionals) when their judgement about a particular circumstance is at odds with a protocol, a 
rule of thumb, or the stated standard of practice: “People can experience moral distress when they 
regard themselves as expected to pursue a course of action they believe to be morally wrong” 
(Weber, 2017; Monrouxe, Shaw & Rees, 2017, p. 568), which may have far-reaching 
consequences. The experience of those who had worked alongside Jayant Patel in Bundaberg 
Queensland showed that it was not only the patients who suffered, some mortally, from his surgical 
exploits. Staff and colleagues were compelled to do “work-arounds” to hide patients, or to do their 
best to rescue patients by providing extra care following surgery, all the while being conflicted by 
the intransigence of hospital management and an unwilling state administration to take effective 
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action to protect patients from what others believed to be grossly unsafe care by Dr Patel (Jorm, 
2012; Pacey, Harley, Veitch & Short, 2012; Thomas, H., 2007). 
The significance of social control, of group loyalty and peer acceptance, cannot be understated in 
such situations. Peer opinion can lead to some vexing disagreements, or alternatively it can help to 
sustain an individual by providing validation of their unique approaches to problem solving, 
collegiality and teamwork. The determination of the standard of care, the right decision in any 
circumstance is therefore not just a formula but is a complex mix of judgement and competency. 
Fundamental Aspects of Being a Professional in the Field of Medicine 
In addition to the skills, knowledge and expertise held by every medical practitioner, there are three 
fundamental aspects to being a medical professional: 
1. The legal aspect: what is expected by the law and regulation; 
2. The ethical aspect: what is expected of medical practitioners’ conduct; 
3. The moral aspect: the personal qualities and values that the individual practitioner holds, 
that could be summed up as the moral dimension. 
The above discussion sets out how the ethical conduct expected of doctors is articulated. Setting 
aside the legal and regulatory aspects, we will now consider those other less definable attributes of 
doctors that accompany the way they practise, the way they relate to their patients, and their 
commitment to their profession: the habitus that each individual occupies according to their 
personal values and dispositions. Attention moves to the individual and the moral values they bring 
to the practice of their profession, as well as how they experience being a part of the professional 
environment, including how they interpret and enact the ethical aspects. Chapter Three will then 
examine the legal aspects by describing how the law actually functions: its mechanisms and 
processes. The focus will be on the protective aspects of regulatory mechanisms, and in this 
context we will return to the individual who is subject to these mechanisms, when I then introduce 
my study that examines the individual’s experience. Now, however, the discussion moves to the 
moral dimension that relates to the individual qualities of medical practitioners. 
The Moral Dimension 
Medicine is a moral community because it is at heart a moral enterprise and its 
members are bound together by a common moral purpose (Pellegrino, 1993, p. 3). 
As a moral community, Pellegrino (1993) opines that the practice of medicine must be guided by a 
shared source of morality, with the same fundamental rules, principles or character traits that will 
define a moral life consistent with the ends, goals and purposes of medicine. He traces the source 
of morality as the character of the physician as it has been through the centuries, providing the 
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conceptual foundation of professional ethics. Pellegrino (1993) explains that this “virtue ethics” 
became supplanted by Kant who defined morality in terms of duty, and in more modern times by 
principle-based ethics proposed by Beauchamp and Childress (1994), which focuses on the 
principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. Kant defines actions 
according to fulfilling one’s duty, but principle-based ethics are the more commonly recognised 
principles of ethical conduct in health care and research because one is deliberating about which 
principles apply to come to a “right” decision. They have appeal because they tend to spell out how 
one is to act, they consider the consequences of a decision and are useful in providing a 
vocabulary and framework for decision-making and “right” conduct. The four principles can also be 
criticised as being too rigid in that the common values are not accounted for. McCarthy calls it an 
“ethics of strangers”: they are limited in their ability to deal with clashes of principle, where parties 
place emphasis on different principles as the basis for a “right” decision. It is difficult to capture the 
“uniqueness of each moral situation”, or to reflect on the nuances of the interactions between 
practitioner and patient, with differences in interpretation (McCarthy, 2003). 
Without dismissing the value of the principle-based ethics (principlism), here the emphasis is on 
the moral as a missing dimension, or as a value that underpins the relationship between doctor 
and patient, and between doctor and the profession. It was MacIntyre (1984) who revived “virtue”, 
which recalls the ancient art of medicine as a calling, with its emphasis on care and healing beyond 
the science and evidence-based medicine of today, with its highly regulated framework, where the 
guidance of principlism has its greatest appeal. “Virtue” however cannot replace rule-based 
practice, as it is so open to interpretation. Pellegrino (1993) sees that virtue must be linked to 
principles in an integrated “medical ethics” that draws together as “phronesis”, or practical 
intelligence, that applies wisdom and good judgement to practical situations. Knowing what is right, 
what the rules state, and what applies in a given situation while determining how to act in the 
interests of a patient, and not oneself (avoiding getting into trouble by breaking the rules, for 
instance) is a vexed issue that has no easy answers, and can be the source of the moral distress 
to which I referred earlier. The public expects the doctor to be their advocate, to act in their 
interests, yet doctors also have other patients and other considerations, including their personal 
values and a life outside. 
How the argument is presented suggests that as a profession, medicine is either altruistic, and 
doctors know how to act because they are “good”, or that medicine has become devoid of moral 
value, that public expectation of altruism is in conflict with what Pellegrino (1993) describes as the 
private ethos of self-interest of today’s world. Here he says that medicine is increasingly seen as a 
commodity, and where moral meaning can become lost in the scientific nature of modern medicine. 
He suggests that the very foundation of medicine, its moral power, needs to be restored in order to 
restore it to its true meaning, which is the healing of sick patients, not just by competent 
performance but by ethical conduct. Quoted in Engelhardt (1977, p. 191), Pellegrino asserts that 
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“medicine must not only perform well but act well, it must choose what should be done to heal a 
particular patient whose good is the true end of the whole activity”. 
If a community is “a body of men and women bound together by common moral traditions and/or 
practices around a shared vision of the good life, which allows them to collaborate as moral 
friends” (Engelhardt, 1986, p. 7), then as a community, the medical profession shares common 
values. While a picture of all good people collaborating together because they share common 
values is rather idealistic, the picture is not actually quite so clear. Competitiveness, self-interest, 
the hierarchy amongst different specialist groups, different cultural and socio-political allegiances 
and beliefs all add up to a diverse group unified mainly by their recognition as credentialed doctors. 
MacIntyre makes it a little clearer: 
Every practice requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in 
it. Now the virtues are those goods by reference to which, whether we like it or not, we 
define our relationships to those other people with whom we share the kind of purposes 
and standards which inform practices. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 191). 
Therefore, regardless of values, common or not, what is shared by doctors is a commitment to the 
purpose of medical practice and the standards by which they practise. But how a doctor interprets 
their commitment does not fit neatly into the dualistic notion conveyed by Pellegrino, as above, of 
being either the altruistic “good” person or the self-interested, status-seeking individual that 
promotes medicine as a commodity whose value is defined in terms of economic capital. What 
doctors bring to medical practice is their own individuality: “in the practice of medicine, the person 
you are is as important as what you know” (Treadway, 2005, p. 1943). 
Finding Common Values 
Regardless of an individual’s personal values, there is a common set of stated values, of standards 
of conduct and performance, and failure to demonstrate such qualities is not well tolerated by 
regulators. Coulehan (2001) examines the process of learning such values and behaviour, as part 
of the socialisation of doctors in training: “An important aspect of this socialization is the transfer of 
a set of beliefs and values regarding what it means to be a good physician” (Coulehan, 2001, p. 
600). Explicit components include the expected activities: the classes, rounds, advice, teaching 
about what is “good”, including the values of empathy and caring. Yet such virtues may be quite 
inconsistent with what a doctor observes in those around them: being detached, objective, 
distrusting of emotions, of patients, of the administration, of insurance companies. This notion is 
commonly referred to as “the hidden curriculum”, after Hundert. These tacit values can become the 
more powerful as they relate to what people do, rather than what they say they do, or should do. 
Coulehan (2001) observes how detachment can lead to the atrophying of affective emotions, 
leaving the focus on cognitive and technical aspects of practice. 
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Whose Values Count? 
Patients value competence and caring. Complaints can be made when expectations of either or 
both are not met, and usually, though not always, because something has gone wrong. Yet there is 
a disjunct between what complainants value in terms of the care they expected to have received, 
and what the regulatory system deems to be of value. A simple example may explain the 
difference: the difference in meaning of the word care, providing care or being cared about. The 
notion of “incommensurability” explored by Hunter (2001) is about patients’ and doctors’ differing 
orientation (Hunter, 1991). A patient is one who suffers an illness because of the symptoms of 
disease, for which they want relief, to be healed, and to be released from the disruption to their 
normal life. Doctors on the other hand are faced with others’ illness as their way of life, their raison 
d’être: “To the typical physician, my illness is a routine incident in his rounds, while for me it’s the 
crisis of my life. I would feel better if I had a doctor who at least perceived this incongruity” 
(Broyard, 1992, p. 43). 
The profession of medicine can therefore either be defined purely as one that centres on its 
mastery of technical knowledge, the status and privilege that accompany this and the capacity to 
exercise social control, or it can also capture something of the traditional virtue of vocation or 
calling, evoking a sense of altruism and goodness. Is this not what most people want in their 
doctor: someone who knows their craft expertly, has wisdom and good judgement, and who cares 
about his or her patient? Gustafson (1982, p. 501) writes that a “ ‘Calling’ without 
professionalization is inept, and a profession without a calling lacks moral and humane roots, loses 
human sensitivity, and restricts the vision of the purposes of human good that are served”. 
A Good Doctor: Best Practice, Best Interests and Being Good Enough 
Marrying the expectations of what patients want with what is possible, I will now consider how we 
may arrive at what a good doctor is. A doctor is expected to serve their patients’ best interest, but 
they are also expected to serve their profession (not bring it into disrepute), those they work with 
and for, and their regulatory obligations. It is inevitable there will be competing interests, and 
without a rulebook that specifies right actions for every circumstance, the health professional is 
potentially facing some significant dilemmas which are not often acknowledge or thought through 
(Pellegrino, 1988, p. 73). 
The community expects that “good” doctors are generally able to balance all their obligations 
without sacrificing the integrity of their professionalism. Consider the outrage that follows when the 
community is exposed to the failings of doctors who have acted recklessly, selfishly or 
dangerously. So too at the individual level, the patient who considers their doctor is not acting in 
their best interests loses the trust on which the relationship is founded. Disputes and conflict may 
follow, associated with loss of confidence and faith and even a sense of betrayal. 
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At the heart of medical professionalism is trust. How doctors conduct themselves when confronted 
with dilemmas that have the potential to breach that trust is critical to their ability to maintain their 
personal integrity and the confidence of patients, the profession and the community. The term 
professionalism “covers the attitudes and behaviours that promote and maintain the patient’s best 
interests above and beyond all other considerations. An ethical health professional would put 
patients’ interests above their own, avoid harm, respect patient autonomy, maintain competence, 
and work and practise within the bounds of their knowledge and experience” (Walton & Elliott, 
2006, p. S62). If patients’ interests are to be served above all else in order to practise ethically, it 
does not mean that other interests cannot also be served. But it may be inevitable that serving the 
best interests of a patient may mean compromising other interests. The dilemma for the 
practitioner is in balancing these competing interests. 
Pellegrino (1988, p. 74) opines that without clarity of what is meant by “good”, the emphasis turns 
to rights, which often leads to an “excessively legalistic framework for moral choice that obscures 
the distinctions between protecting the patient’s rights and promoting the patient’s good”. When 
patients or their relatives demand that their rights are respected, but health practitioners disagree 
that these proclaimed rights are for the patient’s good, then unresolved conflict may ensue, for 
which a legal remedy may be the only option after others have been exhausted, and it will be for 
the courts to determine the patient’s “good”. 
The Medical Identity 
In 1957, Merton described the function of medical education being to “transmit the culture of 
medicine and … to shape the novice into an effective practitioner of medicine, to give him [sic] the 
best available knowledge and skills, and to provide him with a professional identity so that he 
comes to think, act, and feel like a physician” (Merton, 1957). This description implies that the 
“novice” physician is the passive recipient of all that his educators can offer to mould him into 
shape, as if there were a template for the model doctor (females are clearly not part of the picture, 
but this was the 1950s, when authors wrote as if they were not). Nor in this description is there 
mention of the development of moral judgement, personal and professional values and the unique 
characteristics and disposition that the individual doctor brings with them into their practice. The 
term phronesis, also used above, encapsulates my meaning, describing the application of wisdom 
and good judgement to practical action. Where do these skills come from? 
Cruess (Cruess, Cruess & Steinert, 2016) provides an overview of commentary from the past few 
decades about how these more esoteric characteristics of the professional identity are formed. As 
medical educators, their interest is in the medical curriculum and assessment of “professional 
identity”. They refer to the well-known (to medical educators) Miller’s (1990) pyramid or triangle, 
which consists of four levels of assessment of medical competence: “Knows”, “Knows How”, 
“Shows How” and “Does.” They argue that this model, while still accurate, is incomplete. Adding 
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“Is” reflects the presence of the professional identity, with the associated assessment criteria: “the 
attitudes, values, and behaviours expected of one who has come to ‘think, act, and feel like a 
physician’ ” (Cruess Cruess & Steinert, 2016, p. 181). Quoting from Hafferty (2009), they explain 
their reasoning as “the fundamental uncertainties that underscore clinical decision making and the 
ambiguities that permeate medical practice, require a professional presence that is best grounded 
in what one is rather than what one does” (Hafferty in Cruess, Cruess & Steinert, 2009). Given that 
professionalism is now considered to be integral to medical practice, the assessment of 
professional identity should be used as the basis of the assessment of professionalism, they argue, 
yet while doctors are expected to behave professionally, there has been little teaching in how to do 
so. This is considered essential given the failures of medical professionalism, discussed 
elsewhere, which have caused a re-think and trend towards measuring competencies. But as the 
authors state, such competencies are evaluated in terms of what doctors do, rather than their 
values, until, they note, the Carnegie Foundation declared the future of medical education to be “on 
professional identity formation – the development of professional values, actions, and aspirations” 
(Cooke et al., 2010). 
Yet this still does not adequately touch on what the individual practitioner brings with them into the 
profession (Cohen, 1994, p. 133). When an individual doctor becomes a member of the profession, 
there is an acceptance, both conscious and not, of the culture, mores and expectations of ways of 
behaviour that make a doctor “like a doctor”. 
Recognising that identity formation begins from childhood, aspiring doctors “join the community of 
practice that is medicine” and acquire their sense of belonging and their professional identity 
through their social interactions, and the sum of their clinical and non-clinical experiences. This 
process is aimed at developing an identity that is a “fully integrated moral self (one whose personal 
and professional values are fully integrated and consistently applied)”, yet not static but forever 
changing as they progress through their careers, in response to changing health care delivery 
systems and societal expectations (Cruess, Cruess & Steinert, 2016). 
The community of practice must have a meaning that is symbolic of what Medicine is all about, 
how outsiders view this exclusive club, and what many of those who wish to join it aspire to. 
Working from a sociological perspective, Freidson’s (1970) early work focuses on the uniqueness 
of the profession in terms of its prominence and power. Not only is “the physician the symbol of 
healing whose authority takes precedence over all others”, the profession preserves a common 
identity in spite of occasional internal disputes over their various areas of work, and sustains a 
“superordinate” position. He suggests that common identity arises from the visibility of the degree, 
selective recruitment and common social background. Freidson’s (1970) proposition does not 
account for the socialisation that takes place during training, where doctors learn how to be 
doctors. For instance, in discussing the nature of social control in learning, which is often spoken of 
only in terms of coercive or formal control, Bosk (2003, p. 20) notes Freidson’s absence of 
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recognition of the process of socialisation: “Totally dismissed is the notion that individual control or 
group pressure effectively constrains behavior”. Bosk (2003) argues for both a formal system of 
controls as well as acknowledgement of the considerable control through socialisation, work 
routines and relationships with colleagues. Nevertheless, Freidson’s (1970) view of this process 
implies a commitment to an identity which is ingrained in becoming a doctor, incorporating not only 
the values of the institution in which they are being trained and socialised to serve, but also the 
values and attitudes of the profession with exclusive membership: 
It is professionalism itself that seems to transform the ideal responsibility to serve the 
good of the general public into limited concrete responsibility to serve the good of one’s 
personal public, and the ideal of universalistic knowledge and skill into particularistic 
sectarianism expressed by occupational imperialism (Freidson, 1970, p. 52). 
Freidson (1970) proceeds by explaining there are other values as well that account for this 
transformation, proposing that there are three major sets of attitudes, values or orientations: (1) the 
professional ideals of knowledge and service; (2) professional occupation and life career; and (3) 
the character of professional work. 
What is a good doctor? 
Lupton (1999), speaking of western societies, says that risk has “become an increasingly pervasive 
concept of human existence” (p. 25), which is to be controlled, managed and regulated. In this 
context, the professionalisation of medicine has been accompanied by a complex set of laws, 
regulations, codes of practice and conduct, credentialing and accountability, that creates a picture 
of a profession under constant scrutiny and surveillance. In this socio-political environment that is 
averse to risk, there may be no other profession that is so under the spotlight, and that has such 
high expectations of doing, and being, good. The individual doctor, practising within this 
environment, must navigate their way through, and find their own way of doing their good work, 
and of being “good”. 
In Chapter Three, we will see how the law and regulation actually operate to ensure that doctors 
are “good”, that patients are safe and that the public can place trust in them and in the profession. 
Patients’ Expectations of the Good Doctor 
In his capacity as the former Commissioner of the New Zealand Health and Disability Commission, 
Dr Ron Paterson writes: “The ‘good doctor’. Every patient wants one. Every doctor wants to be 
one. It is widely accepted as a desiratum, something to be desired” (Paterson, 2012, p. ix). 
But what is a good doctor? Answer: it depends on who is asking, and it depends on what is 
expected. External authorities spell out what is expected in terms of Codes of Conduct, 
accreditation requirements, legislation, regulation and the administration of regulatory practices, 
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when medical practice comes under scrutiny and what should have been expected is adjudicated. 
As for patients, this also depends: on the circumstances of seeking medical care, on their personal 
values, on what others tell them or what they have heard, read about, or have images of. As noted, 
many patients may not have a picture at all of what they value in a doctor, until their actual 
experience leaves an impression, perhaps of exceptional care, or perhaps of the opposite. 
According to Irvine (2007), former President of the GMC, patients deem a good doctor as one: 
whom they feel they can trust without having to think about it. They equate “goodness” 
with integrity, safety, up-to-date medical knowledge and diagnostic skill, and the ability 
to form a good relationship with them. For them, good doctors are clinically expert and 
at the same time are interested in them, kind, courteous, empathetic and caring. All 
these attributes matter to them because they know that their doctors’ decisions can 
affect the outcome of their illness – even make the difference between life and death, 
or between enjoying a speedy recovery and suffering serious disability (Irvine, 2007, p. 
256). 
With this senior regulator reflecting on what patients want, it feels like a high bar on the scale of 
ideal to perfect. One could surmise that if all doctors met all of these criteria, then we would have 
no need of complaints systems. Yet as patients, we have all experienced situations when a doctor 
is rushed, tired, busy with an emergency room full of anxious patients, or is just having a bad day. 
How forgiving are we? Coulter (2002, p. 668) reminds us that doctors “remain high in the popularity 
stakes in almost any poll, compared with other professions or trades”. Indeed, Willis (1993 in 
Hafferty et al., 1997) reports that public opinion polls in Australia rated medical practitioners as the 
highest ranking occupation for public esteem and social status. A more recent result shows much 
the same, in the Roy Morgan Image of Professions Survey 2017, 89% ranked doctors second, 
after nurses, as the most highly regarded profession in Australia, an increase of 3% from the 
previous year. These ratings were based on the criteria ethics and honesty35. 
This is in spite of the common view that patients are demanding, have high expectations, that there 
is a loss of trust in the profession and that people’s estimation of the profession has “diminished 
somewhat” (Lupton, 1997). Lupton’s research involving in-depth interviews with doctors and lay 
people identified that although some people may not regard the profession favourably, they 
regarded their own doctor (“my doctor”) as good doctors and treated them with respect. Ideal 
professional behaviour, rated by both doctors and lay people in the study, focused on good 
communication, meaning listening to patients’ concerns, explaining medical jargon in lay terms, 
and understanding the patient’s perspective, and empathy. Technical skill, being up-to-date with 
their knowledge were valued by both, while doctors added good judgement. By contrast, bad 
                                                          
35 Roy Morgan (2017) Media release: Source: From the Roy Morgan telephone survey conducted on the nights of May 
22-24, 2017, with 648 Australian men and women aged over 14. Article No. 7244, available on www.roymorgan.com 
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doctors were perceived as not listening, perhaps dishonest, not communicating well, perhaps “just 
in it for the money”, lacking good medical knowledge, with poor rapport (Lupton, 1997). Overall, 
patients rated interpersonal relations and technical skill highly, and humaneness, followed by 
competence and accuracy, being involved in decisions, and time for care. She adds that 
interpersonal skills are strongly related to trust, but notes this does not equate to “blind faith” but to 
honesty in relation to their condition, to treatment options and to being listened to (Lupton, 1997). 
The Meaning of Trust 
In speaking of trust, Lupton (1997) was building on the findings from Mechanic and Meyer’s (2000) 
interview study of what trust means to patients. This study found that interpersonal competence, 
involving caring and dedication, concern and compassion are the most common aspects of trust, 
with listening as the central focus. Patients with serious illness value not only technical 
competence, but also the preparedness of doctors to be their advocates in negotiating health care 
plans and to have their best interests at heart. Trust was something that developed over time, 
commencing with the initial trust of a doctor’s reputation, based on the recommendation or referral 
from a trusted other, but over time, respondents would test the doctor’s responses and actions 
against their own expectations. If the latter were being met, then trust would develop (Mechanic & 
Meyer, 2000). 
Lupton’s (1997) study reinforced this notion of developing trust: “doctors are highly aware that their 
patients’ trust is now no longer necessarily won by virtue of their occupying the role of ‘Doctor’, but 
must be earned and worked at continually” (Lupton, 1997, p. 493). Some doctors in her study 
reflected on the past image of doctors on their pedestals and welcomed being able to come down 
from it, to be less of an authoritarian god-like figure. As Mechanic and Meyer (2000) explained, this 
can be attributed to numerous factors that include greater access to information and higher 
education of the population, which means people are more likely to use their own judgement, 
demand more for themselves in the age of consumerism and the impact of media on demand for 
choice in treatments. Mechanic (2003) concludes by noting not only the overload experienced by 
many practitioners, but also the imperfect or dysfunctional context in which they work, while on the 
other hand the expectations of medical practice have escalated. 
Perhaps, it seems, patients expect too much. At least, doctors appear to think so. Nevertheless, it 
is not for this thesis to argue who is right, but to explain that there are many factors that lead to 
discontent in patients, and much of this is related to what expectations they have of their care and 
treatment. But there are also factors beyond the capacity of the individual doctor that may lead to 
discontent, as Mechanic suggests, but as the one in charge, the one seen to be responsible, they 
will often be the one held accountable. 
McKinlay and Marceau (2000) discuss this phenomenon at length, while reflecting on what has 
contributed to “the end of the golden age of doctoring”. Taking an historical perspective, the 
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authors assert that professional dominance had been acquired by the mid-twentieth century. As 
written about extensively by Freidson (1970), this depicts the doctor-patient relationship as 
asymmetric, in which the “imperialism” of medicine gave power and control to the doctor. Although 
the doctor was there for the patient, acting in their best interests, it was the doctor who took the 
reins and expected the patient to follow (“be compliant”), given their superior medical knowledge 
and expertise. Patients had trust then, but now there is wariness. 
O’Neill (2002) questioned if there is actually a “crisis of trust”, stating that when people need to 
trust others, they do. Therefore, she names it a “crisis of suspicion”. This she attributes to the ever 
more restrictive measures for gaining accountability, which she says have the effect of damaging 
the professional’s sense of dignity and pride in their work, and replacing it with defensive, risk-
aware practices, both at institutional level and individually. This builds a culture of suspicion and 
low morale within institutions, and given the public is now aware of why accountability is essential 
and has access to complaints mechanisms, this is the basis for public mistrust (O’Neill, 2002, p. 
57). 
Katz (1984) said that the “paternalistic sovereignty” that characterised medicine for centuries, when 
doctors knew what was best for their patients, changed when informed consent became a legal 
entity in 1957 in the USA as a defence against battery. But Katz argued that this did not mean total 
self-determination by patients, since although they had a right to be informed, it was doctors who 
disclosed what they deemed to be relevant in order for a patient to make an informed choice. He 
argued that this rights model replaced the medical model, yet he was not convinced it made a 
substantial change in the doctor-patient relationship. Indeed, this was shown in Rogers v Whitaker 
in Australia. The patient, Maree Whitaker, was almost totally blind in her right eye since an early 
childhood accident. She consulted an ophthalmic surgeon, Dr Chris Rogers, who advised her that 
surgery would improve the appearance of her eye and probably restore sight to it. Dr Rogers made 
a considered decision about what to disclose to Mrs Whitaker in terms of potential risks of surgery 
in one of her eyes, but failed to disclose the essential source of her apprehension, that she would 
suffer sympathetic ophthalmia in her good eye, albeit that she had not specifically asked about this 
condition. This very risk, that her good eye would be affected by surgery to her bad eye, although 
extremely rare, was precisely what occurred, and now being blind, she successfully sued her 
surgeon for negligence. 
Dr Roger’s defence relied on the “Bolam principle”, that a medical practitioner is not negligent if he 
acts in accordance with the practice accepted by his peers, which meant in effect that the standard 
of care owed to a patient is determined by medical judgement. Mrs Whitaker appealed and the 
High Court decision stated: 
The Law should recognise that a medical practitioner has a duty to warn a patient of a material risk 
inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular case, 
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a reasonable person in the patient's position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it 36. 
The meaning of “material risk” became the new foundation of consent, and thereafter changed the 
foundation of medico-legal judgements: a body of peers deemed Dr Rogers to have been correct in 
not informing her of the risk, given the high unlikelihood of it happening, but the judgement 
determined otherwise: that Mrs Whitaker had made it very clear that this is what was most 
important to her, this was material to her consent to proceed with this surgery. Mrs Whitaker’s trust 
had been broken, and once broken, it was not possible to get it back. The implications of this 
change to the meaning of consent and the foundation of trust and effective communication in the 
doctor-patient relationship have been far-reaching. 
Perceptions of Trust 
So far, we have seen that the traditional trust between doctor and patient has been based on a 
paternalistic relationship between doctor and patient. But while trust may have been challenged, 
and at times eroded, it has not been eliminated – when people need to trust, they do, but it cannot 
be taken for granted (Gilson, 2002). It is tested and built up, and once deemed trustworthy, is safe 
for as long as the trustworthiness is secure. This cannot depend on meeting every patient’s 
expectations, because sometimes these are unrealistic, or unreasonable, or even unwise. Nor 
does it mean that the doctor is not a good doctor. 
Being a Good Doctor 
Referring to previous argument about being “good”, it was suggested that being good, or even 
good enough, is a value to be aspired to. It is not clear what we mean by good, but it is more than 
being technically competent: people want a doctor who shows some humane qualities as well, 
someone who cares about them as people, who listens and expresses the human virtues of 
compassion, respect and kindness. Indeed, as Paterson (2012) explains, there is ambiguity in the 
term “good” in speaking of both the motivation of doctors and also the quality of the work they do. 
…this ambiguity is reflected in attempts to define the attributes of a good doctor, and to 
describe the characteristics of good medical practice. Invariably, the desired qualities 
relate to both motivation and performance. The duality is also seen in an influential 
seventeenth definition of a physician as vir bonus medicinae peritus, a good man 
expert in medicine (Paterson, 2012, p. 2, 3). 
This suggests that doctors are expected to be competent, and to have the right commitment, not 
only to do their job well in terms of technical performance, but to demonstrate those other less-
                                                          
36 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 (at 490). 
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tangible qualities. Medical competence is the number one quality that patients value in a doctor, 
according to various studies. Ninety-seven percent of respondents to a 2010 survey of members of 
the New Zealand public agreed that remaining up-to-date with developments in medicine is 
essential (Old, Adams, Foley & White, 2011). While this is an obvious response to an obvious 
question, other qualities were also rated very highly, such as compassion at 89%, and 71% valued 
doctors who cared about them as well as their health. 
Consistent with the latter is a finding from a survey in UK as to whether the doctor makes the care 
of the patient their first concern. Seventy-eight percent of the respondents rated this as the most 
important duty (Chisholm et al., 2006). 
What Complaints Reveal 
Turning now to what complaints data tell us, we can deduce that what makes people dissatisfied 
with their care can provide clues as to what would have satisfied them, had it been delivered. 
Unless it is articulated in the complaint, such a conclusion is a default one. A perusal of the NSW 
HCCC’s annual report 2016/17 gives an indication of what aggrieves patients most. After 
“Treatment” at 41% of the sources of all complaints and “Professional Conduct” at 16.4%, 15.9% of 
complaints are in the category “Communication/Information”. The latter includes descriptors such 
as: attitude, manner; inadequate or incorrect information; special needs not accommodated. 
Similarly, the Medical Council of NSW reports “Treatment”, “Clinical care” and “Poor 
communication.” The latter includes descriptors such as “insensitive or inappropriate comments; 
failure to communicate openly, honestly and effectively; disrespectful manner”37. 
Complaints are therefore not all about clinical care and treatment, but more about what transpires 
between doctor and patient, and it can be shown that there is a link between “poor communication” 
and intention to litigate or complain about an aspect of care and treatment, which may or may not 
have caused harm. A systematic review by Durand, Moulton, Cockle, Mann and Elwyn (2015) of 
the literature relating to shared decision-making and intention to initiate litigation, found that while 
the results are inconclusive about shared decision-making, the general inability to communicate 
effectively with patients is a strong predictor of malpractice claims: “the relationship itself may be 
the most powerful antidote to the malpractice crisis that medicine can provide”. While this is a 
study of litigation, such a finding is mirrored in the above complaints data: when the foundation of 
the relationship, expressed through the quality of communication, has been breached, it is a strong 
predictor of motivation to complain. 
It is perhaps more complex than this. The seminal study by Vincent, Young and Phillips in 1994, in 
which 227 clients of five medical negligence firms were interviewed to learn why they were taking 
legal action, the issue rested not only on the initial injury, but how it was handled and the quality of 
                                                          
37 Medical Council of New South Wales (2018) Common complaints about doctors: Complaints received by the Council 
in 2016/17. Available at the Medical Council website www.mcmsw.org.au. 
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communication after the incident. In only 15% of cases were clients satisfied with explanations, if 
any had been forthcoming, prompting clients to take the matter further. The primary motivation was 
not compensation, but to have honest explanations provided, for assurance that the matter would 
be remedied for future patients, for accountability and as well for compensation for losses incurred. 
Speaking at the Australian Institute of Administrative Law (AIAL) conference in October 2007, 
former NSW Ombudsman Bruce Barbour stated: “one of the main reasons people give for making 
a complaint is to obtain information about what happened, and what has been done to remedy it.” 
Similarly, 65% of complainants surveyed in a recent Australian study had attempted to resolve a 
concern locally, but not being satisfied with the outcome, lodged a formal complaint with the 
authority. This indicates that the majority of patients who have a concern about their health care 
are primarily interested in having more information about what happened and to have the matter 
explained to them, and to have any concerns resolved directly. It is only after such an attempt is 
not satisfactory that they turn to the regulator to deal with the issue (Pierce, 2017). More will be 
discussed on this issue in Chapter Three, when we examine complaints more closely. 
What can be surmised from the above is that patients may not only be dissatisfied when something 
has gone wrong or because of an inappropriate treatment decision, but because the fundamental 
starting point of the therapeutic relationship – trust and open and honest communication – has 
been breached. Where these are absent, a patient is less forgiving of mistakes, harm or 
disappointment with an outcome, is more likely to be aggrieved, and more predisposed to initiate a 
complaint. By contrast, when the relationship is founded on trust, the patient is more likely to feel 
confident they are in good hands. Given that trust is at the heart of the relationship between doctor 
and patient, failures in this essential ingredient would undermine confidence in the doctor, leaving 
the doctor open to allegations that they are not what should be expected, that they are not “good”, 
or at least not good enough. 
Summary 
Chapters One and Two have so far endeavoured to provide the context for my study, to present a 
picture of the historical, political and social factors that created the medico-legal environment in 
which doctors practise today. As I have shown, this environment is not a static one but is ever-
changing in response to events, medical developments, ideological and political pressures, the 
structural changes within the health system itself and to the realities of our social world. The move 
towards the professionalisation of medicine was promoted by medical practitioners in order to 
safeguard their interests and jurisdiction and was enabled by governments through their legislative 
powers. 
An almost or as equal a pressure came from the public who not only wanted what medicine had to 
offer and to be able to trust that it would be safely delivered, but when such expectations were not 
always met, the power of public opinion demanded greater accountability, and in many instances, 
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redress. Regulators had to step up, and governments responded by establishing the legal 
mechanisms to ensure greater accountability that included procedures for dealing with institutions 
and individuals who failed to meet the expected standard. Indeed, standards themselves are 
constantly being reviewed and revised as gaps and deficiencies have been identified. Complaints 
became an invaluable mechanism for highlighting such deficiencies. 
What we saw by following the progress from the beginnings of the legitimated medical profession, 
was the usually steady, but sometimes very dramatic, transformation of legal protections from that 
of protection of the profession to protection of the public. Legislation is now framed around the 
public interest, public safety and the public good. 
Chapter Three that follows will describe how the different jurisdictions function to enable and to 
protect, to compel accountability, to respond when things go wrong, and will examine how the 
public is protected by these regulatory processes. Chapter Four will examine how this whole 
system, the medico-legal environment, affects the individual doctor who has been subject to any of 
these proceedings, or who fears that one day they may be. 
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Chapter Three: The Law In Action 
Chapters One and Two considered the place of law and regulation in the profession of medicine, 
and looked into the nature of the profession itself: what is meant when we speak of the 
professionalisation of medicine, of professionalism and of being a professional, a doctor. 
In return for the privilege of being self-regulating, or at least partially so, the profession is required 
to be accountable by practising within the bounds of a wider regulatory environment, and sanctions 
exist if it does not. Doctors can interact with the law for all sorts of reasons. As members of the 
profession, they may be called upon for their expert opinion in a compensation case, a Coroner’s 
inquest or other inquiry. When a doctor is called to account for his or her own actions or conduct, it 
is generally because something has gone wrong, or they are required to account for their conduct if 
it is believed to have caused or contributed to harm. 
This chapter will present the jurisdictions that interact with medicine, and examine those that 
require accountability from the profession, their purpose, and in particular those that take an 
interest when things go wrong: 
1. Jurisdictions relevant to medical practice 
2. Accountability in action: When things go wrong 
2.1. The Regulatory framework 
2.2. Where complaints fit in the framework 
2.3. The complaints processes: understanding what they are for and what complaints are about. 
The Relevant Jurisdictions 
Purpose: Enabling, protecting, resolving, compensating, punishing 
Before the advent of modern medicine and health systems in Britain, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand, regulation of health professionals consisted of civil and criminal jurisdictions, and 
government-sanctioned self-regulation, an arrangement that McDonald (2012, p. 97) refers to as 
the “regulatory trinity”. With the advent of the modern health system, especially the public health 
system, the trinity had to accommodate to the medical profession’s professional autonomy in order 
to ensure that the health system could function. Yet with the demand for greater accountability and 
the growing pressure to protect the public more effectively, other regulatory instruments were 
introduced to strengthen the governance of the health system. We have seen how and why this 
happened, in the account of regulatory change in Chapter One. As McDonald (2012) states, the 
dominant mode of regulation is no longer the trinity, which now sits within a regulatory framework 
that encompasses the breadth and complexity of the modern health care system. 
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The law is also a reflection of society and its changing values. The traditional autonomy and 
paternalism of the medical profession has been challenged by the greater awareness and 
recognition of patients’ autonomy. Recognition of patients’ autonomy has been reflected through 
case law and precedent, which filters into standards of practice thereafter. The legal scholar and 
social justice advocate George Annas (1990, p. 1) writes: 
Medicine has to do with health, healing, and comfort: the health of the patient, healing 
the patient, and comforting the patient. The law has little to say directly about any of 
these, but has much to say about the centrality of the patient’s own view of health, 
healing and comfort. Because the doctor-patient relationship is inherently one-sided, 
the law’s direction over the past decade has been to attempt to give the patient more 
authority over decisions that directly affect the patient’s mind and body. 
That “past decade”, the 1980s, coincides with major changes in medical law, through the sharp rise 
in complaints mechanisms and litigation, and greater demand for accountability by the professions, 
health service providers and the regulators38. Recalling Ehrlich’s (1962, p. xxxiii) conception of the 
law as a living thing, “the law which governs life must be brought into and kept in touch with life” in 
this way, we will examine the law in action, how it both reflects the changing social values and 
expectations, but also its influence on the medical profession and practice. 
Civil law 
Civil law, or common law, refers to non-criminal law, and is between individuals or groups. There 
are four categories of civil law: torts, contract law, family law and personal disputes. The areas of 
contract law and tort law are the most common in matters relating to medical practice. 
Contract law concerns breaches of contract in relation to the provision of service and conditions of 
employment. The doctor-patient relationship is grounded in contract law, either implicitly or 
explicitly, as is the relationship between the patient and a hospital, with whose employees a patient 
has a contractual relationship. Remedies in disputes are generally through the award of damages, 
which is equivalent to the financial loss brought about by a breach of contract (Kerridge, Lowe & 
Stewart, 2009). An example of contract law in action was the landmark case in Australia of Breen v 
Williams39 which established the propriety right of the doctor to the medical records relating to a 
patient. It was determined that although the patient’s contract with Dr Williams entitled her to 
proper care and treatment, the contract did not extend to her owning the medical records. 
                                                          
38 Mulcahy, L. (2003) notes the advocacy roles played by various consumer groups in England of the 1980s onwards in 
demanding better conditions and rights in the wider population, with special interest groups being able to exert a lot 
of political pressure as well as demands to be included in policy development, in Disputing doctors: The socio-legal 
dynamics of complaints about health care. McGraw-Hill, England. 
39 Breen v Williams (1995) 186 CLR 71; [1995] HCA 63. 
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Tort law (case law and precedent) deals with civil wrongs, which give rise to claims for 
compensation for harm done, or medical negligence (“malpractice litigation” in USA). The interest 
in the latter is in causation and needs to answer these questions to meet the criteria for negligence: 
did the doctor owe a duty of care to the patient; has the relevant standard of care been breached; 
did the doctor fail to take reasonable care; did the breach cause harm or loss as a result of the 
breach? (Skene, 2008, p. 219; Studdert, 2004). It is important to remember that not all harm is due 
to negligence. A health provider will not be liable for harm occurring when reasonable care was 
being taken (McIlwraith & Madden, 2009). 
The standard of proof in civil law is determined on the balance of probabilities40 that a court or 
tribunal must consider. The burden or onus of proof lies with the plaintiff (one bringing the 
complaint or claim) to prove that the facts are more likely than not to be true (Kerridge, Lowe & 
Stewart, 2013, p. 116). 
While such matters do not directly achieve public protection, the decisions become precedents in 
similar matters and therefore attract much interest with the profession, the educators and legal 
advisers. This interest may translate into policy and new guidelines: examples range from the 
standard expected for medical record-keeping to the revision of the meaning of consent, following 
Rogers v Whitaker41. This led to a perceived extraordinary increase in litigation (Cica, 1995; 
Studdert, Mello & Brennan, 2004, p. 283). But not everyone agreed there was actually a “litigation 
crisis”. Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart (2009) recall the perception of an unsustainable increase in the 
number of claims and an unsustainable increase in the amount of damages being awarded. This 
had left many to fear that Australia (not just medical professionals) were “in the grip of a ‘litigation 
crisis’”, which escalated when United Medical Protection went into voluntary liquidation (discussed 
elsewhere in Chapter One). Given the consequent consternation, a Ministerial Meeting on Public 
Liability convened and established a panel under Justice David Ipp to examine the law of 
negligence. The Ipp Report (2002)42 that followed this review resulted in major changes to existing 
provisions, in particular the assessment of damages and caps on damages claimed. These 
changes were encapsulated in legislation in each state as their various versions of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW). 
The doubts arose because of conflicting evidence of purported increases in litigation. McIlwraith 
and Madden (2009) observed that there was little reliable data on the incidence and changes in the 
level of incidence of medical negligence litigation in Australia. It was known that very few adverse 
                                                          
40 This is known as “the Briginshaw test” from Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-362: 
His Honour Dixon J stated: The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a 
given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must 
affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. 
41 [Rogers v. Whitaker [1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479]. 
42 Ipp Report (2002) Review of the Law of Negligence (2002),  Commissioned by the Law Council of NSW 
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events translate into a negligence claim43, but reliable data were not available until a study by 
Studdert (2004), in which he concluded that there was little, and unreliable, evidence that the 
malpractice system was a deterrent against substandard care, or indeed improved the quality of 
care. What tort reform did achieve was a containment of costs, rather than greater safety, although 
it also results in more defensive practice (Studdert, 2004). 
Criminal matters 
It is not common for a doctor’s conduct to enter the criminal jurisdiction for adjudication. The 
principle is that the offences are so serious that they are considered to be an offence against the 
community, in contrast to civil law which is about individual relationships. Indictable offences 
relating to medical practice include significant boundary issues such as sexual assault of a patient 
or a sexual relationship with a patient, offences relating to fraud such as Medicare fraud or billing, 
and prescribing offences. Skene (2008) notes that a doctor cannot use as a defence that the 
patient consented or that the doctor believed they were acting in the patient’s best interests. 
Because a criminal conviction is so serious, guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
accused is presumed innocent until they are proven guilty, putting the onus on the prosecution to 
establish (Skene, 2008, p. 29). 
Fraud: Defrauding Medicare, if the misdemeanours add up to an indictable offence, can send a 
doctor to gaol. In sentencing a doctor in a 2015 case, Justice Estcourt pronounced: 
The Medicare system relies upon the honesty and integrity of medical practitioners who 
are entrusted with privileged access to the Medicare claims system, based on the 
premise that they can be trusted to submit genuine claims only. General deterrence is 
therefore a prominent sentencing consideration44. 
Here we can see that the law not only acts to promote compliance with its statutes and to punish 
those whom it finds guilty of offences; it also serves to make pronouncements about its 
expectations in terms of standards of morality and ethical conduct. 
Sex and drugs: (the former Dr) Suresh Nair, with a long history of cocaine and alcohol addiction 
was convicted of offences relating to the deaths of two escorts in his apartment on different dates 
and the supply of the prohibited drug cocaine45. Following his conviction for manslaughter, the 
                                                          
43 Leape, L. et al. (1991) The Harvard Medical Malpractice Study showed that of the medical mishaps that occurred in 
hospitals, one seventh would result in a claim for compensation. Incidence of adverse events in hospitalised patients: 
Results of the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study II. NEJM, 324, 377-384. 
44 The Queen v Humphrey John Polycarp Gomes 7 May 2018: Comments by Estcourt J. in passing sentence. 
45 R v Suresh Nair [2011 NSWDC 124 (26 August 2011)]. 
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Tribunal cancelled Dr Nair’s registration as a medical practitioner46. Being a doctor made his 
personal conduct all the more shocking to the public, who relished the scandalous story. 
Murder: Dr Brian Crickitt, GP, was convicted of murdering his wife in 2016 with a lethal dose of 
insulin, in order to free him to marry his mistress and to collect his wife’s life insurance. He was 
sentenced to 27 years in gaol47. That he used his medical knowledge added to the seriousness of 
the crime. By contrast, the next category of criminal activity is controversial because harm was 
allegedly caused in the course of a doctor’s practice, but without the intent to cause harm, as the 
following matters demonstrate. 
Manslaughter: The recent British case of the Dr Hadiza Bawa-Gaba’s conviction48 and sentencing 
of two years’ gaol, and subsequent de-registration, for her part in the death of a six-year-old 
patient, caused much consternation not only in the UK but in Australia for the meaning that could 
be derived from such findings. Firstly, this brought issues of medical care and treatment, when not 
matters of deliberate intent such as Harold Shipman’s history of murder, into the criminal 
jurisdiction. A finding of “gross criminal negligence” for alleged grave errors in health care, deemed 
to be “truly exceptionally bad”, could lead to a finding of criminal culpability, and was therefore 
extremely unsettling for doctors (Schalkwyk, 2018). In Dr Bawa-Garba’s case, what made it 
particularly disturbing was that there were compounding problems within the hospital that she was 
not directly responsible for (Dyer, 2018b). Such contributing factors were noted, but they did not 
sway the judge in his determination about her performance49. 
In Australia, there have only been four convictions of doctors for manslaughter in medico-legal 
history: that of Dr William Valentine in 1843, Dr Frederick Hornbrook in 1864, Dr Margaret Pearce 
in 2000, and Dr Arthur Gow in 2006. All cases involved inadvertent inappropriate administration of 
drugs during treatment, and all were found guilty, but the punishment that followed was minimal 
(Skene, 2004). 
When things go wrong 
In addition to the criminal and civil court systems of redress, the following are standard avenues for 
responding when something has gone wrong, or if there has been a near miss that could have 
resulted in serious harm. These take place at different levels of the health system and include 
Open Disclosure, Root Cause Analysis, and the Commonwealth Professional Services Review 
Scheme. 
                                                          
46 Health Care Complaints Commission: Media Release: 4 December 2013: Dr Suresh Surendranath Nair – registration 
cancelled by Medical Tribunal. 
47 R v Crickitt [2017] NSWSC 542. 
48 An appeal was held on 17 December 2017 that upheld the decision [2018] EWHC 76 (Admin). 
49 The decision to have her struck off followed an appeal by the GMC that demanded a stronger punishment than a 
twelve-month suspension, given her criminal conviction, but this was overturned on appeal in August 2018, when the 
court restored the original Tribunal decision that she be suspended. 
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Open disclosure: participation in a formal “open disclosure” (OD) for a serious adverse event (or 
“patient safety incident”). Open disclosure is defined in the Australian Open Disclosure Framework 
as: "an open discussion or series of discussions with a patient and/or their support person(s) about 
a patient safety incident which could have resulted, or did result in harm to that patient while they 
were receiving health care"50. The intent of OD is to provide open communication between 
patients, families and carers, and aims to identify what went wrong in order to minimise future 
incidents of a similar nature. 
A Framework for Open Disclosure was introduced in 2003 by the Australian Commission on Safety 
and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) as a recognition of patients’ rights to be informed about 
unintentional adverse events that occur in hospitals (Skene, 2009; Brown, 2008; Finlay, Stewart & 
Parker, 201351). An evaluation by Iedema et al. in 2008 of the implementation of OD in 21 sites 
found a “reasonable degree of enthusiasm for OD among both patients and clinicians”. However, a 
review in 2012 by the ACSQHC52 added non-disclosure protections in order to encourage 
practitioners to participate openly without fear of what was disclosed being later used in complaints 
or civil actions. There had been concerns about the legal implications for practitioners, in particular 
about their indemnity insurance and medico-legal risk, and apprehension that existing laws were 
insufficient to protect information from ODs being used in litigation (Studdert, Piper & Iedema, 
2010). 
Studdert and Richardson (2010) called for greater statutory protection and national uniformity of 
laws relating to apology in which any statements would be legally inadmissible. To clarify the legal 
obligations imposed on doctors in an effort to promote the adoption of OD, Finlay, Stewart and 
Parker (2013) summarised the existing, extensive support for OD as evidence of appropriate 
professional conduct under the National Law. They concluded that it is important to remember that 
the reason for adopting OD is not to reduce litigation but “to encourage health systems that value 
honesty and transparency so that errors can be reduced and injured patients can be properly cared 
for” (Finlay et al., 2013, p. 448). 
Root cause analysis (RCA): RCA is a formal process that aims to identify contributing factors in 
an event, with the aim of ensuring these factors would be remedied and prevent further harm. The 
Incident Management Policy of NSW Health states that it is mandatory for each NSW Health entity 
to have a system in place to manage critical and corporate incidents53. 
                                                          
50 Clinical Excellence Commission (2014) Open Disclosure Handbook. Clinical Excellence Commission, NSW 
Government, Sydney, NSW 
51 Brown, D. (2008) Open disclosure: Morally right but is it legally safe? Medico-Legal Society of NSW Scientific 
Meeting, Sydney NSW. 
52 Australian Open Disclosure Framework Consultation Draft 2012. Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Healthcare. Available at: www.safetyandquality.gov.au/our-work/open-disclosure/the-open-disclosure-standard. 
53 NSW Government Incident Management Policy no. PD2014_004 (February 2014). 
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The purpose is not to find blame but to investigate and understand what contributed to an adverse 
event. Much of this thinking can be traced to James Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” model of hazards 
and losses, which considers not just each contributory event but how they have aligned “to cause a 
mishap or near miss”’ (Reason, 1990, 2000 & 2008). 
The NSW Incident Management Policy sets out the roles of certain personnel and levels of 
responsibility, and a system for scoring severity of incident, which will determine how it will be 
managed. The protocol incorporates the principle of Open Disclosure as well as principles of 
openness, accountability, fairness, a commitment to learning and good communication. 
As with the above, there was support for the concept, with the proviso that evidence obtained and 
opinions sought could not be used in any subsequent legal action. Such provisions already applied 
under the Civil Liability Act 2002, but as with Open Disclosure, there had been widespread fears 
about subsequent medico-legal action (Studdert, Piper & Iedema, 2010). 
Coronial Inquest: Object 3(c) of the Coroners Act 2009 in NSW is “to enable coroners to 
investigate certain kinds of deaths or suspected deaths in order to determine the identities of the 
deceased persons, the times and dates of their deaths and the manner and cause of their deaths” 
(Coroners Act 2009). Most deaths do not require an inquest to be held. However, some deaths are 
deemed to be reportable due to particular circumstances as set out in s6 of the Act, and include 
violent or unnatural deaths, deaths of unknown or suspicious cause, and where death is not a 
reasonably expected outcome of a health-related procedure. The latter means a medical, surgical, 
dental or other intervention, including administration of an anaesthetic, sedative or other drug. 
In order to determine the cause of a death, a doctor may be called to provide testimony about their 
own involvement in the care of a patient or to provide peer or expert opinion about the actions of 
another health practitioner. Under s82 (2) (b) of the Act, a Coroner may refer a matter for 
investigation to the Health Care Complaints Commission, or if under s78 the Coroner has a 
reasonable belief that a person may be found guilty of an indictable offence, that person may be 
referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Peer or expert review in health-related matters will 
be an integral part of coming to such a conclusion. Alternatively, it may be the doctor him- or 
herself who is believed to have caused a death, in which case either scenario may apply. 
Commonwealth Professional Services Review Scheme: this is “a scheme for reviewing and 
investigating the provision of services by a person to determine whether the person has engaged 
in inappropriate practice” (Part VAA, s80 (2) Health Insurance Act, 1973). Inquiries may involve 
alleged misuse of Medicare, such as over-servicing, incorrect item numbers claimed, inappropriate 
services or services claimed but not provided. Such inquiries may lead to criminal charges: the 
Federal Department of Health Annual Report 2016-17 reported that it had successfully prosecuted 
29 fraud cases. It also referred 81 cases for Professional Standards Review in that year. Doctors 
found guilty under these provisions may not lose their Medicare provider number or have 
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restrictions placed on the scope of their practice, but would face a disciplinary hearing for 
unsatisfactory professional conduct, or worse. 
Complaints: From the list above, it is clear that dealing with adverse incidents or events in health 
care is not all about complaints, although they are seen as an important, if not essential, 
component of the mechanisms for responding to adverse events and matters relating to 
professional conduct. It is commonly thought that having a robust system to deal with complaints 
will keep the public safe by enabling identification of those practitioners and health services who 
are putting the public at risk. The onus is largely on the public to take the initiative, although the 
actions of other jurisdictions may open a path to an investigation by a health complaints body, so a 
doctor may find themselves being caught up in more than one process for the same incident. This 
was shown in the cases mentioned earlier: Drs Bailey, Heron and Gardiner came before criminal 
and disciplinary jurisdictions arising from the Chelmsford Private Hospital scandal, as did Dr Patel 
in Bundaberg and Dr Reeves in Bega. 
Most commonly, a complaint will be dealt with through a complaints mechanism within a health 
service, or an independent complaints body. All health care organisations are required under the 
national standards published by the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care 
(ACSQHC) to have a complaints management system (ACSQHC, 2017: Clinical Governance 
Criteria 1.13 and 1.4)54. A person with a grievance can therefore expect to have an avenue within 
the organisation to deal with their grievance. 
Most disputes are handled at the local level within a health service, with the assistance of 
complaint liaison officers (Wilson, 1999, p. 179). This is in contrast to the common belief that the 
complaints process is about court matters, yet the number of matters that are subject to law suits is 
small compared to the number of complaints that are dealt with in a variety of jurisdictions and 
forums55. Wilson (1999, p. 179) sees health service dispute-handling outside of the courts as a 
“social process of calling the health service to account for perceived violations of the complainant’s 
expectations”. Lloyd-Bostock and Mulcahy (1994) also add that not fully recognising the 
importance of complaints understates their value as sources of knowledge about performance and 
conduct issues, citing examples of the failure to consistently act on complaints by patients leading 
to avoidable crises and tragedy in health care. 
                                                          
54 ACSQHC (2017) National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards, 2nd ed. Australian Commission on Safety and 
Quality in Health Care, Sydney, Australia 
55 For instance, Avant Insurance reported that of all matters doctors sought assistance for, 50% were in relation to 
complaints, compared with 18% in relation to claims for compensation. In addition, there were 60 complaints per 
1000 members (6%) and approx. 22 claims per 1000 members (2.2%) (Avant Insurance 2017 Annual Report). As 
Avant’s membership is 75500 doctors in Australia or approximately 65% of all registered doctors, these figures provide 
a useful picture of the scale of medico-legal matters the profession faces per year. Added to this are 18% of matters 
relate to coronial inquests, with the remainder being 11% for employment disputes and 6% “other”. 
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The Complaints Process: Individual Interests or the Public Interest 
Reader note: While this study encompasses Australia-wide regulatory mechanisms, the focus is on 
the NSW system, mainly for the pragmatic reason that space does not allow for an examination of 
each state’s system and the reasons for differences, and because the study originated in NSW. 
The purpose was not to analyse the systems themselves, but the impact of the process, in which 
the underlying principles are consistent. 
The network of complaints bodies fits within a broader regulatory framework, and their statutory 
authority falls within a jurisdictional environment, encapsulated under the term “public interest law”. 
Public interest law 
This is a term introduced in Chapter One when discussing the interests of the individual versus the 
interests of the broader public, which sometimes do not coincide. This issue was pivotal in the 
arguments brought by the various parties and interest groups when the Health Care Complaints 
legislation was being debated in NSW – whether the new Act would provide for an advocacy 
service to assist the individual with a grievance to seek resolution and redress, or whether it would 
exist to protect the interests of the public. 
In Australia, a model based on the American model described by Jaffe (1976) was established in 
the first community legal centre in Fitzroy, Victoria, in 1972, followed by many others including 
Aboriginal Legal Services. Thomas (2002a, p. 270) quoted Selby (1992, p. 12), “a public interest 
legal issue [is] one where the results have ramifications which go beyond the immediate parties 
and affect a broad community of interest either immediately or in the foreseeable future”. It was 
Thomas’s (2002a) view that the public interest agenda for health care complaints was promoted by 
the Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC), which focused on the rights of disadvantaged and 
disempowered groups in contrast to the rights of injured individuals. With a commitment to the 
public interest by the Complaints Unit, and with an already established legal section with access to 
resources for prosecutions, two issues were critical for the future: one was the groundwork and 
expertise for its relationship with the NSW Medical Board to whom it referred matters for 
prosecution, and the other for the shaping of the future Health Care Complaints Commission 
(HCCC) which adopted a prosecutorial role, in an eventual co-regulatory arrangement with the 
Medical Board. 
Public interest law and health 
Statute law: These are laws passed by Parliament, and as public interest laws they exist as 
protective legislation. Statute laws include medical practice legislation and associated regulations, 
and they provide complaints-handling mechanisms, such as the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 
in NSW, the Health Practitioners Regulation National Law Act 2009 (the National Law), and Health 
Services Acts in various states of Australia. 
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Professional discipline: Disciplinary actions are administered under the National Law, and under 
state-based legislation in NSW and Queensland. The primary objective is public protection, and 
their interest is in maintaining standards of care, which does not mean optimal care, but accepted 
practice. There is a process for determining the standard of performance or conduct of an 
individual practitioner, firstly by determining the standard of care for a particular circumstance, 
whether the practitioner breached that standard, and if so, to what degree, thence what level of 
criticism this breach would attract by a body of peers. Departures from the standard are defined 
under the National Law as when: 
the knowledge, skill or judgment possessed, or care exercised, by the practitioner in 
the practice of the health profession in which the practitioner is registered is below the 
standard reasonably expected of a health practitioner of an equivalent level of training 
or experience [s3, the National Law]. 
In NSW, the departure from the benchmark is specified as “significantly below the standard”. 
Questions relating to these determinations relevant to my study are: 
Q. How is the public protected by holding an inquiry into a doctor’s professional conduct? 
Q. Do departures from the standard in respect of one incident mean the public is at risk? 
Q. Do alleged or purported “failures” mean a doctor is a bad doctor? 
Q. Where does the concept of justice fit? 
This thesis explores these questions as we progress further into understanding how the law in 
action functions and how it is experienced, through both the existing literature and what my study 
has found. 
Where the Complaints Process Fits and What It Is For 
Here we return to the law in action, to consider the circumstances in which those administering the 
law decide to act. With criminal acts, which are offences against the state, a prosecuted defendant 
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt will receive a prescribed penalty. With state-based laws, 
including the protective legislation we have been considering, much depends on the adequacy of 
the agencies operating on behalf of the state to give effect to the legislation. It relies on other 
parties to draw attention to a potential breach, and in the case of some agencies or individuals, 
they may fail to act altogether, or to act in a meaningful way. So it was with Chelmsford, where 
state agencies were indeed aware of problems at the hospital, but either lacked the authority to 
act, or failed to act more assertively to look deeper into the troubling information that was emerging 
from that place. 
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From that circumstance, and the regulatory deficiencies identified by the Royal Commission, the 
HCCC was born. But the legislation that enabled it to exist and function relied on individuals to 
draw attention to problems in the health care system through the avenue of complaints. Here I 
reiterate that complaints are about an individual grievance that expects resolution, and perhaps 
redress. Therefore, there is inherent tension in the HCCC’s capacity to satisfy that grievance while 
more pressingly act to protect the public56. Nevertheless, there is no doubt the complaints system 
plays an important role in maintaining public trust through its objectives of public protection and 
taking remedial action where it is found to be necessary, albeit that satisfaction with the process is 
less than overwhelming for some. Other studies and reviews have found numerous concerns and 
criticisms being expressed about such issues in the system as timeliness, transparency, 
communication and quality of interactions communication, fairness, uncertainties about whose 
interests were being protected (Pierce, 2017; Snowball, 2014; Health Issues Centre, 201457). 
These findings will be considered further in the Discussion. 
The regulatory framework 
The regulatory framework is a complex network of interconnected bodies whose primary aim is to 
protect the public and maintain standards of health care. It evolved over time from each state 
having had its own regulatory authorities, referred to as Health Complaints Entities (HECs), each 
with its own set of legislation and regulations, and each with different approaches to registration 
and to dealing with complaints and disciplinary matters, to an integrated national framework aiming 
for greater consistency and mobility between states. Previously, mobility between states was 
difficult for practitioners because registration was state-based. It was also difficult when 
undertaking inquiries into a practitioner’s history, usually in the context of question marks about 
their fitness to practise. This left gaps in ensuring consistency, and in keeping track of those with a 
blemished or uncertain history. The national framework – the National Registration and 
Accreditation Scheme (NRAS) - was the response to these and other challenges, and it came into 
being in 2010 under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 2009 (the National Law). The 
Australian Productivity Commission had recommended in 2005 that there be a national registration 
and accreditation process, and in 2008, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed 
that they would establish a national registration and accreditation scheme. The scheme 
commenced on 1 July 2010 under the national law that was based on legislation passed in 
Queensland in 2009 as the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Queensland). 
The Australian Health Workforce Ministerial Council oversees the NRAS, under which there are 
National Boards for each of the health professions within the scheme (the scheme commenced 
with ten health professions, and there are now fifteen), as well as accreditation authorities for each 
                                                          
56 As I have stated earlier, I am focusing on the HCCC but the principles apply similarly in the complaints jurisdictions in 
the other states and nationally. 
57 Health Issues Centre (2014). Setting things right: Improving the consumer experience of AHPRA including the joint 
notification process between AHPRA and OHSC. A report prepared for AHPRA by the HIC in collaboration with an 
AHPRA Community Reference Group. Melbourne. 
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health profession. The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Authority (AHPRA) provides 
administrative support to the Boards, and is governed by the Agency Management Committee 
(Satchell et al., 2016). A comprehensive summary of the reasoning behind development of the 
national scheme, as well as the consultation that took place in designing the scheme, can be found 
in the thesis of Suzanne Pierce (2017). 
The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Authority 
The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Authority (AHPRA) is responsible for implementation 
of the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme (NRAS), through its various functions and 
oversight of the fifteen health professions’ National Boards. The primary and overarching function 
is protection of the public, and its other functions are to: register the over 630 000 health 
practitioners in Australia, in fifteen health professions; set national standards of practice; facilitate 
mobility (by having registration recognised in all states and territories); publish the online register; 
audit compliance; accredit education and training; and to manage notifications (complaints) about 
practitioners58. 
The Medical Board of Australia 
AHPRA provides support to the Boards, including the Medical Board of Australia, at the national 
level. The Medical Board of Australia is responsible for: the registration of all medical practitioners 
and medical students; developing standards, codes and guidelines for the medical profession;the 
investigation of notifications and complaints about medical practitioners (except NSW); conducting 
panel hearings and referral of serious matters to a Tribunal; the assessment of international 
medical graduates; and for approval of accreditation standards and accredited courses of study. 
As noted, there are two exceptions to the national complaints-handling process: in Queensland, 
complaints are managed by the Queensland Office of the Ombudsman; and in NSW, the HCCC 
handles complaints in a co-regulatory arrangement with the Councils for each health profession. 
The Medical Council of New South Wales 
Councils in NSW are statutory bodies which were established under the National Registration and 
Accreditation Scheme (NSW), and are supported by the Health Professions Councils Authority 
(HPCA), which itself is an administrative agency of the NSW Ministry of Health. Each Council is 
made up of practitioners, legal representatives and community members, most of whom are 
nominated by the Minister for Health and appointed by the Governor of NSW. The Councils work 
with the HCCC in a co-regulatory arrangement, meeting to consult about which agency should deal 
with new complaints. The HCCC has an additional role in handling complaints about health 
                                                          
58 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency: https://www.ahpra.gov.au (accessed 19 July 2018). 
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services and unregistered practitioners59. The HPCA also maintains a co-regulatory arrangement 
with AHPRA and the National Boards for each health profession. 
The Medical Council of New South Wales (the Council) has oversight of the performance, conduct 
and fitness to practise of the 34 255 medical practitioners of NSW60. In consultation with the 
HCCC61, the Council receives and manages complaints about registered doctors and medical 
students in NSW. It works to ensure doctors maintain the appropriate standards for the profession 
and that doctors are fit to practise. Doctors brought to the Council’s attention are managed within 
the three streams of health, performance and conduct. For each of these streams, there is a 
program of intervention: the Health Program for doctors and medical students suffering ill-health 
which may compromise their capacity to practise medicine safely; the Performance Program for 
doctors whose professional performance may not meet safe standards; and the Conduct Program 
for doctors whose professional conduct may not meet acceptable standards. The Council is also 
authorised to take immediate action where a practitioner poses an immediate risk to public health 
and safety, or to themselves, and this generally means a temporary suspension from practice and 
referral for appropriate inquiry and intervention62. 
The function of the regulatory processes 
To reiterate, the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme (the National Scheme) was 
established in 2010 to oversee the safe practice of health professionals, reporting to the Australian 
Health Ministers Advisory Council (AHMAC). 
AHPRA functions to support the national health practitioner boards in implementing the National 
Registration and Accreditation Scheme in accordance with the National Law. There is a co-
regulatory agreement with the states whereby the states maintain certain regulatory functions, 
including complaint-handling mechanisms under the various health complaint entities. 
In Queensland, the arrangement is different. Allegations that the Queensland Medical Board had 
failed to adequately deal with cases of misconduct and complaints led to the Board being sacked in 
2013 after an Inquiry that involved an analysis of some hundreds of files. A temporary 
                                                          
59 Health Professional Councils Authority: https://www.hpca.nsw.gov.au (accessed on 18 July 2018). 
60 Medical Council of New South Wales Annual report, 2016-17 (accessed on 23 July 2018). 
61 s.144G of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) states that: “A Council must, as soon as practicable 
after a complaint is made to or by the Council about a registered health practitioner or student, notify the following 
persons about the complaint or matter- 
(a) the Commission;  
(b) the National Board for the health profession in which the registered health practitioner or student is registered”; 
and  
s.139I of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) states that: “A notice under section 130 is taken to be 
a complaint both for the purposes of this Part and for the purposes of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993”. 
62 Medical Council of New South Wales: https://www.mcnsw.org.au (accessed on 19 July 2018): 
Under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW), S. 146D states that the “Committee can recommend 
suspension or cancellation on grounds of lack of physical or mental capacity.” If this occurs, the matter must be 
referred to the Tribunal. 
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administration was put in place and the work of the former Board committee was managed by the 
Medical Board of Australia63, until the new Board was appointed in early 2014. In addition, the 
former Health Quality and Complaints Commission was replaced by The Office of the Health 
Ombudsman in that year. 
What is the Complaints Process For? 
As well as the state-based health complaints entities, such as the HCCC in NSW, AHPRA 
functions to manage complaints about the health, performance and conduct of individual health 
practitioners. The National Law refers to complaints as notifications, whose purpose is: 
… to alert regulators to registrant performance or conduct that may place the public at 
risk. The notification system is designed to improve the performance of health 
professionals and safeguard the community by providing – where appropriate – 
feedback, intervention and more serious consequences to those practitioners who 
breach professional standards, including deregistration (Snowball, 2014, p. 28). 
The role of the complaints mechanism is to “receive and resolve complaints from health service 
users about health service providers”. However, the objective of the legislation is aimed higher 
than seeking resolution of or redress for an individual’s grievance. Its primary objective is to protect 
the public: “to provide for the protection of the public by ensuring that only health practitioners who 
are suitably trained and qualified to practise in a competent and ethical manner are registered” 
[s1(3) of the National Law]. The individual complaint is a window into possible below-standards of 
care, for which the legislation is obliged to provide a remedy. 
The Health Care Complaints Commission 
The Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC) in NSW was the first statutory body in Australia 
established under legislation to “protect the public” in 1993 to receive, assess and resolve 
complaints before it, to investigate “serious issues of public health and safety” [(s23) HCC Act 
1993] and prosecute complaints of unsatisfactory professional conduct or of misconduct (as 
defined), or to refer to other bodies if appropriate. The functions of the HCCC arose from 
Chelmsford, out of the findings of the Royal Commission into Deep Sleep Therapy, presided over 
by Justice J.P. Slattery, as discussed in Chapter One. Having a strong, independent statutory body 
was considered necessary in order to more effectively deal with maintaining public protection 
against identified practitioners and health services that threatened public safety. As “public interest 
law” in action, the HCCC has the powers to obtain documents, to conduct searches, to fully 
investigate and to prosecute those whose alleged failings had attracted significant criticism from 
their peers. At a less serious level, it also assists in the resolution of complaints which do not raise 
significant issues of public health or safety, but which are significant enough to the complainant to 
                                                          
63 Medical Board of Australia Media Release: Board appoints interim committee in Queensland. 23 May 2013. 
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have taken their grievance to a public authority. Part of the assessment process when new 
complaints are received is to identify those matters that raise issues of public health and safety, 
and others that would be better resolved by more direct, and less serious and threatening means 
(to the practitioner who is the subject of the complaint). The other states do not have similar 
investigatory functions as NSW; their focus is on resolving complaints, and those matters that 
require investigation are handled by the relevant health professional board. Some of the latter may 
be referred back to the state HCE. 
The process of complaints-handling in NSW differs from that of the national scheme, while having 
similar objectives, but for simplicity, the summary prepared by the authors Satchell et al. (2016) 
presents the national framework alongside the HCCC (NSW) framework. There are five stages to 
the complaint process as follows64: 
One: Lodging a complaint. A complaint is to be made in writing, may be about a health 
practitioner, whether registered or not, or a health service, and is to include particulars of the 
allegations. The respondent to the complaint is notified of the complaint. 
Two: Assessment of the complaint. This is to determine how the complaint will be dealt with: to 
investigate it; that it be conciliated, referred to another organisation more appropriate for dealing 
with it (such as Medicare Australia in relation to over-servicing, or the Director-General of Health in 
relation to prescribing, etc.); or that the matter be declined. Certain additional information may be 
obtained in order to assess the complaint. Some complaints may be resolved through assisted 
resolution during the assessment stage. 
                                                          
64 A note on process: Notification of a complaint may come by mail or email. Notification of a claim for compensation 
will generally come direct to the doctor from a solicitor. There are other forms of service, such as a subpoena but 
none of these means applied to the participants so I will not enumerate them here. There were two exceptions, both 
having been involved in police inquiries. 
With complaints, a doctor is required by the terms of their medical indemnity policy to notify their indemnity insurer 
as soon as they become aware of a complaint, or indeed of a matter that they believe may become a complaint, such 
as an encounter with a particularly hostile patient, a severe adverse event such as an unexpected death, a 
catastrophic injury or outcome or a serious allegation of wrongdoing, misconduct or impairment. The insurer then 
advises the doctor on how to respond to the matter at hand, and there is an expectation that the doctor will comply 
with directions and advice in order to remain indemnified. 
Advice generally involves assistance with drafting letters of response, advice regarding what details to include and 
what documents and other supporting evidence should be released. If a matter proceeds further, advice is provided 
throughout the process. Advisers are trained and experienced in providing medico-legal assistance; they are doctors, 
lawyers or claims managers, or a combination of these professions. For less serious matters (in terms of potential 
consequence for the doctor), medico-legal advisers handle telephone enquiries, open files for written complaints 
received, and assist the doctor with drafting letters. A more serious matter, or one that escalates, will be transferred 
to a qualified legal or medical officer to manage. Medical advisers also provide advice to staff on clinical matters, and 
IE or peer opinion may be sought to determine the relevant standards of care or conduct in a particular matter. 
It is important to have a grasp of these procedures, as all doctors with a complaint rely on the advice they receive and 
are obliged to accept as an essential condition of their indemnity insurance policy, for which doctors pay many 
thousands of dollars per year. It means that a doctor’s response to a complaint is generally mediated through the IEs 
employed or engaged by their indemnity insurer, or less often by a private solicitor. 
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Three: Investigation. Investigations relate to professional conduct. In NSW, s23 of the Health 
Care Complaints Act 1993 determines when a complaint is to be investigated65. In the course of an 
investigation, the HCCC may obtain documents or other evidence, may enter premises to inspect, 
examine and remove if necessary any material, documents or equipment, by compulsion if 
necessary through sub poena or search warrant. They may also seek the advice of an expert for 
their opinion relating to standards of care and the practitioner’s conduct, and their opinion may be 
used in any disciplinary proceedings that arise from the investigation. A practitioner has the right to 
make written submissions in relation to any proposed action by the HCCC. 
Four: Pathways at the end of an investigation. The HCCC may: terminate the matter; make 
comments to the practitioner; refer to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) for criminal action; 
refer the matter to the professional Council for performance assessment, counselling or inquiry; 
refer the matter to the Director of Proceedings for prosecution before a Professional Standards 
Committee, or to a Tribunal. Performance matters are referred to the Council to be handled under 
the Performance Program, and concerns about impairment are handled under the Health Program. 
Five: Tribunal (a Civil and Administrative Tribunal, such as that in NSW, an NCAT). Only a 
Tribunal is able to order that a practitioner’s name be removed from the register, or to suspend 
them from practice for a specified period. This means that the matter is of such seriousness as to 
warrant such action to protect the public. A Tribunal hearing is presided over by a judge, is 
generally open to the public, and the decision will be published. 
Why Make a Complaint? 
Understanding why people complain and what they complain about is an important part of 
understanding the complaints process, and because it provides some indication of how those who 
are being complained about may react to receiving a complaint. 
Complaints are a means by which dissatisfied people can express their grievances or concerns 
about a service provided to them or someone they know, with the general aim of having their 
grievance heard and resolved. Having a formalised system lends weight and authority to the 
grievance, either because the complainant has not been able to resolve their grievance directly, or 
because they have not wished to deal directly with the health provider, and want the power of an 
independent authority to intervene on their behalf. There are many reasons for this, amongst these 
being fear or wanting the authority to act to prevent further occurrences, to demand accountability, 
to punish, to remedy, and to seek information or acknowledgement of hurt about an incident of 
                                                          
65 s23 states that a complaint must be investigated if the relevant Council is of that opinion: if the complaint raises a 
significant issue of public health or safety or raises a significant question as to the appropriate care or treatment of a 
client by a health service provider; or, if substantiated, would provide grounds for disciplinary action against a health 
practitioner; or, if substantiated, would involve gross negligence on the part of a health practitioner; or, if 
substantiated, would result in the health practitioner being found guilty of an offence under the Public Health Act 
2010. 
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care (Mulcahy, 2003; Lloyd-Bostock, 1994). The main reason given by 80% of respondents to a 
survey by Pierce (2017) was so the event would not happen to them or anyone else; 75% had a 
belief that what occurred was wrong, unfair or unjust; 65% said that what happened was unsafe; 
and 46% believed the practitioner should not be in practice. 
Most early studies were about why people sued, but once the visibility of complaints systems 
became more apparent, studies began to focus more on complaints. The study of Vincent et al. 
(1994) was foundational as it built on recently exposed knowledge of the quantum of adverse 
events and a greater awareness of litigation and the costs associated. They undertook their study 
to better understand litigants’ reasons for suing doctors, and found it was not, as believed, just 
because there had been an injury but rested on how the incident was handled afterwards. 
Respondents in the study survey were clients from major medical negligence firms. What the 
survey showed was that respondents wanted explanations of what had happened, but only 15% 
had been happy with the explanations given. They also wanted: greater honesty in knowing what 
happened; acknowledgement of the effect of the incident on relationships, work, social life and 
emotional impact; for the organisation to be accountable; to prevent similar incidents happening to 
others; and compensation for actual losses, pain, suffering and care for the injured person (Vincent 
et al., 1994). 
Lloyd-Bostock and Mulcahy’s extensive work on disputes between doctors and patients reaches 
back to the 1980s. It laid an invaluable foundation for understanding not only the motivations and 
expectations of complainants; they set the issue of complaints and complaint-handling into a 
broader context of how society generally deals with conflict and disputes, and into the social milieu 
existing in the decades 1980s to 1990s of growing consumer expectations of accountability by 
health service providers, the medical profession and professionals in general (Mulcahy, 1994; 
Lloyd-Bostock & Mulcahy, 1994; Mulcahy, 2003). They also succeeded in correcting the 
impression created by researchers, law reporters and others that complaints are at a “lower level” 
of the scale, with litigation at the top end of interest and importance. Chapter Four presents earlier 
research of the 1980s on the impact of medico-legal matters that focused on doctors who had 
been sued. It was another decade before attention turned to the impact of being the subject of a 
complaint, which Mulcahy (1994) points out is a very different process, with very different 
motivations, from taking a matter to court with a claim for compensation. 
Lloyd-Bostock and Mulcahy’s (1993) study of hospital complaints and how hospitals responded to 
them threw light on complainants’ motivations for complaining, and on what outcomes they 
expected. This study also explained that how the complaint was dealt with, and whether 
expectations of the process were met or not, would influence what might happen next. 
Complainants who felt they were not being taken seriously, if they received dismissive, defensive 
responses, or perceived there was scepticism about their motives for complaining, often meant that 
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complainants were dissatisfied with the process and would be more likely to progress the dispute 
to the external regulators, to their lawyers, or to their local MP or the media, as mentioned. 
Failure to take a complaint seriously motivates people to take their grievance to where someone 
with authority will take notice. The Davies Committee report in 1970s England looked back at how 
investigations had been conducted in the National Health Service (NHS), and found defensive 
attitudes in response to complaints, low staff morale, indifference to complaints and subsequent 
little information about complaints procedures and reluctance to introduce appeals procedures66. 
As happened in the infamous Mid-Staffordshire scandal in the United Kingdom, Robert Francis QC 
published his Public Inquiry into Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust on 6th February 2013, 
stating: 
A health service that does not listen to complaints is unlikely to reflect its patients’ 
needs. One that does will be more likely to detect the early warning signs that 
something requires correction, to address such issues and to protect others from 
harmful treatment. … A complaints system that does not respond flexibly, promptly and 
effectively to the justifiable concerns of complainants not only allows unacceptable 
practice to persist, it aggravates the grievance and suffering of the patient and those 
associated with the complaint, and undermines the public’s trust in the service67. 
The same applies whether it is a hospital, a clinic, a private practice or an individual health 
practitioner who is the source of the grievance. What this highlights is that complainants have a 
genuine desire to express their concern about an episode of health care, not just because they 
think they deserve better, but to make a difference to their own understanding of an unsatisfactory 
experience, and so that others may not similarly suffer. Furthermore, what is not generally known 
is that the majority of those who complain have actually attempted to resolve the matter directly at 
the point of service. The University of Sydney study by Pierce (2017) found that as many as 65% 
of complainants had attempted local resolution, but feeling dissatisfied with how the matter was 
dealt with, wrote a formal letter of complaint to the regulator. Reasons for this dissatisfaction 
echoed Mulcahy’s (1994) findings noted above: perfunctory or dismissive response; no response; 
no apology; no assurance that changes would be made. In the words of the psychologist Hugh 
Mackay: 
We all want our voices to be heard as authentic, legitimate and worthy of attention. We 
can’t bear to be overlooked, dismissed or belittled. Among the factors that explain why 
we do the things we do, this one is sovereign. When we know we are being taken 
seriously, we can relax into that assurance. When we fear we are not, our reactions 
                                                          
66 Davies Committee report into hospital procedures: chaired by Sir Michael Davies and commencing in 1971. 
67 Right Honourable Ann Clwyd MP and Professor Tricia Hart (2013). Final report of a review of the NHS Hospitals 
Complaints System: Putting patients back in the picture. Department of Health, England. 
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can range from sadness, resignation or disappointment, through envy of those who 
receive the recognition we crave, to a burning fury of resentment (Mackay, 2013, p. 3). 
When the relationship of trust has been tested or broken between health professional and patient, 
and later between complainant and complaints authority, these emotions can be amplified, 
because people expect so much more. 
Who Makes Complaints? 
Complaints may be made by individual members of the public or others on their behalf including 
public officials. For instance, 62.2% of complaints to AHPRA (“notifications”) about medical 
practitioners were from patients, their relatives or members of the public68, while other sources 
include a Commonwealth or State Health Department (0.9%) or other Government department 
(0.7%)69. These latter sources include regulatory bodies such as Medicare Australia, the 
Pharmaceuticals Services Branch in NSW or its equivalent in other states, Therapeutic Goods 
Administration, as well as the police and Coroner’s investigations which may lead to further inquiry 
by the health complaints bodies and the national regulator AHPRA (see Table One below). 
Table One: Source of complaints, HCCC Annual Report 2016-17 
Source Number % of total 
Consumer (client, patient) 3 310 51.8% 
Family or friend 1 599 25% 
Other, unspecified 538 8.4% 
Health care provider 349 5.5% 
Professional council/association, regulatory authority 288 4.5% 
Consumer organisation/advocate, carer/employer 184 2.9% 
Department of Health (State or Commonwealth) 58 0.9% 
Government department 45 0.7% 
Legal representative 17 0.3% 
College  4 0.1% 
Court 2 0% 
Member of Parliament/Minister 0 0% 
Total 6 394 100% 
 
The number of complaints in NSW has risen substantially, due probably to a combination of higher 
population that increases the number of medical interventions, which increases opportunity for 
things to go wrong; greater knowledge of complaints mechanisms, and/or greater desire for justice 
and accountability; or the greater difficulty of achieving a successful claim which leads people to its 
                                                          
68 Medical Board of Australia: Annual Report Summary 2016/17. 
69 HCCC Annual Report 2016/17. 
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alternative. Walton also suggests that the increased numbers are due to patients and families 
overcoming their reluctance to complain, with easier access and greater publicity about how to 
complain (Walton, Smith-Merry, Healy & McDonald, 2012). In the 2012-13 year, there were 4 554 
complaints to the HCCC, while in 2016-17, this number had grown to 6 319 complaints, a 53% 
increase in those 5 years. 2 298 complaints were about doctors, or 56% of all complaints (HCCC 
Annual Reports 2012-13 and 2016-17). 
Health service providers are required to have protocols for dealing with grievances or complaints, 
so that complaints may be dealt with at the point of care. Formal complaints bodies are 
independent from the health service providers, as provided by the legislation. Object 3(d) of the 
HCC Act states it is “to provide an independent mechanism for assessing whether the prosecution 
of disciplinary action should be taken against health practitioners who are registered under health 
registration Acts” [Health Care Complaints Act 1993]. A health service may refer a complaint to the 
complaints body about an individual health practitioner whose conduct or standard of care has 
raised questions about their competence or conduct, as shown in the table under health care 
provider (5.5% in Table One, above). However, data show that the majority come from individuals 
directly impacted by an incident or series of events relating to the provision of care (51.8% from 
Table One) or from a family member or friend (25%). 
What Complaints Are About 
Complaints data (see Table Two below) show the categories under which complaints are filed, 
noting that complaints are classified according to the main issue or issues identified by the 
regulator. It is difficult to provide a definitive summary of the data as the various jurisdictions use 
varied or inconsistent categories for classifying complaints. In the context of the nationalisation of 
health practitioner registration in 2010, Walton et al. (2012)  lamented that such inconsistencies 
were a lost opportunity to present an overall picture of what concerned complainants. Having 
national consistent data would contribute to national policy development that reflects the concerns 
of complainants, just as exists for the reporting of adverse events. 
Harrison (Harrison, Walton, Healy, Smith-Merry & Hobbs, 2016) also noted the value of the 
patients’ perspectives in adding to this substantial pool of data in order to better inform policy on 
safety issues. Because consistency of complaints data is not available nationally, Harrison et al. 
(2016) undertook a study that considered a standard taxonomy from which aggregated data could 
be derived. Applying a previously developed taxonomy by Reader, Gillespie and Roberts (2014), 
they undertook a content analysis of 138 serious hospital complaints being investigated by HCCC. 
They found the complaints could be categorised into three domains of Clinical, Managerial and 
Relationships, each of which contained categories and sub-categories. For example but not 
exclusively, under the domain Clinical sits Treatment, with sub-categories of errors in diagnosis, 
medication or treatment; under Managerial sit delays in admission or treatment, medical records, 
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grievance handling; under Relationships sit lack of or delays in communication, doctor-patient 
relationship, shared decision-making, neglect, lack of caring, consent. There was difficulty in 
defining the categories as many are interrelated – communication problems may lead to a problem 
in the clinical area. The study was useful in both highlighting the value of the patient perspective as 
obtained through the avenue of complaints, and the challenges in developing a useful taxonomy 
that would add to the existing pool of data from adverse events (Harrison at al., 2016). 
As the Walton et al. (2012) study showed, added to the inconsistency of data across the HCEs, 
there is different terminology used when classifying complaints. However, to provide a useful 
indication, the table below summarises the breakdown of complaints received in 2016/17 by the 
HCCC. To illustrate, the following shows the categories into which the substance of complaints are 
filed70. The tables are summarised from the 2016/17 HCCC annual report. 
Table Two: Summary of how complaints are categorised 
Category  
% of 
Total 
Details of Category 
Treatment 41.5% Main categories: inadequate treatment (12.7%); diagnosis 
(4.9%), complications (4.4%), inappropriate care (4.3%), 
delay in treatment (3.6%); inadequate consultation (3.0%), 
results follow up (1.6%) 
Professional Conduct 16.4% Impairment; illegal practice, competence; sexual 
misconduct; boundary violation, disclosure of information; 
assault, advertising, discriminatory conduct, child sexual 
abuse, financial or scientific fraud, breach of condition, 
emergency treatment not provided 
Communication 
Information 
15.9% Attitude, manner; inadequate or incorrect information, 
special needs not accommodated 
Medication 6.3% Prescribing, dispensing, administering medication 
Access 3.7% Refusal to treat, accessibility, remoteness, waiting lists 
Fees/Costs 3.2% Billing practices, costs; financial consent 
Environment/Management 
of Facilities 
3.0% Administrative, staffing, physical environment, cleanliness, 
hygiene  
Consent 2.3% No or inadequate consent, uninformed consent, 
involuntary treatment 
Reports/Certificates 2.2% Accuracy, timeliness of report; refusal to provide 
certificate, cost of report 
Medical Records 2.0% Record keeping, access or transfer of records, records 
management 
Discharge/Transfer 
arrangements 
1.8% Inadequate discharge, delay in discharge, patient not 
reviewed, mode of transport 
Grievance Processes 1.6% No or inadequate response to complaint, retaliation due to 
complaint, information re complaints procedures not 
provided. 
These figures show that while some categories raise concern or even alarm, many of the 
complaints are not about harm and injury, and many do not require severe sanctions to keep the 
                                                          
70 Health Care Complaints Commission (NSW) 2016/17 Annual report. 
 P a g e  | 77 
public safe. This is not to diminish complainants’ grievances in any way, nor to suggest some of 
these issues do not matter. Indeed, as Gallagher and Maxor (2015, p. 353) state, “Patients who file 
complaints believe they have been harmed. The harm may not be physical – it may be emotional 
distress, life disruption or loss of trust. Regardless, the harm is experienced as significant and 
damaging, and the patient wants it to be taken seriously”. 
A complaint can be a window into a broader problem, and an inquiry into it may find a 
straightforward remedy, or may reveal something more sinister or serious. On the other hand, in 
the instance where a patient complains that a doctor failed to provide a medical certificate, it may 
mean the doctor refused to do so because the patient was not unwell, in which case the doctor 
was doing his or her job properly. In the largest category Treatment, the complaint frequently 
relates to differences of opinion about appropriate treatment; an example is refusal to perform a 
caesarean section when the doctor considered it an unnecessary intervention in a normal labour. 
Therefore, complaints are not all about harm, or fault. The second category Communication can 
cover all manner of misunderstandings, and not all have had adverse consequences – a gruff 
manner may have upset someone but it probably did not harm them. On the other hand, a gruff 
manner that frightens patients or staff may deter them from speaking up, and this could have 
adverse consequences. 
Complaints data, while representing the patients’ perspective (Harrison et al., 2016), actually 
represents the interpretation of that perspective. The assessment process deals with a complaint in 
terms of the public interest issues that it raises, as distinct from the human dimension that 
Gallagher and Mazor (2015) referred to. For instance, the patient’s experience of an episode of 
health care can be invaluable in alerting “the system” as to how care is being delivered. Quoting 
other studies, Gallagher and Maxor (2015, p. 353) state that: 
patients and family can provide unique and important insights, especially around care 
breakdowns. When care is complex, fragmented or rife with transitions, patients and 
family members may be the only ones aware of how care is actually delivered. In many 
situations, patients and family may be the first to detect lapses in safety or quality, 
identify worsening outcomes or point out breakdowns in communication that providers 
have missed. 
In situations where patients or family feel dismissed or ignored, this is a missed opportunity to 
remedy things at the point of care which are causing or may soon cause harm to the patient. It can 
also be the genesis of a complaint. Gallagher and Maxor (2015, p. 353) add that by shifting focus 
from efforts to mollify complainants in order to avert publicity and avoid litigation, to taking 
complaints seriously in themselves as to what can be learned from them, is a more constructive 
response for which the patient’s perspective is invaluable. By being taken seriously and valuing the 
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patient’s perspective, it would also resolve those matters that a dissatisfied complainant would 
otherwise take to an external complaints body, as noted by Pierce (2017). 
Complaints and Public Protection 
Before there was a Health Care Complaints Commission, the public in NSW did not have a remedy 
with defined statutory powers available to it. The former Complaints Unit within the NSW Health 
Department was limited in its authority, as was shown in Chapter One when the limitations of its 
authority were made clear during the Chelmsford Private Hospital inquiry. The ability to protect the 
public by taking assertive action against errant health practitioners was critically limited, and 
historically such cases were about gross misconduct including sexual assault or inappropriate 
sexual relationships, inappropriate prescribing or taking of drugs, and fraud. Prosecuting a doctor 
for conduct and performance matters was indeed very difficult, relying on a sometimes flawed peer 
review system which made it difficult to determine conclusively if a doctor’s conduct fell below the 
standard of care and that a body or peers would agree with such an opinion. This is known as the 
Bolam test, which became the benchmark for assessing medical negligence, following Justice 
McNair’s direction to a jury in a high court matter71: 
The Bolam principle may be formulated as a rule that a doctor is not negligent if he acts 
in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible body of 
medical opinion even though other doctors adopt a different practice. In short, the law 
imposes the duty of care; but the standard of care is a matter of medical judgement. 
Reliance on the Bolam test was overturned in Australia following the Rogers v Whitaker 
case in 1991. 
Certainly, civil law has always enabled aggrieved and injured people to claim for compensation. 
But it could be said that such claims do little to protect the public and future patients against 
inadequate standards of care, and in many instances a grievance is not about damages for which 
compensation will follow. In terms of the link between negligence claims and patient safety, 
Bovbjerg, Miller and Shapiro (2001) argued that there are conflicting cultures between the goals of 
each, in that in the pursuit of legal claims, lawyers argue that the threat of litigation makes doctors 
practise more safely, yet the adversarial nature of tort law is antithetical to the strategies of the 
patient-safety movement, which is more about cooperation, systems and a no-blame culture 
(Studdert, 2004). For instance, this is the basis on which open disclosure operates, in the spirit of 
transparency and openness about mistakes, and with which practitioners would not cooperate if it 
were under the threat of disciplinary or legal action. By contrast, tort law actions target individual 
practitioners, assign blame, aim to prove negligence and determine compensation. Studdert (2004, 
                                                          
71 Since 1957, the Bolam test has been the benchmark by which professional negligence has been assessed. It is based 
on the direction to the jury of a high court judge, McNair J, in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee. 
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p. 287) therefore argues that “The clash between tort law and the patient-safety movement 
undermines efforts to improve quality”, and in addition fear of litigation diminishes interest in patient 
safety, all of which can result in defensiveness, under-reporting and reluctance to be open about 
errors. 
Nevertheless, it may be that knowledge of the outcome of cases gives pause to reflect to other 
practitioners, which may have a positive effect through being more informed about what can go 
wrong. Certainly, study of cases and the implications for medical practice is integral to continuing 
medical education through formal and informal channels. 
While there are question marks over the link between tort law actions and patient safety, perhaps 
the same arguments apply to actions arising from complaints. Elkin (2012, p. 448) says that 
“Complaints to regulatory authorities are a useful, albeit imperfect, marker of quality”. Spittal, 
Bismark and Studdert (2015) argued strongly that there is such a link, by saying that important 
lessons can be learned from complaints to prevent future error. Gallagher and Levinson (2013) 
support such an approach, arguing that the accumulation of complaints, even if minor, can be a 
strong indicator of the potential for future problems. By analysing data from a sample of 18 907 
complaints filed with Health Care Entities (HCE) over an eleven-year period,doctors at highest risk 
of future complaints and their characteristics were identified, which would enable proactive rather 
than reactive intervention, and therefore, would protect patients from potential harm (Bismark, 
Spittal, Guerrin, Ward & Studdert, 2013). These authors and others built on this analysis and 
devised an algorithm called the Predicted Risk of New Event score(the PRONE score) which they 
suggest could be used to assess an individual doctor’s risk of attracting further complaints. 
“Regulators could harness such information to target quality improvement interventions, and 
prevent substandard care and patient satisfaction” (Spittal, Bismark & Studdert, 2015). As 
Gallagher and Levinson (2013) similarly believe, “Our lack of response to individual physicians who 
accumulate multiple complaints demonstrates an insufficient commitment to being a truly self-
regulating profession” (Gallagher & Levinson, 2013, p. 521). 
This proactive approach is in contrast to existing reactivity of the medico-legal agencies, that is the 
insurers, medical boards and complaints handling bodies, which they argue does little to enhance 
quality improvement efforts that focus on prevention. Identifying future risk would mean an 
appropriate response in terms of intervention commensurate with the level of risk identified, which 
they suggest is “particularly novel and exciting because it holds the promise of ushering medico-
legal agencies into the prevention business” (Spittal et al., 2015, p. 8). While they recognise the 
legal and ethical challenges this raises, their confidence in the predictability of their approach 
justifies the intrusiveness of the intervention. 
This reads as another encroachment into the medical profession’s autonomy, and increased 
surveillance, which raises ethical questions, but I will not venture further to comment on this, albeit 
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that overall, there is no doubt that patient complaints provide valuable information that can be 
utilised to inform endeavours to protect patient safety. Protecting patients starts with patient safety, 
and it does so by aiming to prevent errors, which can lead to harm to patients, thence to a potential 
complaint, or law suit. But as I have stated before, complaints are not all about harm. The patient 
safety movement may go a long way to reducing errors, but it is not the whole story. 
The regulatory process: the primary objective is protection, but how does it do so? 
Elkin (2014) raises the question as to whether medical practitioner regulation is only about 
protecting the public. If not, she asks what other motivations influence medical regulation, and 
whether these fit the regulatory framework. She distinguishes between protection of the public and 
the public interest, as these terms are not interchangeable, and the distinction is important. First, 
one function of regulation is to protect patients not able to protect themselves against doctors who 
may do harm, and it does so by having minimum standards of recruitment, conduct and 
performance and by intervening when doctors do not meet these expectations. Inevitably, these 
standards impose obligations on practitioners to comply, but they also act to protect the profession 
through its exclusive membership, the legitimacy of “being special” conferred through regulation. 
Maintaining its high standards is beneficial to both the public and the profession, provided aberrant 
behaviour that is a risk to the public is dealt with, which relies on the regulator putting the interests 
of the public before risks to the reputation of either the individual practitioner or the profession. 
Elkin (2015) considers the purpose of disciplinary processes within the regulatory regime. To be 
effective, the regime must have an “enforcement mechanism” within it to respond to those who fall 
outside what is expected of them. Yet the focus is on the individual doctor and their failures, not on 
prevention nor protection, nor on the systems failures that often accompany the incidence of 
adverse events. However, Elkin (2015) examines the three key aspects of disciplinary actions, 
aside from registration: a protection of the public; upholding the standards of practice; and 
maintaining public confidence in the health professions, with the latter two being essential to the 
first. Upholding standards of practice achieves two things: it protects the public and it protects the 
profession. High standards and the denouncement of those who breach the standards protect the 
profession by enhancing public confidence in the profession. This is vital for maintaining the 
special trust between a doctor and the patient, reiterating Freckleton (2006) who said “mistrust of 
health professionals, especially medical practitioners, is becoming endemic and has the potential 
to erode therapeutic relationships” (Freckleton, 2006, p. 17). 
Elkin (2015) also considers whether the punitive aspect of discipline can protect the public, or in 
fact whether punishment is even one of the purposes of discipline: suspension or being struck off 
the register may be a consequence, but the purpose is to protect the public, not to punish, albeit it 
will be perceived and experienced as such by the practitioner. A reprimand on the other hand is a 
signal that the conduct was unacceptable and as such is punitive as well as having deterrent value. 
Elkin (2015) directed most of her discussion to disciplinary actions and their protective function. 
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There are other avenues that have a protective role, and could be said to be more proactive than 
reactive as are disciplinary functions which proceed after the event. These mechanisms exist 
within the framework as well as the statutory mechanisms we have been considering and include 
the professional standards and Codes of Conduct that are established by each professional 
College, as well as the guidelines, protocols and policies published by the Colleges, State and 
Federal departments and other government agencies, the national and state AMA, and 
administrative protocols within individual health services. The medical indemnity insurers, with their 
vast pools of data about complaints and claims, also publish advice and information about avoiding 
trouble by understanding the main sources of such matters, by interpreting and providing guidance 
to their membership about current medico-legal issues, and have protocols for managing the risk of 
member practitioners. The picture is one of a complex network of avenues for providing guidance, 
professional obligations and maintenance of standards in all aspects of professional practice that 
aim at maintaining safer practice. 
Rather than detailing each of these, as noted earlier all medical practitioners in Australia are 
obligated to adhere to the national code of conduct developed by the Australian Medical Council 
(AMC) and issued by the Medical Board of Australia, in consultation with the states’ and territories’ 
former Medical Boards. The Code’s purpose is to describe: 
what is expected of all doctors registered to practise medicine in Australia. It sets out 
the principles that characterise good medical practice and makes explicit the standards 
of ethical and professional conduct expected of doctors by their professional peers and 
the community ... The code is addressed to doctors and is also intended to let the 
community know what they can expect from doctors72. 
The code (s.1.2) makes it clear to doctors that they have a professional responsibility to be familiar 
with the code and apply its guidance. It is to be used to support individual doctors in the 
challenging task of providing good medical care and fulfilling their professional roles, and to 
provide a framework to guide professional judgement. It aims, among other things: 
to assist the Medical Board of Australia in its role of protecting the public, by setting 
and maintaining standards of medical practice against which a doctor’s professional 
conduct can be evaluated. If your professional conduct varies significantly from this 
standard, you should be prepared to explain and justify your decisions and actions. 
Serious or repeated failure to meet these standards may have consequences for your 
medical registration. 
                                                          
72 Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia (2014): S1.1, p.1 
 P a g e  | 82 
Enforcement of this requirement is set out in the national law73. 
The message is clear for medical practitioners: breaching the Code may result in a complaint of 
unsatisfactory conduct. But what is unsatisfactory conduct, and what other aspects of a doctor or 
their practice may deem a doctor to be a risk to the public? Grounds for considering a doctor to be 
a “problem” doctor, as defined by AHPRA, as being a risk to the public are for: (i) unsatisfactory 
professional conduct or professional misconduct; (ii) health problems that may impair a doctor’s 
capacity to practise safely; (iii) below standard performance. 
The meaning of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct 
In Chapter One, we considered the term Professionalism and the inferences of this term in respect 
of the practice of medicine: not only are doctors expected to be learned, well trained, have 
expertise and exceptional skills and knowledge in a complex and highly sophisticated field for 
which they studied hard and endured stiff competition with peers for limited training places; they 
are also expected to have the more personal, human attributes of being good communicators, 
leaders and advocates, to be good team players and caring of their patients. In short, they are 
expected to be good. 
If a doctor fails to measure up to or meet the standards required of them, breaches the codes of 
conduct to which they are committed, their professional conduct may be deemed unsatisfactory, or 
less than good, and attract sanction and remediation. Professional misconduct implies conduct of a 
more serious nature, that their conduct is unacceptable, for which the consequences are 
significant: strict conditions, suspension or even erasure of registration. Such assessments may 
not meet Sir Donald Irvine’s characterisation of not being good as “dangerous and evil” (Irvine, 
2001), nor of Dr Bawa-Garba in UK whose failings were deemed to be “truly exceptionally bad”74 
by a jury when convicting her of manslaughter, but is certainly conduct of a serious nature that in 
NSW attracts the significant criticism of a body of peers, defined as: 
139B (a) Conduct significantly below reasonable standard. Conduct that 
demonstrates the knowledge, skill or judgment possessed, or care exercised, by the 
practitioner in the practice of the practitioner’s profession is significantly below the 
standard reasonably expected of a practitioner of an equivalent level of training or 
experience (Thomas, 2004b). 
Therefore, while attracting the significant criticism of one’s peers may result in an adverse finding 
and potential suspension from practice, conditions on one’s practice or being struck off the register 
for a specified period or even forever, words such as “bad”, “evil” or “dangerous” do not generally 
enter the lexicon of Australian legal actions. The public may have other feelings, and media like to 
                                                          
73 Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (current from 1 March 2018 to date; accessed 24 July 2018 at 
14:03). 
74 GMC v Dr Bawa-Garba [2018] EWHC 76 (Admin). 
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use such words, and they go to character, which the law is reluctant to broach. Nevertheless, as I 
have pointed out, a breach of the nationally endorsed Code may bring a complaint against a 
doctor, because Good Medical Practice expects doctors to be good, but this is only specified as 
being in the practice of medicine (see footnote below)75. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have examined the law in action, as distinct from the historical events and related 
social and political factors that contributed to the formation the regulatory system that we have 
today, which took place in parallel with the professionalisation of medicine, as the subject of the 
previous chapters. 
This chapter has considered what mechanisms exist and what the regulatory process looks like in 
respect of the objectives to protect the public. In the past few decades, demands for greater 
accountability have meant a major challenge to the autonomy of the medical profession. This was 
because there was a social shift in society when the new consumer, armed with the language of 
rights, demanded that the money being spent on health care was being spent wisely and that the 
promises of safe care were being met. When they were not, the public became less tolerant 
because they not only demanded more but because they knew more. News of scandals and 
knowledge of iatrogenic harm in hospitals filtered out and eventually, the authorities had to act 
because the public was losing its trust and confidence. 
The chapter considered what complaints are about, who complains and why, and to whom, and 
what happens to a complaint. The purpose of a complaints process was discussed in the light of 
discrepancies in public perception about what a complaints process is for, as a mechanism to 
resolve an individual grievance or as a vehicle for identifying problems in the health care system. 
The next chapter will consider what it is like for a doctor to be the subject of a medico-legal matter. 
I will present the findings of previous studies which have shown that the impact for some doctors is 
more often than not a negative experience. Anyone could expect that if someone says negative 
things about a person or what they have done or not done, it can cause some discomfort or even 
harm. What follows is an examination of the nature of that harm for doctors, and the nature of any 
                                                          
75 Under 1.4 Professional values and qualities of doctors of the Code, it is stated: 
While individual doctors have their own personal beliefs and values, there are certain professional values on 
which all doctors are expected to base their practice. 
 
Doctors have a duty to make the care of patients their first concern and to practise medicine safely and 
effectively. They must be ethical and trustworthy. 
 
Patients trust their doctors because they believe that, in addition to being competent, their doctor will not take 
advantage of them and will display qualities such as integrity, truthfulness, dependability and compassion. 
 
Patients also rely on their doctors to protect their confidentiality. Doctors have a responsibility to protect and 
promote the health of individuals and the community.  
Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for Doctors in Australia, p. 5 (2014) Medical Board of Australia. 
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changes they may go through as a consequence. This will lead into my own study which attempts 
to explain why it is that complaints hurt, and in the final chapters will consider what this means and 
why it matters. 
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Chapter Four: The Impact of Regulatory Processes 
Introduction 
Chapter One introduced the concept of the law as a “living thing” (Ehrlich, 1962), not as a fixed 
entity, but as responsive to the society in which it was written, and as law in action, being subject to 
interpretation and challenge. A doctor who finds him- or herself the respondent to a medico-legal 
action will discover an environment with which most are not familiar, whose language is not their 
own, and whose thinking is not central to the professional life of a doctor in practice. Interpretation 
and challenge are not straightforward for the doctor unfamiliar with this language and thinking. 
I then presented an overview of what we know about understanding the experience of those who 
complain about health service provision: why they complain; what complaints are about; and what 
people expect by complaining. I also presented an overview of the regulatory mechanisms in place 
in Australia, together with an historical account of how and why the current system came into 
existence. Far less is known about the actual experience of those complained about when they are 
interacting with these processes. This final chapter of Part One presents an overview of what is 
known about the impact of medico-legal processes on doctors’ health and wellbeing. It will focus 
mainly on the literature from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, given the similarities 
and parallels between these countries which derive from their colonial/imperial past, and will give 
passing reference to literature from other countries as relevant to this study. You will note that 
although this thesis focuses on complaints and their place in the regulatory sphere, it does not 
exclude reference to other forms of medico-legal action, in particular claims for compensation and 
other civil proceedings. 
Previous research has found that there is compelling evidence of the harmful effects of having a 
complaint and the impacts on doctors’ practice, including the impact of defensive medicine and 
fear of litigation. Defensive medicine, distressed and distracted doctors are a risk to the public, so if 
there is a concern about such inadvertent consequences, having a deeper understanding of what 
such impacts may be attributed to and explained by, will better inform decision-makers, authorities, 
medical educators, insurers and other stakeholders. My study aims to provide this explanation. 
Overview: Impact of Medico-legal Interventions 
The focus of this study is on explaining the impact of complaints on doctors’ health and practice, 
specifically: 
1. What is stressful about the experience 
2. How doctors seek support through the process 
3. Perceptions of the medico-legal environment 
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4. Impact on medical practice. 
Having a complaint not only has impacts on a doctor’s health and wellbeing; it can also lead to 
behavioural changes that may affect their career and attitude towards the profession that they had 
chosen to enter. This chapter will present what is known about these impacts. What is absent from 
much of this picture is an in-depth understanding of what contributes to doctors’ unease, why 
complaints generate such impacts, demonstrated as common to doctors both nationally and 
internationally, and on why it is important that we have this understanding. 
There has been a progression of studies that focuses initially on the American experience of 
litigation, which later turns towards a focus on complaints in the regulatory environment, primarily 
in UK with increasing interest in other countries including Australia. Indeed, it could be said that 
with Australia introducing the first independent statutory body in NSW, the Health Care Complaints 
Commission (the HCCC), the model for complaints-handling established by the HCCC was 
influential in other countries’ development of subsequent complaints-handling mechanisms (Pierce, 
2017). 
The earlier studies acknowledged the adverse impacts on doctors in terms of emotional and 
behavioural changes, and the remedies recommended lay in suggesting that doctors be offered, or 
that they seek, professional and/or emotional support during and following a complaints process. 
While these recommendations remain appropriate, and this study examines this aspect of doctors 
dealing with complaints, what is largely absent is acknowledgement that it is the process itself that 
often contributes to doctors’ disquiet. This becomes a trend in the more recent studies, when a link 
can be seen emerging between doctors’ adverse responses arising from complaints and the way 
the complaint is handled through the process. This is further confirmed by large studies in the UK 
which reveal a direct link between having a complaint and suicidality, as well as other morbid 
conditions such as depression, anxiety and stress, which are shown to be more common in those 
with a history of complaints than those without. What these studies lack is a focus on the personal 
experience, which is how this current study fits in with the existing literature. 
From litigation to complaints 
As noted, much of the earlier literature in the 1980s to 1990s comes from the USA, where the 
focus was on litigation, as will be shown below. This may have been because the USA favours 
litigation as a remedy to grievances but it may also be due to the significance of complaints not 
being recognised. Mulcahy (2003) suggested as much in discussing the common view that there is 
a hierarchy of remedies associated with their relative seriousness, with litigation at the top and 
complaints at the bottom. However, this overlooks what a complaint represents: to a complainant it 
is serious, or there would be no complaint (except perhaps a whinge to one’s friend, family or 
neighbour); and to the recipient of a complaint, it can mean anything from the inconvenience of 
drafting a response to the potential for loss of career, livelihood and reputation. In addition, 
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complaints were becoming more numerous. With the rise of consumerism and its associated rights 
culture, citizens were turning to making complaints to the authorities as an expression of their 
dissatisfaction with services76. As was shown previously, complaints are not all about money, or 
harm, and people’s motivations for complaining extend beyond what a claim for compensation can 
offer. This trend accompanied the development of tighter regulatory mechanisms and requirements 
for greater accountability by health service providers, especially the medical profession. There 
followed the establishment of formal complaints mechanisms, followed soon after by a flow of 
research from Great Britain about complaints, thence Australia, New Zealand and others. 
Quality and safety 
Early literature also parallels the beginnings of the quality and safety movement, after the 
revelation of high error rates, or “iatrogenic” harms, through various major studies and the release 
of health service data about adverse events in the USA, Australia and elsewhere77. The focus 
turned to the prevention of error by understanding causative factors78, the latter of which included 
the identification of underperforming health practitioners. “In contemporary western cultures, every 
death, every accident and every misfortune is ‘chargeable to someone’s account’ – someone must 
be found to be blamed” (Lupton, 1999, p. 45). At the same time, greater accountability of health 
services and of health professionals was demanded, and dealing with complaints from dissatisfied 
health service users became one such mechanism for ensuring accountability. Complaints data 
were an important way of not only identifying underperforming or even dangerous (“high risk”) 
health practitioners, but of identifying patterns of practice where the source of errors could be 
isolated (Lupton, 1999; Bismark, Spittal, Guerrin, Ward & Studdert, 2013). Claims data from 
lawsuits added to this pool of knowledge, and so there grew a vast body of data about medical and 
other mishaps in health care that was invaluable to the regulators and the professions in terms of 
policy and systems change and quality improvement, as well as more pointedly identifying and 
remedying known sources of clinical and medico-legal risk. Here the language of risk and risk 
management or prevention had begun to proliferate, with the interpretation that it represents the 
bad, the dangerous, the undesirable (Douglas, 1992; Lupton, 1999), and in Douglas’s (1966) view, 
extends to looking for who is responsible, or who is to blame (Douglas, 1966). Seeking out who is 
responsible and therefore who is a risk for the future, then managing that risk, marries well with the 
notion of protection and also of regaining trust, at least in the regulators, if measures to protect are 
made public, to which I allude in the next section. 
                                                          
76 Complaints are attributed to rising expectations and better informed patients, as well as the changing relationship 
people have with professionals, and what people expect from the doctor-patient relationship (Canadian Medical 
Association Journal (2012), 184 (16). Complaints rise with expectations. 
77 Such as the study by Leape, L. et al. (1991) Incidence of adverse events in hospitalised patients: Results of the 
Harvard Medical Malpractice Study 11. NEJM, 324, 377-384. 
AIHW and ACSQHC (2007) Sentinel events in Australian Public Hospitals 2004-05. Cat. No. HSE. 51. Canberra 
78 The study of error by James Reason was published during this era and had a significant influence on how this 
phenomenon was conceptualized. Reason, J. (1990) Human error. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
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Perceptions of the medical profession 
Taking a broad perspective of the work of the past 30 to 40 years, there appears to have been a 
change in thinking about the medical profession. In earlier chapters, I presented an account of the 
reluctance of legal and regulatory authorities to comment on and make judgements about the 
conduct and performance of members of the profession; it was a closed shop, so to speak, and 
those outside of it were not equipped nor even entitled to pass judgement. 
In addition, the exposure of the extent of iatrogenic harms in health care led to a growing concern 
about the safety of health care. An expanding body of literature emerged concerning errors and 
their causes, with consequent regulatory changes that demanded greater accountability through 
increased obligations of reporting, such as mandatory reporting and open disclosure, and more 
systematic data collection and analysis (Leape, 1991, 2004; Brennan et al., 1991 (“the Harvard 
study”); Wilson, 1995; Vincent, Neale & Woloshynowych, 2001; Bismark et al., 2012; Spittal et al., 
2014). While the analysis of the quantum of errors identified that “systems’ issues” were largely 
responsible for such harms, there was also increasing focus on the individual responsibility of 
health practitioners, as noted above. There was demand for greater accountability by the 
heretofore closed shop of the semi-autonomous, self-regulating profession, who it was believed 
needed to restore public trust. Individual doctors had to be made accountable, they had to lift their 
game and patients had rights that they were very willing to exercise. “The litigious society” went 
into action, and there was often little sympathy for those being complained about. Public shaming 
became commonplace when reports of doctors heading to the law courts made for compelling 
newspaper stories. 
While this is the popular picture, it is actually more nuanced than this. Mulcahy and her colleagues 
(2003) showed that the motivations of complainants could be more subtly explained than the data 
appeared to demonstrate (Mulcahy, 2003). Nevertheless, the spotlight has been on doctors to 
behave, to continuously improve and to keep patients happy, and the regulators continue to find 
more ways to ensure the profession is accountable and that the public is so protected. For 
instance, at the time of writing, the Medical Board of Australia issued a draft of revisions of the 
Code of Conduct (Good Medical Practice) and adds this clause to the existing version: “Behaviour 
that could undermine community trust in the profession is at odds with good medical practice and 
may be considered unprofessional”, and doctors are warned not to voice personal opinions publicly 
so as not to undermine trust79. Such intent is being vociferously resisted, with the new President of 
the AMA, Dr Tony Bartone, stating that such requirements are “an overreach” of the Board’s 
authority, and that such conduct does not in itself represent a lack of professionalism nor 
substandard medical practice (O’Rourke, 2018)80. A further recent step by the Board has been to 
                                                          
79 Medical Board of Australia (2018) Draft revised Good medical practice: A code of conduct for doctors in Australia. 
Public consultation paper, June 2018: 2.1 Professional values and qualities, p. 11. 
80 O’Rourke, G. (2018) AMA slams ‘coercive’ draft code of conduct. Australian Doctor, 8 August 2018. 
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introduce links to Tribunal and court decisions to the publicly available AHPRA registration list on 
the website, stating that public trust would be enhanced by being open about which doctors had 
complaints against them. After the outcry that followed which cited this step as being punitive and 
unfair, particularly when cases resulted in no adverse findings, the Board withdrew its intention to 
proceed with this move, with the exception of those who do have adverse findings (Wright, 2018)81. 
These steps by the regulator serve to demonstrate that the medical profession is being required to 
practise within an ever-tightening of the regulatory reins, in order to win back public trust. 
Focus on complainants, not the respondents 
With the main objective being public protection, earlier studies, as will be shown, were generally 
about complaints-handling mechanisms and legal procedures and the experience of these 
mechanisms for complainants. Very little was mentioned about the experience for those 
complained about – perhaps doctors were such a powerful group they did not need such 
consideration – until it was becoming increasingly obvious that being the subject of a complaint 
was for many doctors a highly stressful event, and that perhaps this mattered. From the late 1990s 
onwards, data began to filter through nationally and internationally that it was not only stressful to 
have a complaint but it was resulting in threats to health and was leading to negative behavioural 
changes. 
The general response was to put the onus onto respondents to look after themselves by 
maintaining a healthy outlook and resilience, and to seek counselling if necessary. In more recent 
times, there is a growing understanding, that: firstly, the medical profession has higher than 
average symptoms of burnout, fatigue and mental disorders (Clode, 2004; BeyondBlue); that an 
adverse outcome could distress those involved with the incident as “second victims” (Sirriyeh, 
2010; Wu, 2000, 2012; Ullström, 2014); and thirdly, that being involved in medico-legal matters 
further adds to such distress. In addition, as noted, the solutions were to offer counselling, 
recommending resilience training or reminding doctors to look after themselves. However, more 
recently there has been a growing acknowledgement that the distress may not be due to a doctor’s 
inadequate coping skills; it may be the process itself that is responsible for at least some of the 
distress. While this does not negate the contribution by an individual’s personal make-up (Nash, 
2009a; Charles, 1988), this nevertheless suggests that the process could be more responsive to 
the adverse impacts. 
This is not merely to promote a kinder, more caring bureaucracy that is empathetic to the plight of 
the suffering doctor; it is also for the more pragmatic reason that if significant numbers of doctors 
are being harmed by the process itself, then their safety as health service providers is at risk 
(Shanafelt, Bradley, Wipf & Back, 2002; Mulcahy, 2003; BeyondBlue, 2013; Fahrenkopf, 2008). 
Sick, distracted, anxious and depressed doctors may not have their minds totally on the job, and 
                                                          
81 Wright, J. (2018) Common sense prevails: Board backflips on ‘black mark’ register. Australian Doctor, 30 July 2018. 
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this is when mistakes can happen, as the study by Fahrenkopf et al. showed, in which resident 
doctors with depression made 6.2% more medication errors, indicating that patients are at greater 
risk of unintentional harm. Doctors’ perceptions of the link between their own stress and lowered 
clinical care were examined in a questionnaire study by Firth-Cozens and Greenhalgh (1997), in 
which 50% reported lower standards of care due to stress, including errors, taking short-cuts, not 
following procedures, even an anaesthetist regularly falling asleep during procedures. Stress was 
also attributed to tiredness by 57.4%, overwork by 27.7%, depression or anxiety by 8.5%, alcohol 
5.4% and boredom by 1%. Irritability and anger was reported by 40.2%, serious mistakes reported 
by 7.4% and there were two patient deaths or 1% attributed to these factors. While these latter two 
figures are small, it is still nearly 10% of respondents who reported that their mental state was 
related to serious harm or death. A further study by West, Hushka and Novotny (2006) of medical 
errors amongst interns found them to be associated not only with personal distress, but also 
decreased empathy for patients. Decreased empathy, and the previous study where 40.2% 
reported irritability and anger, may not directly cause harm, but suggests strongly that care of 
patients will be somewhat compromised as it will interfere with effective, and responsive, 
communication both with patients and with members of the team. 
In addition, doctors who decide to leave the profession mean society misses the value of their 
skills, and this can become critical when there is a shortage of doctors in a district, or a shortage of 
those with specialist expertise (Elkin, 2014). Mello et al. (2004) studied the link between 
satisfaction with medical practice in the context of the “malpractice crisis” that was believed to be 
current at the time and concluded that the crisis was indeed decreasing doctors’ satisfaction, in a 
way that was affecting patient care by impinging on the doctor-patient relationship, with a “sizable 
minority” stating that malpractice concerns made them less candid with their patients, and losing 
warmth within the relationship. 
The other aspect that has become apparent in the literature is the recognition that doctors who 
have experienced litigation or complaints report changes in their practice (Bourne, 2017; Charles et 
al., 1984; Ennis & Vincent, 1994; Verdhuis, 1994; Summerton, 1995; Jain & Ogden, 1999; 
Cunningham, 2000; Studdert et al., 2005; Ortashi, Virdee, Hassan, Mutrynowski & Abu-Zidan, 
2013; Nash et al., 2009b, 2010; Kessler, Summerton & Graham, 2006). Such changes include 
being more cautious about patients, loss of trust, changing how they practise, ordering tests that 
are not medically indicated, and other changes that will be examined further in this chapter. These 
effects have also been found in doctors who have not undergone a medico-legal matter, indicating 
there is a pervading sense of fear of litigation and complaints within the profession, in some 
specialist groups more than others (Cunningham, 2000; Cunningham & Dovey, 2006; Nash et al., 
2010; Bourne et al., 2017). This phenomenon is referred to as “defensive medicine”, which has 
implications not only for patient safety, for the cost burden it implies for health care services 
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ordered that are not necessary, that are not always good practice and are sometimes harmful to 
patients. 
If complaints and litigation cause such emotional, personal and professional impacts, then it is 
important not only to understand why, but also what it is about the process that makes it so 
stressful. And what do doctors do about it: are they silent sufferers; do they seek professional or 
other help and support? The review that follows will also consider what support, if any, doctors 
tend to seek to help them through the complaints process, and the reasons identified for why they 
do, or do not, seek such help. 
Being Sued 
Martin, Wilson, Fiebelman III, Gurley and Miller (1991) write that “Malpractice litigation is a major 
life trauma”. It has been known for a long time that being sued, and being complained about, is 
damaging. In 1982, Charles published the first of a series of papers reporting on a survey 
conducted to assess doctors’ reactions to malpractice litigation in the USA (Charles, 1982). To that 
point, little was known about such impacts, and Charles’ interest followed the increase in the 
number of doctors being sued at that time. Charles (1984) cites a 1979 study by Mawardi which 
compared sources of dissatisfaction in two cohorts of doctors graduating in the decades 1935-
1945 and 1956-1965 and found the former had identified the stress of litigation and the latter 
identified stress arising from fear of litigation. This study was about doctors’ perceptions of the 
impacts on their personal and professional lives. Many doctors reported that they had altered the 
way they practised, were indecisive and unable to concentrate, and had lost their nerve. Symptoms 
could last from a few weeks to a number of years. Many were angry about the interruption to their 
working lives and having no redress for this loss. Mulcahy also discusses this aspect of the 
process, that doctors felt aggrieved that it was not only the time, but the frustration doctors 
reported in her study that if a complainant was not satisfied with the outcome of an inquiry, they 
could seek a review or appeal, yet doctors could not seek redress if the complaint was found to be 
unjustified (Mulcahy, 2003). 
Charles (1984) found that while 54.4% considered litigation to be a part of the practice of medicine 
and was no reflection on their competence, this did not ameliorate the sense of anger or affront. 
More than 25% felt alone, although only 10% sought support from their colleagues. The point was 
made that given the length of the process (average of 46 months in 1978), the prolonged period of 
stress became chronic: “Such chronicity is considered a factor in physician impairment” (Charles, 
1984, p. 565). 
Charles, Wilbert and Franke’s next study (1985) considered reactions to litigation by both sued and 
non-sued doctors. Doctors were surveyed about their reactions to being sued, or if they had not 
been sued, their reaction to the threat of being sued (which at the time was estimated to be 1 in 4 
doctors per year, with a higher number for those in a high risk specialty). Sued doctors reported 
 P a g e  | 92 
significantly more severe depressed mood, tension, anger and frustration than the non-sued 
doctors. Only 17.9% of all respondents reported no symptoms. For the remainder, symptom 
clusters were identified, assigned on the basis of DSM-111 criteria: a depressive cluster (affective 
disorders) and an anger cluster (anger plus at least four of inner tension, irritability, frustration, 
insomnia, depressed mood, fatigue, headache, gastrointestinal problems). Litigation was identified 
as the specific psychosocial stressor, applied to both sued and non-sued doctors, although 
significantly more in the sued doctors (17.2% to 6.0%). Doctors also identified the onset of physical 
illness or an exacerbation of an existing illness attributable to the stress of being sued or the threat 
of same. The next study of only sued doctors found 53% were assigned the anger cluster, and 
included 67% who lost at trial and 48% who won. Just 3% reported the depressive cluster only 
(Charles, 1988b). This study found that almost two thirds of these sued doctors had decreased 
satisfaction with their careers, and many questioned their competence. 
Such findings were important as they led the way to further exploration of the identified impacts 
and to the inferences about such findings in the 1984 study as change of practice, the nature of the 
process itself and whether doctors sought moral support. The 1985 study compared sued and non-
sued doctors, and found in addition to symptoms of stress, professional changes which included: 
ordering more diagnostic tests than were clinically indicated; no longer taking high risk patients or 
doing high-risk procedures; wanting to retire early. The 1988 study found that it did not matter if a 
doctor were found guilty or not, in terms of symptomatic and behavioural changes, and although 
doctors who had not been sued also reported such behaviours, it was significantly more severe if a 
doctor had been sued. 
Charles (1988) observed that what is of interest is that doctors who had not been sued tended to 
have attitudes similar to the lay public’s, that litigation is an affront to and reflection of a doctor’s 
professional competence, implying that a law suit is related to negligence or lack of competence 
and is therefore the doctor’s fault. However, this attitude changes if doctors have been sued, 
because in their defence they believed their judgement had been good and their performance 
competent. This change in attitude may explain the anger they felt at a system in which “highly 
competent physicians” become diminished by a lawsuit (Charles, 1988, p. 359). Anger, the more 
reported response, is externally directed. This suggested that if anger is expressed, inner directed 
responses of guilt and shame that “commonly accompany the accusation of being a ‘bad doctor’” 
would be lessened. Therefore, Charles (1988) suggested, sharing the emotional impact with others 
would enable doctors to express their anger, which would ameliorate the tendency for anger to turn 
inwards into depression. Yet she noted that only 10% had shared the experience with their peers 
(Charles, 1982). Moreover, there was little significance in the scores of those who had won their 
cases and those who did not, indicating that the emotional or psychological impact of the 
experience is a function of the allegation, or the process itself, rather than the outcome of a trial. It 
also leads one to consider that sharing the experience with peers will enhance feelings of 
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community with other doctors. This may be especially important for those who lose at trial so that 
they can better recover and return to some degree of equilibrium. 
The reason for the focus on Charles’ studies is that they were foundational and clearly set the 
groundwork for future studies, given they are abundantly cited. By her own admission, they were 
select samples and the significance of findings may not apply elsewhere, but they led others to 
pursue further exploration of the issues raised. She wrote a further article in 2001 in which she 
discusses how doctors react to accusations of malpractice, and some of the strategies they use to 
cope with the impact (Charles, 2001). I will defer an examination of this discussion until the 
Discussion chapter. Doctors with depression arising from litigation considered it their most stressful 
life event (Charles, Warneke, Nelson & Pyskotsky, 1988c). This was in spite of only 1.6% of the 
sued doctors having an adverse finding from their trial, which suggested that: 
malpractice litigation, the chronic character of involvement with the legal process, and 
the resultant stress on both sued and nonsued physicians may in the long run not 
serve the public interest or the quality of medicine. It may diminish rather than enhance 
the integrity and availability of medical care (Charles, 1985, p. 440). 
The study by Martin et al. (1991) followed on from Charles’ work, adding the dimension of time for 
the duration of stress symptoms, which include psychological trauma, job strain, shame and doubt 
and efforts to cope. These were at their highest for the two-year period immediately following the 
lawsuit, followed by a period of “active coping”. While these symptoms decrease after two years, 
they did not return to the level of non-sued doctors, with the exception of shame and doubt. 
Doctors who won their case reported less psychological trauma, shame and doubt, compared with 
those whose cases were pending who had more job strain and more active coping. Martin (1991) 
surmises it is not only the process but the repeated exposure to situations that could lead to 
repeated litigation. However if the doctor wins the case, this permits a successful integration of the 
process, which is moreso than if a case is settled out of court. 
Saberi’s (2009) study of sued doctors in Iran reported 76% of the 497 respondent doctors who had 
been sued were found to have psychiatric disturbance at a higher level than non-sued doctors, and 
the general population at 19%. 
Having a Complaint 
Early studies of the impact of medico-legal matters were focused on doctors’ experience of 
litigation in the USA. Research into the complaints experience began to emerge in Great Britain in 
1990s-early 2000s, where the findings were similar to studies of litigation experience, and while 
these are significant for my study, it is important to consider the specific impact of complaints. This 
is because the consequences for doctors are different, and for some, potentially more damaging 
because: they can directly affect a doctor’s registration; they involve a doctor directly with the 
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regulator; and their complaints history remains on their record, which in many instances is publicly 
accessible. 
These early studies include those of Jain and Ogden (1999), Allsop and Mulcahy (1998) and 
Mulcahy (1996, 2003), and as with Charles in the USA on litigation, were foundational for future 
work in this area. Jain and Ogden’s study was unique in its day because it was qualitative, 
involving detailed interviews with GPs, and examined emotional responses. Undertaking detailed 
interviews with GPs who had complaints, the study identified three stages in response to a 
complaint: 
1. Initial: “out of control, feelings of shock and panic, and a sense of indignation towards 
patients generally” 
2. Conflict: the many conflicts generated by the complaint, e.g., anger, depression, even 
suicide, conflicts around aspects of professional identity including doubts re clinical 
competence, conflicts with family and colleagues, and about management of the 
complaint 
3. Resolution: sense of resolution such as practising defensively, or planning to leave 
practice, or no resolution. 
This approach was contrasted to Mulcahy’s (1996) early doctoral study which analysed complaints 
within a sociological framework that emphasised power relationships rather than emotional 
reactions. Her later work in 2000 was a survey of 848 consultants in UK which considered the 
emotional impacts, finding that they often have a long-term and significant impact such as: irritation 
(52%); worry (42%); concern (38%); surprise (38%); annoyance (37%); anger (33%); distress 
(32%); disappointment (31%); anxiety (28%); and vulnerability (28%). A component of this study 
included written comments, where doctors expressed fear; feeling a loss of control, powerlessness, 
being under siege, a sense of futility, feeling that they work so hard but cannot satisfy their 
patients. The greatest impact was if they thought the complaint was unjustified (five times as many 
felt anxiety; four times as many anger, annoyance, vulnerability; three times as many felt worried, 
distressed, surprised). The greater the impact, the more likely doctors were to change their clinical 
practice, or become more defensive. 
Studies in other countries including Australia were soon to follow (Schattner, 1998; Nash, Tennant 
& Walton, 2004; and publications by Nash et al. to 2013), thereafter in other countries including 
New Zealand (Cunningham & Dovey, 2000; Cunningham 2004), the Netherlands (Verdhuis, 1994; 
Verhoef, 2015), Scandinavia (Birkeland, Christensen, Damsbo & Kragstrup, 2013), and Iran 
(Saberi, 2009). In more recent times, research has extended into issues that are related to the 
impact of medico-legal matters on doctors and on medical practice. These include inquiries into the 
nature and consequences of defensive medicine, the growing concern about doctors’ health, 
mental illness and higher than average suicide rates (Horsfall, 2015; Shanafelt, 2011; Srivastava, 
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2017). In addition, sophisticated data are being gathered that provide profiles of risk that include 
profiles of those doctors with complaints (Bismark, Spittal, Guerrin, Ward & Studdert, 2013; Spittal, 
Bismark & Studdert, 2015). This facilitates more effective targeting of regulatory action where the 
risk to the public is greater. 
The cost of a complaint to doctors’ health and wellbeing has been demonstrated by these studies, 
and they tell a similar story: being the subject of a complaint is a very high risk for psychiatric 
morbidity in doctors (Nash et al., 2010). Generally, studies show that stress, anxiety and 
depression are common symptoms, as are disturbed sleep, increased drug-taking and alcohol use 
and suicidal thoughts (Schattner & Coman, 1998; Mello, 2004; Nash et al., 2006, 2007; Bourne et 
al., 2015). Successful suicide attributable to being involved in an investigation is causing alarm 
now that knowledge of these suicides is available, though the precise numbers are difficult to 
establish (Horsfall, 2015), and not possible in Australia given how such deaths are recorded. For 
instance, suicides may not be recorded as such or may not be referred to the Coroner as the death 
may be attributed to its actual physical cause. In Great Britain, an alarming report was published in 
2014 that revealed that between 2005 and 2013 there were 28 reported cases where doctors had 
committed suicide while undergoing disciplinary proceedings. This was not publicly known until a 
Freedom of Information request to the GMC released the names and dates of death of those 
doctors identified as having ended their lives during an investigation into their fitness to practise 
(Casey & Choong, 2016). 
The extent of the harm 
The AHPRA annual report for 2016/17 reports that there were 111 166 medical practitioners 
registered to practise in Australia in that year. Of these, 5 669 or 5.1% received a notification (aka 
complaint) in 2016/17. A 2010 study of doctors in private practice showed 20.5% of them had at 
least one complaint against them in the decade leading to the study (Bismark, Spittal, Gogos, 
Gruen & Studdert, 2011). Added to this number were claims at 1-2% of doctors per year (MIIAA, 
200982) or 35 claims per year per thousand doctors (ISA, 2008). When all medico-legal matters are 
taken into account, 65% of respondents to the national study of 2 999 doctors in Australia had 
experienced a matter at some time in their career, with 14% having a current matter (Nash, 
2009b). While these figures are not recent, they provide a picture that approximately 7% of doctors 
are involved in a medico-legal matter each year. It is likely that this figure could now be higher, 
given that the proportion of doctors receiving complaints is consistently rising every year (for 
example, in 2012 the percentage was 4.3%, and it is now 5.1%). 
On 8 October 2013, Beyondblue launched its report on doctors’ mental health in Australia, showing 
that doctors suffer 10 times the rate of psychological distress as the general population, and that 1 
in 10 doctors had suicidal thoughts compared to 1 in 45 of the community. Workplace pressures 
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were cited as the highest source of stress for the 14 000 doctors who responded to this survey. 
This report emphatically warns that having this number of doctors unwell is a significant risk to 
themselves, their colleagues, friends and families, and significantly, their patients (Beyondblue, 
2013). Similarly, a large study of 7 905 American surgeons found suicidal ideation to be 1.5 to 3 
times that of the general population, with burnout and depression closely associated (Shanafelt, 
2011). As we have seen, being the subject of a complaint is a very high risk for psychiatric 
morbidity in doctors (Nash et al., 2010). As a work-related stressor, complaints are adding 
significant numbers to the mental health profile of doctors in Australia. Schattner and Coman 
(1998) studied metropolitan GP practices in Victoria and while workload pressures and time 
constraints were the more numerous stressors identified by doctors, the threat of litigation was the 
most severe. 
Fear of litigation and complaints is present even if doctors have never had a complaint, and the 
fear that doctors feel if they do receive a complaint is pervasive. Mulcahy (2003) stated in her study 
that the fear arises from potential consequences about disciplinary action under the GMC and 
courts. Verhoef (2015) wrote about the misery and insecurity during and after the process, the fear 
of having more complaints and of the fear reviving when in similar situations as the incident 
complained about. 
The immediate response to a complaint can range from emotional reactions to changes in doctor-
patient relationships. Short-term feelings of anger, depression, shame and guilt, and decreased 
enjoyment of practice reduced goodwill towards and trust of patients (Cunningham & Dovey, 
2000). The impact softens over time but feelings of persisting anger, reduced trust and goodwill 
towards patients persists (Cunningham, 2004a). What this means is that there is a significant 
negative impact on doctors, and on important aspects of the doctor-patient relationship, and the 
rather poignant “loss of joy of practice” (p. 8). Cunningham (2004) also states that there is no 
evidence that the receipt of a complaint improves the delivery of patient care, negating the 
assumption that patient complaints change the behaviour of individual doctors and the profession. 
Stuart and Cunningham (2015) conducted a study on dentists in New Zealand, which I include 
here because it adds the dimension of the impact on families due to a dentist’s pre-occupation with 
dealing with a complaint, and the anxiety felt by families, and also staff in the practice. The findings 
echo those relating to doctors, and as with doctors, dentists may be shamed by a complaint. The 
authors conclude that dentists “need ongoing support that responds not only to the intricacies of 
the legal aspects of a formal complaint but also to unpredictable interpersonal stress, prolonged 
anxiety and to feelings of helplessness” (Stuart & Cunningham, 2015, p. 29). 
Health professionals interviewed by Verhoef et al. (2015) in the Netherlands reported feelings of 
misery and insecurity during and after the process, with a fear of receiving new complaints. They 
found that publication of disciplinary measures online and in newspapers, as well as general media 
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coverage, enhanced the psychological and professional impact, as did aspects of the process such 
as the feeling of being treated as guilty before any verdict was reached, the long duration of the 
process, and an assertion that criminals are treated better because there is more concerted due 
process. Doctors also reported practising with more cautious care. Although one could say the 
latter is a positive response, the reason is less than positive when in response to fear. They wrote 
that in this case, “Although a disciplinary measure is meant to have a corrective effect, our results 
suggest that the impact that is experienced by professionals might hamper optimal rehabilitation” 
(Verhoef et al., 2015, p. 5). The authors noted that if the health professional was aware of others 
with complaints, this had a normalising effect. They conclude that organising emotional support 
should be considered during the process and after the verdict, to ameliorate the potential 
damaging effects. 
Complaints may go well beyond making a doctor feel miserable. I introduced above the findings of 
stress, depression and anxiety from the studies of Nash, Bourne, Mello, Schattner, amongst 
others, meaning that complaints can lead to morbid conditions that are actually harmful, and are 
perhaps long-standing. The early studies by Charles (1982, 1984, 1985) revealed that it is not just 
those found guilty of the matter with which they were charged who suffer damaging, and long-term 
effects. She suggested it was the fact of the complaint, and the process itself, that caused the 
morbidity. While her studies related to claims for damages due to malpractice, the impacts are as 
relevant to complaints. In fact, some doctors say that having a complaint is the more worrisome as 
claims for compensation are about money for damages, handled mainly by the lawyers, and paid 
for by their indemnity insurance, whereas complaints are about their competence and conduct as 
medical practitioners, and the outcomes can threaten their livelihood, reputation and career. 
Bourne et al. (2015) conducted a very large study in Great Britain in 2012-13 in which 7 926 
doctors participated in a survey, along with a sub-set participating in interviews. Those doctors who 
had a recent complaint or one still current were at significant risk of moderate to severe depression 
(77%), moderate to severe anxiety (twice as likely) and suicidal ideation (twice as likely to report 
self-harm or suicidal thoughts). They reported relationship problems, sleep disturbance, anger and 
irritability, and practising defensively. 
Defensive practice 
Up to 89% of doctors in Bourne’s (2016) study, above, were practising defensively, with doctors 
avoiding high-risk patients or procedures, and engaging in “hedging” behaviour, which includes 
such actions as referring more patients to specialists whom they could have managed themselves, 
ordering tests that were not necessary, or overprescribing. Some who had been whistle-blowers 
felt victimised (20%) and 38% felt bullied by colleagues or their administration. Some doctors felt 
they were practising “poorer” medicine (Bourne, 2016). 
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Common themes identified by Schattner and Coman (1998), Charles (1984), Martin et al. (1991), 
Jain and Ogden (1999), Mulcahy (1994) and others were the threat or actuality of a complaint or 
law suit causing emotional and physical disequilibrium, as well as both positive and negative 
changes in practice (Nash et al., 2004, 2009c). The study by Nash et al. (2009) of GPs in Australia 
investigated whether having a complaint or lawsuit influenced how GPs practised. They found that 
it did, in both negative and positive ways. 73% of GPs ordered more tests than usual, 66% made 
more specialist referrals, 70% introduced systems to better track test results and follow up patients, 
49% avoided certain procedures (such as obstetrics) and 68% improved how they communicated 
risk to patients. 93% overall agreed with the survey question that proposed that inadequate 
communication is a factor in more complaints, although the proportion was lower at 90% for those 
who had a medico-legal matter, and 97% for those who had not. 
The authors note that greater caution may be a positive thing, but it needs to be balanced against 
the higher costs that this means for patients and the community, as well the potential risks of 
having tests that are unnecessary. These findings, and the conclusions about them, are consistent 
with findings in the Bourne (2009) study, and the study by Nash et al. (2009) which was a large 
cross-disciplinary study of Australian doctors comparing 2 999 respondents with a history of 
complaints, claims or any other medico-legal matter, and those without. The results show a similar 
pattern as the GP study, but the proportions differ, no doubt given the former study reflects general 
practice in which one would expect to find a higher number of referrals to specialists, and 
investigative tests. For instance, in the larger cross-disciplinary study, 43% of doctors referred 
more than usual (66% GPs), 55% ordered more tests (73% GPs), 66% better communication of 
risk (similar to GPs at 68%), 48% had better systems for tracking patients (70% GPs). Studies by 
Cunningham and Dovey (2006) and Cunningham and Wilson (2011) also found both positive and 
negative defensive practices and improved “good” practice, such as reflective practice, greater 
sensitivity to societal and professional expectations and initiating systemic change. The positive 
changes were increased investigation and referral rates, more effective identification of potential 
problem patients, more thorough documentation and consent processes, and adjustments to time 
and workload. Negative changes involved withdrawing from the doctor-patient relationship and 
some fields of practice. The authors concluded that while the New Zealand complaints process has 
the potential to improve health care delivery and to reinforce appropriate standards of professional 
behaviour, it may cause individual doctors to practise defensively. This may compromise patient 
care and constrain improvements in health care delivery. An educational process therefore needs 
to accompany the complaints process. 
The larger Nash (2010) study also found that concerns about medico-legal issues led 33% to 
consider giving up medicine, 32% to consider reducing their working hours and 40% to consider 
retiring early. Of course, we do not know if they actually did give up or retire early, but this was 
their intention at the time. But these represent a defensiveness of attitude in respect of doctors’ 
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relationship with the law and regulation. Doctors who had experience of a medico-legal matter 
were significantly more affected than those who had not (Nash, 2010). Ninety-two percent reported 
being recently more aware of the risks of medical negligence (Nash, 2009c). 
The Stressful Aspects of Complaints 
On doctors’ perceptions of the most stressful aspects of complaints, Bourne et al. (2016) found that 
apart from the emotional distress and feelings of powerlessness, doctors also felt unsupported, 
victimised, like a failure and incompetent. Negative feelings toward the complainant extended to 
negative feelings towards the self, and stigma. The most stressful aspects were related to 
procedural issues, where fear of the consequences, impaired self-image and confidence, feeling 
intimidated and embarrassed about justifying their actions to seniors or others were all significant. 
While some participants were aware that a complaint may be justified, others felt that the complaint 
was unfair or biased towards complainants. 
Having a complaint was feared for its impact on one’s career, with a majority of doctors concerned 
about professional humiliation (80%) and public humiliation (70%), and having a marked record in 
the future (Bourne et al., 2017). Public humiliation is consistent with Verhoef’s (2015) findings in 
the Dutch study, where doctors felt that reporters do not necessarily convey the facts, or that 
readers may not understand the considerations behind decisions. They were also concerned that 
adverse reporting may affect their reputations, thence their careers (Verhoef, 2015). In Bourne et 
al.’s (2015) study, 32% also identified that management used the complaints system to undermine 
them, and 24% that colleagues used complaints to take advantage financially or professionally. 
These latter have been issues in Australia when in recent times concern about mandatory 
reporting led many to express fear that threats of mandatory reporting could be used to humiliate 
or intimidate other doctors (Parker, 2011), or that vexatious complaints could be made by 
colleagues for competitive or financial reasons. The feelings were so strong that fierce lobbying by 
a number of doctors resulted in a federal parliamentary inquiry into this allegation in 201783, and, 
while no substantial outcomes eventuated, it was sufficient to bring the matter into the public and 
professional eye, and has recently been included in the draft Code as reflecting poorly on the 
profession84. Having a marked record has also been the subject of a recent outcry in Australia, as 
                                                          
83 Senate Inquiry: Community Affairs Reference Committee (May 2017) Complaints mechanism administered under 
the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law. 
84 The draft amendment to the Code (Good Medical Practice) includes the section under Professional behaviour: 
10.4 Vexatious complaints 
Legitimate complaints are motivated by genuine concerns about patient safety. Vexatious complaints lack 
substance and have other motivations. They are often characterised by an intention to protect commercial 
interests and/or cause harm to another health practitioner, instead of a genuine concern about patient 
safety. Good medical practice involves: 
10.4.1  Raising genuine concerns about risks to patient safety to the appropriate authority (locally and/or 
the Medical Board) and complying with mandatory reporting requirements. 
10.4.2  Not making vexatious complaints about other health practitioners.  
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noted earlier, when AHPRA declared its intention to make public the fact of disciplinary action 
against a doctor, regardless of outcome. The swift reaction that followed compelled AHPRA to 
retract, although those with adverse findings will still find the outcome is accessible by the public. 
Gender, personality and psychological profiles that affect doctors’ response to complaints 
So far, we have considered the response to complaints that doctors report, and some of the 
contributing factors to their reported distress. Also considered are the changes in practice that 
follow a complaints experience or that are reactions to the fear of potential complaints. Differences 
in responses have been reported that depend on whether a doctor has been sued or not sued, or 
involved in any medico-legal matter. In addition to these factors, there is also evidence that gender 
can make a difference, and even a doctor’s personality. 
The GP study by Nash and others (Nash, Curtis, Walton, Willcock & Tennant, 2006) introduced 
these other factors. First, they concluded that those GPs with a current (not yet resolved) or past 
medico-legal matter have higher levels of psychiatric morbidity, as well as higher disability scores 
(impairment in family, work and social life). Psychological morbidity was high at 38%, compared 
with the general adult population of 12%, though comparable with other categories of doctor. 
However, those who considered the complaint as more serious tended to have higher scores. The 
study further considered whether a doctor’s personality traits, gender, and type of practice may be 
related to their history of medico-legal matters (Nash et al., 2008). They found that males had 
higher disability scores than females, and those who worked more than 48 hours per week had 
higher scores. There was also a positive correlation between those who work longer hours, being 
male, being a middle-aged male, and those who drink at potentially hazardous levels. Rural 
doctors and those who work longer hours are more likely to have a medico-legal matter. What is 
alarming is that 45% of GPs with a current matter experience psychiatric morbidity, as well as 
higher disability, or reduced quality of life, and higher alcohol use if they are males. 
Drawing on other research that correlates trait neuroticism and mental health problems including 
high rates of depression, suicide, alcohol and drug abuse, Firth-Cozens (1997, 2007) found that 
those who are stressed, depressed, exhausted, alcohol dependant, or dissatisfied are more likely 
to practise at lower standards of care (2007), and have worse patient outcomes (1997). Wallace 
and Lemaire (2009) emphasised the risks to patients of having doctors who are unwell or who have 
set their own self-care aside in favour of taking care of their patients. 
In summary, Nash et al. (2004) identified that individual and systemic factors have an influence in 
how doctors respond, particularly the personality and professional identity of the doctor. A key 
observation was about the influence of the culture of infallibility in medicine, and the inference that 
errors may be viewed as character flaws: not only are doctors infallible, they must be perfect. A 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
The Board may take regulatory action against a medical practitioner who makes a vexatious notification 
about another health practitioner. 
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finding of note was that 64% of those with a history of medico-legal matters believed that the law 
requires them to make perfect decisions, which it does not: care has to be “reasonable,” not perfect 
(High court decision from Rogers v Whittaker85; Nash, 2009). 
Conclusion: Reflections on Why it Matters 
These findings from the past thirty or so years of research into the impact of complaints serve to 
provide a picture of the psychological and other impacts on doctors’ health and wellbeing. We have 
also gained some insight into the perceptions of causes of and contributors to these impacts, as 
well as personality variables and their impact on how doctors respond to medico-legal matters. As 
we have seen, a complaint affects not only the doctor whom the complaint is about, but it affects 
their family, their colleagues, their current and future patients, and their practice. The injurious 
nature of the impacts is sufficiently severe, and presents a consistent picture across several 
countries, that the impacts cannot be lightly dismissed as another indicator that doctors need to 
toughen up and be more resilient. As Bourne (2017, p. 2) stated: 
Litigation, complaints and investigations are part of the processes that are designed to 
protect patients and maintain appropriate clinical standards. However, the burden and 
stress associated with these processes are clearly having unintended consequences 
and it may be argued that when examined as a whole, these structures may be causing 
more harm to patient care than good. While the regulatory system may protect patients 
from the misconduct of a relatively small number of doctors, it has a perverse effect on 
the majority of doctors who become preoccupied by defensive practice. 
If doctors are preoccupied, they are not occupied in doing their best, and this is not in their own or 
their patients’ best interests. This matters. For several decades, regulators have striven to improve 
public trust by improving patient safety, and they have done so by responding to events where 
public safety has been threatened. Stronger laws, stronger regulation, more defined Codes of 
Conduct that focus more on protecting patients than protecting health professionals, and more 
accessible mechanisms for patients to seek redress for harms and resolution of grievances, have 
added up to a complex network of mechanisms to monitor and remedy unsatisfactory conduct and 
performance, to improve safety and reduce errors. The medical profession, with significantly more 
complaints by proportion than other health professions, has found itself ever more bound by 
surveillance, data gathering, monitoring and accountability, and the adverse effects are too serious 
to cast aside as collateral damage. This study builds on the knowledge of existing literature to 
identify why it is so stressful, and being guided by the testimony of participants who have had 
direct experience, highlight aspects where it could be different. 
                                                          
85 “The law imposes on a medical practitioner a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the provision of 
professional advice and treatment” Rogers v Whittaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 483. 
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In Part Two, I will present my study that builds on the findings of this chapter and seeks to identify 
the underlying reasons for doctors’ distress, through examining their own experiences of what it 
was like, their perceptions of what it meant to them, and how it could have been different. It is 
important to keep in mind that this is not intended to diminish the objectives of regulatory 
mechanisms in their aims to protect the public. Indeed, it is presented with the acceptance that 
these mechanisms are necessary because medicine is not perfect, doctors are not perfect, 
patients are real people and not idealised anatomies, and things go wrong. Patients have a right to 
complain if they are not satisfied and to seek due compensation if they have been harmed through 
the negligence of health carers. But it is also important to keep in mind that complaints are not all 
about harm, but are often about expectations not being met, or miscommunications and 
misunderstandings. What we do know is that complaints have the potential to harm doctors, and if 
we better understand why, then we can better ameliorate the damaging reasons for their harm. 
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Part Two: 
Why Do Complaints Hurt So Much? 
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Chapter Five: Methodology 
Aim 
Part One of this thesis provided a background to the interactions and interdependencies of the law 
and medicine to present a picture of the environment in which medical practitioners work, and how 
the activities of regulatory processes impact indirectly and directly on doctors. Chapter Four 
introduced studies which explored the impact of these activities on doctors and found them to 
undergo significant emotional, psychological and behavioural changes. The aim of my study was to 
build on this existing research and seek explanations for why such changes occur, by speaking 
with doctors who have been through the experience of having a complaint made against them. I 
aimed: 
To understand what can be learned from doctors’ accounts of having a complaint: their 
personal responses and their perceptions of the complaints process. 
This aim formed the basis of the research questions around which the methodological approach 
was designed. 
General structure 
This study was conducted in two parts. The main part is about ‘doctors in trouble’: those who have 
had direct experience of a complaint against them, or involvement in some other medico-legal 
context in which they have had to be professionally accountable. It is this part that forms the 
central focus of the study, as they have first-hand experiential knowledge of the core issue being 
examined in this thesis. 
The second part brings in the perspective of a small number of doctors who provide professional 
support to doctors in trouble, either psychiatric care, or as medico-legal advisers. They represent 
those who deal directly with doctors in trouble, who observe how they react to their predicament, 
and who have perspectives on how doctors in general respond and on the medico-legal 
environment in which they practise. The purpose was not to privilege their perspectives, but to 
provide further insight into the phenomena under study. They are referred to as “Expert informants” 
because they are ‘experts’ who have specialist expertise relating to medical complaints. Their 
voices are a counterpoint to the main narrative of the doctors in trouble. 
Part One: Study Justification 
This section describes this study’s approach to explaining doctors’ experience, within the context of 
the medico-legal environment, which is briefly reiterated here. The medico-legal environment is the 
objective reality within which doctors practise, while the subjective reality is what doctors actually 
experience. This dualism is however too simplistic as it infers that there are two distinct realities. 
Rather, it is a dynamic interrelationship, with other factors influencing how the medico-legal 
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environment is shaped and changed, and how the individual is affected by and shapes their own 
interaction with this environment. 
This latter point is critical to the study; while it would be easy to call upon a common stereotype of 
“what doctors are like” or the symbolic image of “The Doctor” that society has created, doctors are 
as individual as anyone else, though they share some common values and characteristics. The 
profession expects all doctors to conform to and comply with certain codes of conduct, through a 
process of socialisation and enculturation alongside the formal learning experience, while every 
doctor is a person with a distinct personality, motivation, commitment, interest, experience, values, 
social influences and realities. It is these factors that have a bearing on how each responds and 
interacts with the medico-legal environment. This notion was explored in Chapter Two. 
Similarly, the medico-legal environment is not a static beast that just became what it is of its own 
volition – it was shaped, reviewed and revised, it was rejected and accepted, cursed and glorified, 
it was ignored, parodied and feared, all by different interests, preceding laws, regulations, history 
and tradition, by political, economic and social demands and expectations. 
The practice of medicine 
The way medicine is practised is determined by: 
 The profession itself 
 Society’s need for health care (“the public interest”) 
This interdependence is characterised as a “social contract” (Lessnoff,1990; Rousseau, 1862), 
which assumes and requires that the profession will provide safe health care, and in return, the 
profession will be entitled to determine how it will recruit, train and accredit its members and how it 
will set its own standards of practice (“professional autonomy”). Underpinning the social contract is 
a foundation of trust, and Chapter One explained how professional self-regulation has been under 
considerable pressure in recent decades, resulting in an increase in external scrutiny in the form of 
greater regulatory control imposed by governments. 
The law 
The profession’s ability to exist as an autonomous entity is enabled and secured by the law. The 
law protects the profession so it can provide a high standard of care without the challenges of 
competing providers who operate under different standards and interests. The law does this 
through legislation and associated regulation, and through the bureaucracies established to 
administer regulatory processes. This is not to say that the profession is then a stand-alone entity 
that is totally independent of all other obligations. The law requires the profession to be 
accountable so as to ensure that the public interest is protected. Alongside the law are political 
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imperatives; in responding to public demand, needs and expectations, governments may act to 
protect their own interests of economic realities and political survival. 
As the history of regulatory change has demonstrated, political interests have stepped in to enforce 
change where inadequacies in current mechanisms have been identified. When the profession is 
perceived to have failed in its duty to protect the public, then the private interests of the profession 
are overtaken by regulatory mechanisms that will protect the public interest. This means that in 
reality, the profession is not truly autonomous, and that the individual doctor is subject to far more 
scrutiny than what the profession has determined to be necessary within its own rules, codes and 
standards, but is subject to written laws that prescribe a certain set of rules of conduct. 
The doctor agrees to comply with professional obligations through the oath sworn at graduation 
and through ongoing compliance with the Code of Conduct - Good Medical Practice in Australia, or 
the equivalent elsewhere. In return, the doctor is rewarded by status, reputation and by being a 
highly valued member of the community. This balance is kept in check by one’s peers, colleagues, 
employers and one’s professional associations (Macintyre, 1984), as well as by the individual’s 
commitment to moral, ethical and legal obligations. However, when the balance is tipped by 
allegations of failure or breaches, a doctor may be called to account and may then become subject 
to sanctions, restrictions, or even loss of licence. 
When such failures become public, the image of the profession becomes tarnished, and the 
individual suffers loss of reputation. This study focuses on how the individual doctor reacts and 
responds to these instances where they have been called to account: reflections on their 
experience, their perception of the experience and their perspectives on the complaints process. 
Approach 
Rather than aiming to be objective, impartial and depersonalised, the study aimed to draw out the 
personal, the lived ‘drama’ and experience of events that had left an indelible mark on participants 
in the study. This impression provides a picture of the other side of the story away from the 
language of rights, of the law, of wrongdoing and of failure, and that it may go some way to making 
a critical difference to how complaints are managed in the future. 
Chapter Four provided an account of the ‘objective’ experience of doctors who have had 
complaints – that is, from a perspective not their own, but based on largely statistical data. To 
provide the ‘subjective’ perspective of the experience from the doctors’ own viewpoint, a narrative 
approach was determined to be the most appropriate approach that would complement, and 
explain, the objective perspective and thus complete the picture. Hurwitz et al. (2004, pp.3, 4), 
speak of the practice of medicine: 
The objective assessment and intervention is an important dimension in knowing. 
However complete the objective dimension, if we exclude subjectivity and its narrative 
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expression through dialogue, we remove diversity of viewpoint and impoverish the 
knowledge we can gain…. 
While this extract is speaking of clinical practice, the concept could equally apply to how this thesis 
is presented. The empirical findings seek to not only complement the statistical data, but also to 
explain what lies beneath it. As is demonstrated in the Findings and is further considered in the 
Discussion, the testimony of doctors interviewed provided rich examples of those statistical 
findings almost in their entirety. 
The approach taken in the interviews was a key part of creating an environment where the 
subjective narrative could freely emerge. This was done by briefing participants on what to expect 
in the interview, and providing a relaxed atmosphere that would encourage free conversation, 
away from the formal context of medicine and the law. What also made things easier was that 
although I do not share common membership of the medical community, my background as 
observer and participant in the medico-legal world enabled a dialogue unencumbered by lack of 
comprehension of the medical world. As Mishler (1986, p. 11) states, “Interview as discourse is 
meaningful speech between interviewer and interviewee as speakers of a shared language”. 
Using a narrative approach, with the language of narrative being “rhetorically distinct” (Skelton, 
2011) from the language of everyday medical practice, of the law and its practices and processes, 
allowed the person behind the medical persona to reveal their truth and express their 
vulnerabilities, beliefs and sensitivities. This enabled the interview to go beyond obtaining accounts 
of events as chronologies and statements of fact. 
What was the most effective way to explore doctors’ experience? 
The term “explore” is used in recognition that as an active dialogue, meaning is to be derived from 
how doctors narrated and explained their experience and how I as a researcher engaged with this 
and interpreted it. As every participant is an individual, he or she will have responded uniquely to 
what has occurred. There will be similarities in experience, as there will be similarities in response. 
However, even in relation to the same or similar phenomena, different people construct meaning of 
these phenomena in different ways. 
Establishing an environment conducive to developing rapport and trust is important to encourage 
participants to reflect on and interpret their experience through conversation with the researcher. 
Lofland (1971, p. 76) speaks of the interview being characterised as a “flexible strategy of 
discovery…Its object is to carry on a guided conversation and to elicit rich, detailed materials that 
can be used in qualitative analysis”. 
Careful analysis was undertaken of each individual interaction to identify the topics spoken about. 
This was followed by compiling the key concepts derived from the collective of all interviews, and 
together with notes taken during this exercise and those recorded shortly after an interview, 
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creating a web of interrelated ‘threads’ of interpretation. The Methods section below provides 
further detail of this process. As part of the analysis, the constructed web was later placed 
alongside the chain of events that forms the official protocol for managing complaints, which is 
described in Chapter Three of Part One. 
This exploratory approach was derived from a number of sources, initially from Crotty (1998) who 
established that meaning is created through a dynamic approach that involves the researcher 
actively engaging with the participant’s account, as distinct from an objective truth or meaning 
waiting to be discovered from a participant’s account, as commonly used in traditional grounded 
theory, such as Charmaz (2006) and as described by Ezzy (2002) and Crotty (1998). 
Truth, facts and stories 
Explaining these foundational questions means eliciting narrative accounts of experience, 
subjective reflections of the experience and interpretation of the process doctors have undergone. 
Josselson (1995, p. 33) explains that “narratives are not records of facts, of how things actually 
were, but of a meaning-making system that makes sense out of the chaotic mass of perceptions 
and experiences of a life”. In this sense, it is a given that one’s accounts are one’s personal truth, 
whether or not these truths have been verified through investigation and the legal processes that 
the individual has been subject to. As Amsterdam and Bruner (2000, p. 221) write: 
Facts are themselves born of interpretation…Facts inescapably derive from the 
interpretive stance of the knower, for it is the knower who bestows upon them the 
status of fact. The knower does so by interpreting, by narrating, by making sense of 
what the knower encounters. 
A complaint is the “truth”, or a perception of what happened, presented by an aggrieved patient (or 
relative or guardian of the patient), the medical records are another truth, and a legal finding is 
another truth which is the culmination of all these truths condensed and transformed according to 
statute, legal interpretation and professional opinion by peers and lawyers. In other words, these 
various truths are versions and interpretations of a sequence of events and facts that are 
constructed by different parties for different purposes, but that will be held out by those parties as 
the correct version or interpretation. There is also choice in what facts one chooses to describe 
what happened. In constructing the narrative of what happened, the account, or story, is not just a 
“stringing-together” of facts but the choice of facts is constituted by the narrative itself, as what 
matters in order to construct the narrative. As Amsterdam and Bruner (2000, p. 111) write, “stories 
construct the facts that comprise them….much of human reality and its ‘facts’ are not merely 
recounted by narrative but constituted by it. To the extent that law is fact-contingent, it is 
inescapably rooted in narrative”. 
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It is for this reason that a decision was made not to access official documents and findings relating 
to an individual case, even though these are generally available on the public record. As a 
researcher, I did not wish to know an “official” account of a case. This would be to distort the 
participant’s personal account, and for this study, this is what matters. In Arthur Frank’s words 
(2010, p. 22), “The truth of stories is not only what was experienced, but equally what becomes 
experience in the telling and reception”. 
Key questions 
Given that the study describes and explains the social reality of doctors, then their lived experience 
is at the heart of these explanations. The following two key questions provide a pathway to my 
approach: 
1. What can be learned about the complaints process through doctors’ accounts about the 
impact of complaints on doctors, their health, sense of self and practice? 
2. What is learned about the interaction between law, regulation and medical practice from 
doctors’ perceptions of these interactions and interdependencies? 
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Part Two: Methodological Approach 
Methodology 
This study examines how doctors have made sense, or have tried to make sense, of a major event 
in their professional lives: what happens when the experience has taken on such significance that 
it has disrupted a doctor’s working life, their personal life, that may have threatened their future, 
and that has impacted on their composure and sense of wellbeing. This phenomenon has been 
quantified by others in the previous research recounted in Chapter Four, but the aim in this study 
was to find out why, and what it has been like for those affected. 
Symbolic interactionism 
Writing of “symbolic interactionism,” Blumer (1969) introduces the concept that people are not 
merely acted upon by the society in which they live, nor is their behaviour shaped by their inner 
world of drives or instincts. People are active in shaping their world, and how they do so derives 
from a reflective process of ascribing meaning to things. 
Recognising that how we construct our own world is frequently symbolic of a greater social reality, 
it is useful to consider these premises in relation to the participants in the study. The works of 
Lacan (in Miller, 1988) on the symbolic and the imaginary, and of Macintyre (1984) on virtue 
provide added insight into how our identities are shaped and influenced by what meaning we 
attribute to the world around us, and our own perception of who we are and our place in the world. 
This concept of “narrative identity” has emerged as a central focal point for the unfolding of this 
thesis. 
There are three basic premises in Blumer’s perspective, which provide a useful starting point for 
unlocking the meaning of narrative identity, in the context of doctors’ experiences: 
1. Human beings act towards things on the basis of meanings they ascribe to have for them 
As a doctor, what does it mean to be a member of the medical profession? What 
expectations does society have of doctors, what are the expectations that doctors have of 
themselves and the people who care about them? What does the profession and what do 
the regulatory authorities expect? How do doctors respond to the authority of the law and 
regulatory processes? 
2. The meaning of such things is derived from or arises out of the social interaction one has 
with others 
How have these expectations shaped a doctor’s career? Why did they become the subject 
of a complaint: how did they fail to meet the expectations of others? How did their 
involvement in the complaints process affect them? How did others react? Did their 
reactions affect the doctor? 
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3. These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process used by the 
person in dealing with the things he or she encounters 
Did these responses make a difference to how doctors saw themselves then, and how they 
see themselves now? To what do they attribute these changes? Is it about them, about 
complainants, or about others? What is it about the regulatory and legal process that has 
contributed to these responses? 
A narrative approach to the inquiry 
How else to explore these questions than to engage in a conversation, not to obtain answers to set 
questions, nor chronicles of events or statements of fact, but to encourage reflection on these 
fundamental perspectives about the self as a member of the medical profession, in its relationship 
with the regulatory processes constructed by society through the law, and in response to social 
and political needs and expectations? 
The conversations began with the first contact with participants, through phone calls and emails to 
establish understandings about the nature of the study and to negotiate arrangements for those 
who wished to proceed, or if indeed they were to be included as participants. In this way, a 
relationship had begun before the more formal interaction of taped interviews. This is important as 
the approach relied on establishing trust with participants, as noted above, so they could feel at 
greater ease in speaking candidly about the more personal aspects of their life as a doctor in 
relating an event through the natural form of telling a tale, a story, or constructing a narrative, as is 
now elucidated in the following section. 
What Narratives Contribute 
What are narratives and what can they contribute? 
Taking an approach that uses doctors’ narratives as the primary, though not only, source of data, 
there are various approaches to narrative that could have been selected, as well as an array of 
interpretations of “narrative” and “story”. 
There is no one method or tradition for conducting a narrative-style study, nor are there agreed 
definitions of Narrative, Story or Discourse. The distinction between them is sometimes unclear 
and the terms are frequently used interchangeably. 
A story is about what happened: a sequence of events which generally has a chronological order 
as related by the story-teller. Story is a component of narrative discourse, which has a form in 
which the story is told (Abbott, 2009), which is generally accepted as having a beginning (“once 
upon a time”), a middle (“then this happened”) and an end (“and this is how it all ended up”). 
The study of stories is less about finding themes and more about asking what stories 
do, which is to inform human life. Stories inform in the sense of providing information, 
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but more significantly, stories give form – temporal and spatial orientation, coherence, 
meaning, intention, and especially boundaries – to lives that inherently lack form 
(Frank, 2010, p. 2). 
Stories, therefore, have a form, one that Frank suggests is more than the mere structure of 
beginning, middle and end. Labov (1975) asks why a story is worth telling; as a narrative it will 
have a point, a point that is revealed in how it is told and what is to be told. As Greenhalgh (1999) 
explains, while narratives generally have a framework, a beginning, middle and end, they have a 
structure that is reflected in: 
1. The story: the sequencing of events, the timing of events, the history of events, the 
experience of the event, making sense of what happened 
2. The plot: reflecting on the experience, finding meaning and imposing a perspective on the 
experience. 
Nelson adds another element in the exploration of identity through narrative: “I make sense of 
myself or others by arranging what I care about into a story” (Nelson, 2001, p. 81). She presents 
the following as the key features of stories which together construct an identity as: 
  depictive, as representations of human experience 
  selective, in what is depicted 
  interpretive, in how the acts, events and personae are represented 
  connective, creating relationships among their own elements, and with other stories. The 
connective features work together to give it meaning and to convey meaning. 
These features distinguish a story from a chronicle, which is an historical or chronological account 
of events, but which lacks the interpretive element that the above features represent. 
Ricoeur (1984) presents a three-stage process of interpretation, and adds the concept of 
temporality. The latter draws out the events that have shaped a person’s identity, so that it is not 
just a string of events that happened along the way but an event or series of events that have been 
of significance. An isolated experience in a person’s life is only significant if seen in relation to 
other events in one’s life, pieced together via the process of emplotment to form one’s personal 
narrative. A personal narrative includes what has happened in the past, the present and the future, 
as each aspect impacts on the other: what happened in the past affects what is now in the present, 
which impacts on what will happen in the future. How people act in relation to these events reflects 
who they are as people and what their motivations are, and in this way, their identity is revealed, or 
at least becomes more clearly apparent. The other aspect of temporality is that some events have 
more significance to one’s life than other events, in terms of what shapes a person’s sense of self 
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and identity. The memory of past experiences, of the present and the imagined future experiences 
coalesce into a constructed self-identity (Ricoeur, 1984). 
How useful is the narrative approach? 
Most approaches to narrative are consistent with the straightforward structure of beginning, middle 
and end, although the analysis of this study’s interview material allows for greater flexibility, for it is 
unclear from this structure where a story began, what is the middle and where it ends, if indeed it 
could be said that there is an end. In this study, the latter becomes an anticipated future, whose 
end is uncertain. This definition is therefore somewhat confining, though it is not to be dismissed as 
it has relevance, because generally the story does commence with an account of the defining 
event of the complaint. However, during interviews it became clear that the story began much 
earlier than this, at a point when a doctor made the defining decision to become a doctor. From this 
perspective, the complaint can be seen as a disruption to a life story, one that changed the course 
of that life story, in the sense of a “biographical disruption” (Bury, 2001). So it could be said that the 
narrative begins with the start of a career as a doctor, the middle as mid-career experience, and 
the end as what happened as a consequence. The story becomes a narrative when the point of the 
story becomes apparent, which is the life-course-altering event of the complaint. This latter 
interpretation of narrative resonates with Ricoeur, as briefly summarised above, which allows for 
greater depth by emphasising the element of deliberative selection of significant events in 
accordance with one’s personal construction of their identity. 
This inquiry goes beyond an account of what happened and its focus on the event itself, to become 
not only an examination of a picture of where the event was placed in a person’s life story and its 
impact on their identity, but also an examination of perspectives on the broader social, political and 
regulatory context in which such events are constructed. Nevertheless, Nelson’s description of the 
key features of “story” are useful for the later examination of identity as a critical part of the 
analysis. Throughout this thesis however “account” or “testimony” is preferred to Nelson’s 
terminology “story”. Accounts or testimonies include stories (of what happened) which for this study 
are the catalyst for the broader narrative inquiry. 
Narrative, in summary and for the purposes of this study, consists of an account of what happened, 
but more importantly focuses on the reasons for giving the account, on the significance of the 
event or events that motivated the giving of the account, and the attempt by the narrator to explain 
the significance of the event or events in the broader context of their lives, careers, values and 
aspirations. This is achieved through in-depth interviews and is set against an examination of the 
contextual features in which doctors practise. 
Narrative inquiry 
For this study, I have undertaken a narrative analysis, or “Narrative Inquiry”, which Polkinghorne 
(1988) describes as being an examination of “lives unfolding temporally as particular events in an 
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individual’s life”. I make a distinction between narrative analysis and analysis of narrative. The 
latter is not what I chose to do. The latter requires an examination of the structure and content of 
the narrative as text, identifying themes and categories and in some cases the actual use and 
structure of language. 
This is not to say the tools and methods of analysis of narrative have been abandoned, for there is 
indeed a partial identification of themes in the later analysis of data. Following the former concept, 
referred to hereafter as Polkinghorne’s term Narrative Inquiry, enabled other contextual factors to 
be drawn on that create a sense of the continuity of “lives unfolding”. Here the works of Frank 
(1995), Ricoeur (1984), Clandinin (2007), Dewey (1938) as well as Mishler (1986), Riessman 
(1993, 2008), and Denzin (1989) have all contributed to the understanding of narrative as a way of 
gathering, exploring, interpreting and presenting the data in this study. 
Connelly and Clandinin (2006, p. 375) state that: 
People shape their daily lives by stories of who they are and others are and as they 
interpret their past in terms of these stories. Story is a portal through which a person 
enters the world and by which their experience of the world is interpreted and made 
personally meaningful. Narrative inquiry, the study of experience as story, then, is first 
and foremost a way of thinking about experience. 
Narrative inquiry is also a collaboration between researcher and participants in order to understand 
the experience: 
Beginning with a respect for ordinary lived experience, the focus of narrative inquiry is 
not only valorizing of individuals’ experience but also an exploration of the social, 
shaped, expressed, and enacted – but in a way that begins and ends that inquiry in the 
storied lives of the people involved. Narrative inquirers study an individual’s experience 
in the world and, through the study, seek ways of enriching and transforming that 
experience for themselves and others (Connelly & Clandinin, 2000, p. 20). 
In this way, the interview is more than hearing and recording someone’s story. It involves 
participation by both the interviewee and the researcher in seeking an understanding of the 
phenomenon under study, together with contextual factors and influences. The outcome will ‘enrich 
and transform the experience’ and the collective of experiences for not only the individual who 
wished to tell their tale, but also for the benefit of others. Indeed, as will be seen in the Findings, 
the majority of participants had both purposes in mind: to tell their story but as importantly, to 
contribute for the benefit of others. 
A person’s experience of a phenomenon is made meaningful by the telling of it. Each interview 
aimed to examine the story as it was constructed through its telling, and to build on it so that where 
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possible, the emerging narrative would anticipate a future. As I have noted earlier, this may be 
compared with other theories about narrative structure which identify a beginning, middle and end. 
In these interviews, we did not seek the end but rather looked to the future to consider what impact 
the past has had on this future. In this sense, the narrative creates the sense of there being a flow 
in the life story of a doctor impacted by a complaint, where the interview is a moment in time in that 
life-story. Who knows where the future will take them? 
What is known is that the life-story as it was anticipated had been interrupted, and in the process of 
telling what this interruption was like, the doctor reflected on how it has affected them when it 
happened, throughout the duration and in the aftermath, at which point they reflect on what it 
means for them now, and in the future. As Ricoeur (1984) would define this process, or mimesis, 
they refigure what the past event means for the future. There is a thread, the process of 
emplotment, or the underlying theme or point of the story. Mimesis extends beyond the story itself, 
to a way of examining a life. Hence, what happened before influences what is happening now, 
which affects what will happen in the future. There is a plot that holds these threads together, 
based not only on a linear series of events but of how we respond to them and understand them, 
and how we do so is not static or fixed, but may change over time (Ricoeur,1984). Telling the story 
will likewise not be a static account. It may be told differently tomorrow, or to a different person, but 
there will be a point to it and that point will constitute the narrative. The analysis of findings that will 
follow will be seeking what this point is. 
An ontology of experience 
This study centres on doctors’ experience of complaints, so there is now a need to explain what 
“experience” actually means in the context of exploring others’ experience through the means of a 
narrative inquiry. Narrative Inquiry begins with an ontology of experience, one that emphasises 
continuity. The inquiry, through the medium of an in-depth interview, is an act in itself within the 
stream of experience that has led to the moment of the interview, that generates new relations and 
understandings and that then becomes a part of future experience. It is a moment in time in the 
continuum of that experience. In this way, the inquiry itself alters the phenomenon that is the focus 
of this study. 
Clandinin and Connelly’s (2000) view of experience has its roots in Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy 
(Experience and Education, 1938). Salient features of Dewey’s (1981, p. 251) concept of 
experience, as set out in Clandinin (2007), are: 
Experience is the fundamental ontological category from which all inquiry proceeds (not 
just narrative): a notion of the inexpressible. It is a “changing stream that is 
characterized by continuous interaction of human thought with our personal, social, and 
material environment. Because every experience is constituted by interaction between 
“subject” and “object”, between a self and its world, it is not itself either merely physical 
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nor merely mental, no matter how much one factor or the other predominates…. 
[experiences] are the products of discrimination, and hence can be understood only as 
we take into account the total normal experience in which both inner and outer factors 
are so incorporated that each has lost its special character. In an experience, things 
and events belonging to the world, physical and social, are transformed through the 
human context they enter, while the live creature is changed and developed through its 
intercourse with things previously external to it (Clandinin, 2007). 
Clandinin (2007, p. 4) adds that “Narratives are the form of representation that describes human 
experience as it unfolds through time….they are the most appropriate form to use when thinking 
about inquiry undertaken within a pragmatic framework”. 
In relation to “experience as data” in qualitative research, St Pierre (2008, p. 326) writes: “Narrative 
goes hand-in-hand with another concept that grounds qualitative inquiry, experience, as in the 
common phrase, ‘the everyday lived experiences of participants’. Participants often embed their 
experiences in stories they tell us in interviews. Experience thus becomes data and then 
foundational evidence that warrants our claims.” However, she disputes that experience is data. 
She quotes Scott (1992) who explained that “it is not individuals who have experience, but subjects 
who are constituted through experience”. Experience is not the origin of the explanation, nor the 
authoritative evidence, “but rather that which we seek to explain, that about which knowledge is 
produced” (Scott, 1992, pp. 25, 26). In other words, experience, per se, is not the data, or the 
evidence. It is the explanation of the experience that is the data. As St Pierre (2008) explained 
further, “experience is not simply material, what ‘happens’; it is also discursive. Of course, this is 
not to say that nothing happens, but that what happens is recognized and made meaningful only 
through available discourses that ‘systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 49), including identities. 
This suggests the reason for someone wishing to tell their story as an experience of the past that 
has had significance is that it would provide the opportunity to articulate what that experience 
meant to them. 
Under conditions of adversity, individuals often feel a pressing need to re-examine and 
re-fashion their personal narratives in an attempt to maintain a sense of identity (Bury, 
2001, p. 264). 
It is this examination, not the experience itself, that forms the basis of this inquiry. 
What illness narratives contribute 
Illness narratives speak of the disruption to one’s life and to one’s identity caused by the onset of a 
disease, injury or chronic illness, and the role of narrative or story in seeking to re-establish a 
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sense of self or identity when so much has changed. Bury (1982) called this concept a 
“biographical disruption” because the event disrupted the predicted course of a person’s life. 
When illness seriously disrupts a person’s life, especially following the onset of a life-changing 
disease, injury or chronic illness, it can result in what Goffman (1963) spoke of as the “spoiled 
identity” which is associated with stigma because the image of the person is different, either 
because of physical changes or that the individual believes they are no longer the same to others. 
The person they thought they were is now different because it may have changed their capacities, 
appearance, status in the world, dreams, and potential future achievements. Frank (1995, p. 60) 
explains it thus: “the present is not what the past was supposed to lead to, and whatever future will 
follow this present is contingent”. 
Just as illness interrupts one’s normal existence, so it is with complaints, and has effects that reach 
beyond the event itself: 
Illness alters life plans and projects. And it provokes a response, however difficult and 
tenuous. Illness matters because real things are on the line: self-identity, physical and 
mental health, life chances, social status, employment, finances, religious aspirations, 
or personal relationships. Seen this way, illness and treatment are embedded in the 
local moral experience of a particular network, neighborhood, or community (Kleinman, 
2006, p. 834). 
Broyard speaks of the “crisis of (his) life”, making a narrative or story out of his illness in order to 
detoxify it (Broyard, 1992, p. 21). In much the same way, the experience of a complaint can also be 
perceived as the crisis of one’s life. It is a disruption, one that threatens one’s identity. Doctors 
undergoing an event of significance, such as a complaint that threatens their self-image, how 
others see them or how they see themselves, their reputation and their future, are similarly 
affected. 
Denzin (1989, p. 70) writes of illness as an epiphany, as “interactional moments and experiences 
which leave marks on people’s lives. In them, personal character is manifested. They are often 
moments of crisis. They alter the fundamental meaning structures in a person’s life”. However, it is 
important not to take on the “Phoenix”-like metaphor of a new person arising from a spoiled identity 
via illness. For instance, a change in physical or mental status via illness may affect one’s image to 
the world, and may interfere with or prevent continuation of lifestyle and livelihood. Having a 
complaint is different: it is often silent, not known about or not spoken about. It is generally not 
obvious unless it has been in the news or people around know about it. This invokes Goffman’s 
(1963) stigma theory: actual overt stigmatisation can occur if the event is visible, or self-
stigmatisation otherwise. Alternatively, there may be no radical change at all, as one learns to live 
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with it (Frank, 1993). Nevertheless, this still suggests some conscious reckoning has taken or is 
taking place. 
A story worth telling 
Whatever the root cause, as Labov (1967) writes, a story has to be worth telling: there has been a 
precipitating event from which “an implicit canonical script has been breached, violated or deviated 
from in a manner that has done violence to it”. 
The precipitating event, whether illness, complaint or other, can be significant enough in a person’s 
life that their identity and sense of self are so disrupted as to cause a fundamental shift in their life 
course, and therefore, a fundamental shift in their belief in who they are. A re-assessment is what 
then occurs, during which the meaning of the event and its consequence are contemplated (Frank, 
1995; Charmaz, 1990; Bury, 1982). Part of the impact of the complaints process is the waiting, not 
knowing what the outcome may be, and therefore, what the consequence will be in terms of the 
future. 
An interview is an opportunity to express the evaluation of their current status, which anticipates a 
future that can be the positive result of a reconstruction of one’s identity. Nelson (2001, p. 6) calls 
this process a production of a counter-story that addresses the former narrative of the spoiled 
identity. Ricoeur would call it the configuration, and then the refiguration phase of a narrative 
(Ricoeur, 1991, 2008). Overall, I will borrow from Nelson’s term “Narrative Repair” to explain this 
process, for which people use narratives to explore how they seek to undergo such repair (Nelson, 
2001) to reconfigure their identity. 
The social dimension 
It is important to acknowledge the social dimension in narrative inquiries. 
Narrative inquiries explore the stories people live and tell. These stories are the result of a 
confluence of social influences on a person’s inner life, social influences on their environment, and 
their unique personal history. Narrative Inquiry is an approach to the study of human lives as a way 
of honouring lived experience as a source of important knowledge and understanding (Clandinin, 
2007, p. 7). 
This inquiry takes account of the social dimension, as well as the historical and political. How a 
person constructs their story is influenced by what they want to tell, which will in turn be framed by 
the “who” they wish to portray, and that “who” is the creation of a history of a self-made and other-
influenced identity. 
A picture of that milieu is described in Chapter One as an exploration of the creation of 
professional, personal and social identity in the context of the legal and regulatory environment in 
which medicine is situated. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that this environment is 
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constantly changing in response to events and influences in the social and political environment. 
Clarke (2003, p. 365) recognises that as situations are unstable, influenced by social worlds that 
are constantly changing, methods are needed that capture the complexities of such situations and 
identify participant positions that acknowledge what perspective they are speaking from. 
The moral dimension 
Nelson introduced the concept of “master narrative” (Nelson, 2001). From master narratives, 
identities are formed, drawing on the values, acts, characteristics and experiences that mean most 
to the individual. As Nelson (2001, p. 82) said, “I make sense of myself or others by arranging what 
I care about into a story”. We seek our identity in terms of “plot templates” and character types 
which surround us in our lives, and which are often shared by others. The self’s master narrative 
could be another term for identity. But as a narrative, it extends beyond identity (“I as a doctor”) to 
an exploration of how identity is created, by whom and why, what influences this creation, what 
maintains it and what threatens it. Lacan (Miller, 1988) conceptualises this as the symbolic and the 
imaginary – what is symbolic of being a doctor (what a doctor is like; how the image of a medical 
practitioner is portrayed in society) and what the individual doctor imagines him/herself to be. 
Let us say that being a good doctor is a doctor’s “master narrative”, or their imagined self. This is 
what all doctors are expected to be, what they pledge an oath to be, and what society demands of 
them. But of course, the degree of commitment to such a virtue is as variable as there are doctors. 
Regardless, there are common characteristics, and standards that have to be met, and so it 
becomes a search for moral legitimacy that is not about right and wrong, but about virtue, 
worthiness and values. As Hunt and Carnevale express it, 
Moral experience encompasses a person’s sense that values that he or she deems 
important are being realised or thwarted in everyday life. This includes a person’s 
interpretations of a lived encounter, or a set of encounters, that fall on spectrums of 
right-wrong, good-bad or just-unjust” (Hunt & Carnevale, 2011, p. 659). 
Wortham (2001, quoted in Neimeyer, 2005, p. 70) comments on how “we subtly position ourselves 
as characters of moral worth in the stories we tell to others. The underlying assumption is that 
narrative conveys a moral sense of life”. The analysis of this study therefore focuses on how 
subjects positioned themselves, how they spoke, how they manifested their interests and moral 
beliefs, and how their talk reflected moral understandings. 
Memory of past experiences, experiences of the present, and imagined future experiences 
coalesce into a constructed self-identity. Hence, at interview, the past is recalled; the present is 
deliberated on as it was shaped by the past; the future is contemplated for what this all may mean. 
The self-identity that was shaped in the past may no longer hold the same value when the 
significant event of having a complaint throws this into question. The master narrative, the 
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imagined self, has been set off course, and the moral question emerges as critical: is the master 
narrative as it was in the past retrievable, has its interruption interfered with the self as imagined 
and as lived, has it altered the future life course, and does it matter? 
The purpose of interpretation was to explore how a doctor’s career trajectory was shaped by 
events, such as having a complaint, what this meant at the time, what it means now, and what it 
means for the future. By looking back, there is a connection between events that is constructed by 
what they now mean, and by looking forward, this construction anticipates what the future may 
become. This study presents the testimony of doctors in trouble in such a way that their experience 
was not just a series of events that upset them, and perhaps changed them, but that has caused 
them to reflect on a bigger world they did not create (the medico-legal environment) and what this 
has meant for them, not only in terms of what they went through, but how it impacted on shaping 
their future. 
The value of such understanding is expressed by Scott Fitzpatrick (2014, p. 64): 
By exposing us to new possibilities of being, narrative provides us with ways of 
reflecting on and structuring future actions in light of our past and present lives, and of 
giving unity to that life. In this view, narratives not only become something to be lived 
out, they also act as one of the primary ways by which we come to understand our 
identities. 
Interpretation of the interpretation 
As discussed earlier, the interview itself is a joint enterprise that reflects on an event which 
continues to have resonance and emotional significance. Meaning is drawn from explaining events, 
perceptions and feelings. The result or “product” of this process is a transcript which will be further 
analysed and interpreted, with a product that is of the making of the researcher, based on the 
interaction between interviewer and interviewee. The record of an interview is a representation of 
the talk. Mishler (1986, p. 11) writes that, “How we make that representation and the analytic 
procedures we apply to it reveal our theoretical assumptions and presuppositions about relations 
between discourse and meaning”. 
Neither the interview nor the analysis that followed involved verifying the “truth” of an event, since 
for the purposes of this study, the truth was not relevant. What was important was the account of 
an experience, and this account would be constructed according to what the interviewee wished to 
tell and how the interview or conversation itself unfolded. To reveal the truth would not be possible, 
if viewed in this way. Narratives can only achieve “verisimilitude”. Bruner (1991, p. 7) states that  
“Narratives, then, are a version of reality whose acceptability is governed by convention and 
‘narrative necessity’ rather than by empirical verification and logical requiredness, although 
ironically we have no compunction about calling stories true or false”. 
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Bruner (1991) explains the components: 
The loose link between intentional states and subsequent action is the reason why 
narrative accounts cannot provide causal explanations. What they supply instead is the 
basis for interpreting why a character acted as he or she did. Interpretation is 
concerned with “reasons” for things happening, rather than strictly their “causes”. 
Hermeneutics implies there is a text through which somebody tries to express a meaning and from 
which somebody is trying to extract a meaning: there may be a difference in what is expressed, 
and what it means. 
Summary 
This section of the chapter provided an overview of the value of narrative inquiry as a method for 
examining doctors’ experience of complaints. For this study, those devices, tools and methods that 
would best facilitate obtaining, analysing and interpreting the very rich material were selected. By 
adding the account of the political, social and regulatory environment in which doctors’ practise 
would heighten the understanding of “where doctors are coming from”, when a complaint against 
them threatens to unravel the careers and lives they have made for themselves.  
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Methods 
To develop an understanding of why doctors respond as they do to complaints, it was preferable to 
seek methods that would be fluid, dynamic, relatively unstructured yet consistent in their overall 
approach so that similarities and differences in doctors’ responses could be identified. The 
methods also needed to acknowledge personal perception, context and experience, so there was 
to be no concern about identifying or verifying the official facts of a case, for reasons that have 
been explained earlier. 
As no one traditional approach was satisfactory in meeting the epistemological stance taken for 
this study, it was decided to draw on several methods from qualitative research methodology and 
the methods of narrative inquiry. These were the most appropriate as they provided the scope to 
explore subjective experience as distinct from the objective realities, and to elicit subtleties, 
nuances and meaning through interaction with the participants. Rather than making assumptions 
based on my own observations, experience and reading, I aimed to obtain doctors’ accounts of 
their experience and perceptions, achieved by subtle exploration of their accounts and their 
perceptions of the complaints process. I believed that the most effective way to obtain the 
explanations I was seeking was to have doctors, as experts in their own experience, tell us. 
Approach to Interviewing 
The interview method was used as the primary source of data collection (Charmaz, 2006). For the 
main part of my study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with seventeen doctors who had 
the experience of a complaint against them. A narrative style is a non-intrusive way of having 
participants relate their accounts and tell their stories. However, given there were specific 
questions, there needed to be some direction and structure so that all topics would be covered. In 
so saying, these directives were subtle, rather than imposed, so that questions would be 
answered, though posed in an unstructured way. A consistency in the method chosen was 
therefore achieved, and the topics covered, while the conduct and flow of each interview varied. 
Most interviews became more like a conversation which allowed the participant room to speak 
without interruption, with occasional prompts and incursions when going off topic or to introduce a 
new topic, to explore a response or to return to expand on points made earlier. If a participant was 
less forthcoming, the interview was more directed, at least initially until the interviewee became 
more at ease. 
Recruitment 
Main group: Doctors in trouble (doctors with experience of complaints against them) 
Recruitment came from various sources: 
1. Through negotiations with medical indemnity insurers to place notices in their membership 
publications 
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2. Recommended by participants’ colleagues who knew of the study 
3. Doctors attending a conference at which I presented. 
Medical insurers 
Meetings were held with the two larger medical indemnity insurers (MIIs) in Australia, Avant 
Insurance and MDA National. The purpose was to obtain support for the study, primarily in order to 
facilitate recruitment of their members for participation, and secondly, to inform them of the study 
with a view to the findings being of benefit in designing appropriate support for members through 
the complaints process. Both organisations agreed to place advertisements in their publications to 
members seeking interest in participation. These advertisements were placed four months apart in 
order to space the subsequent interviews. 
It was made clear that my study was being conducted independently of their organisation, so 
interested doctors were to contact the researcher directly. Names of doctors who came forward 
were not provided to the MIIs. 
Inclusion criteria were that participants were to be currently registered and practising, or recently 
retired medical practitioners, with the experience of at least one complaint against them. Age, sex, 
speciality, nature of complaint and outcome were irrelevant for recruitment, as the focus was on 
their experience in their own terms, not as defined by “the process”. For instance, to select by any 
of these criteria could be seen to pre-empt that there would be a correlation between that criterion 
and how they responded. I did not wish to make such an assumption. 
A number of enquiries was received, each responded to with a personalised letter, participant 
information and a consent form. Doctors were invited to phone or email if they had enquiries prior 
to providing their consent. Some doctors phoned to say they would like to have their say about the 
process but did not wish to proceed with an interview as they did not wish to “go back there”. One 
doctor emailed to say he would like to participate but did not feel safe to do so. After a lengthy 
conversation, he was reassured that his participation and the data derived from this would be 
entirely confidential and not-identifiable in any subsequent publication. He agreed to go ahead. 
A few doctors received the information but did not respond further. Reminders were sent but no 
one was pressed further unless they replied to the reminder. For a few of the latter, there was to be 
another follow-up by email or phone call, as fitting in around busy schedules proved difficult for a 
few doctors. One doctor postponed her interview several times, explaining later that she had not 
felt quite ready to talk about her experience. Sadly, one doctor died by suicide some months after 
our initial contact, which I came to know about through a media report. 
Some doctors had been informed of the study and had expressed an interest in being interviewed. 
I either declined, or they did, because of the expectation that the study would be used to advocate 
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for their cause. The exception was one other doctor who had been put into contact with me whom I 
did interview, but in later consideration, I decided not to include the data from this interview in the 
main analysis. Hers was a very controversial case, well known in her specialist field, and as with 
those mentioned, I considered that her motivation was to express her profound sense of injustice 
at how the medico-legal system managed her prolonged case through various jurisdictions rather 
than to understand her experiences more broadly as I was aiming for. While this did not make her 
ineligible, she expected that her name would be published, which is contrary to my protocol of 
ensuring anonymity of all participants in the primary group. Setting the disaffected group aside, the 
motivation of doctors during our initial contact was not generally raised. It was not a question that 
had been included in the original plan, but after conducting the first two interviews, it was obvious 
that this question needed to be asked. As an iterative process, it was apparent that the interviews 
were to be more than an account of “what happened” and doctors’ perceptions of this. It also 
became clear that the interview was also to be an exploration of the moral dimension of their 
experience, which I will explain later in the next chapter. 
Suggested by colleagues 
Other potential participants came forward after being suggested by their colleagues. It was this 
group who tended to make demands of the conduct of the study. 
Conference attendees 
Interest was expressed in the study after presenting a paper at the Australasian Doctors Health 
Conference 22-25 October 2015. Prior to the conference, Ethics Committee approval was obtained 
to distribute flyers, announced at the end of the presentation. The flyers could be obtained from me 
directly and by agreement with the MDO Avant, from a supply displayed on their marketing table. 
Within hours, I had five approaches and over some weeks, other email contacts following the 
conference. 
Second group (the “expert informants”) 
Five expert informants who provide professional support to doctors, in various capacities including 
private psychiatrists and medico-legal advisers in medical defence organisations, were invited to 
be interviewed. These practitioners were specifically invited because of my familiarity with their 
work through my previous employment experience. Given they are actively involved with doctors in 
trouble (DiTs) during the complaints-handling process, they have a perspective that extends 
beyond the individual to a broader view of what doctors in this situation go through and how they 
respond. As with the first cohort, scheduling the interviews was difficult and prolonged as few have 
a spare hour or two without several weeks’ notice. 
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Final numbers 
By the end of sixteen months, 17 extended interviews had been conducted with doctors in NSW, 
Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia. There had been 26 enquiries. Of the “Expert 
informants”, all but 2 proceeded to an interview. One doctor, a medico-legal adviser, was 
interested in an interview but 2 follow-up contacts did not receive a reply; the other, a doctor in 
private practice who writes medico-legal reviews, was likewise interested, but did not follow 
through. 
The following table presents the basic demographic profile of the participants. I have not added 
further personal information, to protect their identity. Each is designated as a DiT (doctor-in-
trouble). The demographic details of the expert informants is included in Section Two of the 
Findings (in Chapter Six). 
Table Three: Doctors in trouble 
Identifier Gender Specialisation  Location  Type of practice Career  
DiT1 M Gynaecology City Public Mid-career 
DiT2 F Obstetrician/ 
Gynaecology 
Regional  Private group 
practice/private 
hospital 
Mid-career 
DiT3 M Psychiatrist  Regional Community Resigned mid-
career 
DiT4 F Physician Regional Mixed: 
Solo practice; 
public hospital 
Mid-career 
DiT5 F Emergency 
Physician 
City Mixed: 
Public/private 
hospital 
Mid-career 
DiT6 M Obstetrician/ 
Gynaecology  
Regional Mixed: 
Public/private 
hospital 
Late career 
DiT7 M Psychiatrist  City Private solo 
practice 
Mid-career 
DiT8 F GP (hospital) City Public Mid-career 
DiT9 F Psychiatrist  City Solo practice Late career 
DiT10 M Psychiatrist 
Registrar 
City Public In training 
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Identifier Gender Specialisation  Location  Type of practice Career  
DiT11 M Gastroente-
rologist 
Regional Solo practice; 
Public/private 
hospital 
Early-career  
DiT12 F Psychiatrist City Mixed Mid-career 
DiT13 M Anaesthetist City Mixed Mid-career 
DiT14 M Psychiatrist City Solo practice Late career 
DiT15 F GP City Private group 
practice 
Mid-career 
DiT16 F Emergency 
Registrar 
City Public In training 
DiT17 F Geriatrics City Mixed Late career 
 
Demographics 
Doctors in trouble (DiTs) 
Participants are categorised as: In training (as specialist); Early career (recently qualified as 
specialist); Mid-career (well-established in area of specialty); Late career (towards or after 
retirement age, still working either full-time or part-time). 
Setting 
Participants were invited to nominate their preferred venue for the interview. This was in 
recognition that, as difficult subject matter may be touched upon, they should feel as much at ease 
as possible without being in unfamiliar territory. Venues therefore included homes, offices, private 
rooms in hospitals or private surgeries, and this meant I as the researcher needed to travel to 
them. Given this was a national study, this had logistical challenges. For the most part, it was 
possible to accommodate the travel requirements, but in one instance, the challenge of distance 
and expense prevented travel to a more remote district. Instead, a telephone interview was 
suggested but the doctor was not happy with this and so he declined. Three interviews were 
conducted within the university campus, as finding another suitable location proved difficult for the 
participants, one because he was travelling from interstate, one because she was fearful for her 
privacy if close to work or home and the other wanted to reconnect with the university environment. 
These arrangements were not ideal, as it was either unfamiliar territory for them and they felt 
unease, or it was very familiar and there was much reminiscing of student days. On the other hand, 
an arrangement with one participant to meet in a large public park proved impossible, as on the 
day it poured with rain. A nearby café served as a retreat, and with the buzz of music and 
background chatter, the interview appeared as a pair of friends having a lengthy catch-up over 
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coffee. The recording device was secreted behind the sugar bowl, and the mobile phone was 
placed on the table, as is usual in modern life. Even towards the end of the interview when she 
became weepy, this was managed as a “normal” occurrence between acquaintances, although we 
walked for a while afterwards while she regained her composure and more confident self. In this 
instance, I consider that the apparent normality of the situation enabled me to achieve one of my 
most successful interviews. 
The interviews with expert informants followed much the same format as the main group, although 
with different questions which were more structured than the other set (see below). These 
interviews were conducted in their workplace: an office, a meeting room or clinical rooms. 
The templates for the sets of questions are in Appendices 6 and 7. 
Interview Questions 
The full version of the guide to the interviews is in Appendix 6. Box 2 below is a summary of the 
questions. The following interview guide demonstrates that the main topics to be covered were 
identified prior to the interview, and each interview included these topics. Motivation to participate 
was added after the first two interviews, as it became clear this was relevant as doctors spoke 
about why they were interested in being interviewed, a topic that arose naturally during introductory 
conversation. 
Box Two: DiT interview questions 
Introductory questions: 
Self, practice 
The complaint and you 
Experience of having a complaint: What happened, what did you do, feelings at the time 
Process of dealing with the complaint: advice, communications with AHPRA/HCCC 
Support 
Telling others: family, colleagues, medical insurer 
Formal, informal, professional support during the process 
Changes to you and your practice 
Changes to self or practice during or after the complaint-handling process 
Attitudes to patients, profession, colleagues 
Attitudes to self by others 
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Impact on your perception of medicine 
Why they chose medicine, what they expected 
Whether the experience of a complaint change their perception, feelings about being a doctor 
Perceptions of the whole process 
Overall perceptions of the whole process 
The most challenging aspects of being complained about 
What could have been different 
 
Box Three: Guide to interview questions for the experts 
Introductory questions 
Role as a doctor providing support to doctors, and in what context support is provided 
Experience of complaints 
Comments on how complaints impact on doctors’ health and wellbeing, and why 
Observed changes in doctors: practice, emotions, behaviour 
Obtaining support 
Why many doctors do not tell others or ask for support 
The complaints process 
Impact of the complaints process on doctors 
Perspectives and reflections 
 
Reflections on the interviews 
All interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and a mobile phone as back-up. Recordings 
were sent to a professional transcribing service, given the length and nature of the audio files. 
Before commencing the analysis of transcripts, I replayed the recording with the transcript and 
made corrections as necessary. Utterances, pauses, emotive sounds such as coughs, tears and 
laughter were noted in the transcript in square brackets, as were interruptions. For each transcript, 
I added some observations of my own about the setting, the conduct and tone of the interview, and 
any unusual or noteworthy events and incidents. This became valuable in later analysis as it 
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provided contextual material that added richness to the construction of the unfolding narrative of 
each participant. 
The interviews were conducted in a way that encouraged free expression, prompted at times to 
bring a participant back from meandering, to overcome hesitations and insecurity, or to ensure that 
all intended topics were covered (see Interview Guide in Appendix 6). Each interview was an 
interchange, and whether intended or not, how I as an interviewer responded to the participant’s 
talk affected how the interview progressed. 
By having consented to being interviewed, the interviewee had agreed to share their experience. 
They had varied motives for volunteering, and while this may have influenced why they attended, it 
did not appear to have made a significant difference to what they chose to speak about during the 
actual interview. For instance, some came prepared with a file or even dossier of “their case”, as if 
to launch into an examination of what occurred and analysis of how they fared at the conclusion of 
their medico-legal matter. As the focus was more on the process, the outcome of the complaint 
was to become secondary, and in most cases, these prepared dossiers stayed in their briefcases. 
But once this was understood, all participants freely opened up about the more personal. By 
steering participants in this way, the desired subject matter was covered while avoiding being 
prescriptive in the order of topics and the manner in which participants could express their 
thoughts. This was not to say the interview was dismissive of their desire to tell what happened, 
how they felt about it and if they had a need to justify and reason. However, if an analysis of the 
legal case opened up, then the interview would become engrossed in a critique of the judicial or 
official decision, which would be a distraction and not appropriate as this would draw the interview 
into a commentary about justice served or denied, in their specific case. It was for this very reason 
that certain individuals were declined from being interviewed, as they wished to use the study to 
advocate for justice they felt had been denied them in other jurisdictions. 
In this way, while there was control of the boundaries around which our discussion would proceed, 
yet as with most interchanges, the participant as narrator was able to select and edit those 
elements according to how I as the listener responded. As Greenhalgh (1999) writes, “The choice 
of what to tell and what to omit lies entirely with the narrator and can be modified, at his or her 
discretion, by the questions of the listener”. The conduct of the interview affected how the 
interviewee responded to this opportunity to be selective in what they chose to relate, and how 
they would do so. In some cases, an interviewee’s uncertainty meant that they would check back 
periodically to see if this was what was needed, or wanted (“Is this what you’re after?”). Reflecting 
on experience was more of a struggle for some than others. Some embraced the opportunity, and 
needed very little input from the interviewer. Others, who came prepared to relate the facts, were 
less relaxed or were even surprised that there would be interest in them as people with a 
subjective story to tell about how those facts came about and their perception of the process that 
dealt with these facts. 
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As this account shows, the context of the interview is a very important element in the data 
collection and my analysis pays special attention to the exchange between teller and reader (or 
interview participant and myself as interviewer) and the social purposes and conditions in which 
narratives are embedded (Eagleton, 1997). 
As the interviewer, I was acutely aware of how the interviewees appraised me and the situation, as 
to how much they were willing to share with me. For instance, every participant wanted to know my 
credentials and the basis of my interest in this subject. I would find myself telling them the story of 
how I came to be doing this doctoral study and what it was that had caught my interest. More 
importantly, they needed to understand that I had sufficient experience and authority to be trusted 
to talk with me about their professional and personal life. There was universal surprise that I am 
neither a doctor nor a lawyer, so my interest in this topic raised a lot of curiosity. 
It is interesting to explore further the nature of the relationship of myself as interviewer and the 
interviewee as participant. First, I needed to gain the trust and confidence of my participants, so I 
needed to establish the worth of my own identity, before we could proceed with the interview. 
When there is a differential in power and status between interviewer and interviewee (Fontana, 
2003), in this study it was they who came with the credentials and who chose the setting for the 
interview. But as I have noted, I needed to establish my credentials, which are clearly not as 
privileged as those of a doctor. Yet I did hold control of the interview – how it was arranged, its 
purpose, its content, its conduct. 
Each doctor’s account is not just a story of what happened, but is the telling of how they see 
themselves as doctors and also as normal human beings responding to a critical event in their 
lives. For these doctors, their identity is so much tied in with their professional selves that as a 
reader, you will see that their personal narrative is the thread that underlies each interview, and 
that this thread is the common thread that binds the findings into the principle of “Moral 
Legitimacy”. 
The findings that are presented in the next chapter present the testimony of doctors in trouble in 
such a way that shows their experience was not just a series of events that upset them, and 
perhaps changed them, but that has caused them to reflect on a bigger world they did not create. 
They reflect on this bigger world – the medico-legal environment – and what this has meant for 
them, not only in terms of what they went through, but how it impacted on shaping their future. By 
also presenting the testimony of the expert informants who present a variety of perspectives 
depending on their role in working with doctors in trouble, we will gain a clearer picture of what this 
environment is that DiTs have to navigate through. 
 P a g e  | 131 
Ethical Challenges 
The conduct of this study presented some challenges beyond the expected range of ethical 
considerations, and needed to be adequately addressed prior to gaining Ethics approval. 
1. Confidentiality 
Not only was it essential to protect participants’ identities; attention was to be paid to not refer to 
any other identifying facts, even if these were not named. Some matters can be identified by those 
“in the know” merely by recognising the story, because these tales are part of the “insider 
knowledge” that every profession carries. It was certainly an issue of significant concern to those 
considering whether to participate. Care has been taken to anonymise accounts to ensure 
confidentiality. 
2. Disclosure of illegal activity 
Complaints data and various studies reveal that taking drugs, medication for non-therapeutic 
purposes, exists and can be either a cause of complaint, a reason for an adverse event, or a 
consequence of stress relating to practice or to involvement in a complaints process. Doctors were 
therefore forewarned about revealing this information in an interview, since although not being a 
health practitioner with obligations to make a mandatory notification if there were to be a belief of 
potential impairment, as a researcher there would be a duty of care to ensure the safety of the 
practitioner and of patients. 
3. Protection of the participants 
It was anticipated that doctors may find the recall of events distressing, and care needed to be 
taken to both forewarn participants and to handle this appropriately in the interview, to prevent 
further inadvertent harm. A statement to this effect was included in the participant information, as 
well as assurance that my many years of experience of working with doctors in trouble had 
equipped me to deal with many disturbing events and emotionally-charged situations. In addition, 
professional advice and opportunity to de-brief were sought from my mentor and supervisor, the 
psychiatrist Professor Garry Walter. 
Narrative Analysis 
Introduction 
Beneath the telling of other people’s stories, there is no denying that my interest in this topic has 
had a profound impact on how I chose to conduct my study, and on how I now choose to explain 
what was found. My background in relation to the topic was described in the preface, but I need to 
also explain how I dealt with the vast pool of data I had collected from the participants in the 22 
extended interviews, and in particular, how I found I needed to deviate from traditional methods of 
data analysis in order to preserve and respect the character and integrity of each account. While it 
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was tempting to re-create the stories as testimonies to a set of unique experiences, I erred away 
from doing so for these reasons: 
1. Preserving their confidentiality. Some “cases” are well known or have sufficient clues that 
someone “in the know” would be able to identify who the participant is. 
2. The limited value of “stories” per se in responding to the research questions. Stories of 
“what happened” provided interest and context but were not central to the exploration of 
experience and perception. 
3. This study is not a study or analysis of narrative per se. Narrative-style interviewing was 
instead a tool to encourage free and open dialogue. 
There are, however, common threads that can be identified throughout these testimonies and it is 
these that the analysis focuses on. 
What are common threads? 
Common threads are not themes, because “themes” can be fixed labels imposed on the analysis. 
Themes are what are contrived by the researcher, who identifies and imposes them on the basis of 
coding transcripts, which has the risk of taking the life and individuality of the testimonies and 
treating them as disembodied “data”. Themes can remove the individuality of participants, except 
to use them as extracts to support and exemplify a decision about naming the theme. This thinking 
aligns with that of Jackson and Mazzei (2009) who argue that: 
...qualitative data interpretation and analysis does not happen via mechanistic coding, 
reducing data to themes, and writing up transparent narratives that do little to critique 
the complexities of social life; such simplistic approaches preclude dense and multi-
layered treatment of data. Furthermore, we challenge simplistic treatments of data and 
analysis in qualitative research that, for example, beckon voices to ‘speak for 
themselves’, or that reduce complicated and conflicting voices and data to thematic 
‘chunks’ that can be interpreted free of context and circumstance. 
Common threads can be interwoven, do not have boundaries, and they can link the thoughts and 
ideas of participants, binding them together but enabling them to remain distinct and individual. For 
this study, the aim was to present how participants thought about their experience beyond 
providing a description of “what happened” and how they described their experience. 
Speaking of narrative inquiry, Polkinghorne (in Clandinin & Murphy, 2007) describes it as 
philosophically different from other qualitative methodologies. In a conversation with Mishler, he 
says: 
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I think in qualitative research there is a general push to provide taxonomies and 
conceptual systems and so on which sort of look for commonalities across interviews 
and other things. And my own point there is, I think that narrative is quite different, that 
it really deals with individual lives. I come at narrative more than from a philosophical 
perspective in terms of it's the way we understand human existence. He looks for how 
people have responded differently to similar events in their lives and how they've 
responded in some similar ways. But that when you use narrative as a kind of data 
which is sort of equivalent to any other kind of interview data and you analyze it and the 
way qualitative analysis normally looks at things I think it misses the significance of 
what narrative is about. That it can capture in this kind of temporal development of 
lives, of the unique histories of people86. 
Likewise, Riessman (1993) speaks of her reluctance to using traditional methods, when she found 
that looking for themes became difficult to categorise when narrative accounts “knitted” several 
themes into long accounts that had coherence and sequences which she did not wish to fragment 
into distinct thematic categories. 
Management of interview material 
Instead of undertaking a thematic analysis, I was guided by authors who allow for a more iterative 
process, dealing first with the vast pool of transcript material, then sorting and building a 
conceptual scaffold (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) that builds on ideas, beliefs and concepts that go 
beyond descriptive accounts of what happened. What happened becomes the centrepiece around 
which these concepts can be explored, not the raison d’être of this thesis. 
This iterative process involved three steps which commenced with a holistic “sweep” of each 
interview transcript, then a more in-depth identification of the topics spoken about, to an 
identification of the underlying concepts that these topics represented. Josselson (2011) and 
Lieblich (1998) have a similar approach and my analysis began with this. Josselson (2011, p. 226) 
explains: 
What is perhaps unique to narrative research is that it endeavors to explore the whole account 
rather than fragmenting it into discursive units or thematic categories. It is not the parts that are 
significant in human life, but how the parts are integrated to create a whole – which has meaning. 
Josselson (2011, p. 226) frames this approach around the concept of the hermeneutic circle (from 
Friedrich Schleiermacher), “in which an understanding of the whole illuminates the parts, which in 
turn create the whole”. Analysis from this stance means gaining an overall sense of meaning, and 
examining the parts in relation to it. 
                                                          
86Looking Ahead: Conversations with Elliot Mishler, Don Polkinghorne, & Amia Lieblich, in Clandinin, D. & Murphy, S. 
(2007) Handbook of narrative inquiry: Mapping a methodology. Thousand Oaks, Sage, California. 
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Initial handling of the material involved an adaptation of the “framework” method of analysis, from 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003). This enabled a structure within which to manage and organise data, by 
which is meant the contents of the transcripts from the interviews. While there are three stages 
involved in this approach, it was more useful to represent analysis following Ricoeur’s (1976, 1984) 
three-stage process of interpretation: 
1. Naïve interpretation 
2. Structural analysis 
3. Critical interpretation 
This commenced with an analysis of each transcript one by one, and then the transcripts as a 
whole (Ricoeur, 1984). 
First, taking a step back to consider what constitutes “data”, this study includes as primary data the 
audio recordings of interviews and the transcripts from these interviews. As supplementary data 
are included observations relating to participants. This includes file notes documented following an 
encounter with a potential participant by telephone or email that adds to the picture of a 
participant’s experience. 
Following each interview, notes of incidents or observations about the interview were recorded, 
such as how it progressed, and peripheral and other issues that may have had a bearing on how 
the interview was conducted or how a participant responded to the situation. 
Management of primary data 
The interviews generated a vast amount of material, contained within verbatim transcripts for each 
participant. After checking the transcripts for errors, the first step was to identify broad “domains” of 
topics spoken about, such as the experience itself and perceptions of the experience, leading to 
reflections on the meaning for each participant. Groupings of the nature of experience and 
perceptions were generated, and a reflexive process enabled reflections on meaning by seeing 
patterns, similarities and common threads, as well as identifying anomalies, gaps and unique 
experiences. To complete the picture, a process of analysis considered what insights had emerged 
that had not been anticipated, whether explanations could be found for these in the data, in 
documents referred to, or in the literature. 
These steps represent the first two steps of Ricoeur’s (1984, 1991) approach, while providing a 
straightforward method of dealing with the data. This completed the picture and brought the 
analysis together, allowing the analysis to move on to the critical interpretation presented in the 
Discussion chapter. 
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This approach is consistent with the method “Framework Analysis” (Gale, Heath, Cameron, Rashid 
& Redwood, 2013) which was followed as a process that enabled identifying, capturing and 
articulating what was common to the collective of interviews, without the necessity of reproducing 
the entirety of data, which runs into thousands of pages. For each interview, the concepts were 
identified, and extracts of text that articulated how the participant addressed those concepts were 
highlighted. In this approach, Gale (2013, p. 1) describes how to manage data for the purpose of 
analysis: “The framework creates a new structure for the data (rather than the full original accounts 
given by participants) that is helpful to summarize/reduce the data in a way that can support 
answering the research questions”. The analytical framework consists of a set of codes (“a 
descriptive or conceptual label”) organised into categories, with “analytic memos” which investigate 
particular concepts, themes or problems that emerge from the data. Categories consist of codes 
grouped into clusters, which starts the process of abstraction of the data. Themes are explained as 
interpretive concepts or propositions that describe aspects of the data. While Gale (Gale et al., 
2013) built a matrix for entering the summarised data as codes and cases, my approach differed 
by producing tables of these grouped concepts, did not match cases to these groupings, but 
instead, marked the raw data according to the concepts that had been identified. These will be 
shown in the next chapter, the Findings. 
The approach taken may differ in certain elements but it draws a certain consistency from Ricoeur 
(1979, 1984) as well as Gale et al. (2013), Ritchie and Lewis (2003), and Josselson (2007), and 
was useful in dealing with the vast volume of data obtained. As Gale stated in recognising that 
there exists a number of approaches to qualitative data analysis: “The Framework Method, 
however, is not aligned with a particular epistemological, philosophical, or theoretical approach. 
Rather it is a flexible tool that can be adapted for use with many qualitative approaches that aim to 
generate themes” (Gale et al., 2013, p. 3). Following Ricoeur (1976, 1984) as explained above, 
there were three steps, as follows: 
Step one: Naϊve interpretation 
Each “raw” transcript was set up in table form to provide a column for notes. With this document, 
errors and misheard words were systematically corrected while listening to the recording. For each 
such document, the notes taken immediately following the interview were incorporated, which 
provided additional contextual information and observations. 
The first step of analysis was to re-visit each interview transcript and accompanying notes to 
identify the topics that were spoken about, highlighting particular phrases or words that appeared 
to have significance. In the adjacent column, thoughts and reactions were noted, and for each 
transcript key concepts, thoughts or ideas that became apparent were noted as each transcript 
was traversed. 
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A separate notebook noted observations of a more conceptual nature. This was a way of extracting 
the key topics from each interview, which would be used as the basis for the Structural analysis of 
Step two. 
In undertaking this “sweep” of the transcript and related data, a holistic approach was taken. As 
explained earlier, rather than dissecting out sections or parts that may fit into a category that may 
be common to many or all of the participants, the story told (What happened) became the unifying 
thread within an account, around which a picture of a doctor’s reactions, perceptions and 
perspectives was built. Out of this were attached labels of meaning, the concepts which define the 
underlying narrative for each doctor. In other words, sections of the text were identified and 
interpreted in the context of other parts of the narrative. This latter is what has been referred to in 
the methodology as the “plot” of the narrative, or the thread that holds the account together, and 
the process referred to as “emplotment” (Polkinghorne, 1988). 
Step two: Structural analysis 
Step two meant creating a method that would gather the observations from Step one in such a way 
as to build a framework that would reflect the concepts that were being identified in Step one. This 
step would identify the significant phrases and statements that would support or challenge the 
concepts that had been highlighted in Step one. The idea was not to find all the statements that 
were consistent across the data but to offer a picture of the range of experiences and responses 
that would challenge some common beliefs about how doctors react to complaints and about how 
they endure the process. This may ultimately lead to a more meaningful and useful insight into how 
to most effectively acknowledge and respond to doctors’ needs throughout and after being involved 
in a formal complaints process. 
Step three: Critical interpretation 
Apart from some interesting observations and glimpses into the lived experience of a group of 
doctors who volunteered to participate in this study, there is little relevance unless this material is 
used to build an understanding of the phenomena under study so that others may benefit. This 
data aims to provide an explanation of what lies beneath the previous studies referred to in earlier 
chapters that show many doctors suffer adversely from being the subject of a complaints inquiry. 
If we keep in mind the significance of this revelation, in terms of the consequences that reach 
further than the individuals directly involved, it is with this focus that I present my interpretation of 
not only the findings from my study, but how it relates to that previous research and to the 
theoretical and contextual framework in which the study is situated. This step in the analysis drew 
together the analyses which arose from all sources. The Discussion compares and contrasts data 
from the doctors in trouble with each other and the expert informants. Do they have insights that 
may explain some of the doctors’ responses, behaviour, and values? 
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Conclusion 
I have described here a methodological approach which focuses on drawing out experience, 
perceptions and reflections on meaning of the experience of a small number of self-selected 
doctors who responded to notices in the medical press and at a doctors’ health conference in order 
to share their experience of complaints. A narrative inquiry method was identified as being the 
most appropriate and useful way to achieve this aim, drawing on various methods presented in 
qualitative research literature. The design of the study was influenced by my prior experience of 
working with doctors in trouble, and this enabled me to consider how doctors may best respond to 
this approach. 
The testimonies of doctors could have been obtained with other approaches, and could have been 
analysed in many different ways. As a researcher familiar with the statistical evidence of the impact 
of complaints on doctors, and who observed it in my career, although from an entirely different 
perspective, this approach made sense as a way of drawing together my own knowledge, my 
learned understanding of narrative inquiry as a way to reach beyond the objective data to gain a 
greater understanding of doctors’ personal and subjective experience. What this approach has 
achieved are significant meaningful insights into the thoughtful contemplations of a small number 
of doctors who have had a sufficiently vexed experience in their careers as to wish to share that 
experience for the benefit of others. 
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Chapter Six: Findings 
Section One: Doctors in Trouble 
The Framework 
In the previous chapter, Gale’s Framework Method (Gale et al., 2013), Ritchie and Lewis’ 
“conceptual scaffold” (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) and Ricoeur’s (1984) three-step framework for 
analysis were introduced as key tools to structure the analysis and results. Using Ricoeur’s 
terminology, the three steps to analysis are Naïve interpretation, Structural analysis and Critical 
interpretation. 
This chapter will present the first and second of these steps, with the third forming the basis of later 
critique in Chapter Seven, the Discussion Chapter. The current chapter will follow the progress of 
analysis from the management of the primary data that involved 1) undertaking a “broad sweep” of 
each transcript to identify the main topics discussed, the emergence of the underlying concepts 
and then the key categories or domains (the “naïve interpretation”), to 2) a more in-depth analysis 
of the categories, using participants’ accounts as testimony to support the analysis (the “structural 
analysis”). 
Each domain has an introduction, followed by presentation of selected relevant testimony, and the 
chapter will conclude with a summation of the significance of the Findings. This will lead into the 
Discussion chapter, which will bring the thesis together through a critical interpretation of the 
findings. 
Naïve interpretation 
The main topics arising from the naïve interpretation of the data are grouped into key concepts and 
set out in Table Four. These are set out in logical order in the table that starts with What 
happened? through to How could it have been different? These are the “common threads” 
introduced and outlined in the Methods as a way of expressing the concepts that were most 
apparent from this first step of the analysis. The second column provides notes and questions 
which led to the more refined conceptualisation. For each interview, the concepts were identified 
and extracts were highlighted that emerged from participants’ accounts. As an example, under 
“Moral legitimacy”, there is a line item “Being a good doctor”. Not one participant actually said they 
were a “good doctor”, yet they were all in various ways focused on validating their own self as a 
person and professional of worth, of recognised value, of competence or of good character, 
conveyed variously in terms of their own values such as being a great leader and mentor, being 
recognised for their expertise, or being dedicated towards their patients and their profession. It 
became clear that this concept was central to the narrative, and if there is to be a core theme that 
underlies doctors’ accounts, it is this. 
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Concepts identified from examination of transcript data from Doctor in Trouble (DiT) interviews 
The following Table Four represents the identification of the concepts that arose from undertaking 
the “broad sweep” of transcript content, which are then grouped into categories, following Gale et 
al. (2013) and as described in the Methods. Taken as a whole, the preliminary naϊve analysis 
presented in this table can be structured into five categories of experience and meaning, including 
a preceding category that describes the complaints experience itself. Questions are in the first 
person from the perspective of the doctors in trouble (DiT) because they signal the thoughts and 
reflections that typified their interviews. The notes suggest what needs to be explored, examined 
and interpreted from my initial analysis, which were followed up in the structural analysis. 
Table Four: Key concepts 
Concepts and categories Notes 
The law, the process and me  
What was it like: what I went 
through 
Initial reactions, perspectives on interacting with legal 
processes. 
Is it fair? Interactions with the authorities; working with their 
advisers. 
The reckoning 
Neutralising the threats 
Am I to blame? Did I do wrong? 
Justifying:  finding causes, finding reasons (law seeks 
causation/interviewees seek reasons): 
Why did the patient complain? 
What was their motive; what was their story? 
Do doctors have to make perfect decisions? 
How could it be different? Reflections on how the process could be different, and why. 
Getting through it: telling others  
Whom did I tell? 
What made a difference 
Personal, professional, legal 
Moral legitimacy: the good 
doctor 
 
Being a good doctor: 
Why I went into medicine: what 
were my aspirations; what were 
my expectations; who influenced 
me? 
The drive to be seen as a “good” doctor, not a “bad” one. 
“Good” as a virtue? The external standards and the more 
personal: a calling, or vocation, or self-created? 
Where does professional identity come from - self, others; the 
social, political, historical construction of the profession? 
Perceptions of self: before and 
after the complaint: what has 
changed, in what way, why? 
The critical point: was I a good doctor? Am I now a good 
doctor? 
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Concepts and categories Notes 
Perception of self by others: 
what have others said or done in 
response to the complaint 
event? 
 
The inside self and the outside 
self: compares what I think about 
me, what I think others think 
about me, and what others think 
about me (or what has been said 
about me).  
How important is collegiality to the individual: in developing the 
professional self; in being part of a sub-culture of common 
interests; in validating oneself as okay or not okay, in getting 
through a complaints process and beyond it. 
 
The scapegoat, the whistle-blower, as some participants found 
themselves being marked. 
Threats and challenges to 
identity because of the complaint  
Threat of loss: reputation, career, status, income. 
How my attitude and expectations changed over time and with 
the reality of working life; how it changed since having a 
complaint. 
How needing to be good at something is important to self. 
Changes   
How the experience affected me In retrospect, on balance 
How this changed my practice  How and why changes in attitude towards patients, in 
practising more defensively or cautiously, knowing they are 
doing so, and why. 
Did it affect my attitude to my 
profession and career? 
Is my commitment to medicine as it was before? 
Has this affected my future? The past, that has led to the present, that impacts on the future 
The next step was a structural analysis, which enabled a closer examination of the participants’ 
accounts of the complaint experience. This was based on the notes and questions that arose from 
my naïve reading of the data. These could be grouped as the common threads from the first step 
of the analysis, and they would become the subject matter for this more structured analysis. This 
step examined each of these five categories, presented as Parts 1 to 5 of this chapter: 
1. The complaints experience 
2. The law in action: the law, the process and me 
3. Getting through it: telling others 
4. Moral legitimacy: the good doctor 
5. Changes. 
Part one is an overview of “The complaint experience” which is a descriptive account of what 
happened and how doctors reacted when receiving a complaint. The remainder of the chapter 
presents the findings of each of the other four key categories. The Discussion in Chapter Seven 
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will present a critical interpretation of the participants’ responses to and perceptions of the 
complaints process. 
How the findings are presented 
Keeping in mind that DiTs were the focal point of my study, the data from this group provides the 
basis for the analysis. Each section starts with an introductory text, followed by data from 
participant DiTs presented as quotes from their transcripts, accompanied by explanatory notes and 
my own observations. The findings are set out as free-flowing text, which allows for the 
development of conceptual ideas and description, and in boxes for longer quotations. Each of the 
following categories is presented as a dedicated Sub-chapter or Part, commencing with Part One: 
The Complaint Experience. 
Part One: The Complaint Experience 
Why did doctors wish to participate in the study? 
Seventeen doctors with experience of at least one medico-legal matter were interviewed for the 
main part of this study. The reasons they gave for participating ranged through altruism to a desire 
to tell their story, to a desire for justice. One doctor stated that he became involved because of 
curiosity about qualitative research as well as having a desire to explore his own reactions to the 
complaint experience. 
Knowing why doctors wished to participate adds to the overall picture of how a participant 
presented their narrative, or to articulate this in terms of their individual “plotline”, what it adds to an 
understanding of whom they present themselves to be. For instance, having altruistic reasons so 
as to benefit others could contribute to a picture they create of themselves as a good or worthy 
person, instead of as the bad or unworthy person with a complaint against them. 
Wishing to participate 
Throughout this chapter, doctor participants are referred to as a ‘DiT’ with a number, as per the 
table below which identifies their assigned code, their specialty and a summary of the medico-legal 
history. The predominant reason was to speak of a distressing incident in their lives: “I’ve had a 
recent complaint which came to nothing but was very upsetting and I was so distressed by it” 
(DiT15). DiT3 participated “...mainly because it was the most devastating thing that happened to 
me in my career”. DiTs 2, 12, 13, and 14 were interested to be involved with the issue in the formal 
context of a university research study, and for this to be conducted by someone who had the 
credentials to have fostered a degree of trust and confidence (my background in relation to the 
topic is explained in the Introduction). There was also a sense that by speaking about their 
experience through the medium of a later publication, this may help others going through, or who 
may one day go through, a similar experience. It was interesting to note that a couple of doctors 
said that while their matter may not have been serious, they knew that the process had a 
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significant impact on others. DiT9 spoke of the experience of a former female colleague and friend 
whom she said had been publicly humiliated and treated unfairly in a judgement against her 
because the panel that heard the matter failed to take into account the circumstances in which that 
doctor had acted. The friend subsequently gave up medicine because of this incident, and as a 
fellow female colleague, this participant identified strongly with her and felt a strong sense of 
unfairness on her behalf. This is what motivated her to come forward to be interviewed, more than 
an incident which she had experienced some years earlier in which she too had felt unfairly treated 
by the process. 
Making time to meet was problematic due to doctors’ busy schedules and because of practical 
considerations of the research project. Limited funds meant that interviews in different states were 
arranged within the one trip. But for some doctors, there were several months of delay between 
consenting and the actual interview, with repeated postponements due to hesitation about re-
visiting a difficult time in their lives. DiT3, for example, delayed making a time to meet by over 
seven months, eventually telling me she had to gather the nerve to participate in the interview as 
the complaint experience had been a highly emotive event for her. 
The complaint experience 
What happened 
As noted earlier, the account of what happened became secondary to a doctor’s account of how it 
affected them and their reflections on the event itself, why it may have happened, and the 
complaints process. I will therefore not provide a detailed account of what happened. The other 
reason for my reluctance is that some of the doctors are readily identifiable because the events are 
well-known either within the profession or their specialist area of practice, and/or they were well 
publicised at the time. While the loss of story potentially diminishes the description or summary of 
key events that explain the way doctors responded during the interview, it would be a breach of 
their privacy and confidentiality to speak in detail of their account. It was a condition of their 
consent that this study would not identify the participants. 
This noted, Table Five sets out basic summaries to give the reader a picture of the type of matter 
that preceded their participation in this study. For “Outcome”, see Chapter Three “The Law in 
Action”, which summarises the complaints-handling processes in Australia. 
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Table Five: Complaints history of DiTs 
Participant History of complaints Outcome 
DiT1 Gynaecology: complaint from husband 
re post-operative complications in 
another country; not substantiated but 
complainant appealed, leading to a full 
investigation. Dr had been accepted 
for work in Australia but the 
investigation held up his registration in 
Australia for a considerable period 
Not substantiated. Doctor likes 
working in this country but wishes 
to leave the profession 
DiT2 Obstetrics and gynaecology: one 
complaint 
Lengthy investigation; forced out of 
job; suspended by Medical Board; 
restrictions: overturned on appeal. 
Much local publicity and matter was 
subject of controversy within the 
profession. Not substantiated. 
Doctor no longer practises as a 
doctor 
DiT3 Psychiatrist: one complaint Not substantiated after three years 
of inquiry, and much publicity. 
Doctor quit medicine after this 
DiT4 Physician: one complaint Not substantiated 
DiT5 Emergency physician: two complaints Not substantiated 
DiT6 Obstetrics and gynaecology: one 
complaint from a staff member 
Not substantiated; moved cities to 
“escape toxic peer relationships” 
DiT7 Psychiatrist: Medical Board 
suspension due to criminal charges 
Criminal matter found guilty but no 
punishment; much publicity. 
Medical Board imposed conditions 
and doctor now works in restricted 
part-time private practice 
DiT8 General Practitioner: Complaint of 
discrimination; another complaint 
related to a drug-seeker 
Neither substantiated 
DiT9 Psychiatrist: history of complaints; 
some minor; one major 
Most minor matters were no further 
action NFA; major complaint 
substantiated; appeals; restrictions 
on practice; publicity 
DiT10 Psychiatric registrar: one complaint 
from intern 
Not substantiated 
DiT11 Gastroenterologist: one complaint Not substantiated 
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Participant History of complaints Outcome 
DiT12 Psychiatrist: complaint and claim for 
compensation from parent of failed-
suicide adolescent left severely brain-
damaged 
Complaint not substantiated; 
settlement of claim agreed 
DiT13 Anaesthetist: no complaint; Medical 
Board intervention due to impairment 
(drug use) 
Criminal allegations: Medical Board 
notified by police with allegation of 
misconduct in relation to a death 
Criminal matter dismissed 
Medical Board imposed strict 
conditions 
Lost job 
DiT14 Psychiatrist: one complaint about the 
content of a medical report 
Not substantiated 
DiT15 General practitioner: two complaints: 
one about failure to diagnose, the 
other an administrative matter 
Not substantiated 
DiT16 Emergency Registrar: two complaints 
about alleged unsatisfactory 
professional conduct 
Not substantiated 
DiT17 Physician: complaint about 
management of patient, plus two other 
minor matters 
Not substantiated; resolved directly, 
one conciliated. Doctor holds 
complaints responsible for onset of 
a medical condition, so she took 
leave then retired 
 
Reactions: Response to a Complaint 
This section presents participants’ responses to receiving a complaint, and reactions to the 
process. As explained above, the results are presented here rather than in table form. This is 
because the extracts selected are descriptive accounts that speak for themselves, and do not 
require interpretation at this stage. They provide a picture of how participants reacted when first 
receiving a complaint, and what went through their minds. 
First reactions 
The respondents reacted with surprise, shock and dismay when they received the complaint. 
Three accounts from the interviews represent this reaction. The first is from DiT3, whose complaint 
was not proved, but after which he asked to have his name removed from the Medical Register: “It 
was not what I went into medicine for”. His account is presented at length because it encapsulates 
the reaction that so many of the participants expressed: 
The complaint landed on my doorstep on the day of my partner’s birthday in 2012. So, 
the timing was just hideous. Um, and interesting from an emotional perspective, I can 
still clearly remember, we’d been for a fantastic dinner, gone home, I hadn’t gone 
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through the post before we went out for dinner. Got home from dinner and kind of 
opened this letter from the [complaints body] and I read this incredibly vitriolic, highly 
personalised, accusatory complaint on a multiple, alleging multiple levels of 
incompetence. Um, one only had to read through the complaint to understand that this 
was vexatious. So thereupon ensued essentially a week of hell. I was really actually 
quite terrified, because even though you’re a psychiatrist, even though you’re a rational 
being, seeing something highly personalised like this, you have immediate images of 
losing your livelihood, losing your reputation. Um, what are colleagues going to think of 
you? Are you going to lose your private practice, because the system is the outcome of 
complaints will be published? So, the risk of personal reputational loss is – the 
perception of that risk is very high, and the potential consequences of that, both in 
terms of income, livelihood, quality of life, standard of living, all of those kinds of things, 
you just see that vanishing out the window, instantly. 
The second is from a junior registrar, DiT16 in an emergency department, whose email letter 
arrived from HCCC during her tea break. 
I first didn't realise – I thought what – like I was very confused. I was like, why – nobody 
has called me? I didn’t remember this patient at all and then I started to remember a 
little bit. Um, and it was a long complaint and there was a lot to unpack. And reading it 
the first time around it was literally like a kick in the guts, it was a very sort of physical 
reaction. Um, especially because there was a lot of quite personally hurtful statements, 
she used very personal language to describe me. And then it was really hard for me to 
think that there was somebody out there in the community who hated me that much – 
like who had such a skewed idea of who I am and that seemed to really vehemently 
dislike me. And so that was hard and then I was just so scattered because I had to go 
back and start working and it was really hard to just compartmentalise that (DiT16). 
The third is from DiT15, a GP with two minor matters that were not substantiated, but which left her 
so distressed she had to seek professional help after months of not sleeping and worry: 
I think it's just, um, it's like a – a grieving, you know, it's a – it's the same sort of process 
that you go through [emotional], you – you’ve been grieving - - - the loss of your 
confidence and, um, and you, sort of, do this, um, projected grieving of, you know, 
gosh, you know, what if I lose my – my career, my employment, my income, my 
standing, my reputation, my, you know, all these potential losses that are in your head - 
- - there is a – a real grief reaction that – that these are all the things that you are risk – 
at risk of losing and, gosh, if I lose my income how am I going to support my family, my 
parents, what am I going to do, what – what job am I fit to – what job am I fit to do, you 
know? Who wants a dud doctor [laugh], you know – [pause] – you can’t be a doctor 
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anymore but nobody else wants you either if you, you know, were found to be 
incompetent and you know; why would you do another job competently? So just your 
employability is, you know, is at risk as well. And, you know, how am I going to pay for 
my kid’s school fees and all that sort of stuff (DiT15)? 
As outlined in Chapter Four, doctors are aware that one of the risks of their profession is that they 
may be sued or complained about. This may seem remote, and seems unlikely it will happen, but 
when it does, it takes many by surprise. 
These participants eloquently describe the surprise and shock they felt upon receiving a complaint. 
The first respondent quoted above relates the stream of fears that poured through his mind: loss of 
his job, career, reputation, standard of living; and for both, the suddenness of the transit from 
ordinary life to this state of terror or disbelief. For the second, a check of emails during a short work 
break leaves her reeling, yet she must gather herself together (“compartmentalise”) and return to 
work. As she later said, she had to ask her supervisor if she really was the person described in the 
letter of complaint as she did not recognise herself in what was said about her. She also said she 
continued to have these doubts for long after the matter was finalised, some months later, even 
after the complaint was not proven. 
These stories were told in hesitant phrases, incomplete sentences, using strong emotive 
vocabulary, and from my observation from having been present, the words are spoken in rapid, 
highly charged speech. Yet I have used the term “eloquently” because it was how they expressed 
themselves, as well as what they said, that left an impression of such strong emotional shock and 
disbelief. This was observed in several other interviews as well (DiT1, DiT2, DiT5, DiT8, DiT9, 
DiT14, DiT17). 
Some participants spoke about the grief they experienced after the initial bad outcome that later 
gave rise to a complaint, for example: “I was very upset this had happened. I was very upset I'd 
had such a bad outcome” (DiT12). A complaint compounds this emotion – feeling sad for the 
patient, and then for themselves, but responding to the complaint creates a duality – having to 
defend one’s actions sometimes means losing sight of the patient. This same doctor later 
recounted how she was happy the patient received money as compensation just to “make it go 
away”, but also because she felt bad for the patient who had such a terrible outcome (DiT12). 
DiT5 was particularly upset about a complaint because she felt that she and the nursing team had 
‘gone above and beyond’ for the patient: 
…they all remembered the patient, so a number of them were really distressed about it, 
they were distressed that I was undergoing a complaint, they were really distressed 
that the woman had complained about me when, like, we'd actually gone above and 
beyond. We'd made so much effort to address her pain, and everyone was so upset 
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about the diagnosis because she was so young and it was so unexpected that you 
know (DiT5). 
Others spoke about how the impact of receiving a complaint infiltrated their lives, from difficulties in 
concentrating to penetrating fear of what may happen. For instance: 
I think – I think – I think as soon as I got the complaint, my practice was different. I 
would look at things differently. I would be – initially I couldn’t focus on what I was 
doing for weeks (DiT1). 
Being a sort of person, you know, like many personalities most probably in medicine, 
we’re Type A, we like to dot the i’s, cross the t’s, get everything right, be all things to all 
people, and then suddenly to have number 1, a complaint and number 2, I was just 
painted so black that it was extremely confronting (DiT17). 
Complaints do make you feel bad whenever you receive them, even a small one like 
that because you always think the worst (DiT1). 
You can imagine how this devastates the operating day when you’re trying to 
concentrate (DiT6). 
After sensing she was about to receive a complaint because of a patient’s unexpected adverse 
outcome, DiT2 said tearfully, “And it felt, you know, it felt like the hurricane was about to come 
down on my head and there was nowhere safe to run to, and I couldn’t do anything to prevent the 
disaster from arriving”. 
For many participants, being “incandescent” (DiT3), angry, horrified and awful, or “the most 
distressing thing that had ever happened in my career” (DiT2) were typical responses recounted 
during interviews. 
As the analysis proceeded, these reactions reappeared many times as participants sought to 
recover from the fears that the first notification heralded for their immediate and longer-term future. 
Some also feared that it would affect their practice, whether they could continue doing their job well 
and safely while distracted by fearful thoughts. As discussed above, DiT16 had wondered if they 
even had the right person, as she said she could not recognise herself in what was said about her: 
Do they [the HCCC] have my – like are they getting me confused with someone? 
Really? This doesn't sound like me at all. So there was a lot of disbelief initially and 
then I read the letter and, I was like, okay, she mentions my name a lot so it must 
actually be me. 
After being accused of being condescending and dismissive, DiT16 said: 
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… it made me look at myself and to see whether I am condescending or I am 
dismissive and, um, yeah and I think it made me – I guess it just made me angry at the 
system for not giving me that time to spend with people. 
Yeah um, because often, you know, there's always a little part of you that goes, oh, you 
know, I – maybe I am like this and it, it makes you second guess things and it makes 
you, um, yeah – it makes you question how you practise, um, and yeah, and so, and so 
that, I think that's one of the more difficult things about getting a complaint against you 
(DiT16). 
The feelings expressed in these quotations suggest that a complaint raises doubts for a DiT about 
the person they had thought they were. Their self-image appeared to have been shattered, 
questioned and challenged. Most participants engaged in a process of self-reflection: am I really 
this person, did I really do such things; or is there another explanation: did the complainant identify 
the correct person? 
Other thoughts voiced during interviews were as if to neutralise the complaint, to find reasons for 
the complaint that deflected blame away from themselves: was there a problem with the patient or 
did the complainant wish to find blame in the doctor as if to explain their own state of mind or 
behaviour? In DiT16’s case, an anxious mother had been kept waiting for an extended period in 
the hospital waiting room and was agitated and annoyed, especially while overhearing nurses 
chatting about their love lives. For DiT12, a mother sought compensation for injuries caused by a 
daughter’s self-inflicted drug overdose and attributed this to DiT12 who “failed” to identify suicidal 
ideation some days before this event. This notion of blameworthy or blameless self-perception, and 
“good” or “bad”, will become a core part of the discussion in a separate section. 
Overall, there was an underlying fear, whether justified or not, of loss of income, reputation, career, 
status, all of which suggest a fundamental shift in participants’ sense of confidence and security. 
This may undermine trust as well as their own sense of competence. These sentiments echo on a 
broader scale those expressed by the DiTs in the section above, where shock and disbelief, fear 
and loss of confidence were frequent descriptors of their reactions to a complaint and the process 
that followed. 
Conclusion 
This section has paid little attention to the nature of the complaint or to the potential seriousness of 
the outcome for doctors. The focus has been on how having a complaint has affected the 
participants – their actual emotional reactions and symptoms of emotional impact, of behavioural or 
attitudinal change. It has also been on how they seek to find reasons to neutralise the impact, how 
it has raised questions in their mind about their own confidence to keep working, to be competent 
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while suffering the anxiety, distress, uncertainty for their future or even to deal with a deeper level 
of disturbance. 
The next part explores the nature of the process, to delve deeper into what some of the 
contributing factors are to these emotional and behavioural impacts. 
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Part Two: The Law in Action 
As described in Chapter Three, the law in action is about process: how it works, what actually 
happens, the mechanics of administering laws and regulations through the statutory bodies 
charged with these responsibilities. As the naïve interpretation of the data revealed, one of the key 
categories emerging from the participants’ accounts of being a respondent to a complaint is the 
process itself. Their accounts describe such aspects as the receipt of letters from the authorities, 
the style and nature of the communication, how doctors meet the obligations required of them, and 
their understanding of what is happening while traversing the process. They speak of their 
perspectives – whether it is fair, whether the rhetoric of public protection is reflected in the actual 
conduct of matters by the authorities, their interactions with the law and lawyers. The next section 
is more speculative, where DiTs reflect on why they had been complained about, if it was really 
about them or was there something else about the context or the complainant, and whether having 
been blamed, they are really blameworthy or not. These thoughts have been intrusive and at times 
threatening, and they appear to be a way of neutralising the threats of such thoughts. Nelson 
(2001) likens this to the counter-story that a “damaged identity” creates to neutralise the effect of a 
threat to the self and self-respect. Finally, most reflect on how it could have been different, and 
these may provide insight into how procedures and protocols may be amended in the future to take 
greater account of the adverse impacts on those involved in these proceedings. 
The law, the process and me 
This section follows the process of how a complaint is dealt with and what doctors experience 
throughout the process. This is presented in narrative form, as various thoughts and impressions 
are revealed, interwoven with comments, interpretations and explanations. 
Receiving a notification 
Earlier participants’ emotional reactions to receiving a complaint were described. This section 
describes how they received the complaint. DiT8 recalled how she had received a phone call from 
the regulator while driving with a sick child in the back of her car. The caller demanded that she 
respond to various questions about a patient accusing her of racial discrimination. Knowing the 
patient was a very dangerous person with a lengthy criminal record, DiT8 responded by urgently 
trying to warn the caller of the risk of being in the same room as the patient, as she was when 
making the call. Undeterred, the caller pursued vigorous questioning over the phone. DiT8 later 
had to attend a hearing, where the complainant’s issues were examined at length, but DiT8 had no 
opportunity to raise her own concern about the unusual manner in which she was called to answer 
to a complaint. This was not a typical case and all other participants received notification by mail or 
email. Some spoke of the persisting fear and trepidation that accompanied the arrival of any 
subsequent mail. DiT16, introduced earlier, received her letter by email during the work day, and it 
was very disorienting. DiT3, also introduced, had his special day concluded by the letter awaiting 
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his arrival home. For these participants, the letter becomes a symbol that associates official 
correspondence with fear. 
Ongoing communication with the complaints body had a similar effect. DiT5 received her first and 
only complaint after 23 years of service, and it took her by surprise. Communication with the 
complaints body had her in tears every time, even though she knew she had done nothing wrong 
and was aware that the complainant had been devastated by the news that DiT4 had delivered to 
her. She recalled: 
Every time they would call me, I'd go weak at the knees and practically collapse and 
burst into tears and all of it saying, you know, you have no case to answer, but, you 
know, she was, oh, I mean, I can understand why she was very distressed because I 
was the one who first delivered the news (DiT5). 
Responding to a complaint 
… for a week or two couldn’t eat, couldn’t sleep, um, and while we worked through with 
the solicitor putting a letter together and pulling, you know, the hours that were involved 
in me responding to this (DiT15). 
Responding to a letter of complaint is challenging because so much depends on what they say and 
how they say it. Some doctors are confused about what they are responding to, and need to rely 
on the advice of their medico-legal adviser. So it is not just a matter of providing the clinical facts of 
a medical event and of their reasoning; it can also be a carefully constructed account that protects 
the doctor’s interests. “I was quite frightened by the legal stuff”, said DiT1. DiT5 said: 
... it's just like you’re being judged here and every now and again you’ll get a little letter 
which will tell you where you’re up to. There’s, sort of, no ongoing contact and therefore 
you just sit there wondering [laugh] am I about to be, like, struck off, which I know is 
catastrophising again, but like, is it going to be the worst case scenario because, you 
know, with all these scenario possibilities and when you don't know who’s making the 
decision or what factors they’re taking into account or you don't get to write another 
letter or – it's just they’re all dealing with the first pieces of information so there’s not 
even a second response written. It just goes to the Medical Board, [sound effect] and 
the letter comes back [sound effect] (DiT5). 
The confusion and uncertainty generated by this part of the process leaves a lasting impression: 
doctors are not in control and are not certain of what is expected of them. For some, needing to 
relinquish some of the control to their medico-legal adviser does not always sit comfortably. DiT16 
describes how she pondered the preparation of her written response: 
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I had quite a conciliatory tone and I was happy to sort of make concessions even 
though I didn’t quite agree with them, um because I knew what would be expected and 
because that’s what was told to me when I called up the [complaints body], so I called 
up [Medical Indemnity Insurer] and they said something like to show that you’ve 
reflected – they want to see evidence of you reflecting and basically like, they want to 
see that you’ve learned something from it (DiT16). 
A response to a complaint may make a difference to how it is assessed and subsequently dealt 
with. Doctors such as DiT16 learn that taking the advice of their adviser will give them a better 
chance of being assessed favourably. Yet it does not always accord with their perspective of what 
happened. 
The process itself 
For some, the process is confusing and uncertain, because doctors do not know the end-point and 
how they will get there, and do not know how best to navigate their way through because of 
uncertainty about what they are responding to and how it will be assessed. Adding to the 
uncertainty is trying to understand the procedures of a large bureaucracy, whose role is sometimes 
unclear. As DiT12 said: “It's like walking down a highway full of potholes” (DiT12). 
Responding to a complaint may also mean responding to issues identified during the assessment 
or inquiry phase of complaint-handling, which may not be directly about the complaint. Participants 
felt this makes them uneasy and puts them into a defensive mode, as it is not clear what the basis 
for this request is and where it may be leading them. They would have liked the opportunity to 
explain, to provide reasons for their own judgement and conduct at the time but they are being told 
how to structure one’s response which is not always what a doctor thinks is a logical way forward. 
What a doctor thinks is relevant or superficial may not accord with how the regulator sees it. As 
DiT4 said: 
It’s the forensic detail of the reply that elevates each of these small things into 
something, so each small thing becomes elevated in importance ... I responded only to 
the complainant’s messages. It went into a very different trajectory (DiT4). 
Time is important to doctors 
Many doctors spoke of the delays in the process, when they had no idea what was happening and 
at what stage of the process the complaint was. Time is important and adds to the pressure – 
preparing responses within a short timeframe; the lengthy time waiting for a reply, and later, to 
hear of the outcome. Nor were the doctors provided with information about how a decision was 
made about the outcome of a complaint. These points are illustrated in the following quotations: 
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I was given 14 days to provide a response; it was months before I even got a reply 
(DiT8). 
You just wait and you wait and you wait (DiT13). 
It took a huge amount of time. My spare time was all spent photocopying the file which 
I had to do myself and writing reports. I didn't type then, I had to do everything by hand 
(DiT12). 
I must have spent, like, a shitload of time going through all the notes and getting help 
from all these people and gearing myself psychologically to deal with it. And then, 
actually sitting down, going through the letter, taking away the personal feeling so that I 
could look at it in a very detached manner and just respond to it as factually as 
possible. It took a lot of time to do that (DiT16). 
Doctors are generally busy people with tight schedules. It is not just the time itself but it is the 
inconsistency in timeframes that adds to the anxiety and the irritation. They are expected to meet 
statutory timeframes, but the regulator is not. In addition, waiting for the next step builds up the 
unease and tension. 
The power of the law 
Failure to respond to a complaint may lead to further action against the doctor as cooperation with 
complaints processes is expected in the Code of Good Conduct87.  
[T]here’s nothing else you can do because they’ve got you over a barrel (DiT8). 
The whole legal process is very persecutory and I know the law a little bit – enough to 
know that just because you're right doesn't mean you win. You can still lose even 
though you're right. I didn’t lose. I just wanted to – end it (DiT12). 
From the participants’ perspective, the legal process is very adversarial (DiT14), showing little 
regard for the time it takes, and the anxiety provoked, while responding to matters put to them. At 
times, this seemed like a never-ending process as new matters were brought up and compounded 
by lengthy delays. 
The nature of communication with the authorities 
When dealing with AHPRA or the HCCC, participants described how they were dealing with a large 
bureaucracy with complex procedures, statutory requirements and timeframes, and to many of 
them it seemed like a faceless (some were not sure if they were dealing with doctors or with junior 
administration staff), de-personalised monolith that has a logic that is not one they can relate to, 
yet has considerable power in respect of their futures. Their unease translates into a sense of 
                                                          
87 Medical Board of Australia: Good Medical Practice: A Code of Conduct for doctors in Australia. 
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unfairness, because the reasons for what it asks of respondent doctors is not made very clear. For 
instance, the process allows a complainant to seek a review of the decision, which is a reasonable 
right in respect of any legal decision. However, the effect is that it is “not over”, and in addition, the 
complaint will remain on the doctor’s registration record, even if a complaint has not been 
substantiated. DiT15 expressed it thus, but it was an issue that several doctors remarked on: 
The letter back says “we don't find that there’s enough evidence, to uphold this 
complaint against you”, but it's still open to the patient to complain again if they’re not 
happy, this is not the end of the matter. So I found that quite upsetting that I still can’t 
completely rule a line underneath that, now, you got away with it this time, but the 
patient can still complain and we can still have you back on the carpet, and I think that, 
if it's finished it should be finished (DiT15). 
DiT5 said much the same: the letter at the end of an inquiry told her that her matter was not found 
proven, but the fact of the complaint would be on her record forever. This extends to when applying 
for a job, and having to answer the question about ever having been referred to the complaints 
body or Medical Board, “and I have to answer yes, yes, forever, for the rest of my career. So, you 
know, a career will span 50 years – and hopefully they’ll be my only two complaints (in 25 years so 
far) – will sit with me forever. That’s pretty unfair” (DiT5). The after-effects of a complaint 
reverberated for the years since a complaint and would for a long time ahead for DiTs. In response 
to a friend with experience of the authority, who told her “I think you should just cop it”, DiT5 said, 
“But, like it says at the bottom of the letter, this will be on my file forever, there’s no way of 
removing this blemish. That’s what it says if I’m ever referred to the Medical Board again this file 
will come up again, so it's – it hangs over me forever. I think that’s pretty unfair” (DiT5). 
Communications from the authority could also be so brief or insufficient as to invalidate the 
personal toll of the process on DITs. As DiT8 said, “Communications from AHPRA are very brief”. 
DiT6 said there was a long delay between the decision being made and being informed. He was 
cynical about what the letter said, that AHPRA acknowledged the stress that was caused to him. 
DiT5 also said that a delay of 6 weeks in being informed “there was no case to answer” added to 
her grievance about the way her matter was managed. Changing the tone of the correspondence 
such as acknowledging that this may be a difficult time and to contact their medical indemnity 
insurer would make it less impersonal. “The anonymity of the tone (of letters), the guilty till you’ve 
proved yourself innocent, the denial of justice in effect, or the denial of the usual judicial process, 
where you’re innocent and they have to prove you guilty” (DiT6). 
Participants found the lack of information added to their confusion. DiT16 had hardly heard of the 
HCCC and there was no brochure or link to further information. On accessing the website to obtain 
information, she was alarmed at the potential courses of action a complaint may take. As DiT5 
said: 
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There’s no ongoing contact and therefore you just sit there wondering, am I about to be 
struck off, which I know is catastrophising, but is it going to be the worst case scenario 
because with all these scenario possibilities and when you don’t know who’s making 
the decision or what factors they’re taking into account. 
Just doing their job 
Participants see the regulator as the adversary rather than protective of their interests. DiT8 said of 
AHPRA, “they are all just people following a process, so do I hate them? No, they’re probably just 
doing a job and they don’t realise the effect”. DiT4 said: “I had the feeling from the Medical Council 
that they wanted to give me this sort of response because in a way they had to placate two parties 
(the complainant and AHPRA). I felt that quite strongly”. This was after being given 
recommendations to improve how she communicated with patients and their relatives. She felt the 
accusations were unjust as she had had a torrid time with this patient’s relative, and that the 
Council had assumed she was in the wrong because there was a complaint, but did not take 
account of the context. Yet she later admitted that she took this message seriously and passed it 
on to the team. 
As these perceptions illustrate, DiTs experience confusion and a variety of emotions throughout 
the process. The bewilderment many felt was not just from the complaint itself, but from not 
knowing what was happening and how the bureaucratic process was handling their matter. DiT6 
even viewed AHPRA as “the enemy” and referred to his faith to assist him come to terms with his 
experience: 
I’ve come to terms with it now, um, because, ah, I realise – because I’m a sort of 
practising Anglican and I believe in you’ve got to forgive your enemies. It’s not for them, 
it’s for you. I don’t have any resentment about it because – because that just makes me 
sick, and there’s nothing I can influence – these are all just people following a process. 
And – and they’re probably just doing a job and they don’t realise the effect and you’ve 
got to forgive them for your sake so you don’t let that have power over you (DiT6). 
Another manifestation expressed by some DiTs was the ‘catastrophe’ ahead of them. They had 
seen others before them suffer from the public exposure, the unfair judgements, the humiliation, 
the loss of jobs, and feared this may happen to them. They now had to “face the music” so to 
argue, fight, blame, and accuse would do no good. Interestingly, one doctor said when asked 
about the ‘catastrophe’ she had thought was about to befall her, and subsequently didn’t happen: 
“it was the fear speaking, but it was all gone now” (DiT12). 
Was it fair? 
Participants conveyed a strong sense of injustice or unfairness with the system and its processes. 
They acknowledged they are afforded procedural fairness, which is written into the legislation and 
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procedures, by being given the opportunity to respond to complaints made against them and to 
decisions arising from inquiries into the complaint. The sense of unfairness arose from how the 
process actually worked as, what I have termed, The Law in Action. In the previous section, 
delays, brief and sporadic communications which relayed little information, mystery about how 
decisions were made, were not just annoyances; they were also perceived as being unfair to them. 
Other aspects of the process added to this perception, as follows. 
Access to relevant information 
Participants spoke about their frustration in being unable to access records, which they need to 
have in order to respond adequately to complaints. Medical records are not only a factual record of 
a medical encounter, but are also a useful reminder to the doctor about the patient and their 
issues. Some complaints may be made some time, even several years, after an incident, and 
doctors may struggle to recall either the patient or the event referred to in the complaint. DiT9 was 
required to respond to a complaint dating back 12 years. She could not recall the patient, but was 
told to do the best she could as the patient file had been archived several years before. 
DiT15 was refused access to the medical file by the complaints body for several months, and was 
unable to remember with certainty what she had done; this raised a doubt that perhaps she had 
neglected to perform expected assessments of the patient. She said this added to her distress 
significantly, as there was a doubt about her competency. Once the file was provided, it was clear 
that she had performed the tests, and the matter was closed very quickly after that. She felt her 
anxiety could have been avoided if the complaints body had provided the records with the letter of 
complaint. During the interview, this participant thumped the table in anger at what she perceived 
was the unfairness of an aggrieved patient with a trivial issue taking up so much of her time and 
emotional energy: 
… the hours that were involved in me responding to this and all the patient had to do 
was write a letter of complaint to our clinic and “cc” to Complaints Commission [thumps 
table], that’s the only effort he had to make to make my life utterly miserable for the 
next month or more … because he didn’t get what he wanted … [it] cost me – I don't 
know – a total of maybe 12 hours’ work or more to respond to this complaint that took 
him 10 seconds [laughs] (DiT15). 
Going back to the origins of a complaint, some participants spoke of the dilemma they faced when 
there was an incident in providing care that resulted in an adverse outcome to the patient, or even 
death. They spoke of how their first desire is to provide appropriate care for the patient, and loved 
ones if need be. At the same time, they are dealing with their own dismay or even grief from a lost 
or damaged patient. As a professional, they also wish to identify what went wrong and what were 
the contributing factors. However, this may be curtailed if the incident becomes managed by 
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others, or by an administrative process or protocol, such as a complaint, an open disclosure 
process, or because of perceived “damage control” by administrators or senior staff. 
Peer opinion: It’s slippery ground (DiT4) 
DiT4 now does some medico-legal work and commented on the implications, based on her own 
experience, of the reliance on peer review to make judgements about other doctors’ conduct and 
performance. The inference is that giving such opinions from the outside and out of context can 
have deleterious consequences for those being judged, and can therefore be unfair or even 
precarious: 
It’s so easy to be critical in retrospect and it’s slippery ground to be criticising other 
people in retrospect. I don’t think that’s reasonable to say that they would have 
absolutely made that decision at that point in time, only because now it’s this decision 
and you can see whether it does line up. The view is easy from the cheap seats; 
they’re in an office now reading a thing where they get the end story as well as the 
beginning story, the person that was in the firing line was doing it in a different 
sequence (DiT4). 
Reflections on blaming and being blamed 
DiT1 commented on the fallout from the investigations into the scandal at mid-Staffordshire 
Hospital in the UK in 201288 . The fallout meant that everyone was blaming everyone else, and by 
speaking about this issue, implied that this tendency to blame, and to be blamed, is all-pervasive. 
While mid-Staffordshire was a particularly extreme case, the sense that being a good doctor doing 
a good job does not protect one from blameworthiness by others: 
… lots of patients died and it was felt to be due to the lack of care within the hospital 
and the doctors blamed the managers and the managers blamed the doctors and, you 
know, the nurses … – it was a whole hoo ha with all people blaming another…It makes 
you very uncomfortable as a doctor if you know that – as an honest doctor, I think – if 
you know that you’re – when something goes wrong, which inevitably will do even if 
you take the greatest care – if something goes wrong, you could be held accountable in 
the same way that somebody in the street could be held accountable for doing a – a 
criminal activity. Makes you feel uncomfortable (DiT1). 
“Nonsense” or anonymous complaints 
Some participants could not understand why all complaints are accepted by the authority without 
vetting or triaging them. There was a belief that “Nonsense complaints [are] taken at face value” 
(DiT8), while DiT8 wondered why AHPRA appeared not to “have a mechanism for weeding out 
bulldust type complaints”. 
                                                          
88 Report of  the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, February 2013. 
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A member of the health care team made a complaint against DiT6. He knew who it was, but it was 
never officially divulged. It became so toxic for him that he relocated to work elsewhere. He 
declared it to be: 
… such a flawed process. The anonymity of it got me, the fact that you could – it was 
like Stalin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany that you could make an anonymous 
accusation and never be held to account. I thought it was absolutely despicable and 
underhand. You know, to me, if you have a complaint about someone, you make it to 
their face. It goes against every part of my philosophy, so that was why it offended me 
(DiT6). 
Some DiTs considered the process is weighted towards complainants. This was not only in 
accepting complaints at face value regardless of being trivial or “nonsense”, but also because 
some felt they had no opportunity to put their side of the story, to provide reasons and their own 
perspective. “The patient has the main voice. You only respond to their complaint, that’s what 
people tell you to do. You don’t draw a picture from the other perspective at all” (DiT5). 
The frustration of dealing with “nonsense” complaints added to the perception of unfairness. 
Doctors are aware that some complaints are very serious, and will be investigated. Most 
complaints are not investigated, but are finalised with no further action or with a non-disciplinary 
pathway to resolve them (see figures in Chapter 3). Some doctors could not see why the complaint 
against them, being a “trivial” or minor matter, had either not been dismissed on receipt by the 
authority or that it was treated as if it were a serious matter. They felt as if the process considered 
them to be one of the “bad guys”. Such minor matters could still take many months to be finalised, 
and they did not understand why. As DiT5 said, “Me, it felt like, you know, me the Butcher from 
Bega, which I know is catastrophising the whole thing, but I did sort of feel that he and I were at the 
Medical Board at the same time” (DiT5). She felt she was being judged at the same level, 
reinforced by the statement at the end of the letter from the Board, when it was all over, that this 
would remain on her record “forever”89. 
Fairness at the end of a complaint 
Perceptions of the issues discussed above not only left participants feeling disgruntled; they also 
added to the feeling that the process is unfair. For instance, once a complaint had been finalised, 
many participants did not feel vindicated, even with a finding of not guilty, or the complaint not 
                                                          
89 This latter point was noted in Chapter Three as causing significant consternation amongst the profession. A doctor’s 
medico-legal history of matters which have attracted conditions is indeed able to be accessed through the online 
register of health professionals on the AHPRA website. It had been proposed by AHPRA that all complaints be 
available, with the rationale of being transparent and enhancing the public’s trust, but this caused such an uproar that 
the proposal was withdrawn. The effect however has been to reinforce doctors’ view that the process is weighted 
towards complainants. 
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being substantiated90. Others expressed their dismay that complaints stay on their record forever. 
DiT12 said of her matter that was settled91: “You can still lose even though you’re right”. DiT4 was 
also upset that her matter would stay on her record forever: “When it’s over, it should be over”. 
DiT13 accepted his conduct was “less than ideal”, but as the complaint related to activities in his 
own time (recreational drugs) he felt it was unfair, as he had never had a patient complaint nor 
caused injury. Not only did doctors retain a sense of guilt after the complaint was finalised, they felt 
that the whole process had treated them as if they were guilty and that the onus was on them to 
prove otherwise. DiT8 stated: “But just going through that process and you just sort of feel – you 
feel guilty from the moment that that letter rocks up”. 
DiT6’s views were very clear, when speaking about the role of the regulator: 
And I think that these people are meant to be protecting you and – and helping you but 
they’re actually your adversary, you know – and it’s a false feeling. I have a feeling with 
all these boards that you’re always guilty ‘til you prove yourself innocent. It’s the 
reverse of what’s normally the case in other realms of the law – … because you have 
to disprove an allegation. It’s not that they’ve got to prove it. 
This sense of injustice was amplified when comparing the system with the criminal jurisdiction, 
where the presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle. The other aspect is the perception 
of the role of “their” Board, as the authority that exists to protect the profession, when in fact it is 
there to protect the public. As DiT8 said: 
The thought too that these people (i.e., the Medical Board) are meant to be protecting 
you and helping you, but they’re actually your adversary, and it’s a false feeling. I have 
a feeling with all these boards that you’re always guilty till you prove yourself innocent. 
It’s the reverse of what’s normally the case in other realms of the law, because you 
have to disprove an allegation, it’s not that they’ve got to prove it. You’ve got to 
disprove it (DiT8). 
Some participants felt that when facing the law, they have little power even when giving an opinion, 
adding to the sense that the system is adversarial. DiT14 endured a long court hearing resulting in 
no case against him being found; however, the legal argument was prolonged and largely fruitless 
and the judge finally called a halt to it. DiT14 viewed the regulatory system as adversarial, and he 
felt powerless and distressed throughout its duration. 
DiT8 wondered what would have happened if he had ignored “the whole thing”, until he looked into 
it and found the authorities have the power to search a doctor’s records, their house and examine 
                                                          
90 See Table Five Complaints history 
91 A compensation claim may be settled, not because a doctor was liable, but because a commercial decision is made 
because of some foreseen difficulties in defending a claim in court. 
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their bank account. Procedural matters interfered with a perception of procedural fairness for these 
participants. While doctors do have a right of reply, sometimes they are unable to effectively 
exercise this right without access to sufficient information, such as medical records. Many 
participants felt that the delays and length of time it takes to finalise a matter, added to the sense 
that their interests are secondary to the process, that the presumption of innocence does not apply 
to them and that they must comply with requests for information and reports within restrictive 
timeframes, yet the authorities appear to have no such pressures to respond to them in a timely 
manner. Therefore, several doctors felt that the very process itself assumes they are guilty, unless 
they can provide sufficient evidence that will clear them of accused wrongs. As DiT15 said, “the 
process itself is like a punishment”, for an assumed wrong. 
Does the type of matter make a difference? 
As explained in Chapter Three, not all complaints are handled in the same way. First, a complaint 
to a complaints body comes under the regulatory provisions of public protection legislation. Serious 
complaints are investigated and may result in conditions placed on a doctor’s practice, a 
suspension from practice, or de-registration. Such matters impact directly on a doctor’s career and 
reputation. A claim for compensation comes under civil law dealing with wrongs, and is about 
finding fault, causation and monetary compensation. Payouts for claims, as well as the costs of 
defence, are included in medical indemnity insurance. As DiT6 explains: “Well, in negligence 
generally – we’re all comfortable with the whole, sort of, concept of negligence and the legal 
system around that, so if someone is going to sue me for negligence then – then fine, I’ve got my 
defence organisation” (DiT6). 
Many participants said that although claims are stressful because doctors still have to face the 
processes of being accountable for their actions, complaints are more so because of the link with 
their professional status. Even within complaints, there are different types of complaint. Some are 
viewed as “nuisance” complaints, others go to the heart of a doctor’s competence and 
commitment. Two DiTs spoke about the type of complaint making a difference. DiT15 had two 
complaints: the first was about her clinical care; the second was about a patient who had a 
grievance about an administrative matter. While she was disturbed and annoyed about the 
administrative matter, she was highly distressed about the other as it touched on her competence 
as a doctor. She said: 
So it wasn’t really about my medical expertise, it was more an administrative complaint 
… and so I wasn’t as upset about this. … I didn’t feel like it was my medical 
competence or my expertise or, um, you know, didn’t feel like my career was 
threatened… (DiT15). 
DiT12 was sued and avoided court because a settlement was agreed. She was “fine” about this 
because the patient’s “life wasn’t very good” after a failed suicide attempt left her severely brain 
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damaged and compensation would have helped her. Even though DiT12 was not considered guilty 
of negligence, and believed that her actions to look after the patient had actually “saved” her from 
an adverse finding, she was pragmatic about the settlement, knowing a court case would have 
made her very anxious. 
These results demonstrate that some doctors can be pragmatic about the compensation paid out 
when a patient has been catastrophically injured. It is what they pay their insurance for. For 
complaints experiences such as DiT15’s, an administrative misunderstanding over a Medicare 
entitlement was upsetting to receive, but dealing with it was more annoying. The other matter was 
about her clinical care, and it was this matter that sent her into a very distressed state requiring 
psychological support. 
Summary 
These results have shown that when traversing a complaints process, many participants feel like 
perpetrators of a wrongdoing, even though there is no fault apart from making someone unhappy 
which could have been resolved in a more conciliatory way. They then feel under threat, which 
results in having to defend themselves against the threat. This is a different perception of 
“defence”: defence as a part of the process means explaining and accounting for their actions, and 
procedural fairness ensures they have a right of reply in which to do so. Due process ensures 
things are done in a systematic, ordered way that is about protecting the process against 
challenges about its fairness. However, due process meant that participants sometimes felt 
alienated, so they are defending themselves against the threats that the complaint represents to 
their future, as well as the inference of moral culpability. 
The results show that there is a strong sense of loss of control that enters the doctor’s life when a 
complaint leads into a process requiring them to account for their actions. This is made more 
difficult when access to vital information, such as DiT2’s patient’s file, has been withheld, and this 
can be compounded over time if the subject matter of a complaint occurred several months or even 
years before. Therefore, while doctors acknowledge there needs to be a system to manage 
complaints and to catch out “bad” doctors, and recognise that the system ensures they have a right 
of reply to complaints and decisions made about them, they also perceive the process to be unfair, 
with some believing it to be weighted in favour of complainants, and therefore not just. The other 
aspect is the process, described above as being “punishment in itself”, because of delays and 
silences in communications with the regulatory authorities. Contributing to this is how they are 
required to respond: not to tell their version of events, but to respond to issues raised in the 
complaint, which many believe do not correspond to what really happened. This adds to the sense 
that the complaint is accepted as it is, without any vetting or triaging. 
Neutralising the threats 
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Am I to blame? 
An observation from the interviews is that participants went through a process of rationalising the 
complaint. Some of this was the weighing up of being right, or being wrong, or perhaps being partly 
to blame. But even if a participant took full responsibility, there was a justification for their actions at 
the time, or an attribution of at least partial blame to the complainant or to other people. In some 
cases, complaints that were not substantiated naturally left doctors feeling relieved, yet they would 
say “but there is always a doubt” and “I must have done something wrong that someone was 
unhappy with my care” (DiT11). There is also the dilemma that if doctors remain adamant about 
the treatment they propose as the right course of action, they may still upset people who do not 
agree with them. Each of the participant interviews contained one or more such stories, and in 
each case the doctor weighed up their actions. Following are some examples of how participants 
rationalised some of the blame. 
A mother demanded antibiotics for her child which DiT16 believed to be incorrect, not helpful and 
potentially harmful. DiT16 reflected on why the mother was so angry: 
I was the sole doctor in the paediatrics department at the time, and so you have to deal 
with every child that comes in. I think she was annoyed before she came in the room 
because there were extraneous circumstances as well – she had waited some hours in 
emergency department before her son was seen, and she overheard two nurses 
discussing their love lives and so obviously she was annoyed before she even met me, 
and it was like she was taking that annoyance out on me. 
A patient made a second complaint against DiT16 after a car accident. The patient was 
constructing a compensation case that was not just about the accident, but also about the alleged 
poor care she had received in the hospital. DiT16 summed it up by stating “it sometimes reveals 
more about them, rather than what it tells about you. I felt like I was a bit part in someone else’s 
story”. 
DiT12 “failed” to schedule a patient who was not suicidal at the time, and was sued as well as 
complained about, because several days later the patient took an overdose and was 
catastrophically injured as a result. 
In another case, a very elderly patient, with underlying co-morbidities, underwent abdominal 
surgery. The patient’s daughter had insisted on active treatment because the patient had been fit 
and healthy prior to surgery. She survived the operation but had a difficult course of recovery over 
a prolonged period, during which DiT17, a physician, was called in to help manage her. The 
daughter blamed DiT17 for her mother’s subsequent death, yet DiT17 had been brought in post-
surgery with the patient already in intensive care and not recovering well. 
DiT17 reflected on what lay behind the complaint and expressed her thoughts as: 
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Each one of these (complaints) is usually a difficulty coming to terms with not a good 
outcome. Somebody has to get blamed for this bad outcome, and whether it was some 
guilt feelings about having gone ahead with this surgery, which maybe in hindsight was 
not a good thing to do. But you know, I have the perspective of looking and saying, 
“Look, these people are the ones suffering; they’re just making other people suffer 
along the way”. You know, that’s what happens sometimes when people are aggrieved, 
as opposed to when there’s a clear case of somebody doing something very wrong. 
DiT4 knew she was going to receive a complaint after a vexed phone call with a very difficult 
relative of a patient: “She had her agenda. She wanted to ram it down my throat, um, and that she 
didn’t want to listen to what I had to say and so one of her complaints was that I said that ‘I didn’t 
want to speak to her anymore’, whatever”. She felt that whatever the agenda was, she was never 
going to please this angry person. 
These are examples of the bargaining that became a feature of some participants’ moral 
deliberations: perhaps they were at fault, but perhaps it was more about the complainant who had 
another agenda, or who could not come to terms with a bad outcome. Perhaps it was about 
participants needing to find fault in others so as to deflect total responsibility from oneself, which 
would ameliorate the impact of the accusations. 
When constructing her response to the complaint, DiT16 met with her mentor and former 
supervisor. They went through the complaint “forensically”, and the more they went through the 
notes, the more they realised that the complainant had misrepresented events, a lot of the details 
were confused, and some things were “blatantly untrue” and didn’t make medical sense. Her 
mentor told her that “she’s made some really terrible allegations against you and you have the right 
to defend yourself”. So from being initially conciliatory in her response, DiT16 went through the 
complaint step by step and refuted everything that the complainant had said, “providing really good 
evidence for why these allegations were being refuted”. 
The above accounts suggest that participants felt under threat and needed to gather the forces to 
defend themselves. This behaviour fits with the general perception by participants that the system 
is weighted towards complainants, with the perceived adversarial nature of the process compelling 
them away from conciliation towards defensiveness and taking “sides”. They used the resources at 
hand, material and emotional support from a mentor or supervisor, the power of their medical 
knowledge and any evidence that they could gather, to repudiate the accusations. But without 
collegial support and access to evidence, other participants’ experiences suggest that they fare 
less well. This is illustrated in the experience of DiT2 whose colleagues abandoned her and she 
was refused access to the medical files. 
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What could have been different? 
Some doctors, though not all, reflected on what could have made life easier for them while they 
traversed the complaints process. Not one doctor denied that there should be a complaints system, 
as all recognised that people have a right to complain, that health care is not always safe and that 
not all doctors, and other health practitioners, do the right thing or are entirely competent. Most 
doctors recognise that they themselves are not perfect, but that even if they could have been 
better, there should be room for doctors to improve without being blamed for everything that goes 
wrong or that could have been better: “good enough” medicine could replace “perfect” medicine. 
Nevertheless, when faced with a complaint, they know they are accountable, yet in being 
accountable, they then feel the system assumes they are guilty. 
Doctors agreed there should be a system for managing complaints and that people have a right to 
complain but that it should not be so hard for the respondent: “There has to be a process but the 
process for the doctor is the punishment even when you have done nothing wrong, it’s a 
punishment” (DiT15). Some doctors considered other ways of being accountable that do not 
generate the fear that has been described, or the defensiveness that will be described in the last 
part of this chapter, Changes. How to achieve a balance was considered in detail by DiT15, whose 
reflections are set out in Box Four. 
Box Four: There needs to be a balance: DiT15 reflects 
[E]verybody knows you have to have a complaint process - - - and God knows the doctors do 
make mistakes and that sometimes doctors do… practise poor medicine, not just make 
inadvertent mistakes, so there has to be a process but the process for the doctor is the 
punishment even when you have done nothing wrong, it's a punishment….the fact that I would 
even think about I can’t continue in medicine when I’ve done nothing wrong – what does that do 
to your workforce if the balance is too far to the complainants? 
 
[Y]ou lose doctors, you make doctors insecure, in some ways you make their practice worse, if 
they are practising too defensive medicine so … there’s got to be a good balance and, I don't 
think that complaints should be that easily made, I think they should require some energy on the 
patient’s behalf, if it's important enough to make a complaint then they should, you know, be 
required to devote some energy and thought to it. I’m not saying that doctors – are gods and 
shouldn’t be, you know, have a – a proper complaints process - - it's got to be even-handed, but 
regardless of how even-handed you make it, the mere fact of having a complaint about you can 
be utterly devastating - - - no matter how minor it is, yeah (DiT15). 
 
DiT15’s thoughts reflected what others also said: that a complaints process is necessary, but it 
appears to be weighted towards complainants, whose effort in writing a complaint is far outweighed 
by the effort, time and resources required by a doctor to respond to it. It also appeared to have little 
regard for its impact on participants, given the perceived dismissiveness with which the authorities 
communicated with them, which some perceived as perfunctory, lacking in information and 
explanation, and bureaucratic. In addition, that the complaint will remain on their record “forever” 
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(DiT5) was both threatening and unfair, especially if the complaint was not substantiated or was of 
a relatively minor significance. 
Being experienced as punitive has a negative impact not only on the doctors themselves; it can 
also promote the risk of defensive medicine. Protection of the public, as a given, may be more 
effective if the adverse impacts can be ameliorated. Suggestions for how to achieve this ranged 
from process changes to the manner of communication between the authorities and doctors, to 
suggested alternate resolution practices. 
Communication with the authorities 
DiTs’ impressions of the nature of communication with the authorities ranged from being very brief 
(DiT8), to having significant delays in receiving letters, the anonymity of the tone (DiT6), and the 
lack of acknowledgement of the process being stressful, being “detached and a little too devoid of 
emotion or any acknowledgement that this might be difficult” (DiT16) all added to the grievance 
about the process itself. 
DiT16 said that a phone call to her before the complaint arrived by email during her break may 
have helped, and she wondered what would have happened if the email had never reached her 
and how the system would respond to her lack of response that would follow. She added that the 
letter gave little information about what would happen next. Having more personal contact was also 
noted by DiT4, who suggested that their insurer have a contact person or support person allocated 
who could be like a supplement to medico-legal advice. She also commented that the nature of the 
communication is “like a postal service, back and forth” between the Medical Board (Council, as it 
is now) and herself: 
And so it's just like you’re being judged here and every now and again you’ll get a little 
letter which will tell you where you’re up to. Yeah, there’s, sort of, no ongoing contact 
and therefore you just sit there wondering [laugh] am I about to be, like, struck off, 
which I know is catastrophising again, but like, is it going to be the worst case scenario 
because, you know, with all these scenario possibilities and when you don't know 
who’s making the decision or what factors they’re taking into account or you don't get 
to write another letter or – it's just they’re all dealing with the first pieces of information, 
so there’s not even a second response written. It just goes to the Medical Board, 
[sound effect] and the letter comes back [sound effect] (DiT4).  
The frustration and sense of bafflement of dealing with the big bureaucracy represented quite a 
contrast to the busy, organised lives of the DiTs as medical professionals. This manner of 
communication was anathema to how they would prefer to resolve problems, yet they had no say 
in how this could be achieved. 
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Not all participants were of the view it would be preferable to deal direct with patients when there is 
a dispute or grievance, although it was a more common view. Some doctors believed that if they 
could just sit down with an aggrieved patient and sort it out, it would provide the opportunity to 
resolve a grievance before it escalated. DiT2 felt she was denied the opportunity to do so by her 
hospital administration that intervened and prevented her from being with the patient after a critical 
incident. DiT1 was caught up in a dispute with an aggrieved husband which escalated to a formal 
complaint, but when he then picked up the phone to explain the situation to the husband, the 
acrimony was immediately dispelled. Others were not so certain that a direct approach was a good 
idea. DiT16 said she would not be happy to do so, though it would depend on what the complaint 
was about: 
I think a written forum is a much better way to express yourself, especially when 
emotions are heightened. You would want a mutual third party there, just in case they 
make another complaint against you because obviously you’re not their favourite 
person, which is why they’ve made a complaint against you and they might not be 
reasonable in the way that they approach you. I wouldn’t be comfortable just walking 
into a room with just her and go chat about it amongst yourselves (DiT16). 
She acknowledged that for some doctors, this may be feasible if they have had a long-term 
relationship with a patient, but the complaint about her was “out of the blue” from a person whom 
she had known for only a very short period of time. 
While a doctor may say it is in their nature to want to solve problems, they are faced with a 
bureaucratic process that removes them from control and from direct communication, which 
becomes a process mediated by others in a manner sometimes unclear to doctors, whose 
frustration became clear when talking about how it affected them. While this may appear to be a 
challenge to participants’ professional autonomy, nevertheless it gives pause to consider whether 
there are aspects of the process that could take more account of the perceptions of it as unfair and 
unnecessarily unwieldy, confusing and unsympathetic, which undermines trust in the regulator and 
which brought some participants to ponder how these processes serve to protect the public. 
Although not one participant denied there should be a system to deal with serious matters of public 
interest and safety, when reflecting on the role of the process itself, some participants expressed 
the view that in today’s world, patients expect too much from health care, and it is not possible to 
either keep everyone happy, nor is it feasible. DiT4 said: 
I think it is the direction of health care, I mean, people’s expectations just get higher 
and higher, and maybe the legislation just says protect the public, but the general 
sense is that the patient has to experience excellence and have no complaints almost 
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at the end. I don’t think it’s in the public interest, I think expectations just seem to be 
becoming just way over the top (DiT4). 
People expect a lot.  Our whole society expects a lot. In my life time when I was a little 
girl, doctors couldn’t do anything wrong and now, ah, it’s almost that the consumers 
know what’s best and if they want something, they should get it (DiT4). 
Summary 
The overall impression from the participants is that many of their observations about dealing with 
the medico-legal process could be avoided if greater acknowledgement were made of how the 
process is experienced by those on the receiving end. 
There were differing opinions about whether it would be better to resolve complaints more directly 
with the aggrieved person, which would de-escalate a potential formal complaint, or if this would be 
too confronting and uncomfortable (DiT16). Direct resolution is a process offered by the HCCC for 
less serious cases, although like DiT16, some parties are not happy to take up this opportunity. 
The Medical Indemnity Insurers advise doctors not to deal directly with complainants unless 
mediated through the MII, given that sometimes, a participant’s anger or defensiveness can 
escalate a grievance. While this is done to protect the doctors, some doctors such as DiT1 feel it is 
unnatural that they cannot follow through with a patient, even if the patient is unhappy with them. 
In summary, there are many aspects of the process that participants found to be problematic. 
There is a belief that having a permanent record disadvantages doctors when applying for work 
elsewhere, and may damage reputations. There is also a belief that while the public has a right to 
know of instances where they are placed at risk by “bad doctors”, the doctors who are not “bad” 
feel they are being treated as if they were as bad or even worse than criminals, whose criminal 
record will be wiped after so many years, or not recorded at all for minor matters. 
Finally, there is an impression that the balance is weighted towards a public that expects more 
than the profession is able to give, and that they, the doctors, bear the brunt of this. A common 
view was that there should be a more refined process to handle complaints. Many considered that 
there should be a better way of separating the minor matters from the serious, rather than treating 
them all much the same. It has the effect that doctors who previously were considered competent, 
dedicated doctors have a stain on their professional career. 
Conclusion 
The complaints process has evolved over time to more effectively protect the public against the 
risks inherent in a health care system that allows health professionals to practise below standard, 
to perform poorly and demonstrate unacceptable conduct, and to deal with complaints by those 
dissatisfied with or harmed by their care. The findings of this study so far have identified that 
doctors’ experience of the process has left many of them metaphorically battered and bruised, and 
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certainly not experiencing the system as caring and sensitive, nor even acknowledging that the 
process is stressful. 
Participants have offered some thoughts on how it could be different. The changes considered do 
not suggest radical change, but a greater sensitivity to how the messages conveyed by the 
bureaucratic handling of the complaints process can be improved. While these perceptions are 
open to challenge, because the system is designed around the principles of procedural fairness, 
the legalistic tone does not marry well with the values inherent in care for others that participants 
said the medical profession stands on. Dealing with this dissonance, and its emotional toll, is the 
subject of the next section of this chapter: Getting through it, telling others. 
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Part Three: Getting Through It, Telling Others 
Whom did I tell? 
The focus here on the question ‘whom did I tell?’ comes about because it is known that many 
doctors do not seek professional, collegiate or personal support when they are experiencing 
distress for whatever reason (BeyondBlue, 2013; Nash, 2013). Yet the incidence of psychological 
and emotional harm is known to be significant, and in some cases prolonged, and can affect a 
doctor’s attitude to their profession, the way they practise, and their personal wellbeing. The 
reasons for doctors not seeking help when suffering mental illness have been well documented in 
the BeyondBlue (2013) survey. These include practical reasons such as insufficient time, lack of 
access to available help, and more personal reasons such as embarrassment, shame, fear for 
reputation and fear of stigma affecting career (Beyondblue 2013). However, not everyone needs 
professional support, or they may prefer support from those closer to them, in terms of friends, 
partners, colleagues and others in the workplace. This section aims to provide greater insight into 
why doctors chose to tell others, or not to, about receiving a complaint and whether this made a 
difference in their handling of the process. 
The analysis here does not delve into doctors’ coping skills or techniques for maintaining their 
wellbeing such as diet, exercise, work-life balance. These techniques are amply covered in other 
literature and advice to doctors generally92. For the purpose of this study, the interest is in seeking 
an understanding of what makes some doctors reticent to tell others, whom they decide to confide 
in and whether sharing with others makes a difference to them. This will reflect on later 
deliberations about reputation and trust, as well as dealing with the uncertainties of the future 
triggered by the complaints experience. 
The following table explores one participant’s account of sharing what was happening for her at the 
time. This is to convey a sense of the deliberations about whom to divulge their experience to and 
under what circumstances. 
Box Five: A Doctor in Trouble: One participant’s story (DiT15) 
Telling the 
interviewer 
I’ve never had any mental health problems, I’ve never had anxiety or – 
or depression or anything like that and always considered myself a 
fairly…sort of, strong, get on with it, sort of, person - - - I was just 
nobbled by this happening. I was dreading going to work [emotional] … 
you know, crying all the time and like this [laughter] ... just [emotional] – 
I just couldn’t function properly. 
                                                          
92 MIIs, the Colleges, AMA, medical newspapers, the Australasian Doctors Health Advisory Service, BeyondBlue, all 
offer articles, resources and advice to doctors, including such publications as “Keeping the Doctor Alive”, a self-care 
handbook. 
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Telling her partner My partner was with me and ... I had that – all that sort of support, but 
he’s very sensible and he just kept saying, “You know, don't you think 
you should go and talk to someone about all this?” Oh, no, no, I’m fine, 
I’m a doctor. 
Telling her solicitor And the solicitor from [MII], he was in fairly regular contact with me … 
and he was really good and he eventually said, “Look, you know, if 
you’re so upset, go and see someone.”  I was impressed with [MII], you 
know, also I – I, kind of, knew that they had the counselling service as 
part of it but … but the remaining aware of how you’re going and 
prompting me - - - doing something about, you know, yeah. 
Professional help DiT15 was selective about whom to see: not a young person but an 
older person with experience of medical professionals. 
I said, “Well, I don't see any point in going and talking to anybody, it is 
what it is, they can’t change it, it's, you know, I’ve just got to wait until 
this process is – is done with and I don't see how a counsellor can 
change anything, you know, all he can say is, well, yeah, [laugh], you 
know, that is what it is and, you’ve got a good ... partner supporting you 
and, you know, just have to hang in there until it's finished”. But 
somehow unloading it all to the psychologist, ah, was helpful. 
Telling the boss “Look we know you’re good, we know you’re competent, we don't have 
any problems with it and we’re sorry you’re in this position.” 
 
As noted, doctors who receive a complaint are required by their indemnity insurer to notify them 
about a complaint, and to heed the advice of the adviser who is allocated to their “case”. DiT15 
dealt directly with a solicitor, who recognised that her ongoing distress was of concern, for her own 
sake but also because it made it difficult for him to work with her in dealing with the complaint. Both 
her partner and the solicitor entreated her to get professional support, and after resisting for a long 
time, she eventually took their advice, and it “helped”. Taking this advice was not easy, and it did 
not sit well. After all, she argued, what could anyone tell her who wasn’t a doctor? This seeming 
belief in the superiority of her knowledge resonated with her seeming disbelief in receiving a 
complaint, and the shock and distress that followed once the reality set in. 
Receiving reassurances from her boss about her competence did little to assuage the long-
standing grief that accompanied her to the interview. DiT15 was a good example of intrusive 
worrying and fear that led to severe anxiety, loss of sleep, long-standing fear of recurrence of the 
event, and of others knowing about it. Her boss only knew because she had to access the records 
in order to respond to the complaint. 
Telling others 
Other DiTs responded in varying ways, not all as traumatised by the event, but as deeply reflective. 
Confiding in others was helpful and some participants felt it was critical to enduring and surviving 
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the process. While all the DiTs interviewed had told at least their partners, not all immediately 
shared it with others. When they did, rather than feeling judged, they felt supported, and not only 
this, they felt validated and this helped to maintain a degree of confidence. 
DiT16 confided in family (medical doctors), her fiancé, friends and colleagues, and her supervisor: 
I got a call from the boss … to see how I was, which was a big surprise, like, it’s really 
lovely. It’s really nice to see people take an interest in your wellbeing because a lot of 
how you see yourself as a doctor is based on your terms of success, like treating 
patients well or having good outcomes. One of the things that really struck me was 
when my boss said “I’m really sorry this happened to you, this sucks”. Nobody had ever 
acknowledged it had caused me distress. I can’t underestimate the importance of 
having the support of people around you because I think that completely changes how 
all of this – because I know – there’s a lot of shame attached to it and I know that some 
people would be so ashamed that they wouldn’t want to tell anyone about it … the 
negative feelings that were attached to this were only mitigated when people said stuff 
like, oh that really sucks and I’m so surprised and that’s not my experience with you 
and I can’t believe that somebody complained about you. And so it was like I needed 
five positive reinforcements for every negative (DiT16). 
The more common response was to tell only one’s partner. Not everyone wants to tell others or get 
professional support, and telling colleagues takes courage. Yet when participants did confide in 
colleagues, it made a difference as they could relate to the experience as a peer: 
I've got quite a good friend who's a colleague I've talked to about a few things. That 
was nice. He thought I'd probably done nothing wrong. I did that once. I didn't need to 
do it again. They said they had this support program - - - I didn't use it. I didn't need it. I 
just had to beaver away and get through it. So I did. I'm used to complexity and 
uncertainty which I think really helped (DiT12). 
But if a doctor tells no one, it can add to the stress. DiT11 did not tell anyone apart from his wife, 
yet once it was all over, he confided in his former supervisor. He was surprised how much better 
he felt, and relieved, when his former mentor told him he too had had a complaint: “When I was 
going through dealing with it, nobody knew. I brought this up, yeah, at our meeting when it was 
completed” (DiT11). 
After the initial shock of receiving notification of the complaint in the mail, DiT3’s partner thereafter 
intercepted every envelope that arrived. DiT14’s wife remained his confidante and support 
throughout his lengthy process and court case: “My wife is wonderful. She’s always been totally 
behind me” (DiT14). Similarly, DiT8’s wife stood by him throughout the ordeal of his complaint, 
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supported his move to another city, and at the time of the interview was reluctant to leave his side. 
For both of them, they had lived through a trauma and this was a part of that narrative. 
Telling friends and colleagues was often conflated: the friends chosen to confide in were fellow 
doctors. DiT4 confided in a friend, who is also a doctor: 
I talk to her about things but that’s the only person. It would not help if you didn’t speak 
to a doctor. People would not understand what you’re talking about, you know. They 
just wouldn’t understand. I’ve discussed some things with people outside and the 
questions they ask you, it’s quite clear that they don’t really understand what it is that 
you’re trying to convey or what you’re talking about. It’s – I don’t know, they just don’t 
understand what it is to be a doctor. I don’t think it’d help to speak to anybody else. It 
might help to speak to other doctors but I just haven’t got that relationship with anybody 
else. And her values are similar to mine and things like that. I think that means a lot too 
(DiT4). 
This was interesting, as it shows that DiTs needed to not only “offload” their story but they needed 
someone who could identify with them and understand how they may be feeling and why they may 
be feeling that way, that is not to have to explain why they had such anxiety, fear or whatever their 
emotions were. Telling colleagues was much the same, though the risk was higher if they feared 
being judged. On whether to appeal a decision that arose from an administrative error, a colleague 
said to DiT5: “I really think – of course if you wanted to and I’d support you and I’d help you – but I 
think you just need to cop it. And think of it as something unfortunate that’s happened in your 
career”. To which DiT5 responded “But I don’t think of it as something unfortunate, I think it’s like a 
terrible blemish really. I think of it as something awful” (DiT5). 
She had a nervous time and was so fearful of the hearings, she was accompanied to them by a 
friend: “[I] managed to have someone who could go along and hold my hand and drive, because I 
was not in a fit state to get myself down and back” (DiT2). 
Getting medico-legal advice 
As has been noted, doctors are required to notify their insurer if they receive a complaint and, for 
participants in this study, most found them helpful. DiT15’s lawyer went beyond providing legal 
advice and intervened to arrange emotional and psychological support for her: 
And the solicitor, um, from [MII], he was in fairly regular contact with me, um, and he 
was really good, um, and he eventually said, “Look, you know, if you’re so upset go 
and see someone”, because I'd be crying on the phone saying, you know, “It's so 
distressing” and, you know, [emotional], look, he probably hears from every person he 
speaks to but, um, and he was probably dealing with things that were way more, um, 
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worrying that my little matter, um, and I can, sort of, see, you know, you’re just one little 
droplet in the whole thing, but for me it was everything [emotional] (DiT15). 
DiT14 found he was well supported by his solicitor, and though this was focused “on the legal stuff, 
I don’t recall deep and meaningfuls, but it felt supportive. He was terrific during the hearing and we 
would meet every morning before we went to court. And we’d review the day at the end of each 
day” (DiT14). The DiTs who mentioned their lawyers and advisers were generally appreciative of 
the support and advice they were given, although DiT2 spoke of differences of opinion with her 
adviser, who was a peer in her specialty. She felt he was less sympathetic to her situation because 
of this, and it added to her anxiety. 
Getting professional help 
As noted in Chapter Four, Nash et al. (2013) and BeyondBlue (2013) found that very few doctors 
seek professional psychiatric or professional help, nor even tell their GPs, when they are 
distressed by having a complaint. Not one of the participants had sought psychiatric care. One 
signed himself into a rehabilitation centre to assist with addiction problems. As for obtaining 
psychological support, it took some time before DiT15 agreed to see a psychologist. Although she 
said to her partner “I’m fine, I’m a doctor”, she was in hindsight not at all fine. She was reassured 
only because her medico-legal adviser, whom she trusted, referred her. But she was choosy about 
who would help; it would not be a 25-year-old who would not understand why it would be upsetting, 
but a middle-aged man who, she felt, would be sensible because of their maturity and experience. 
What she found helpful was having someone who was “used to talking to doctors”, who would 
listen to her story, and encourage her not to think in terms of the worst possible scenario when the 
outcome was uncertain. This reinforced what she had told herself. Although she had recounted her 
story to her partner, it was “some kind of validation” to have someone else listen. Others had said 
they would not see a psychologist because “What would they know? They’re not a doctor,” which is 
reminiscent of BeyondBlue’s findings (2013). 
Summary 
Having someone hear their story, to support them throughout or to validate their worth were of 
value to each participant. The exception was DiT11 who did not tell anyone apart from his wife, 
until by chance his former supervisor revealed in a public forum his own experience with a 
complaint. His was a back-story of high achievement, and a minor complaint had weighed heavily 
on him. Having colleagues or other doctors as support people was of great value, as the 
participants trusted that they would understand. DiT5’s experience was a little different however. 
The colleague she sought advice from was engaged by one of the authorities and had “insider” 
knowledge of how the system worked, so the advice was to “just cop it”. This was not what DiT5 
wished to hear as she felt her experience was “awful, a blemish” on her career. 
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What was apparent was that some doctors wanted to better understand their own emotional 
reactions to a complaint; for example, DiT10 wrote a journal of his unfolding experience. Some 
participants also wanted to understand more of the process, and its impacts, by becoming alert to 
medico-legal events and taking more notice of others in a similar situation. Others admitted to 
having “tuned in” to media reports and medical-legal literature after having had a complaint. An 
issue that might otherwise not have been of interest to them now became one that they related 
closely to. DiT1 for instance had an impressive knowledge of recent cases, was aware of data in 
the UK and Australia relating to the numbers of complaints per year, suicide rates of doctors 
undergoing investigations, the names of inquiries into hospitals and individual doctors, and an 
understanding of procedures, rights of appeal and review, beyond his direct experience. 
The next part of the analysis focuses on the ‘moral’ dimension revealed through some of the 
deeper insights given by participants as they recounted their reasons for going into medicine, what 
they thought it was going to be like and what it was actually like, particularly following their 
involvement in a medico-legal matter. It was not anticipated that they would ponder so deeply 
about what this all meant. 
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Part Four: Moral Legitimacy 
This section introduces reflections on the underlying reasons for participants’ reactions to the 
complaints process, which appear to arise from the deep-seated values they hold. The experience 
they had was not just an event; the recollection and the reflection that accompanied the recounting 
of it showed that the event also had a personal, moral significance. It was more than whether they 
had been accused of a wrongdoing and been found guilty or innocent; it was about questioning 
whether having a complaint meant they had to reassess the values that they held about 
themselves. Hunt and Carnevale (2011) stated: 
Moral experience encompasses a person’s sense that values that he or she deems 
important are being realised or thwarted in everyday life. This includes a person’s 
interpretations of a lived encounter, or a set of encounters, that fall on spectrums of 
right-wrong, good-bad or just-unjust (Hunt & Carnevale, 2011, p. 659). 
This section of the findings focuses on the moral significance of having a complaint. It presents the 
deliberations of participants and what mattered most when they reflected on the complaint. The 
interview was an opportunity for participants to explore what it meant to them to be a doctor, why 
they went into medicine, what they expected of themselves, and what others expected of them. It 
was important to also understand that this ‘created identity’ may have been subject to various 
threats and challenges during the complaint process. While there are commonalities of experience 
imposed by the regulatory process, it was expected that not all participants would react in the 
same way. This would depend on how they saw themselves in their professional role of ‘doctor’, 
the values that they held, and their own personal characteristics and circumstances. As stated by 
Hunt and Carnevale (2011, p. 659): “We regard moral experience as a contextualised experiential 
phenomenon that is best understood from the subjective perspective of the person living the 
phenomenon within his or her local social context”. The interview was an opportunity to explore the 
subjective perspective of participants’ individual experience of having a complaint, and the values 
relating to who they held themselves to be. These deliberations are presented from the perspective 
of the ‘doctor in trouble’, beginning with why they went into medicine and their aspirations. 
Establishing their moral legitimacy is explained through their reflections on their values about what 
it means to be a good doctor, whether they saw themselves as such, and if they still did after 
having a complaint. Being a member of the medical community, what did they feel that others 
thought of them after having a complaint? Participants had various ways of dealing with these 
questions and the other threats and challenges from having a complaint, and what this meant in 
terms of restoring a sense of worth. 
Choosing medicine 
This question was included in the interview to give a perspective of what doctors aspired to when 
they chose to enter medicine as their career, and how their career eventuated and unfolded, to set 
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the scene for how their early expectations may have been affected by the experience of a 
complaint. 
Some participants came from medical families (DiT11, DiT16), and it was either expected or 
natural that they continue the family tradition. Some ‘got the marks in high school’ so went into 
medicine (DiT3, DiT4 and DiT11), while others had more altruistic motivations: a cure for cancer for 
a relative (DiT5), or a desire to help the community (DiT6). DiT8 was the first doctor in the family 
and her grandfather’s advice guided her “… have something at the end of your working days you 
can feel [you’ve] contributed, and haven’t been a drain on society”. DiT5 spoke of not knowing 
what she wanted to do and went along with a friend to a talk on studying medicine at the university 
where she was later to study: “So I went to this introduction thing and the chancellor was speaking 
and she said the word “vocation”. I practically fell off my chair. I hadn’t heard that since I was at 
school, you know, I – I still do think there’s a strong element of that”. DiT4 also spoke of medicine 
in terms of vocation: “I was very idealistic and had no experience of the world – I came from a 
Catholic school with nuns and I wanted to do the best I could for people in the world and I just 
imagined that was the way to do it. And I believe very strongly in vocation in that sense”. 
DiT11 entered medicine because he got the marks, and found he enjoyed it. Others spoke of what 
it meant to them: “I loved medicine, I loved talking to people, I loved to explore people’s stories 
(DiT14). DiT7 admired a senior with whom he worked and aspired to be like him and take on his 
specialty, psychiatry: 
The [hospital] had always and has always done very well in terms of getting psychiatry 
registrars through the program and getting them…with a high pass rate….and I think 
part of that was because [supervisor] told us we had to. [H]e was a – pretty tough like 
that … he didn’t suffer fools. So you got used to him. He was a real professor. Not in a 
fuddy-duddy way. He was a commander-in-chief. 
Doing well at school opened up choices. With her high marks, DiT2 was encouraged by others and 
her parents, “You should do medicine”, but not the school: 
I topped the high school, no-one kind of realised that I was actually quite clever, even 
though I was a girl. So my guidance counsellor at school kind of scoffed at me when I 
said that I was thinking of doing medicine, and said “Teacher or nursing would be much 
better … you shouldn’t really aim for something that’s impossible to achieve. So I 
thought – well I’ll teach you, you bastards [laughter]. 
DiT2 had in mind to be the perfect doctor with the qualities she most admired: “I’ll be the nice 
obstetrician who supports women’s choices, who supports women to give birth at home, who 
doesn’t treat them badly”. These ideals characterised the first decade or more of her practice, until 
there was a tragic outcome which led to her complaint. DiT2’s experience will be examined in more 
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detail a little later, but when looking at her aspirations for her career when she set out, and what 
happened after this tragic event, she said wistfully that she “would not go into medicine now … no”. 
Her experience, which was prolonged and traumatic, left her so disillusioned that she no longer 
practises and has taken up a different career where she said she can once again feel she can be 
“good at something”. Participants commonly expressed this pervading sense of wishing to restore 
some sense of purpose and worth. 
Establishing moral legitimacy 
Participants were not asked to speak of their perceived values or virtues, whether they were “good” 
or “bad” doctors, whether they were blameworthy or blameless. Nor were they questioned about 
the truthfulness of the complaint or the veracity of their accounts. The concept of a moral 
legitimacy emerged as a common thread in close analysis of the transcripts, which revealed that 
each participant appeared to be seeking to establish that there was “good” in them, and what that 
good might be. For many, there was a pre-occupation with wishing to be seen, and believed, to be 
good at their job, or at the least that they had been so. The struggle was to hold onto that belief. 
What follows is an interpretation of what participants spoke of, not as what was expected of them 
by external standards, but what they expected of themselves. 
What is a good doctor? 
Participants did not specifically define what they meant or understood about being a “good” doctor. 
Some spoke of how they believed others saw them, that there was an expectation that as a doctor 
they were held out as different from the rest of society, and this expectation affected not only how 
they behave, but their place in the community. Patients were told by their GP that “I was a ‘whiz-
kid’. I’ve never said that. I’m just like any other person”. (DiT11). Some felt scrutinised: as doctors 
at work, they had to be “superhuman” and were not allowed mistakes, while outside of work their 
conduct as a citizen could be suspect. DiT1 trained and worked in the UK before coming to 
Australia. His complaint related to his work in UK. He said: 
Doctors are held to higher standards than the general public, even in their personal 
lives; there’s a perception that as doctors, we have to behave in a certain way, but that 
invades every aspect of our lives. And you do feel that – because having had no 
interaction with the GMC before, I didn’t feel those eyes on me as much, but now I’m 
much more aware of how your behaviour is considered and, you know, at any time, 
even though – even if it's nothing to do with your practice, you could be picked up for 
doing something that is considered a no-no by AHPRA (DiT1). 
He reflected on how this affects relationships with patients such as having a “normal” conversation 
with them, use of social media, even having children at the same school as patients and meeting 
up at the soccer game; while such conduct is discretionary, others may have a different perception 
of it, which may attract critical opinion. He says: 
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I thought I could just be myself, but you can’t – you can’t just be yourself. You have to 
be yourself within a very strict confine of conduct and, ah, accountability. ... We’re 
expected to be a certain level of superhuman and we’re not, we’re just normal people. 
You can’t make a human level of mistakes (DiT1). 
When a participant’s worth was brought into question by a complaint and the process that followed, 
there was a lingering fear that this meant they were not the ‘good doctor’. As a ‘good doctor’ they 
thought they were immune from complaints and could not get into trouble. DiT2 believed she was 
“immune” from complaints because she believed she had all the attributes of being a good doctor: 
I’m female, that tends to protect you, because people tend to not dislike female doctors 
as much as they do male doctors. I’ve got good social skills, I usually manage to make 
the patients like me. I don’t get abusive and yell at people. I don’t get drunk and turn up 
at work. I practise safely. I’m an obsessive auditor, unlike anyone else I’ve ever worked 
with in practice. I can tell you exactly what my [surgical] rates are, and I knew that it 
was better than everybody else’s at the hospital … so it was just very interesting when 
somehow you get painted as the dangerous one (DiT2). 
DiT1 also thought he was immune: 
Never thought it would affect me, never thought I'd be involved. That’s one of the 
things, I thought I was a good doctor and I thought good doctors don’t get put in front of 
the GMC. And then suddenly … since then I’ve had this, you know, dramatic realisation 
that you can be a good doctor, a careful doctor, yet still your dog bites the postman, 
you know93? Even if there were no issues of competence, all the same, someone has 
been aggrieved by something I did. You don’t realise you’re vulnerable until you’ve 
been through the process” (DiT1). 
DiT5 had never had a complaint before, in 23 years practice: “I felt I'd done a really good job”. DiT4 
likewise could not relate herself to being like some of the notorious “bad” doctors but thought the 
system treated her as if she were, saying, “I am not like that. There are some bad doctors out 
there, I am certainly not that. It upsets me that they should lump me in alongside Graeme Reeves 
as if I was as bad as he is” (DiT4). 
From being a “good” doctor, a turning point occurred when the complaint letter arrived: “‘Cause 
you’d read these things, and, um, it won’t happen to me. Why would it, yeah. I’m – I’m trying to do 
the right thing. Of course. That’s being a doctor. You’re trained to it. In Medicine you’re meant to do 
no harm” (DiT8). She then felt guilty when she received the notification: “You think, ‘what have I 
done wrong?’” 
                                                          
93 This latter reference is a story DiT1 related about a friend who was walking his dog which attacked but did not injure 
the postman, who complained to the GMC because the friend was a doctor, and should know better. 
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DiT4 took the event as an affront on her competence: 
But to us, it’s, ah, almost an attack on our capabilities as clinicians. Um, because I think 
as medical health professionals we’re always trying to improve, always trying to be 
better and learn more and improve on our practice. Um, and when something like that 
happens, whether you get sued or a notification that it’s saying to you – it’s almost like 
it’s saying to you, “well, you’re not good,  you’re not trying hard enough or you’re not,  
or, you know, that’s wrong what you’re doing there”. So I – I think that the normal 
response would be to, sort of, bristle up at that and get quite sad (DiT4). 
What will others think of me? 
When doctors express fear about their reputation, it goes to their sense of their good self, and that 
their future may be at stake. DiT5 said: “You know, you’re not a bad person. It seems so trivial to 
say that, but it did make me feel like I was a bad person”. After a complaint by a drug addict in 
which she, and her senior, believed she had acted appropriately, she was instructed by the Board 
to read the Code of Conduct, the inference of which caused her much offence. 
It’s terrible [cries] to think you’re breaching the Code of Conduct, which is the basis of 
good practice. It is ridiculous how much it upsets me [cries] considering it was, like, 
years ago [silence]. It upset me dreadfully for the first six months. I couldn’t sort of 
speak about it without becoming a howling mess. It went with me the whole time, 
everywhere. I tried the whole time not to catastrophise the whole thing but um, it really 
goes to the core of being a good doctor (DiT5). 
DiT2 was distressed by how, after a complaint, she thought potential employers would react to her 
and, in her case, the complaint went public through the media so she became acutely aware of 
how others in the community viewed her, as well as the profession and hospital: 
I thought that if anyone saw that I had an investigation underway, that they – my CV 
would immediately go into the round circular filing cabinet underneath the desk and that 
they wouldn’t consider me. That I’d be immediately branded as being bad ... [it also] 
became difficult, ‘cause the general public knew. So every time I went to the 
supermarket, I felt like people were looking at me. “She’s that axe-murderer” – I used to 
be in the Local [Community] Group, and I turned up at a meeting once and had people 
say, “Oh, I saw you in the paper”. So not only had I lost my professional reputation, but 
it was spilling over into my personal social life as well (DiT2). 
Another DiT felt very exposed: “It’s not nice to have your name in the paper” (DiT8). This was a 
matter before a Tribunal open to the public, with a reporter and photographer present. Many 
people commented on the case, as the complainant was a known person with a past that drew 
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public attention to the matter. There was a fear of matters going public, of being reported in the 
media, and a distrust about how it would be done as it is often sensationalised. Once it was in the 
media, there was no right of reply: “Even if you could, but even if you do, people have already 
made their minds up, haven’t they?” (DiT6). DiT14 was critically aware of protecting his reputation 
during his trial where he was found not guilty of scientific fraud: 
And after 12 days of hearings, and honestly it may even make me teary now, but I 
remember coming out of day 2 or day 3 when they were still having legal wrangling and 
ringing my wife in tears and saying, “You know, they’re accusing me of being a fraud”, 
and it still brings tears to my eyes thinking about it and, you know, that’s dreadful – and 
it really – I could give up medicine if that were to be established – I didn’t think the 
chances of it being established were strong but it is such an attack on your absolute 
being and essence as a doctor (DiT14). 
Weighing it up, feeling responsible 
Several participants engaged in a process of reckoning which they spoke about as having occurred 
during or after the event, and even during the interview, when they looked back to consider what 
their contribution was to the incident that became the subject of the complaint. Even when not 
substantiated, some considered that there was a reason for the complaint, and searched for what 
that reason could be. In this sense, they felt responsible for the complaint, even though not liable. 
The account of DiT1 is included here at length to demonstrate both their feeling of being a good 
doctor and questioning this through consideration of their responsibility: 
I'd always considered I was a good surgeon and a good doctor and anytime you get a 
complaint – which you do get complaints – anytime you get a complaint you always feel 
like shit. You do – whether it's spurious, justified or not. I think there is always some 
degree of truth in a complaint – in the words. It may be that – that most people would 
consider it a spurious complaint – but within that, the reason it's arisen is because 
somewhere along the line the person, the complainant has felt aggrieved. So there is a 
reason why they feel aggrieved – they may have perceived things wrongly, but they still 
feel aggrieved because you’ve allowed them to perceive things wrongly. It's part of our 
job unfortunately as well, to make, I think, make the patients – recipients of our care – 
relatives understand why we are doing something and sometimes we don’t always do 
that. It’s not always that easy to do – you do get complaints even when you’ve done 
everything – you think you’ve done everything right, but in there will be a lesson to 
learn that you may have not communicated what you’re doing correctly or you may 
have missed the fact that somebody has not been happy and you’ve not had the 
chance to address it with them. I still feel like a good doctor, but I don’t feel as confident 
maybe, as I might have done before. I feel diminished (DiT1). 
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DiT1 also felt a degree of responsibility for the complaint: 
You would be a very egotistical, ah, big-headed bastard if you didn’t take anything from 
a complaint. And, look, well, there’s a few of them out there [laughs]. And look, you 
know, people will complain and I, by no means, do I want to be pleasing everyone all 
the time, because that’s impossible. But they would have complained for a reason. 
You’ve got to think about how you behaved there as well and see if there’s anything 
there that you did wrong (DiT1). 
The opinions of peers and colleagues 
Participants not only reflected on their worth as doctors, but many were critically aware of the 
opinions of their peers. 
Peer review 
A matter sent for peer review in the course of an inquiry will influence, if not determine, how a 
complaint will be dealt with, and therefore its outcome (see Chapter Three). But a participant may 
find criticism by a peer very troubling for their own sense of competency and worth. 
DiT1 commented: “At the end of it, a report was sent out to one person, so you’re in the hands of 
that one person really, as to whether or not you’re considered to be acceptable or not” (DiT1). In 
DiT1’s case, a peer made adverse comments about the care of the patient, and much of which 
DiT1 said should have been attributed to other people in the team. In addition, the comments were 
accompanied by a degree of criticism, stated in terms of departure from the standard, as 
interpreted by the peer. If the degree of departure is significant, then further action against the 
doctor will ensue. Of this DiT1 said: 
I’ve not got any, you know, significant below standard comments anywhere – and 
therefore the likelihood is – they’ll say there’s no case to answer is the overall outcome 
anyway. But I still felt bad because there’s a report that says that I fell below standard. 
Just the fact that I’ve fallen below standard, you know, makes me feel terrible because 
I have high standards and when none of those three points are either related to me 
directly or one is actually false – but if you then argue, you are just going to prolong the 
outcome when you know the outcome will be that there’s no action. So that was – that 
was distressing as well (DiT1). 
Collegial peers 
One’s collegial peers can have a big impact on how well a DiT gets through the process. After a 
terrible outcome, DiT2’s professional partners with whom she had a long-standing relationship 
turned her out of their circle. The nursing team also were instructed by the hospital administration 
not to speak to her. She felt abandoned at all levels: 
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No-one contacted me at all to see how I was, and I was devastated … people that I 
thought actually would offer some form of support were very keen to just wash their 
hands and walk out and not associate themselves. I’d like to come and join the club 
again. 
When asked why she thought they responded as they did, she said: 
I think that the message that was going around the hospital was that it was my fault, 
that I was dangerous, and I think they didn’t want to be guilty by association with me, 
that they might also somehow or other be bad practitioners because they supported me 
in some way (DiT2). 
DiT1’s hospital was asked to provide a report about him: 
So the letters that came back from the hospital were extremely supportive, as 
expected, they basically said, this guy is a good doctor. Um, doesn’t make you feel that 
much better though. [Laugh]. Makes you feel better to a degree, but you know there’s 
still this complaint and therefore a feeling that you’re shit. No, not only that, that you are 
so bad, you’re as bad as those people you read about (DiT1). 
Nevertheless, he said that his team stood by him the whole way through, and he felt validated by 
their support. Looking back, he felt that this was crucial in dealing with a prolonged and 
acrimonious process. 
Good or bad, worthy or unworthy 
As can be seen in these results, while the participants tended not to press the point that they were 
“good” doctors, some spoke of not being “bad” or not wishing to be judged as “bad”. Participants 
expressed themselves variously, alluding to images of themselves as having valuable and valued 
skills and attributes. This can be seen in the quotations from DiT4 “... as medical health 
professionals we’re always trying to improve, always trying to be better and learn more and 
improve on our practice”, or DiT1 who has “high standards”. DiT14’s allegation of scientific fraud 
was so antithetical to who he was and how he had built his career in service to the public and the 
profession that he found it “incredibly confronting and distressing” to be considered as anything but 
a person of his high moral standards. 
When asked about how they felt now and on reflecting about feelings of guilt or responsibility for a 
complaint, most expressed a sense of doubt: that even though a complaint may not have been 
substantiated, they must have done something to have upset the patient to the point that they 
lodged an official complaint. If there were adverse findings, or perhaps a claim that was settled 
rather than dismissed, then this weighing up of being blameworthy or blameless, unworthy or 
worthy, bad or good, was a strong preoccupation throughout the interviews. The ‘good doctor’ they 
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used to be was perhaps no longer quite as worthy. Exception came from two participants, DiT7 
and DiT13, who acknowledged that their behaviour even through medical school was eccentric, 
outlandish or troublesome and they never declared they were “good” as in virtuous or having 
particularly worthy moral values. It was interesting however that in speaking of their more eccentric 
professional lifestyles and experiences, both were at pains to tell me of their academic brilliance 
and achievements, as if to neutralise their aberrant conduct which later brought them so much 
trouble with the law or regulators. This is a presumption, but it is consistent with observations made 
in the interviews; it was a universal theme that participants spoke of their credentials and their 
positive or “good” qualities. For DiT7 and DiT13, their good qualities included having been very 
bright and having achieved top of the grade academic results, and reference to various activities 
and roles they had played in the past as mentor, leader, professional committee work and medical 
education. 
Being blamed, being blameworthy 
Being blamed does not always lead to feeling blameworthy. A doctor may be blamed for an 
adverse outcome, but they may not actually have contributed to it. As DiT1 explained, “If there is 
an adverse outcome, people will try to use this to blame you even though that particular thing didn’t 
contribute to the outcome”. However, they are required to account for their actions, and even if 
found not responsible or guilty for the adverse outcome, there may be other factors picked up 
through peer review (as discussed in The Law, the Process and Me) that the doctor will have to 
account for, or the complainant may seek a review if dissatisfied with the outcome94. While these 
actions are in the interests of public protection and complainant rights, and doctors generally 
accept this, nevertheless, as DiT4 said “If it’s over it should be over”. Yet it will remain on their 
registration record forever. The sense of injustice was so strong in DiT1 that even though he 
enjoys his work, he announced as he was leaving the interview that he “really wanted to give up 
medicine”. DiT3 actually did, as soon as he received the report that cleared him. 
In reflecting on these issues, doctors were weighing up whether they were blameworthy, or 
whether other factors were also at play, such as fault with the patient/complainant, other people, or 
the process itself that pre-judged them or judged them unfairly. Adding to this introspection were 
thoughts about how others did or may view them. The stigma of media exposure (DiT1, DiT2, 
DiT5, DiT7, DiT13, DiT14), being cast out by those whose support she relied on (DiT2), or 
gossiped about (DiT16) were not only a threat to these doctors’ futures (DiT2 was “unemployable”) 
but represented the struggle to regain a sense of their good self. Such deliberations are reflections 
on their moral status, as it was before, as it is now in the telling, and what it means for the future. 
Redeeming that sense of worthiness gives them pause to reflect if they indeed deserve it: “it’s like 
a seed of doubt” (DiT11). 
                                                          
94 The role of peer review and complainants’ rights of review have been explained in Chapter Three “The Law in 
Action”. 
 P a g e  | 184 
An existential crisis 
A doctor’s feeling of self-worth, their status in the community and their sense of who they are, are 
all threatened by having a complaint, and this existential crisis is what DiTs spoke about of their 
own experience. It can be damaging if it happens early in their career, as DiT16 alluded to when as 
a junior registrar she felt her future was under threat because of the damage to her reputation, or 
DiT6, who as an early-career specialist was seriously contemplating giving up medicine. On the 
other hand, DiT3 had enjoyed a blemish-free long-standing career at a senior level up until the time 
of the complaint; DiT2 also as a senior specialist who believed she would never again be “good” at 
her craft; and DiT14 as a very senior specialist who would not retire while his reputation was at 
stake, indicate that for some doctors the fact of their long-standing service, and status, has been 
challenged can likewise be “incredibly damaging”. People respond differently, and this is partially 
accounted for by their different values and sense of identity as a doctor. 
Conclusion 
There was agreement among participant accounts that being a doctor carries with it an identity that 
defines to varying degrees how they see themselves. A complaint represents a moral challenge to 
this identity. Participants provided a picture of some of the influences that brought them into 
medicine and what they aspired to be: good doctors, whose sense of self as doctors in their 
professional and personal roles is very much who they are. Having a complaint brought these 
doctors to reflect on what sort of doctor they truly are: a bad doctor like others who have attracted 
the contempt and ire of the public and the profession, or someone who always considered 
themselves to be good and are hanging on to the thread that they are still that person. The next 
part of the chapter will look further into the threats and challenges to this thread of hope. 
Just as doctors sought to neutralise the circumstances contributing to the complaint, so they also 
sought to neutralise the impact. Participants were deeply affected because of what a complaint 
represented in terms of threats to their reputation and the fear of loss that a complaint may result 
in. It gave them pause to consider what it meant to them as a person who identified as a good and 
worthy doctor which, in turn, was a reflection on their worthiness as a person. For these 
participants, neutralising the impact of such considerations appeared to be a natural part of the 
process of recalibrating the sense of self and the threats to it. 
There was no suggestion by participants that the process of recalibrating was able to fully restore 
their former sense of self, their attitudes towards their own career, to the profession, to their 
patients and to their commitment. Most spoke of how it had changed them, changed the way they 
practised, and changed their attitudes towards the profession. The next section will also explore 
what these changes were, and doctors’ reflections on why this may have been so. 
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Part Five: Changes 
The previous section considered how participants attempted to make sense of the complaint, what 
may have been the motivator or “hidden agenda” behind it, what it meant in terms of their own 
practice, and more significantly, whether the complaint raised questions about their values and 
worthiness; that is, their moral legitimacy. 
This section considers how doctors in trouble reflected on the experience, on balance, in both a 
personal and a professional sense. There was a range of responses, from one who saw the 
experience as a positive one because it made him consider how he may better relate to his 
patients (DiT11), to the doctor who declared he did not go into medicine “for all this” and had his 
name taken off the medical register (DiT3). These thoughts infiltrated the participants’ thinking 
about medicine, medical practice and their place in it, and how this may have consciously or 
unconsciously translated into changes in their practice, attitudes and behaviour. 
Reflections on the experience 
The DiTs reflected on their recovery from the complaint experience in different ways. DiT14 
pondered over how long it took to recover from the ordeal of a 12-day trial, which was dismissed by 
the judge. Sometime later, at interview, he was still teary about its impact on him: 
You can see it in what I tell you now – it’s something that’s still there and it doesn’t take 
much to stir it up, but I’m by nature a reasonably optimistic person and, you know, my 
way of dealing with a lot of stuff is to say “Shit happens.” But it doesn’t mean it’s not 
there – I can still become quite emotional about it and I don’t pretend otherwise. I think 
as I’ve got older, I’m more ready to acknowledge being emotional about things than the 
abrasive young man that I may have been in my 30s [laughter] (DiT14). 
Recalling the experience brought up strong emotions for many of the participants, and their candid 
responses provided some insights into how it affected them. DiT1’s admission of his own 
vulnerability extends to a universal recognition of people’s vulnerability that becomes evident when 
undergoing a process that is traumatic. But DiT5 was more optimistic: “I’m just hoping I can stay 
where I am ‘cause I really enjoy what I do. Despite all the things that have happened” (DiT5). 
DiT13 spoke about the process changing him: “I’m a completely different person to the one they 
were talking about, then and there.” He was reflecting on how he was described at his Tribunal 
hearing, as quite a different person from who he was three years previous to that (it took three 
years to bring his matter to a hearing). The consequences meant he could no longer work, but he 
felt he was being judged as the person he was at the time of the complaint, not who he was at the 
hearing, nor who he is now. He reflected on this at length: 
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I was just so acutely distressed after being told I couldn’t work, that I was some sort of 
bad doctor, you know, that just totally floored me, and, um, you know, I just, as I said, I 
was ready to kill myself, I thought oh this is terrible, you know, what’s my life come to? 
I think I could have been treated with a bit more compassion, because the irony was for 
the six months up until that day, I’d been working without any event – even though I 
was quite distressed, you know, and then suddenly they say, “No, you’re unsafe now to 
practise”. Well, what’s happened? What was it yesterday when I did those [procedures 
at hospital]? Why was it okay to work then and now suddenly I can’t? Don’t you think 
you can have an investigation and let me continue to practise? (DiT13). 
He then mused: “The public is well and truly safe from the likes of me at present. You know, he 
said I am not a bad person, I was a sick person and I’m getting better”. At the time of the interview, 
DiT13 had recovered from drug and alcohol addiction. He was able to return to work with 
conditions, but while undertaking rehabilitation, he was stood down. So even though he is now 
sober, he is virtually unable to obtain sufficient employment to make a living, and his future is 
uncertain. 
Other participants, regardless of the outcome of their inquiry, did not come out unscathed either. 
Even DiT10, who had a very minor matter relating to his supervision of a junior resident, realised 
that, having dwelt on it from time to time ever since, it affected him more than he acknowledged at 
the time. For DiT1, it was important for him to have his story heard, as he grappled with conflicting 
thoughts about enjoying his job, yet not being “as confident”, and as the interview drew to a close, 
declaring that he wanted to give up medicine.  DiT9 was happy to say she still enjoyed her job in 
spite of what had happened. 
It could be surmised that as a self-selected cohort of participants, the participants would not have 
volunteered to be interviewed if they had not wanted to speak about it to a stranger because it had 
affected and unsettled them, even in some cases several years after the event. For DiT8, the event 
had taken place some 12 years before the interview, and she was cleared of any wrong-doing, yet 
the event clearly unsettled her still at the time of the interviews. Whatever the outcome, participants 
found that not only had they been affected by a complaint, it had changed them. 
How it changed my practice: thinking defensively 
Some participants felt the experience made them think defensively and be more cautious about 
patients, how they interacted with them and how they treated them. DiT1 noted how his manner 
towards patients changed: “I was a little hesitant, I’ll say, in talking with patients, much more 
formal. I don’t think I was as friendly with the new patients as I would have been, had I not got that 
letter” (DiT1). 
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What came across was that there was a certain caution about some patients and a generalised 
belief that there will always be difficult people they may have to deal with: 
The nice patients are still nice patients. The-not-so-nice patients I’ve been suspicious 
of. So if I don’t get a nice rapport with people now, I’ll walk them out the door without 
asking them if there’s anything else that they’re not happy about (DiT1). 
DiT4 avoided the not-so-nice patients altogether: “I’ve moved out of that pool of very difficult 
patients”. DiT8 took a more pragmatic approach to patients: 
Well, I work on the principle that most people are very reasonable and I heard this 
statistic, that 97% are reasonable and there are 3% turkeys out there and whatever you 
did, there would be some people, they’d complain. So no, it doesn’t affect me with 
patients. In fact, people that have had a problem, um, usually, as long as you take an 
interest and are not seen to be walking away – they often turn out to be very grateful 
and they – and they become almost friends or they become friends because they 
realise it’s not a perfect world but if you try your very best to try and sort them out 
they’re appreciative. What they don’t want is being abandoned or people try to bluff that 
there’s not a problem when there is (DiT8). 
DiT17, who stopped practising to preserve her health after being diagnosed with a chronic medical 
condition attributed to work stress said, “I think you need a bit of a thick skin sometimes, and my 
skin wasn’t thick enough, and I think it was starting to affect my health” (DiT17). DiT16 said: 
I guess I’m less likely to hold my ground now about things like investigations and 
antibiotics. Like if [a patient] is adamant or if a patient’s mind would be put at ease and 
I’m more likely to work with them, even though I disagree with what they want (DiT16). 
DiT16’s inclination was to give in to patients’ demands, against her clinical judgement, and she 
was aware this was not ideal. It can cause problems either way, as DiT15 experienced when she 
was blamed for over-servicing, while DiT16 was blamed for not doing so. 
When a patient of DiT8 was seen to be obtaining a copy of the notes and the discharge summary, 
it made her think “whether he would find something in that that he could complain about”. She 
thought this because she was aware he was not happy with how she had treated him, and was not 
surprised when she later received a complaint. She reflected on how this had changed how she 
recorded her notes, and why: 
I must admit I tend to write my notes these days with the view that the person who you 
write about could always have a look at them, but it does mean sometimes you can’t 
put down really what you’d like to say because the notes really are not for the patient 
 P a g e  | 188 
as such. They’re for other doctors who are going to be picking up the key. So they 
need to know certain things, and if you can’t put them down, it’s not good. When I was 
a little medical student, I just wrote down everything that the patient said to me and 
everything that everybody else said to me … write it down verbatim. I filter a lot more 
now ... 
Flashbacks and feelings of nausea when seeing patients with the same condition as the one who 
complained, fears of another complaint, caution about patients’ motives permeated some DiTs’ 
daily practice since having a complaint. For DiT5, encountering patients with similar symptoms as 
the patient who complained about her triggered defensive thoughts: 
It wasn’t that difficult to go to work, but I'd get a sick feeling if I had to see someone 
with back pain. And back pain is incredibly common and I'd have this, sort of, nausea 
feeling and then I'd, sort of, think what tests do I want to do, stop thinking yes and no, 
all decision making you know, because that was one of the huge complaints that I 
should have done an X-ray, which is actually never a test indicated except if there was 
trauma – so this would, sort of, swirl in my head for weeks afterwards – you’ve got to 
put that out of your head – it's so ridiculous … It's like a seed of doubt. Even though I 
knew that it was silly but I couldn’t stop this, sort of, second guessing. It was like being 
in a whirlpool. It sort of permeated every interaction and I have to break bad news all 
the time, and whether I had done something wrong was just like a cloud, was really 
hard to get out from under (DiT5). 
Just as DiT5 became wary of patients with similar symptoms, DiT8 became similarly fearful: 
Each case you look at, you know, when you’re going through you think, God, could this 
be one? You think no, this doesn’t seem to be and you get to – well, perhaps it’s the 
next one. You know, each case you look at you think, oh no, this might be my – my 
Waterloo, you know. You just wonder (DiT8). 
For DiT4, there were reasons for her fear that arose not just from the interaction with the patient 
that had resulted in a complaint, but it was the continued focus on the alleged deficiencies in her 
care that reinforced and then embedded the fear. Although she said the litany of issues raised in 
the complaint was readily refuted, they were given greater weight by having to respond to each in 
detail. So it is not only the complaint that sowed a seed of doubt, it was the “forensic detail” of each 
component of care, treatment and decision-making required to respond to the complaint that gave 
it significance. Knowing how she responded would affect how the matter would then be dealt with 
in the inquiry, such as how it would be assessed and what would happen next. Even though she 
believed her actions were correct and defendable, there was uncertainty about whether the 
authorities would agree. This deliberative thinking carried over into everyday care of other patients; 
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that decision-making became laboured and she had to again question her own judgement which 
for years she knew had been sound. It appeared like that seed of doubt had grown roots. 
Fearing another complaint, DiT5 found herself spending extra time with difficult patients. For DiT4, 
there was an emotional toll that affected her personal as well as her professional relationships: 
When things start to build up, they have consequences to me in my personal life – I 
might get more irritable about things, more angry about things, more unreasonable with 
other people, personally I mean. I just do more, I just take on more, I do more and then 
after it, that’s when irritation builds up and anger builds up and things like that. 
Probably I was much more – I was more tetchy with staff as well, like I was more what I 
might call exacting (DiT4). 
Complaints can make a positive difference 
The above accounts indicate that participants had reflected on how the experience motivated them 
to think about themselves as doctors. While most related how complaints affected their behaviour 
in negative ways, DiT11 alone felt the complaint made a positive difference. Looking back at the 
complaint, he considered how he could have done things differently to prevent the complaint, 
which was basically about his manner of communication with an older patient. As a result, he had 
improved his consultations, and although he acknowledged that it is not possible to please 
everyone all of the time, “it’s the way you go about not pleasing people that’s important”, and 
having clear documentation. In retrospect, DiT11 felt that the complaint had made him reassess his 
own self: 
My inherent personality is not going to change. I felt that it had been, ah, brought down 
a peg. Oh, I’ve learnt from it. I’ve improved what I do consciously. And I think, you 
know, now it’s, sort of, ingrained into what I do all the time. So I think it’s made me a – 
a better person, um, but also it’s, ah, um – oh, it was bloody stressful for those few 
months [laughter] (DiT11). 
As these reflections show, participant doctors generally recognised that they had changed the way 
they practise since having a complaint. What some did not so easily recognise was that even if 
they had not consciously made practical changes, their attitudes had shifted and this was reflected 
variously in loss of confidence and commitment, and in caution about some or all patients. Loss of 
trust in one’s competence appears to have underscored some doctors’ confidence in themselves, 
and loss of trust in patients appears to have explained some doctors’ caution. 
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Changes in attitude to profession and career 
Weighing it up: what is reasonable? 
Earlier it was shown that some participants felt that being a doctor put them in a position of not 
being seen as “normal” and not being able to lead a “normal” life, that they are held to a standard 
above that of the general population. They also expressed the view that there are high 
expectations of them that are sometimes not achievable, and there is little tolerance for perceived 
error. The DITs expressed fears of not being “good” doctors, but they ponder if they can be “good 
enough”. Looking back over the experience, some reflected on what is reasonable, both for the 
profession at large, and for them as individuals. The experience of a complaint left a profound 
impression on DiT16 as a junior doctor, saying “The first thing you get pretty upset or a bit angry 
about what people say about you, but then you have to address exactly what it is and realise that 
just because you think what you’ve said or what you’ve done is okay, doesn’t mean that other 
people think it’s okay”. 
Asked if she had actually absorbed the complainant’s dissatisfaction with her being less than 
perfect, DiT4 said: 
Hopefully I learn from these things but there’s something about me which caused this. 
Because certain things about me would provoke reactions in other people and there 
are things about all of us which if I look at myself and my colleagues, we’re all quite 
different in personality and all those sorts of things. The system deals with the person 
who makes sporadic errors and in a way systems demonise people too as well, 
because it’s sort of saying this is a shocking thing that they’ve done but their whole 
life’s not shocking. But at least at the time, it must feel to them like that’s the case. 
DiT4 and DiT16 recognised that even if they think they are doing a good job, not everyone will 
agree. Having said that, she acknowledged that if she could upset one person, she may upset 
others. However, because a doctor had done one “shocking” thing did not mean it applied to their 
whole life. 
Will it ever be the same? 
As has been shown, for many participants, life and practice will never be the same after a 
complaint, and for a few the change was significant. DiT3 is no longer a doctor as he resigned, 
DiT1 wants to resign, DiT2 cannot face being a doctor again so has taken up a different profession, 
DiT13 is virtually unemployed and DiT17 retired early due to stress-related ill-health. Unfortunately, 
as noted in Chapter Five, one doctor who wished to be interviewed suicided before this could be 
arranged. Others remain in practice and some of them remain profoundly disturbed by their 
complaints experience, while others see it as one of those experiences that they would rather not 
have had, but did. 
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After a court hearing, DiT5 wondered if life would ever return to normal: 
I kind of expected I’d walk out and the world would suddenly be right again, but it’s still 
not. I mean, I still have to write every time I apply for a job, have you ever had 
restrictions on your practice? Yes. Have you ever been investigated by AHPRA? Yes. 
So it’s never going to go away, and it still feels like I have to apply for seven jobs before 
I get one. 
DiT14 said “the experience still left a little bit of its toll. But I think all these things do over a lifetime 
don’t they; it’s one of life’s experiences. Just caution, plus, plus, plus”. Thinking about his views on 
medicine, he said: 
Ah, a bit more cynical but in the end, I just decided that you could only be true to your 
own standards and – and in the end there’s – have you seen that great poem called 
The Man in Mirror? No. There’s one, ah, it’s called The Man in the Mirror and he’s the 
one you’ve got to please. You know, because he’s with you to the end and you – you 
can fool everyone else but you can’t – you can’t fool that guy. So that’s, um, you know, 
what I’ve sort of – the philosophy I try to work – work through with this, you know, and 
you can only do your best in good faith. So it’s made me cynical about these sort of 
investigations, these procedures. It’s not really affected my practice in a sense because 
you can’t practise looking over your shoulder the whole time, otherwise you would 
never get anything done (DiT14). 
DiT1 was being partly fatalistic, partly pragmatic that it was inevitable there would be more 
complaints: “Even a small one makes you feel bad because you always think the worst”. While 
liking his work, he intends to resign from medicine as soon as he is able. 
Being realistic about the potential for further complaints, DiT11 reflected: 
I don’t think it will stop me from doing what I do. But I think if it happens again and 
again, you have to think either I’m not dealing with it properly or there’s something 
going on. Um, yeah, I don’t think that specifically will make me stop working. Because it 
was right at the start of my career, it’s – you, sort of, roll with it. If there was notification 
that something happened really late in the career you might just think, well, you know, 
stuff it, why put up with the stress, you know, whereas at the start you are a bit more 
self-deprecating, I think (DiT11). 
DiT4 thinks age gives one perspective on the implications of complaints and errors on doctors: 
I think the more you get of these things the more at my age you normally feel look, do I 
really want to do this? Do I really want to put myself through these risks and that’s one 
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thing I’ve noticed as I’ve got older, I think if I made some error at the end of my career 
which put a blight on it, it would be something which would be pretty well impossible to 
get over. I mean a complaint which went really seriously, and all complaints have got 
some truth in them. I do think that, you know, it’s not even if you don’t agree with it, if 
you think it’s unfair or whatever, and it would be really difficult to get over that. I guess 
it’d be hard to get over it any time if you had some legal case, a high profile case, all 
over the news (DiT4). 
Reflecting back on a bewildering experience with a complaint, DiT5 spoke about why it took her a 
long time to arrange the interview (it was put off a few times over a period of nine months), saying 
she thought she had put away her feelings about the matter into a “little box” and was now ready to 
talk about it. Although the patient was not known to her prior to the incident, she had felt she and 
her staff had gone to extra lengths for her as they had made a devastating diagnosis and they felt 
distressed for her. The case therefore stood as exceptional, and when there was a complaint, it 
was very distressing. She thought she had recovered sufficiently to talk about it, but surprised 
herself in the interview that the raw emotion quickly returned to the surface, out of “its little box”, so 
she wondered if she would ever be able to put it away, back into that box: 
I did actually think it was in its box until this morning and I burst out crying again. It is 
funny because I thought actually when I replied to you the first time, um, well, I think 
actually your letter said that, you know, that this can reawaken things and I thought, no, 
no, I’ve pretty much [laugh] got that sorted now [laugh]. I think it's your consent forms 
said that, I think, I remember reading somethingin the long thingy – in the information. 
Yeah. I remember reading that and thinking no, no, no, I’ve got that one pretty done 
and dusted now [laugh]. 
But it was not “dusted”: 
It is funny because, um, I have, ah, one of my colleagues who works at (regional city), I 
mean, she was so invested in the process, when the Medical Board letter came she 
sent me a bunch of flowers which had a card that said, “Don’t let the bastards get you 
down.” [Laugh]. And she often says, “Oh, you know, I had to do something today. All I 
could think about was your letter” [laughter]. But I think she was more damaged than I 
was in the end, it was, like, God, you have to let that go, it wasn’t even your complaint 
[laugh]. 
Ridiculously since that day I – and I actually received many letters of thank you and I 
have never saved any of them and since that day I now actually save letters of thank 
you to, sort of, say, you know, you’re not a bad person [laugh], you have that little 
stack. I mean, it – it really upsets me to even talk about it [cries]. 
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Asked if this helped her put it into perspective, she said: “It was very nice. I kept the card on the 
noticeboard for about a year and a half” (DiT5). 
Still young but not able to work, DiT13 became philosophical about his “long journey” as a doctor: 
You know, I’ve had some good times and I’ve had some bad times, but, you know, 
there’s more to life than work. So, and but more importantly hopefully I can help others 
recover from their illness. But in some ways, it is the best thing that’s sort of happened 
to me, because now I’m living, you know, living a life of sobriety and I tell you what, 
that’s fantastic. To get up every morning and I don’t feel guilty about what I’ve done the 
night before. 
Summary 
A sense of vulnerability is evident in some of these accounts as they relate how the experience of 
a complaint changed the way they thought about how they practised, their patients and their future. 
Many made changes that they knew were not in their patients’ best interests, or at least, they 
contemplated such changes. Caution about patients, revived fear when attending a patient with a 
similar presentation as the complainant, cautiousness when making decisions about ordering tests, 
or about diagnosis, treatment and care. Some make more meticulous notes or are more cautious 
in what they actually record, others are now more conscious of how they communicate. Such 
actions are often positive, for the good of patients, as well as being more protective of the doctor. 
But when defensiveness and fear get in the way of sound clinical judgement, it can have other 
costs. 
The recovering addict DiT13 had seen four of his fellow addict doctors in rehab take their own 
lives, and he is the one remaining of his cohort. He knows how close he came to the same end, but 
while there’s life, there’s hope as he contemplated a life that can only improve from now on. But 
the process of managing his addiction by the authority has left him scarred and bewildered: while 
being grateful for having been a catalyst for recovery, the process left him without income, without 
work, and with a tarnished reputation. His words: “But my journey is my journey, and I always 
wonder, you know, sliding doors moment, what might have happened that night if I hadn’t gone 
out95, but, um, you know, things happen and you can’t change the past and you’ve just got to deal 
with it”. 
DiT5 now keeps all the complimentary letters, cards and notes from satisfied patients, which she 
would have once appreciated and then discarded, in a special box that she opens when she has 
doubts about herself. Her tears flowed when speaking of such memories, and surprised her as she 
thought she was over that now. DiT15 wept throughout the interview, as her emotions caught her 
during recollections of what the process was like for her, and DiT4 had to pause as she recalled 
                                                          
95 He had gone out that night and became embroiled in a police matter, which led to an AHPRA notification. 
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dealing with a letter from the authority requiring a response to a complaint within a few days, at the 
same time as her father passed away. DiT14’s tears welled up as he recounted how he had called 
his wife during a break in court proceedings, to share with her the horror of being accused of fraud, 
which if found to have been proven, would have spelled the end of his career. But not only that, 
such an accusation was so contrary to his personal values, it was unthinkable. 
Fear lasts a long time. The incidents recounted by some of these doctors happened many years 
ago (for DiT8 12 years, though most were in the 3-6 year range). What stood out was that 
unresolved emotion from that time remains under the surface ready to bubble up during the recall 
of the event. For some, the fear of a repeat of such an event was intolerable, sufficient to give 
thought to retiring early, or even quitting. 
The future 
How a doctor reconciled their situation affected how they saw their future, as above. DiT3’s future 
had begun, when he announced before the interview that he had quit medicine, just after the final 
report came that found him not guilty. He had been considering this for some time. When asked 
how it felt, he said: 
I can go and be really mad and get away and not have to worry. And it’s actually – it 
really is – it’s interesting. I’m in the process, I’m still going through the process you 
know, and it’ll probably take a year before I can settle down to that new identity. But it’s 
– I’m much happier – much more relaxed, energised. All of those sorts of things (DiT3). 
While he was not in a position financially to give up medicine, and although he enjoyed his work, 
DiT1 said medicine was no longer the same, he had lost the joy. “You know, I really want to give 
up medicine and do something else.” DiT8 was profoundly affected by what happened to her friend 
and colleague, whom she thought had been treated grossly unfairly by the regulator: “I’m still 
happy to be in medicine but I do think of my friend who just threw in her towel and said enough’s 
enough.  She went and became a potter.” DiT17 presented as a doctor who felt quite comfortable 
that she had not been judged as “bad”, nor that the complaint had any substance to it. But she said 
the complaint spoke of her as a person she did not recognise, and nor did anyone else (her peers). 
So she retired. She said how much she missed her work, feeling restless and having a good brain 
that she wasn’t using enough. “It’s still hard to get used to. It’s still hard, because I’m still young” 
(DiT17). 
At the time of the interview, DiT2 was contemplating giving up her medical registration, but could 
not quite resolve herself to not ever doing clinical work again. She reflected on the disjuncture of 
the complaint: 
This has literally stopped me in my tracks, I’m no longer practising, I’m effectively 
unemployed and I don’t know what to do with myself. It still feels slightly dangerous. 
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So, you know, every time I walk through the front doors of a hospital, anything I can do 
at any point in the future, could turn back into this process again. I was going to drop 
my medical registration ’cause I didn’t want to have to do this again. Honestly, if they 
had designed something as psychological torture, it would look like what I’ve been 
through. I have to find the reality for myself as to how I’d define myself as a 
professional success and whether clinical work is in there or not. The initial thought 
was, oh, well, they’ll investigate it, I’ll get an answer as to whether I can practise or not, 
and then I’ll move on, but that – none of that had happened, so I had to figure out what 
I was – who I was and what I was doing (DiT2). 
So she took up teaching as she had to be good at something. 
Do I really want to do this? pondered DiT4, the doctor who was so committed to medicine as a 
“vocation”, but for whom as a school-leaver could have taken up a profession in music. Now she 
spoke of returning to her music, reducing her hours in practice and performing once again. 
Looking at how a complaint may have affected a doctor’s future, it could be said that as the 
interviews took place a few years, or at least several months, after the complaint was finalised, the 
future had already begun to unfold. As a moment in time in the continuity of a doctor’s life, it is 
difficult to predict what may actually happen to a career trajectory, but the interview was an 
opportunity to explore the participants’ thoughts following the event and how it had already shifted 
the lifetime trajectory they had anticipated before the event. During this time period, participants 
had indeed moved on with their lives, having adapted to their altered sense of self, albeit not 
necessarily accepting it. In such cases, one can only surmise that they will continue to function, 
they will continue to practise, and as DiT2 said after her first tentative steps back into medicine 
following the traumatic experience of an unanticipated death and subsequent standing down from 
practice, “I did two weeks and that was okay and no one died, and that was gratifying”: the 
catastrophe that she thought may happen because it had happened before, did not. But it changed 
her all the same. 
There is no doubt that some doctors’ lives were significantly changed, from those who resigned 
(DiT3), retired (DiT17), felt forced out (DiT2), or were on the edge of employability (DiT13 and 
DiT7). Others doubted they could go through this again (DiT5), or whether continuing in medicine 
was really what they wanted (DiT2), though DiT5 and DiT8 still loved their jobs, in spite of all that 
has happened. 
Conclusion 
Returning to the reasons the participants went into medicine, it was not to be the doctor that this 
chapter reveals. Even one such as DiT11 who “got the marks” and was known as a “whiz kid” by 
his referring GPs, had a strong commitment to excellence in his practice, and took the complaints 
 P a g e  | 196 
experience as a call to reflect on how to improve his practice and his communication with patients. 
DiT2 was to be a “good doctor, a caring doctor” and could never have foreseen that later in her 
career, she found that being a good doctor was not good enough. Others such as DiT6 never 
believed a complaint would be made against him, until it happened. 
This snapshot is not sufficient to conclude that complaints destroy doctors’ lives or that they have 
been so catastrophic as to permanently damage them; however, these doctors had a reason for 
telling their story on this occasion and they were all variously affected, some in positive ways, 
others in more negative ways. But it cannot be presumed that all doctors would react in the same 
way. In the next section, the testimony of industry informants provides useful insights into how the 
complaints process affects doctors, and why this may be so. 
  
 P a g e  | 197 
Section Two: Industry Informants 
Introduction 
Seven industry informants (IEs) who provide professional support to doctors in various capacities 
in the complaints process were invited to participate in the study. These included private 
psychiatrists and medico-legal advisers in medical indemnity insurance companies. The purpose 
was to obtain their perceptions of what doctors experience, their insights into why this was so, and 
their perspectives about the complaints process. This is positioned as a counterpoint to the DiT 
narratives. Of the seven invited, only five proceeded to interview: one did not respond to two 
follow-up communications; the other became unavailable. 
The role of IEs 1 and 2, as non-practising general practitioners, is in medical indemnity insurance 
handling claims and complaints. An important part of their role includes advocacy and advising the 
company on medical matters, but an essential function each has adopted is a more pastoral role in 
supporting doctors through the complaints process. This may involve being attuned to doctors’ 
emotional states while they are assisting with medico-legal matters, or being available to advise 
when a claims manager or solicitor senses that a client member is in need of emotional or 
psychological support. Their roles mean being alert to potential or actual problems, and taking 
appropriate action if necessary. The latter may be offering the chance to talk, giving advice about 
seeking professional help, or actually intervening if a doctor is at risk, such as referring them to a 
psychiatrist. In rare instances, a mental health team may be asked to attend a doctor at serious 
risk of self-harm. 
The role of IEs 3, 4 and 5 is as psychiatrists, whose patients include doctors who are suffering 
mental distress or illness. Some of the latter will have been referred to them by the Medical Council 
and is a condition of their continuing registration. Others are voluntary patients who have either 
initiated treatment themselves or professional, clinical or personal associates have recommended 
it. The goal of these relationships is therapeutic. A third source of doctor-patients are those 
referred for forensic psychiatric assessment for court or Tribunal matters, with the purpose being to 
assess psychiatric disturbance, other related conditions or drug and alcohol dependence that may 
be affecting capacity to practise or that is believed to have been associated with a competency, 
conduct or criminal issue. These doctors will often be called to give expert evidence in matters 
before the court or disciplinary proceedings. 
It is on the basis of these roles that these IEs were invited to participate, and from their 
perspectives that they provided the following observations and insights. 
The interviews 
Participants were invited to nominate their preferred time and location for the interview. This was 
usually in their workplace: private practice rooms, in a hospital or clinic, and in the offices of 
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medico-legal advisers and solicitors. One participant was interviewed by telephone as the distance 
was prohibitive. A full guide to the interview questions is provided in Appendix 7. Box Six contains 
a summary of the key topics covered. 
Box Six: Guide to interview questions with IEs 
Introductory questions 
Role as a doctor providing support to doctors, and in what context support is provided 
Experience of complaints 
Comments on how complaints impact on doctors’ health and wellbeing, and why 
Observed changes in doctors: practice, emotions, behaviour 
Obtaining support 
Why many doctors do not tell others or ask for support 
The complaints process 
Impact of the complaints process on doctors 
Perspectives and reflections  
 
Analysis 
Interviews were prolonged and at times went “off topic”, given that interviewer and interviewee had 
common history in the industry, anecdotes and topics not directly relevant arose during the 
conversations. These peripheral topics are not included in the analysis, which is confined to the 
key categories identified from the testimony of the DiTs. The exception was that experts were 
neither asked nor offered insights into how the experience changed doctors. Other insights 
pertinent to the core objective to understand doctors’ experience of complaints are also included. 
To reiterate, the key concepts that are included here are: 
 Part 1 The complaint experience 
 Part 2 The law in action 
 Part 3 Getting through it: telling others 
 Part 4 Moral legitimacy: the good doctor 
Analysis for this group relied on these four concepts, so presenting the data involves identifying 
text from the transcripts which “fits” these topics, and where there are anomalies, these are 
addressed as this process proceeds. 
Motivation to participate 
IEs were not specifically asked why they wished to participate; each gave their time willingly and 
generously, so it was clear they wished to contribute. Each was expansive on how their role 
contributed to the support of doctors, and in some cases, how their role contributed to advocacy for 
greater recognition of the impact of medico-legal processes and procedures on doctors’ wellbeing 
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and health. IE3, a psychiatrist, spoke of earlier days of the investigations process when it could 
take four or more years to finalise a matter: 
I became aware more and more of the impact that it had on doctors. And I saw a 
number of doctors who were sent to me for treatment because they were depressed, 
they were distressed, their alcohol problem had exacerbated, their relationships were in 
trouble, they were suffering the effects of being involved in what, in those days, was a 
far more prolonged process of investigation and prosecution (IE3). 
As professionals who have worked with DiTs, the IEs were motivated to share the benefits of their 
experience and expertise, with the view that by sharing their insight into the reasons for doctors’ 
distress, they may indirectly influence how the regulators may ameliorate the adverse impacts. 
  
 P a g e  | 200 
Part One: The Complaint Experience 
IE3 viewed the event for doctors as “an existential crisis”, “traumatising”, “overwhelming”, and 
“distressing”. He stated that “It’s just all covered by this big, black event, and over time it never 
goes away so you’ll never be the same”. IE2 stated that “Some of them get really angry” and that 
DiTs experience a great deal of fear: “they are actually at a fundamental level worried that they’re 
going to lose their house, or their life savings or whatever. The other big one is the loss of face and 
the publicity”. IE2 explained that in spite of being covered by their medical indemnity insurance, 
potential loss still causes anxiety. She said that doctors are also fearful about the peer review 
process and that any criticism will reflect badly on them96. Speaking of how they react to a 
performance assessment97, IE2 said: “So how do they take it? Badly. Do they get the shits? Yes. 
Do they get depressed? Yes, they are depressed, they are miserable”. 
IEs1, 2 and 4 stated that doctors fear having conditions placed on their registration, and that this 
will be known to the public since conditions are listed on the medical register which is available on 
the AHPRA website. Loss of confidence was a major concern, for example: “Doctors need to have 
confidence in their own decision-making skills to get through the day-to-day work” (IE2). She said 
when a matter is prolonged, this loss of confidence, and the “threat to their core self” is especially 
significant: “You need confidence in your decision-making and you need to be able to trust the 
doctor/patient relationship”. She felt when DiTs encountered a major complaint, “that trust is 
eroded for a period of time – and how long depends on the nature of the complaint and the doctor’s 
own persona, their ability to see it for – you know, to get a perspective on it and their ability to 
compartmentalise” (IE2). 
IE4, a psychiatrist, said that some doctors get very distressed, and that he can only treat them 
symptomatically while they perceive themselves to be under attack. He considered that those who 
have been through the process end up with a level of post-traumatic stress disorder, characterised 
by intrusive worrying that it is going to happen again, that they become hyper-vigilant with panic 
attacks, sleeplessness “because they fear the environment is dangerous”. IE3 commented on the 
experiences he had witnessed in those who seek treatment from him as a consultant psychiatrist: 
I think individuals respond very differently. I mean, some people go down the pathway 
of feeling shamed and becoming depressed and withdrawn, embarrassed and unable 
to face people in their community or beyond. They don’t tell their wives, they don’t tell 
their husbands, they don’t tell their children; it’s based on shame and with that 
becomes self-incrimination and embarrassment, and it can be to a profound extent. 
                                                          
96 The peer review process, as described in Chapter Three, can play a pivotal part in the determination of what action 
if any will follow in an inquiry into a complaint: serious criticism may lead to an adverse finding against the doctor. 
97 A performance assessment is a non-disciplinary pathway involving an assessment of a doctor’s practice in situ by a 
group of peers appointed by the Medical Board. A report sets out issues of concern that need to be addressed by the 
doctor within a given timeframe. Failure to meet conditions may mean that they will be referred for disciplinary 
action. 
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Other doctors become quite belligerent and they don’t look at what the issue is, 
because they don’t know what its implications might be. They don’t have a sense of 
balance or appreciation of what might happen. So they see themselves under extreme 
attack when they may not be, and the response is an aggressive belligerent one. The 
notification (of a complaint) can be a tipping point for them (IE3). 
While experts observe various responses to the complaints experience, there are some common 
threads that accord with other findings. Shame, embarrassment and fear are expressed as anger, 
distress, sleeplessness or becoming withdrawn, and such responses can overwhelm doctors’ 
capacity to deal with the complaint. They are reasons not to tell others or to face their community. 
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Part Two: The Law in Action 
Advisers are integrally involved in the process as they guide doctors through their defence, and 
they describe how doctors respond. IE1 stated: 
So sometimes they will quite – almost consciously – sabotage the whole process, and 
in that way they won’t meet deadlines, they won’t answer your phone calls; they turn up 
to some hearing and be surly and difficult, whereas if you could just get over where 
they were at, they could present in a different way. I think it’s part of their distress about 
the process and maybe it is their shame that they can’t face what’s going on and they 
can’t interpret it, they can’t make sense of it, they’re confused – they’re a bit like a 
rabbit in a headlight, so, they will resist the journey, if you will, unless you can make it 
clear and understand where they’re coming from, and acknowledge it. 
IE3 described a client/patient who was facing a Tribunal hearing: 
And I have a case of a doctor I’m treating at the moment who is filled with terror – he 
really is out of his depth in this environment and the amount of fear and the amount of 
anxiety and the effect of this investigation upon him because of personal vulnerabilities 
that he carries, it’s really been awful to witness, and a lot of time I’ve spent with him 
trying to get him to understand the process that he’s involved in, and put it into some 
sort of reasonable perspective. I mean, it’s almost like a public execution was going to 
follow and he was going to be in the forefront of every publication, the whole world 
would be looking at him, he would be disgraced, humiliated, all of his standing as a 
good practitioner. Clearly what he did was wrong, he had no problem with that. But he 
still was terrified. He is terrified about the process, and if that had been managed along 
the way, I’m sure he will never offend again. I’m sure of it, and I’m sure his skills are 
pretty adequate. So the public protection issues are almost non-existent. 
The sense of powerlessness and bewilderment with the process is expressed in these accounts of 
how doctors progress through the process. 
An adviser’s role is to advise and assist with defence, but they find they cannot do so effectively if 
emotions are getting in the way, so their role is also to recognise distress and handle it. As they are 
not the treating doctor, there are limits to this role. But being experienced in their primary role, they 
are “following that narrative and you can pick the clues” (IE1). They may then arrange appropriate 
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referrals for psychiatric care if especially distressed, or to one of the specialist doctors’ health 
services available, such as the Doctors Health Advisory Service98. 
The perception of unfairness 
DiTs’ accounts presented a picture of aspects of the process that left an impression of unfairness. 
The IEs have a broader perspective as they have all worked within the system for many years in 
various capacities. But there were some similarities. IE4 said: 
The system is stacked against us. There are multiple levels of – that are grossly 
excessive, expensive, overkill level of scrutiny and legalistic bodies there to, you know, 
punish doctors. Look at New South Wales: AHPRA, Health Care Complaints 
Commission, the Medical Board’s now called Medical Council of Australia. Then you’ve 
got other bodies. You know, there was recent instance of psychiatrists where the Police 
were involved. About – about boundary violations, alleged. You know? There’s these 
consumer type groups: the Mental Health Commission. There’s no other word for it. It 
is clearly anti-doctor. 
IE4’s perspective is at odds with IE3’s, who did not at any time express a view that the system is 
anti-doctor, and in fact, he is highly supportive of the system. This, however, did not detract from 
his perspective that doctors fear the process and are profoundly affected by it. There was a view 
that lawyers misunderstand that doctors are not like them, that the process is adversarial, which is 
counter to the culture of medicine. As IE4 stated: 
If someone’s in the middle of litigation, you can only treat them symptomatically. You 
can’t expect recovery while they’re under attack. Or they’re perceiving themselves to 
be under attack, or they are under attack, you know? Litigious processes are 
adversarial. And it’s counter culture to doctors. Doctors feel like their work and their 
patients and they are under attack by the legal system, by an adversarial process, 
which is trying to work things out in a non-medical arena. 
A complaint may raise other issues 
The issue that triggered a complaint may not have been proven, but in the course of an 
investigation, other issues may have been identified and attract a peer’s criticism, which will have a 
significant bearing on how the matter progresses. Participant DiTs perceived this as unfair as they 
do not know what they are dealing with, and this adds to the sense of the unknown. IE3 comments 
on this phenomenon: 
                                                          
98 This is a panel of on-call doctors who take phone calls from doctors for advice on a range of personal, professional, 
financial and emotional problems, or doctors are advised to see their own GP. This is part of a national network under 
Australasian Doctors Health Network that also includes New Zealand. 
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I mean I think that, you know, the thing that might have triggered the investigation is the 
substantive issue. But then to hang off a whole lot of other criticisms because of other 
things that come to mind, but that is a questionable outcome. You do read some of 
those peer review reports where it’s a case of not only do you do that badly but you did 
this, this, and this and then says “I’m very critical or severely critical”, they use those 
magic words that set the level of misdeed; so the commission is in the position that 
they are compelled to read those words in particular and then bring that into the 
hearing, where in their own right, they would never have reached that threshold. I think 
that’s a failing or I would criticise in some of the peer review reports where there is this 
idealised view of what safe practice is. It’s not about total and utter best practice, it’s 
about the issue of public protection and that gets lost. And it then triggers a whole 
series of other criticisms and I’m quite sympathetic to the doctors in that case. You 
know, there is an element of unfairness in that. 
IE3 has a long history of treating doctor/patients, of providing expert opinion in forensic and 
disciplinary matters and of advising in Medical Board conduct and impairment matters. In the 
above quote, he speaks of the inherent unfairness when peer opinion is highly critical of a doctor 
for failing to meet a standard of performance or conduct that is well above the accepted standard. 
The effect is that the doctor so affected will be judged unfairly, and what follows will be a much 
harsher path. 
The other theme that emerges is about cultural dissonance. This is about how the culture and 
language of Law and Medicine are so different, to the point of clashing in an adversarial context. 
While IE3 sees the law as a “game” to those who practise it, the values which characterise 
medicine are antithetical to this. 
There is also a perceived difference in the impact of a claim compared with a complaint. When 
considering if the type of matter makes a difference to doctors, IE1 said that: 
I find my doctors don’t get particularly upset about claims, not in the way they will about 
a complaint, and it’s because a complaint goes to who they are, you know, in a way 
that a claim doesn’t, and maybe it’s because a claim is dressed up in a whole lot of 
legal mumbo-jumbo, so it doesn’t make a lot of sense to you, but, you know, a 
complaint is a very personal thing; I don’t like who you are, I don’t like what you did – it 
really does cut to the core of people. 
Why complaints upset doctors 
Many of the aspects of the complaints process expressed by DiTs in Section One are amplified by 
the expert informants. As a psychiatrist, IE4 has worked with many doctors who have had 
complaints, and also with the Medical Council. His view is that most doctors are caring, reasonable 
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and do a good job. It is a “blow” to them to think they have done harm, when their “key value” is not 
to do so. Then the doctor is faced with a “factory conveyor belt process”, which is “skewed” against 
them (IE4). 
He then described the lengthy process where a doctor spends a considerable amount of time 
poring over the file, thinking about it, writing down responses and having the MII look at it, tweak it. 
The doctor is left feeling scrutinised and vulnerable, not knowing what will happen, whether they 
will be judged harshly. He believes that even the Medical Council is acclimatised to that adversarial 
lens. The doctors are scrutinising the patient file, which “is quite sacred”, with sensitive information, 
which is “a level of intrusion and kind of defiling of the therapeutic relationship. So there’s a very 
ugly sense of defilement as part of the experience” (IE4). 
You know that the whole design of it is, uh, let’s find something wrong. What have they 
done wrong? They don’t look at what’s been done right. But there is this sense that 
you’re having to defend yourself. There is a sense that yes, you’re the accused. 
If they’re going through it and ending up with PTSD or being anxious and depressed, 
then it’s working against the community. Because then you’ve got more and more 
defensive doctors. 
You can’t be engaged and defensive simultaneously. You can’t. You’re one or the 
other. So when I’m defensive and the defensive thoughts come in, I’m not engaged 
with that patient. I’m distracted. But I think it is excessive, in the current way of doing 
things. And if someone has been through the system, I’ll tell you now, that it will 
recalibrate them not in the direction you want (IE4). 
While the above encapsulates much of what the DITs said, it adds another dimension. First, this IE 
speaks of the breach of trust between patient and doctor that he believes occurs when a medical 
file is handed over for the scrutiny of others, which he declares to be like a “defilement” of that trust 
and an intrusion into the relationship. He also raises the spectre of post-traumatic stress disorder 
syndrome which may explain the defensiveness and ongoing anxiety that many doctors admitted 
to in their interviews. This, he believes, “recalibrates” them in a counter-productive way, one that 
does not serve the public interest. Could it be done differently, he asks? We will return to this 
consideration shortly. 
What could have been different 
The IEs saw the issue from a more global and less individual perspective, as would be expected. 
When asked if they had any insights into how it could be different, IE1 considered that a “proper” 
regulatory process is necessary and that can identify the group of unsafe doctors and deal with 
them; what is also needed is a process that enables a doctor to resolve a complainant’s concerns. 
 P a g e  | 206 
It is difficult to have both in the one system, and how it is phrased in terms of statutory definitions of 
conduct is “not how a complainant thinks” so is unlikely to meet their needs. 
What IE1 is referring to is that to a complainant, a complaint needs to be acknowledged and 
resolved. In other words, the purpose of the system is not clear to those who provide the input (the 
complainant), nor the recipient (the doctor). 
A common view expressed is that there should be a more refined process that is more discerning 
about what matters are minor and what are serious; what will resolve a complaint, and being clear 
about how the doctor should respond accordingly. IE1 considered there should be a better way of 
separating the minor matters from the serious, that the process treats them all much the same. It 
has the effect that those doctors who are good, dedicated doctors have a stain on their 
professional career, and also does little to resolve the concerns of the complainant. DiT4 stated: 
While public protection is a recognised necessity, we do need to have mechanisms to 
ensure that patients are well treated. I’m just not convinced that an adversarial one is 
necessary. First, maybe we can find some hybrid, where doctors don’t feel like it’s 
stacked against them, feeling like the system is actually equally interested in both 
sides. I think that it’s overkill at the moment. Number two, how do you develop a culture 
where the doctor is not presumed to be a bad guy, just because someone’s 
complained about them. If they are, we need to find out. But to presume that is 
destructive; it makes doctors defensive. You can’t practise well if you’re defensive. 
You’re asking does it improve on patients? If I’m lost in defensive thoughts and worries, 
I’m not with a patient. I’m worrying about my own arse. That’s not what you want when 
you go to the doctor. 
I think the system needs to trust that most doctors are reasonable. That should be their 
assumption, and the presumption of fairness. Doctors need to feel that it’s not stacked 
against them. If there are warning bells to be looked at, fair enough. But I think that that 
would help doctors feel less defensive. I think that the way that the system interacts 
with doctors should be considered, to be more sensitive, more caring (IE4). 
Adding to this, IE1 thinks that doctors should not feel so rushed and stressed and that there is not 
time to be polite, to sit with patients and be respectful – a health care system that has a kinder, 
gentler way of doing things, with the inference that it may lead to less dissatisfied patients, fewer 
complaints, and less distressed doctors. 
Summary 
The complaints process has evolved over time to more effectively protect the public against the 
risks inherent in a health care system that allows health professionals to practise below standard, 
to perform poorly and demonstrate unacceptable conduct, and to deal with complaints by those 
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dissatisfied with or harmed by their care. The findings of this study so far have found that doctors’ 
experience of the process has left many of them metaphorically battered and bruised, and certainly 
not experiencing the system as caring and sensitive, nor even acknowledging that the process is 
stressful. 
Participants have offered some thoughts on how it could be different. The changes considered do 
not suggest radical change, but a greater sensitivity to how the messages conveyed by 
bureaucratic, brief correspondence, by lack of personal contact, by the anonymity of those who are 
making decisions about their future, strongly suggest to the respondents of these messages that 
they have a case to answer, that they are perceived as guilty. While these perceptions are open to 
challenge, because the system is designed around the principles of procedural fairness, the 
legalistic tone does not marry well with the values inherent in care for others that the medical 
profession stands on. Dealing with this dissonance, and its emotional toll, is the subject of the next 
Part of this chapter: Getting through it, telling others. 
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Part Three: Getting Through It, Telling Others 
Knowing that most doctors will be disturbed by receiving a complaint, knowing that most people in 
a stressful situation turn to others for support, but also knowing that many doctors who do not do 
so may be at risk, advisers are alert to how their client is faring. IE1, as a medical adviser in an MII, 
generally asks a doctor “How are you feeling about this?” followed by the critical question “Who 
else have you told about it?” She explained: 
If the doctor has told no one, then I will immediately know this is someone who’s going 
to find this a very difficult process to manage, and I think that comes from that sense of 
absolute shame, that they can’t tell anyone. I mean, I’ve had people who have been, 
and what seem to have been, incredibly happy relationships for 30 years, who share 
everything, who cannot tell their spouses and/or their families - - - what’s happening to 
them, and that leaves them incredibly – you know, that issue of building that resilience 
around you is gone because you’re missing that whole part of it. So one question I will 
always ask is who else have you told, apart from me? 
She also asks “what are you most worried about?”: 
It’s difficult for a doctor who generally is in control of a lot of things, not everything - - - 
and so you’re putting them in that really vulnerable position. So in terms of trying to 
manage them and enabling them to be able to manage that process is giving them 
control. So you can say to them, well, you can’t control, you know, what the outcome 
will be, when you’re going to be asked to provide a response, but you can control and 
decide who you want to share this with, who you want to choose to have as your 
support person, who you’re going to have – in some ways I describe it as a journey 
with them. They’re not going to manage it on their own (IE1). 
IE2 puts it this way: speaking of doctors in the performance “merry-go-round”, if a doctor is 
depressed, “we get them involved with all the people that can support people, crank up the rest of 
their support network and try and get them out of there as quickly as possible”. 
It is usual also for advisers to remind doctors to see their GPs, to inform them what has happened, 
and that they are under stress. This is common advice for all doctors: the doctors’ health services, 
Beyondblue, who advise doctors to have their own GP and to see them regularly. As a psychiatrist, 
IE3 explains: 
… some people go down the pathway of feeling shamed and becoming depressed and 
withdrawn and embarrassed and unable to sort of face people in their community or 
beyond. They don’t tell their wives, they don’t tell their husbands, they don’t tell their 
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children. It’s based on shame and with that becomes self-incrimination and 
embarrassment, and it can be to a profound extent. 
Other doctors become quite belligerent and they don’t look at what the issue is, 
because they don’t know what its implications might be. They don’t have a sense of 
balance to it or anticipation of what might happen. So they see themselves under 
extreme attack when they may not be and the response is an aggressive belligerent 
one. 
It’s because they feel confronted. And they add fear to it because they don’t 
understand what might happen. And then you get this response which is to attack the 
complainant and to attack the investigation body and to sound off, and it’s completely 
out of proportion and those doctors are often acting out of fear, they’ve never been 
confronted in this way before, they had no method for problem solving – you know, you 
see these behaviour patterns. A lot of it is fairly indicative of the individual. 
Other doctors are intrinsically bad in the sense that they’ve been serious offenders for 
a long time and it’s now come to light and they are very defensive and they are very 
abrupt and their response is to attack the informant and the institution. 
It’s very situational and personality dependent. I mean, some of the most difficult 
people to deal with in the medical board, medical council setting are very accomplished 
doctors. Doctors who have fairly impressive careers and are accomplished people in 
their field, um, but who have things like an addiction and the idea of being identified as 
susceptible to an addictive illness, it’s so hard to incorporate that. They go to the most 
extraordinary lengths and they are the most difficult people to get into proper treatment 
so they can recover and they don’t. They go down a completely different pathway 
which is to fight the authority tooth and nail; and just end up in the most terrible state. 
They can fight their lawyers and their advisers all the way - - - and it makes it very 
difficult to – to look after them (IE3). 
IE3 considers that while it is difficult to generalise, doctors avoid other doctors or doctors avoid 
being patients for lots of reasons, from believing themselves to be the best expert on their own 
health, which IE3 said is completely misguided, to embarrassment, social stigma, and fantasies 
that they should as a doctor be a paragon of good health. To a doctor, having to admit to not 
having good health is really an indictment of their skills, which to IE3 is a bizarre way of thinking. 
He added, “there are lots of psychological and practical reasons why doctors might just take that 
choice step of either convincing themselves that whatever’s happening isn’t that serious, which is 
the denial, or taking the short cut and saying, well I know what’s needed and so I’ll just treat it 
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myself. Um, because it’s so available, you know, and that is a significant cause of doctors going 
down those paths. But neither of them are acceptable (IE3). 
This is reminiscent of BeyondBlue’s findings (2013), and will be considered further in the 
Discussion. It is also reminiscent of DiT15 who resisted psychological help for her distress because 
she said as a doctor she knew what was wrong with her. Although she said to her partner “I’m fine, 
I’m a doctor”, she was in hindsight not at all fine. 
The message from the IEs is that DiTs’ fears for themselves, their reputations and their futures can 
be overwhelming and although some may resist, manifesting as rage, anger, withdrawal, refusal to 
cooperate, or as various forms of anguish, what they recognise is that having professional or 
personal support is going to be necessary because “they are going to need it”. 
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Part Four: Moral Legitimacy 
Establishing moral legitimacy: IEs speak of what it means to be a doctor 
The testimony of the IEs supports my interpretation of DiTs’ testimonies that having a complaint 
touches a doctor at a deeper level than responding to questions about the medical care of a 
patient. It goes deeper than having an identity as a doctor; it goes to who they are. IE3 
acknowledges there is a doctor identity, and for some it’s the foremost thing that they are. And if 
you took that away, they would feel that they were nothing. However, for other people they feel 
quite comfortable in their own self and role and being a doctor is just part of their identity and it’s 
not the whole identity. You see variables but if you threaten that, people respond differently. 
Speaking of that identity, the IEs comment: 
Well, it’s an identity that that person views into that role. You look demographically or 
socio-culturally and you’ll see very different perceptions of what it is to be a doctor 
(IE3). 
Doctors invest a lot of themselves in being a doctor; they are a doctor, so part of their 
person – being a doctor is very much who they are. You’re never off duty, it is who you 
are. Work is their identity. ... If a doctor has a strong sense of identity before a 
complaint, it can help. If it happens early in one’s career, it can be incredibly damaging 
(IE1). 
You know, like, all of that is about – you know, you accept those responsibilities but it 
also goes to defining who you are. It gives you your status in the community, it gives 
you your sense of self-worth (IE2). 
As the IEs said, a doctor’s feeling of self-worth, their status in the community, their sense of who 
they are, are threatened by having a complaint, and this existential crisis is what DiTs spoke about 
of their own experience. IE1 says it can be incredibly damaging if it happens early in their career, 
as DiT16 alluded to when as a junior registrar she felt her future was under threat because of the 
damage to her reputation, or DiT6 who as an early-career specialist was seriously contemplating 
giving up medicine. On the other hand, taking account of DiT3 who had enjoyed a blemish-free 
long-standing career at a senior level up until the time of the complaint, of DiT2 also as a senior 
specialist who believed she would never again be “good” at her craft, and of DiT14 as a very senior 
specialist who would not retire while his reputation was at stake, indicates that for some doctors, 
the fact that their long-standing service, and status, has been challenged can likewise be 
“incredibly damaging”. As IE3 notes, people respond differently, and this is partially accounted for 
by their different values and sense of identity as a doctor. 
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In conclusion, there is agreement that being a doctor carries with it a “doctor identity” that defines 
to varying degrees how they see themselves. A complaint represents a moral challenge to this 
identity. The DiTs provided a picture of some of the influences that brought them into medicine and 
what they aspired to be: good doctors, whose sense of self as doctors is very much who they are 
(IE1). Having a complaint brings these doctors to reflect on what sort of doctor they truly are: a bad 
doctor like others who have attracted the contempt and ire of the public and the profession, or 
someone who always considered themselves to be good and are hanging on to the thread that 
they are still that person. So we will look further into the threats and challenges to this thread of 
hope. 
A complaint questions doctor’s capability to do the right thing for patients. As the experts 
explained: 
Medicine is such a different profession to any other profession ’cause we’re dealing with something 
that is absolutely core to the human condition which is (people’s) health. You know, and doctors 
take that responsibility very seriously, in the main, and believe to themselves and to the external 
world – well, it’s the external world – that they’re doing everything in their capability to do the best 
thing by the patient. So when that’s questioned via a complaint or a claim – it actually goes to the 
very core of what they think they’re there on this planet to do. And it’s more than – this is half the 
reason doctors can’t retire as well, apart from the fact they’ve got [laughter] poor financial 
management, is that it actually defines who they are. It much more defines who they are than 
many other professions (IE2). 
Losing a sense of competence, a complaint subsumes everything else you’ve ever 
done. I think that’s why it really cuts to the core, ’cause it cuts to the core of who they 
are; it’s quite an existential crisis in a sense, you know, when somebody says to you 
you’re crap at what you do and they’ve invested a lot of themselves in it (IE1). 
A complaint is a very personal thing; I don’t like who you are, I don’t like what you did – 
it really does cut to the core of yourself (IE2). 
Doctors often feel great responsibility and so they take that seriously. And then they 
feel like that their sincerity or their competency has been challenged, you can’t help but 
take it personally (IE4). 
There is a perception that lawyers see complaints and claims as not personal: “Legal people think 
it’s a game. It’s their bread and butter” (IE4). It is about conduct, behaviour, judgements, and if it is 
a claim for compensation, it is about money for harms and injury, which is what doctors pay their 
indemnity insurance for. The words set out in these results tell a different story: it is indeed 
personal. As IE4 said, “For us, it’s not a game, it’s at the heart of the calling of medicine”. As IE2 
explained, medicine is dealing with the core of the human condition, people’s health, and the 
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burden of responsibility becomes ingrained into the very core of a doctor’s life and being. And so, it 
is indeed personal. 
Summary 
Expert informers provided a picture of doctors’ responses to complaints that is largely consistent 
with participant DiTs’ accounts. Given that they are dealing with doctors “in the moment”, it adds an 
additional dimension that confirms that the individual accounts are not unique to this small group of 
self-selected individuals, but that what they spoke of represents a common picture of what doctors 
in general experience when they are dealing with a complaint against them. The expert informants 
also provide a perspective of the legal process as they perceived it, as one that is antithetical to 
medical practice, and, together with dealing with a complex and at times mystifying administrative 
process, is a reason for doctors’ feeling alienated and confused. 
The expert informants provide additional insight into reasons for doctors’ reticence to speak to 
others about having a complaint, and how they respond to this by initiating conversations around 
who doctors confide in, or if they do not, how to manage this signal that may mean the doctor is at 
risk of a morbid reaction to the process. This is useful for identifying strategies for overcoming 
doctors’ tendencies not to seek support, and more will be said of this in the final chapter. 
Conclusion 
Participant doctors provided their time, their thoughtfulness and their candid perspectives on how 
they responded to and dealt with having a complaint. From the accounts they have provided is 
derived rich testimony of their experience, which to most was an ordeal that had an irrevocable 
effect on their practice. Not only this, it had an irrevocable effect on how they saw themselves as 
doctors, changed from the picture of themselves when they first went into medicine and pursued 
their careers, to being more cautious, more defensive, less trusting, sometimes angry, sometimes 
profoundly sad. 
The key reasons for these effects has been identified as the sense of unfairness that arises from 
the process itself, and the underlying threat to a doctor’s sense of worthiness, encapsulated as 
their moral legitimacy. 
The next chapter will examine what this means, not only from what this analysis has presented, but 
how it reflects, amplifies or diverges from what other studies have found. Accepting that there 
needs to be a robust mechanism to deal with errant conduct and performance, and deriving from 
the thoughts of Doctors in Trouble and Expert Informants, the chapter will consider what could be 
done differently to avoid or mitigate some of the adverse impacts on doctors, who may, or may not 
be guilty of a whole range of misdemeanours, disappointments and failed expectations that they 
have been accused of. 
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Chapter Seven: Discussion 
Silent narratives: Finding the Common Thread 
Critical interpretation 
This final chapter is what was referred to in the Methodology as the third step in Ricoeur’s (1984) 
three-step process of narrative analysis, which he termed “Critical interpretation”. This brings 
together the literature introduced in Part One, Shaping the Profession, with the narratives of the 
study participants’ experience, the perspectives of the expert participants, and a critical 
interpretation of what this means for doctors, how the law in action impacts on them and the 
inferences that can be drawn from this interpretation in terms of how the profession is regulated in 
order to protect the public. 
As will be shown, the Findings generally confirm the results of previous research, with many 
consistencies in the results, regardless of the mechanics of the medico-legal processes and their 
state or country of origin. But apart from some interesting observations and glimpses into the lived 
experience of a small number of doctors in Australia, there is little relevance beyond what was 
already known unless this material is used to build a deeper understanding of the phenomena 
under study, so that others may benefit. 
The findings not only support what other national and international studies have found, they 
provide additional insights that have universal value in explaining the contributory reasons why 
many doctors suffer adversely from being the subject of a complaints inquiry. These insights are 
derived from the analysis presented in the Findings, and the key ones that emerge, as the 
“plotlines” described by Blumer (1969) and Ricoeur (1984), are that: 
1. the legal process is perceived as unfair; and 
2. the threat to moral legitimacy is key to a doctor’s plight. 
This chapter will trace the consistencies and the anomalies, then explore these primary insights 
through how doctors reacted not only when receiving a complaint, but how they endured what 
happened next, how it affected their practice and their sense of self, and how it shaped their future. 
Part One traced the origins of the present-day regulatory environment in which doctors practise. 
The history of the emergence of the medical profession has parallels with other professions, but its 
history is also unique because of the unique nature of the profession. Its uniqueness lies in its 
position of expertise, privilege and status, and for most of the profession, it has been driven by a 
profound sense of duty, altruism and commitment. It has also been driven by expectations of the 
community in its demand for safe health care in a rapidly advancing technological world. This 
history identified some defining events that steered a course which began with a drive to define the 
profession, enabled by legislation to protect it, through a changing social, economic and political 
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environment, to the current complex system that aims to maintain standards of practice, ensure 
doctors are accountable, and with the overarching aim of protecting the public. 
Being accountable is linked with patients’ rights to complain, recognised after decades of the 
relative powerlessness of individual patients to seek redress for grievances, aside from the 
previously only available legal recourse for harm through the courts. But being accountable to the 
public meant the profession having to answer to statutory authorities for its conduct, and having to 
answer to authority independent of the profession meant having to relinquish some of its 
professional autonomy. This required doctors having to account for their actions, decisions and 
judgements in a sometimes very public arena. Chapter Four showed how many doctors find this is 
a confronting experience and one that has lasting consequences. This study has aimed to identify 
the underlying reasons why, when called to account, doctors find the process so stressful, and at 
times frightening. 
The complaints experience 
Receiving a complaint 
Capturing recollections of first reactions provides a picture of the surprised entrée into what was to 
follow in terms of being swept up in a process over which many doctors felt they had little control, 
and the beginnings of the disruption of the narrative of pursuing one’s career. Common responses 
in this study and those reported in the literature were the thoughts that went flooding into their 
minds, envisaging catastrophe, the end of one’s career, livelihood, fear for reputation, and 
disbelief. When the reality begins to settle in, sleeplessness, loss of concentration, worry and 
distress intrude into their lives. The doubts begin to creep in and doctors worry that perhaps they 
are as guilty as they feel they are being made out to be, and what this means. 
The recollections of participants in this study are consistent with those summarised in the literature. 
These include the initial feelings of being out of control, panic, shock, anxiety, misery, anger, 
distress, shame, guilt, insecurity, fear and powerlessness being common reactions (Charles, 1984; 
Mulcahy, 1996; Jain & Ogden, 1999; Schattner & Coman, 1998; Shanafelt, 2002; Cunningham, 
2004, Cunningham & Dovey, 2006; Bourne et al., 2016; Verhoef, 2015; Nash et al., 2007, 2009, 
2010, 2013;). Psychiatric disturbance (Saberi, 2009, Nash et al., 2006), stress, anxiety, disturbed 
sleep, suicidal thoughts and continued feelings of distress can become prolonged for the duration 
of a complaints process and beyond. This has been likened to post traumatic stress disorder by the 
experts interviewed, explained as being characterised by intrusive worrying that the event is going 
to happen again, so doctors become hyper-vigilant with panic attacks, sleeplessness and irrational 
fears of danger. Death by suicide occurs for a small but disturbing number (Horsfall, 2014; Casey, 
2015; Milner, Maheen, Bismark & Spittal, 2016). Increased alcohol and drug taking was a finding 
from Nash et al. (2010), although this factor was not discussed by the participants in my study. 
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Martin (1991) found that stress symptoms were at their highest for the two-year period immediately 
following a lawsuit, then decreased but never returned to the level of non-sued doctors. She 
surmised that it was not only the process itself while in the workplace, but that the repeated 
exposure to situations that may lead to further litigation added to long-term effects. Some of the 
participants in my study reported this feeling as well, with one speaking of the dread she felt when 
patients with similar presentations arrived, bringing flashbacks of the case that had resulted in a 
complaint against her (DiT5). Others actively avoided such patients (DiT1). The irony of such 
reactions is that they may expose the doctor to further complaints, and more will be said of this 
later in the chapter in Changes. Added to the long-term impact was a feeling of being under siege, 
a sense of futility, never being able to satisfy patients in spite of hard work, loss of control and 
powerlessness (Mulcahy, 1999). 
Grief for the loss that the complaint represented often added to the grief some expressed over an 
adverse outcome when a patient had suffered badly, or had died, leaving some doctors feeling 
deep sympathy for these people. The phenomenon of “second victims” has been described by Wu 
(2000) and Wue and Steckelberg (2012), Sirriyeh (2000) and Ullström (2014). Harrison (2014) 
writes that when an unexpected adverse outcome causes not only the grief of the person harmed, 
it can also leave those treating the patient in a state of dismay and grief. Yet, few supports exist for 
doctors, who are expected to just get on with it. In this study, participants had varied experiences 
of this phenomenon, with one team sharing their shock and sorrow about a catastrophic outcome 
(DiT5), while another doctor, devastated by the death of a patient, was excluded from the staff de-
briefing sessions that followed, leaving her alone and bewildered (and later blamed, then finally 
exonerated) (DiT2), and yet another who was actually pleased for the patient’s compensation 
payout because of harm she suffered, although very distressed about having been blamed for it 
(DiT12). This can be summed up by the English neurosurgeon Henry Marsh who wrote: 
Everybody accepts that we all make mistakes, and that we learn from them. The 
problem is that when doctors such as myself make mistakes the consequences can be 
catastrophic for our patients. Most surgeons – there are always a few exceptions – feel 
a deep sense of shame when their patients suffer or die as a result of their efforts, a 
sense of shame which is made all the worse if litigation follows (Marsh, 2014, p. 154). 
The experts, who see doctors when they are undergoing an inquiry into a complaint, observed 
similar reactions, finding some of them overwhelmed, fearful of loss – of house, reputation, 
livelihood, loss of face – and some very angry. While in these states, they can be difficult to assist 
because their emotions can be an obstacle to preparing their defence, until the emotions are 
acknowledged and their greatest fears addressed. But certainty cannot be guaranteed, and it is 
this state that keeps many doctors distressed and anxious for the duration of the process, since 
they can perceive they are under attack, and if this is prolonged, may result in post-traumatic 
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stress disorder. Above all, the experience was summarised as an “existential crisis” by participants 
and experts. Experts see doctors when they are at their most vulnerable and when their emotions 
are raw, so experts’ testimony added confirmation that participants’ recollections were not unique, 
but echoed the experts’ observations of common emotional responses. 
What is stressful about complaints 
The critical question is why doctors suffer from these symptoms, and why they are so enduring. 
The mental health of doctors is known to be in a more vulnerable state than the general population 
(BeyondBlue, 2013). The stress, and fear, of litigation and complaints is a known contributor to 
mental illness and is rated by doctors as one of the most stressful of all stressors in medical 
practice (Schattner & Coman, 1998) and malpractice litigation is described as a major life trauma 
or the most stressful life experience (Martin, 1991; Charles et al., 1984). This was reflected in the 
comments of doctors in my study, even if a complaint was not substantiated, as occurred in a 
majority of the participants’ complaints99. Yet they suffered a range of the symptoms during the 
process and well into the future, to the point where tears flowed while recollecting their experience, 
up to several years after the event. This accords with Charles’ (1988) finding that there was little 
significance in the scores of those who had won their cases and those who had not, suggesting 
that it is not the outcome that is most feared, but the process itself. The next section will look at 
how the process has such an impact, and related factors that the process gives rise to. 
Is it fair? 
While it is generally understood that legal processes are lengthy, doctors are afforded procedural 
fairness in that they have a right of reply to decisions being made about a complaint, and are 
generally provided with access to evidence that supports a complaint, such as access to the 
medical records, copies of peer reviews and the like, as noted in Chapter Three. However, 
participants identified multiple ways they felt they were treated unfairly, relating to the process 
itself, and for example, the delays in dealing with “nonsense” or minor matters. As identified in 
Chapter Four, these may not have been labelled as “unfair” as did several of the participants in my 
study, but the effects were much the same – that aspects of the process itself contributed to 
doctors’ distress and to defensive practice (Cunningham & Dovey, 2000; Nash et al., 2010; 
Bourne, 2017). These aspects included prolonged timescales and “poor process” which were 
identified in Bourne et al.’s (2017) study, which found it was the interruptions to their working lives 
which were taken up with meetings, hearings, and responding to matters, with no redress for this 
loss (Charles et al., 1984). Mulcahy (2003) said it was more than just the time being engaged in 
the process; it was the fact that complainants, if not satisfied with an outcome, could seek a review 
or appeal, yet doctors could not seek redress if the complaint was found not proven. DiT1 was one 
such doctor whose matter was re-opened and subject to a lengthy investigation, before being 
                                                          
99 AHPRA’s 2016/17 figures showed that no further regulatory action was needed on 76% of the 3 557 complaints 
closed, indicating that the participants were not an unusual group in this respect. 
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closed with no adverse finding against him. Observations about delays, the quality of 
communication, the lack of compassion or consideration in the process and the feeling of 
powerlessness were also identified by Horsfall (2015). 
Overall, there is an impression of incommensurability between the law and medicine, leading to an 
added feeling of frustration and uncertainty. Expert informants had a view that the law 
misunderstands that doctors are not like them, that the process is adversarial and is counter to the 
culture of medicine. As IE4 said: “doctors feel like their work and their patients and they are under 
attack by the legal system, by an adversarial process, which is trying to work things out in a non-
medical arena”. Being captive to the power of the regulatory process added up to a sense that it is 
the process itself that is the punishment, and that participants had to prove themselves innocent. It 
was not only some of the participants who said this, but McGivern and Fischer’s interview study 
(2010) found the process made them feel guilty until they are proven innocent, and they begin to 
practise more defensively thereafter. Doctors under Fitness to Practise inquiries in the UK reported 
the same perception (Horsfall, 2015). 
Enduring the complaints process 
As well as feelings of powerlessness and emotional distress, Bourne et al.’s UK study of 10 390 
doctors reported on the most stressful aspects (2016), and found doctors felt unsupported, 
victimised, like a failure, and incompetent (Bourne et al., 2015, 2016, 2017). The most stressful 
aspects related to procedural issues in the process such as prolonged duration, unpredictability of 
procedures, managerial incompetence, poor communication and perceiving that processes are 
biased in favour of complainants, fear of the consequences, embarrassment about having to justify 
their actions, fear for career, humiliation – professional and public – the latter of which was also 
reported by Verhoef (2015) as affecting reputation and career, and having a marked record. As 
noted, this has been a current issue in Australia. In my own study, these fears were apparent and 
underscored their experiences for the duration of the process. Here, “walking down a highway full 
of potholes” characterised the feelings of confusion and uncertainty that began with the notification 
of the complaint. Not knowing what may lie ahead, what the outcome may be, what impact it would 
have on their reputation and career, and how decisions are made that would affect their future, 
were all reflections of this uncertainty. One expert described “the long haul ahead” for doctors 
receiving a complaint, but could not provide the reassurance that doctors need, nor give false hope 
that it will come out well. 
What compounds the issue is that the complaint may raise other issues, determined in the course 
of the inquiry, when peer review may be critical of another aspect of the respondent doctor’s 
treatment or care, or the quality of medical records or other matter of which they are critical, and 
the doctor will be required to respond to these further issues. This not only prolongs the process, 
but adds to the sense of powerlessness – they are in other unseen and unknown hands – “there is 
an element of unfairness in that”, said an expert. Some participants found this aspect very 
 P a g e  | 219 
confronting, to be held in judgement by one’s peers when it may have been more a matter of 
differences of professional opinion than actual departures from the standard, and although they 
have a right of reply, they feel the system has the greater authority. It is perceived as weighted 
“towards complainants”, as was also found in Bourne’s study (2016). As an expert said, it is “an 
adversarial process” that leaves doctors feeling vulnerable. 
The Findings also describe the process issues that compound the uncertainty – the long wait 
between communications, yet being given little time for doctors to respond – and the impersonal 
nature of correspondence, with little information about how decisions were made and delays in 
progress, and in resolution of the matter. While some participants recognised that the people who 
are administering the system “are just following a process”, participants believe they have little idea 
of what effect it is having on the recipient. These findings reflect the “procedural issues” identified 
in Bourne’s (2016) study of what is stressful about the process. While the procedures in the UK are 
not the same as Australia, the frustrations expressed relating to procedural issues were very much 
alike. 
The significance of this 
Liminality is a concept that comes to mind when reading these accounts. Liminality is an existential 
state that places its subject into an uncertain space, the boundary of which commenced, when 
speaking of participants’ experience, with the receipt of a complaint. The ending is never certain, 
and so the space in between is one where the doctor wonders what is going on, how will it end, 
and most significantly, what will it mean for them. Each communication from the complaints body, 
Medical Council, medical indemnity insurer or lawyer can be a reminder of the uncertainty that 
these communications represent and symbolise. Speaking of the state of liminality in respect of 
chronic illness, Little, Jordens, Paul, Montgomery and Philipson (1998, p. 1491) state: “The liminal 
life is also the existential life, separated from other lives only by the symptoms and disabilities of 
the illness, and a cultural agreement to validate the transparency of the existential issues in times 
of `normality’”. So it could be said of these doctors, being separated from other lives, not here by 
symptoms and disabilities, but by their own sense of unease about the future, by the inferences of 
their being not only accountable but having to justify their actions, and in so doing, feeling guilty 
and accused. With a reduced sense of control, they wait it out, responding as required to the 
occasional missives from the authorities, while “sitting in the cheap seats” (DiT3) as some 
unknown person makes critical decisions about them. 
While waiting it out, most are back at work, trying to be normal, but every letter, phone call or email 
brings back the process going on behind the scenes. As simple as being fearful of mail arriving that 
can be a reminder of the shock endured on first receipt of the notification of a complaint, and so 
was symbolic of the fear, or the feeling of ever-presence, when a trip to the supermarket or any 
other normal event could be interrupted by a phone call from the regulator, recalling the underlying 
anxiety carried constantly. The process therefore was not merely a series of actions, interspersed 
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with periods of normality; it was a constant in doctors’ lives, yet whatever was happening behind 
the scenes was silent to the doctor. This again evokes the sense of existential uncertainty 
characterised in the “illness narratives” or “biographical disruption” (Kleinman, 1988; Bury, 1982; 
Charmaz, 1990), in which a person living their normal life while having a chronic illness or a cancer 
in remission, may revert from being that person to being a patient. How one plays the “sick role”, 
as Parsons (1951) described it and as explained in Chapter Five, may have adverse 
consequences depending not only on their disease, and on how they play that role. The doctor with 
an open complaint is a doctor at work, a member of the community with a social life, but is also a 
respondent to a legal process, which carries legal and regulatory obligations, again with potentially 
adverse consequences depending on the seriousness of the complaint, but also on how they play 
their “role” as a respondent, or defendant. They cannot just ignore it, because “they’ve got you over 
a barrel” (DiT8). The powerlessness and loss of control that participants in this and other studies 
(Mulcahy, 1996; Jain & Ogden, 1999; Bourne et al., 2016) reported can be explained by this 
phenomenon. While at work, there is the doubt that a complaint implies, that they are less the good 
doctor than they thought they were. 
Just as a cancer patient in remission fears an uncertain future, part of the fear for the participants 
was the catastrophe that some saw ahead of them, which generated the angst and dread. They 
had seen others before them suffer from the public exposure, the perceived unfair judgements, the 
humiliation, the loss of jobs, and feared this may happen to them. But to argue, fight, blame, and 
accuse would do no good, for they still had to “face the music”. Interestingly, one participant said 
when asked about the catastrophe she had thought had been about to befall her, and 
subsequently did not happen, “no, it was the fear speaking, but it was all gone now” (DiT12). 
Additionally, just as illness interrupts one’s normal existence, so it is with complaints, and has 
effects that reach beyond the event itself: 
Illness alters life plans and projects. And it provokes a response, however difficult and 
tenuous. Illness matters because real things are on the line: self-identity, physical and 
mental health, life chances, social status, employment, finances, religious aspirations, 
or personal relationships. Seen this way, illness and treatment are embedded in the 
local moral experience of a particular network, neighborhood, or community (Kleinman, 
2006, p. 834). 
The impact extends beyond the individual as well, and can affect staff and one’s team members 
and colleagues. Stuart and Cunningham (2015) found anxiety spread into the practice, and DiT5’s 
team became distressed at the complaint because they were part of the care of the patient but also 
in sympathy for the doctor who received the brunt of her anger. DiT1’s team felt the complaint was 
very unfair and gave him significant support, which he recalled later helped him endure the long 
process of investigation and appeals that followed. 
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Family members are also affected. Participants’ partners invariably supported them, although 
DiT13’s partner had long been troubled by his conduct and the future of their marriage was 
uncertain. Clode’s (2004) study of general practitioners highlighted that partners of GPs suffer 
psychiatric and psychological morbidity at a greater rate than the general population as they carry 
the effects of their partner’s stress and anxiety. My study did not venture into this territory beyond 
the participants’ acknowledgement of the support their partners gave during and after the 
complaints inquiry, but it suggests that further research would be beneficial in gaining a full picture 
of how doctors maintain or restore their equilibrium. 
Shame, stigma and reputation 
Participants found it a challenge dealing with their own emotions, but thinking about what others 
may think of them made it very troubling, particularly if their case was reported in the paper, as was 
discussed in the Findings. Verhoef (2015) reported on the fear of such exposure. Participants 
spoke of this fear when first receiving a complaint and what happened when the press did report 
on their matter, such as DiT2’s experience (see Findings) when her photo was printed in the paper, 
and she became acutely aware that the public as well as the profession knew and were judging 
her. To reiterate what she said: 
So that became difficult, ’cause then the general public knew. So every time I went to 
the supermarket, I felt like people were looking at me. “She’s that axe-murderer.” I, you 
know, I used to be – I used to be in the Local [Community] Group, and I turned up at a 
meeting once and had people say, “Oh, I saw you in the paper”. So not only had I lost 
my professional reputation, but it was spilling over into my personal social life as well 
(DiT2). 
The stigma for her was too great, and she ceased attending her community group, she no longer 
attended her specialist College conferences, and eventually she stopped practising as a doctor. 
Feeling blamed, she felt unworthy, and although she was eventually cleared of any wrongdoing, 
the shame that she endured never completely receded. 
Writing about disasters, Wells (1995) distinguished between events that give rise to blame and 
those that do not, much of which is attributable to how it is reported, which can bias public 
perception. “There is a complex relationship between public reaction, media responses, risk 
perception and causal attribution” (Wells, 1995, p. 9). Misfortune due to “natural” causes is not 
blameworthy, while blame can be attributed to “man-made” causes. Quoting Lee (1981), Wells 
added: “The awfulness of a catastrophe may lie not merely in the loss of life and suffering involved, 
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but in the violation of people’s sense of justice or moral rightness” (Lee, 1981100, p. 7, in Wells, 
1995, pp. 9, 10). 
Similarly, Bosk (2003) made a distinction between “technical” errors and “judgmental” errors, the 
latter of which are “moral in nature” (Bosk, 2003, p. 168) and are dealt with more seriously than 
errors in techniques. Examples of the differentiation between technical error and moral error 
abounded in the participant accounts, with the difference in how they were handled and how the 
participants perceived them being evident. DiT15, for instance, had two complaints. The first was 
about a “failure to diagnose”, and because of the potential seriousness of the illness, and the risk 
to the public if she were found to be an unsafe doctor, there was an investigation. This was 
finalised with no finding against her, but the complaint itself and its inferences were sufficient to 
produce such severe shock and depressive reactions that she had to obtain professional 
psychological support. The second was about an administrative matter that the patient was 
annoyed about, and was quickly dealt with and closed by the regulator. DiT15’s reaction to this, 
after the initial shock and tears of receiving another complaint, left her irritated and angry with the 
patient, but without the soul-searching, the agonised analysis of what she may have done wrong 
with its moral undertones, and the distress. 
The case of DiT2 demonstrated very clearly that technical error is forgivable, while moral error is 
not. As an obstetrician, babies sometimes die before, during or after their births. DiT2 had her 
share of “adverse outcomes” over her twelve years of specialist practice and without a suggestion 
of wrongdoing or error. She was one in a group of partners running a practice and seeing patients 
in the local private hospital. After a prolonged shift dealing with a lengthy delivery, she spent her 
next evening at home on call and was ten minutes away if needed. She left instructions to be 
called if needed, and expected a low-risk delivery. She telephoned a few times during the night to 
check progress and was assured that all was well. She left early for the hospital to be there for the 
delivery. When delivered, the baby was dead, and had been for some hours. The mistake was not 
hers – during the mother’s labour, the midwives had misread vital signs. DiT2 was blamed, 
sidelined by the hospital administration, isolated from staff, excluded from her partners’ practice, 
eventually suspended from medical practice, and publicised in the press as the one who had 
refused to attend for the patient. Her alleged failure was unforgivable, and her exclusion was her 
punishment. The midwives were sent for re-training, but kept their jobs. DiT2 was found not guilty, 
was reinstated to the register, but has not practised again. In Bosk’s (2003) terms, the hospital’s 
and team’s failure to forgive DiT2 for her alleged moral lapse would mean that she was excluded, 
whereas the technical error made by the midwives was forgiven, remedied and they were brought 
back “into the fold”. 
                                                          
100 Lee, R. (1981) The public’s perception of risk and the question of irrationality. In F. Warner (ed.), The assessment 
and perception of risk., Royal Society. 
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In this way, Bosk (2003) explains the consequences of technical error as more forgiveable and that 
individuals remain part of the work group, and their performance is not seen as “nonnormal”, 
unless of course this becomes a pattern of practice, in which case questions will be asked (and I 
add, sometimes reluctantly101). The occasional technical error is accepted even if the patient 
suffers harm – “these things happen” – and the problem resolved by re-training, as in this case. 
When good faith is brought into question, lapses in moral performance are less forgivable. Bosk 
(2003) writes of a collective conscience in the occupational group, with its own morality, and a 
moral lapse is not tolerated, and the individual may be scorned, humiliated or even excluded, 
which is precisely what happened to DiT2. Bosk argues that forgiveness bonds the team: 
Forgiveness removes the stigma of uncertainty – by allowing people to confront their 
error, it can therefore serve to limit self-criticism and prevent an individual from being 
immobilized by guilt. Forgiveness helps individuals mobilize for action after failure has 
stripped them of a sense of mastery. It is a necessary part of group life which sustains 
commitments and mobilizes actors in the face of inevitable failure (Bosk, 2003, p. 179). 
The absence of group forgiveness can leave a doctor exposed to their own doubt and uncertainty, 
of which DiT2 was left with so much she could not return to practice. DiT14 was one who could not 
forgive himself had it been found true that he had been guilty of medical fraud, and he would have 
given up medicine. 
Lewis (1971) opines that shame is a deeply painful negative appraisal of oneself, as defective, and 
therefore a bad person. Shame is different from guilt in that the person appraises oneself, while 
guilt involves appraisal of the specific behaviour, and as such, shame is more associated with 
psychological pathology. For doctors, if they felt their treatment was not up to standard, or if a 
patient does not do well, then it can give rise to shame, which Davidoff (2002) associates with the 
culture of perfectionism. This starts in medical school, when lack of knowledge implies a short-
coming and in later training implies a lack of dedication, in itself implying a moral failing. When a 
doctor has done something wrong, or who is accused of same, this invokes this deep-seated 
sense of shame, and self-forgiveness is not easily remedied. 
Carlsson (2016) examines further the nature of guilt, associating it with blameworthiness, yet 
distinguishing between being blamed by someone else, and blaming oneself. The latter, he argues, 
“necessarily involves suffering” (Carlson, 2016, p. 89), but one is only morally blameworthy, and 
therefore should suffer guilt, if the issue were under one’s control. This is not just to speak of guilt 
as found, or not found, in a Tribunal of court of law. This is about the sense of blameworthiness 
and shame that participants spoke about, regardless of the finding in relation to the complaint. It 
                                                          
101 We could see this in the Patel case where prolonged efforts to raise the alarm about the shocking outcomes of 
Patel’s efforts were disregarded, as were Dr Harry Bailey’s at Chelmsford, the cardiologists at Bristol, etc., because 
peers were reluctant to voice critical judgement about their techniques. 
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certainly appeared that some participants had been “immobilised”, as Bosk (2003) argued, when 
forgiveness was not forthcoming or if one could not forgive him or herself for their alleged 
shortcomings or failures. This is about taking moral responsibility, which is beyond the blame 
attributed by a complainant, and beyond the liability attributable by the legal process. In this sense, 
Carlsson (2016) argues that being blamed by someone else is not necessarily harmful, but to 
blame oneself certainly is, and one suffers. He also argues that blameworthiness is associated with 
an inference or perception of ill will, which may explain why participants reacted so strongly at the 
“personal” nature of many complaints, and the underlying hate expressed in some. For instance, 
what disturbed DiT3, DiT4, DiT5, and DiT16 was the attack implied against them as people, not 
just what they had been alleged to have done. Allsop (1999, p. 160) observed, in her examination 
of more than a hundred complaints, that rather than expressing complaints in terms of precise 
allegations, complainants expressed them as “stories which put an emphasis on doctors’ 
obligations, (so) the professional identity of the doctor comes under attack as well as their clinical 
competence”. This implies that once trust is breached, and the doctor’s perceived lack of moral 
responsibility has betrayed the patient, the response is unforgiving and the doctor becomes the 
villain. As IE1 said, “it is personal”. 
Therefore, I would argue, when doctors receive a complaint, they react emotionally as a defence 
against the moral imputations. But being advised by their medico-legal advisers or lawyers to “stick 
to the facts”, what is missing is an avenue for expression of the imputation of a moral lapse, 
leaving the blamed one feeling uncertain and morally guilty, under attack as IE3 said, and with the 
emotional load that was so abundantly evident in the Findings. 
We’re just normal people 
With this in mind, and as noted in the Findings, the key underlying theme emerged as the principle 
of moral legitimacy. During interviews, doctors appeared to feel compelled to restore a sense of 
themselves as moral, or “good”, in response to the inferences in a complaint, and how it was 
handled by the authorities, that they were blameworthy, guilty, not good doctors but bad, or seen 
as bad, and that they now had to redeem a sense of their good self. This was not only to restore 
their own moral values, but reflected what many felt was expected of them. As DiT1 articulated, 
“Doctors are held to higher standards than the general public, even in their personal lives: there’s a 
perception that as doctors, we have to behave in a certain way, but that invades every aspect of 
our lives. … We’re expected to be a certain level of superhuman and we’re not, we’re just normal 
people. You can’t make a human level of mistakes”. A complaint meant they had let the side down 
(the “social contract” discussed in Chapter Two), that they could not meet this externally imposed 
expectation. The extrinsic rewards of medicine – the financial security, esteem, recognition and 
even fame – are ideally balanced by the intrinsic rewards – the satisfaction of doing a meaningful 
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job well (Riley, 2010102) – but this balance can be disturbed when the inference of not having done 
a job well, which may then extend into doubt about the whole of their practice, can contribute to 
this sense of no longer being the “good” doctor one thought they used to be. Even DiT11, who did 
not ever consider himself to be a “bad” doctor, said the experience “brought (him) down a peg”, 
and he then made a conscious effort to improve, although “it was bloody stressful for those few 
months”. DiT1 likewise said he was “still a good doctor but not as confident”. DiT11 reflected on the 
process and why it affects doctors so much compared with lawyers, who do not see it as an 
emotional thing, but a black and white process of dealing with facts. This was an important 
observation because some felt there was a general lack of empathy for doctors’ plight. Even with a 
sense of his good self being relatively intact, DiT11 found this a challenge and felt there was 
always a doubt, while going through the process, suggesting that what is missing in the process is 
an avenue to express emotional responses, as the experts also identified. It was interesting that 
DiT11 told no one except his wife, and it was not until some time later, when he encountered a 
former supervisor who revealed he had had a complaint, that he felt ready to share his experience 
with others, albeit within a closed circle of that person whom he trusted and admired. This 
suggests that the “shame response” discussed by Cunningham and Dovey (2000) did not fit his 
image of a highly competent specialist who had excelled in his education and training, and the 
hesitancy revealed in his thoughts in the above quote is indicative of the discomfort he felt in 
thinking that there had been something wrong with him, that he was not good, or good enough. In 
this way, Wilson and Cunningham (2011) contend that doctors respond both emotionally and 
intellectually to a complaint. The intellectual appraisal that will follow a complaint (what went 
wrong?) uses the biomedical paradigm as does the complaints process itself. “Judged by 
themselves or others to ‘have failed’ in the ‘dichotomy between correct and incorrect medical 
practice’” (Wilson & Cunningham, 2011, pp.450, 451), the failure becomes internalised, leading to 
the experience of shame. They argue that this shame response is what drives the changes in 
attitudes towards patients and to changes in practising behavior. 
The shame response is an underlying emotional response to a complaint (Cunningham & Dovey, 
2000, p. 464), as are depression, anger, guilt and loss of joy (Wilson & Cunningham, 2011). 
Shame is also listed as a common symptom by Charles (1988), Martin (1991), and Stuart and 
Cunningham (2015). As DiT16 said: “there’s a lot of shame attached to it and I know that some 
people would be so ashamed that they wouldn’t want to tell anyone about it”. It is explained by IE1 
and IE3, who said: 
… some people go down the pathway of feeling shamed and becoming depressed and 
withdrawn and embarrassed and unable to sort of face people in their community or 
                                                          
102 Riley, G. (2010). Professor Geoff Riley, AM, is a psychiatrist and Professor of Rural and Remote Medicine at the 
University of Western Australia. He was speaking at a conference of the Royal Australian College of Surgeons (Rural 
Surgeons), in Broome, WA on 1 September 2010. 
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beyond. They don’t tell their wives, they don’t tell their husbands, they don’t tell their 
children; it’s based on shame and with that becomes self-incrimination and 
embarrassment, and it can be to a profound extent (IE3). 
Shame is attached to feeling blameworthy, yet they may not be. “But there is always a doubt” as 
DiT11 said, because a patient was unhappy with his care. 
Embarrassment, easier to handle than shame (Lewis, 1992, p. 126), is about self-consciousness, 
uneasiness, awkwardness, while shame is a deep-seated feeling of self-mortification, humiliation 
and guilt. Lewis describes some of the ways people deal with shame, such as by deflecting onto 
others or other circumstances, denial of the issue that caused the shame, substituting shame with 
anger, sadness, self-blame, or confessing the source of shame. Any of these may be attributed to 
the participants, but I will avoid making interpretations that enter the psychological realm, being ill-
equipped to do so. However, the term was used by both participants and in particular by the 
experts, as reasons for doctors’ angst and reluctance to tell others or for others to know, and in the 
findings of others’ research (Cunningham & Dovey, 2000; Cunningham, 2004; McGivern, 2010). 
The other aspect is that shame is closely related to stigma. Goffman (1963) explained the early 
meanings of stigma as being signs of visible deformity or blemish, but the more recent meaning 
refers to disgrace, which he states is a reflection of the more recent psychologisation of 
experience, expressed as distress and other mental problems. Visible stigma discredit people, but 
the invisible stigma are those where bearers discredit themselves, and become internalised, 
leading to a change in the conception of self. This change can be associated with feelings of 
shame, deviance, being inferior, or “discreditable”, representing the “spoiled identity”. The person 
who has discredited oneself anticipates the reactions of others, even if these never happen. 
Kleinman writes (1988, p. 160), “By that stage, he has thoroughly internalized the stigma in a deep 
sense of shame and a spoiled identity. His behaviour, then, becomes shaped by his negative self-
perception”. 
While Goffman (1963) and Kleinman (1988) are writing about illness and disease, I posit that their 
interpretation of stigma applies similarly to the self-stigmatising that occurs when doctors in trouble 
anticipate that others will shame them because they have failed to measure up. This is supported 
by a recent study by Clough, March, Leane and Ireland (2018) of what prevents doctors from 
seeking help for stress and burnout that cited time, or lack of it, as the greatest systemic barrier, 
but the most consistent reason was stigma. Perceived structural stigma was fear for being 
disadvantaged or discriminated against at work; perceived stigma from others and self-stigma were 
about perceived devaluing and discriminating beliefs. 
The DiT who feels shame believes they are less than worthy or that they may deemed by others to 
be less worthy. So they tell no one, or just the few trusted ones, and have difficulty forgiving 
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themselves, even if the outcome of a complaint has found them not guilty. Stigma are a “public 
violation of what is considered normal” (Lewis, 1992, p. 195), but the question is, in relation to who 
or what? This brings us to the concept of identity, and the notion of what Goffman (1963) describes 
as a “spoiled identity”. Kleinman (1988, p. 5) writes of cultural orientations, being “the patterned 
ways that we have learned to think about and act in our life worlds and that replicate the social 
structure of those worlds”, which can be likened to Bourdieu’s (1993) “field”, or the particular 
culture of medicine into which new doctors become socialised and internalise the customs and 
culture of being a doctor. Becker (1961), in his book Boys in White, describes the acculturation 
process that takes place in medical school of 1950s America (where girls apparently do not enter), 
in which medical values become assimilated beyond the learning of clinical skills. An example was 
of exercising responsibility and to handle “one’s opportunities to do so skillfully and well, are 
important signs of one’s personal worth and hence symbolic value beyond the actual experience 
involved” (Becker, 1961, p. 255). Such expected competencies have become in more modern 
parlance part of the “hidden curriculum” of medical training, where doctors learn how to behave like 
doctors, and in this there is a common identity. But while the profession may appear to act as a 
unified institution, or as a collective, to the outside world, within it there are the same rivalries, 
competitiveness, hierarchies of status and prestige as are common in other large institutions. 
Nevertheless, the granting of the right to the wearing of a white coat was to Becker the material 
symbol of acceptance into the tribe, and one worn with pride as the sign of being accepted into the 
inside (Merton, 1972). When this is challenged if accused of incompetency, for instance, and this 
opinion is generated or supported by one’s peers, the sense of self is disrupted and challenges the 
security of being part of the collective. When a doctor lets the side down by being complained 
about, the identity of being one of them, of being a good doctor, is thrown into question, and there 
is a risk that they may symbolically, or actually, be forced out of the club, or humiliated and 
excluded, as Bosk (2003) intimated, and as DiT2 experienced. Safer not to tell them, but then, the 
identity is already spoiled, through self-stigmatising ruminations. It was these ruminations that were 
expressed during the interviews when thoughts went from “am I one of the bad guys”, to “what will 
others think of me”, to it being “an attack on your absolute being and essence as a doctor”. 
Telling others 
Shame and embarrassment, and perceived stigma in nearly half of the respondents, were 
identified by the BeyondBlue (2013) study of doctors as reasons for not seeking help or support, 
yet 25% of doctors were found to have some degree of psychiatric disorder. As discussed in the 
Findings, participants tended not to tell others beyond their partners, and not to seek support 
beyond obtaining medico-legal advice. Those who sought professional psychological support only 
did so when they were in a state of high distress, such as DiT15, whose partner and lawyer both 
recognised she was not coping, not sleeping and was acutely anxious. This accords with the 
experts’ opinions, who all said that doctors in a state of distress were frequently handling it alone, 
and BeyondBlue’s (2013) finding that 30.5% either chose not to tell anyone, or to rely on 
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themselves. As professionals, the expert informants felt it very important to address this critical 
need and if necessary, guide doctors to obtaining professional support. 
Bury (1982) stated that the “overall effects of stigma affect the individual’s ability to mobilise 
resources to advantage” (Bury, 1982, p. 180) which gives some insight into this reticence, and 
supports the experts’ opinion that guiding them towards support is a critical need. The Findings set 
out some of the reasons for participants’ reticence to seek support – shame or embarrassment 
were evident, with worries about what others would think of them a key reason. Another reason 
was the sense that none other than a doctor would understand what they are going through. DiT2 
saw a nurse/counsellor but found this of limited value. Others were reluctant to use the free 
psychological service available to doctors, although some of them who did found it useful, while 
others did not know of the service. Cunningham and Cookson (2009) undertook a survey of the 
use of a similar service in New Zealand and amongst their conclusions, the service was valued and 
effective, but that it was not well known about. The Canadian Medical Association’s study (2003) 
found that only 2% of doctors sought support, in spite of 18% being identified as depressed. A 
systematic review by Kay, Mitchell, Claravino and Doust (2008) found reasons for not seeking 
support included time constraints and lack of availability of services being primary, as well as 
embarrassment, which accords with Clough (2018) that lack of time is the primary structural 
reason. The survey by Nash, Daly, van Ekert and Kelly (2013) found that of those who had 
contacted an independent counselling service, 47.5% had contacted the Doctors Health Advisory 
Service and 73.4% had sought independent counselling. What this suggests, as with Cunningham 
and Cookson’s (2009) study, is that doctors have a strong need for support, and that they need a 
variety of sources of support, but lack awareness of what is available. Nevertheless, given the 
additional awareness of doctors’ mental health needs in recent times, there is growing interest in 
and education in the need to be more responsive to doctors’ vulnerabilities. This is especially so 
given the recent exposure to news of doctor suicide and mental illness, especially amongst junior 
doctors. 
What made a difference 
What made a difference was not just having professional advisory and therapeutic services 
available, though these were important, but also having a trusted person in whom to confide, 
whether this was family, friend, colleague or senior, someone who was not there to judge, defend 
or challenge but to accept that the experience was difficult and emotionally distressing. The most 
significant aspect, however, for assisting a doctor feel they are valued as doctors and that they 
remain accepted as part of the circle is to be in a supportive collegial environment. This largely 
depended on how one’s colleagues respond to the doctor in trouble, and as stated by Amsterdam 
and Bruner: 
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The sense of identity … relates us to the groups on whose good opinions we rely for 
self-esteem, and fixes us to the roles and statuses that those groups assign us as a 
condition for holding their good opinion” (Amsterdam & Bruner, 2000, p. 234). 
When a doctor loses that good opinion, it can have significant consequences – for DiT2 who had 
been actively sidelined and excluded by her colleagues came seriously unstuck. Writing for the 
Medical Observer, psychiatrist Dr Helen Schultz, whose interest is in the high rates of suicide 
amongst doctors, would like to see doctors being kinder to each other, as IE1 had similarly said. 
She says: “With every conversation we have with a colleague, we have the power to make or 
break that colleague” (Schultz, Medical Observer, 2018). Being kinder, more forgiving, enabling 
time to de-brief are all important to the preservation of self-esteem, while loss of colleagues’ good 
opinion can be devastating and add to one’s doubts about one’s own worth. 
Those who chose not to disclose to others for reasons of their shame and embarrassment can feel 
very isolated, and as DiT15 found, she suffered until psychological support was finally obtained. 
Cunningham and Dovey (2000) suggest a rapid response “crash team” organised by a doctor’s 
professional college to minimise the adverse effects of a complaint, while Nash et al. (2013), 
having asked respondents to nominate what support they would want if they were to experience 
another medico-legal matter, found 88% wanted someone to attend court with them, 76.5% wanted 
more information about the medico-legal process, 78.3% wanted more information about what 
services were available for them, 81.8% wanted someone available within their medical defence 
organisation for contact when needed, and 75.6% suggested a peer support program. These 
services would complement the activities of the defence team. Certainly the participants in my 
study identified the lack of information about the process as a large contributor to their 
apprehension about what was happening, where it was headed, and on what basis, so the 
provision of additional information, and support outside their actual defence, would relieve some of 
this uncertainty. 
The emerging plotline: Challenge to moral identity 
What emerged as the underlying plotline to the collective of doctors in trouble narrative, was how 
participants’ sense of identity had been challenged by having a complaint. As the Findings 
established, the biographical disruption (Bury, 1982) of having a complaint, which represents a 
significant or even catastrophic event in a doctor’s life, was sufficient to disrupt and potentially 
forever change the anticipated course of a doctor’s life, and each account represented the struggle 
to recalibrate and re-establish a sense of equilibrium that would see them restored, not as the 
same, but as ‘good’. Williams (1984) wrote about narrative re-construction while Nelson (2001) 
referred to “narrative repair” and Walker (2006) to “moral repair” as ways that people whose lives 
have been disrupted in significant ways seek to “reconstruct a sense of order from the 
fragmentation produced” (by the event) (Williams, 1984, p. 177). Telling the narrative in an 
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interview or elsewhere is a way of making sense of a disruptive event (Riessman, 1990), and how 
it is told gives an indication of how the person is undertaking the “repair” of their disrupted life. 
There have been many characterisations of narrative “templates” – Frank (1995) for instance 
named these as the Restitutive, the Chaos or the Quest narratives, and Robinson (1990) identified 
another broad typology as progressive, regressive or stable. As noted in the methodology, this 
thesis did not set out to undertake a narrative analysis which would have analysed the transcripts 
in these terms, and indeed which would have affected how the interviews were conducted, but to 
analyse the narratives to identify the underlying aspects of the complaints process that caused the 
distress that had been studied elsewhere. Some of these typologies can be applied to the 
participants’ narratives – such as the chaos implied by the sense of loss of control and the 
powerlessness – or the restitution which looks for attempts to retrieve the path of the life course 
narrative where the career that was mapped out was “disrupted” by the complaint. However, as 
Frank (1995) says, restitution would never recover what was lost. It would always be different, 
even if good had come of the experience. Bury (2001) expresses some caution in the 
“overdetermined nature” of these analyses. In this respect, the translation of the concepts behind 
“the illness narratives” and the disruption so caused, into the biographical disruption of doctors’ 
experience is valuable, but it is not determinate. To provide a more nuanced conceptualisation, 
Plummer (1983, in Robinson, 1990, p. 1177)103 describes experience as “a stream; a flow; social 
structures are seamless webs of crisscrossing negotiations; biographies are in a constant state of 
becoming and as they evolve, so their subjective accounts of themselves evolve”. In this way, the 
event that gave rise to a complaint may certainly have disturbed many, as we have found in the 
participant narratives, to the point of chaos for a time; it disrupted their daily working and family life 
while going through the process with a sense of dread for what may or may not eventuate, but it 
cannot be said to determine the eventual future because the future is not yet here. During the 
process, the future may have looked bleak and uncertain, but even in the telling during the 
interview, that future had already arrived as they were present to tell the tale. But it was clear, the 
future when going into medicine was not to be what had been anticipated. As Frank (1995, p. 55) 
said, “The present is not what the past was supposed to lead to; the future is contingent”. There 
was no doubt, however, that the process had left an indelible mark, and the interview was one 
occasion to attempt to retrieve some of the valued anticipated future. This, to Riessman (1990), is 
the “moral stance” taken in understanding a significant event in someone’s life. The unfolding 
reflection on the experience by participants revealed this to be at the heart of their narrative – 
described by Ricoeur as the emergent plot that underlies each account of the experience. 
Neutralising the threats 
In unravelling this moral dilemma, participants made attempts to neutralise the impact of the 
threats to their moral stance, by findings reasons for the complaint (see Findings in the section 
                                                          
103 Plummer, K. (1983) Documents of Life, Chap. I. Allen & Unwin, London, quoted in Robinson, 1990. 
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Neutralising the threats: Am I to blame?). While these will not be repeated here, it is useful to recall 
how rationalisations, justifications and other reasons were contemplated as ways of mitigating 
participants’ perceived blameworthiness, as if they were bargaining their way to seeing 
themselves, and being seen as not so bad, or even good. Nelson (2001) likens this to the counter-
story that a “damaged identity” creates to neutralise the damaging effect of a threat to the self and 
self-respect. Most reflect on how it could have been different, and these insights may provide a 
guiding light into how procedures and protocols may be amended in the future to take greater 
account of the adverse impacts on those involved in these proceedings. 
This, of course, is natural, and is consistent with doctors wanting to understand the underlying 
reasons for a complaint that go beyond the causes identified in the legal process. It also sheds 
further light on why many participants feel the process is unfair, as they have not had the 
opportunity to express their deliberations throughout the process, and if they do, it can be 
interpreted as defensiveness. It feels that the system, which listens to complainants, does not 
listen to doctors, adding to the perception the process is weighted towards complainants. 
Responding to the threats: Changes 
Part Five of the Findings summarised how participants reflected on what difference, if any, the 
experience had made to them, their practice, attitudes to their patients, their practice and their 
career. Some felt the experience had overall been a positive one as it had made them think more 
deeply about how they practised and what could be learned from the complaint. Others weighed it 
up and “still love their job”, in spite of seeing the complaint as a challenging intrusion and the 
experience of dealing with it unpleasant. Others were less forgiving, and carried a burden of 
ingrained distress and anxiety that flowed through their everyday lives and affected their attitude, 
perspectives and behaviour. 
Some changes could be said to have made a positive difference and provide for safer care, such 
as writing more detailed notes, being more attentive or being more cautious about demanding 
patients. This is similar to the perceived practice changes identified in the study by Nash et al. 
(2010), including the introduction of improved systems for tracking test results (48%), for identifying 
non-attending patients (39%), for auditing one’s practice (35%), referring patients more than usual 
(43%), ordering tests more than usual (55%), and prescribing medications more than usual (11%). 
Respondents also reported improved communication of risk (66%), increased disclosure of 
uncertainty (44%); 33% considered giving up medicine, 32% considered reducing their working 
hours and 40% considered retiring early due to concerns about medico-legal issues. The latter 
results were all significantly greater for doctors with experience of a complaint, compared with 
those who had not. While many of these steps may indeed lead to safer patient care, they may be 
unnecessary, be costly, and may even cause harm, such as ordering imaging technology 
unnecessarily (Studdert et al., 2005). Importantly, if they are done as a result of fear instead of 
one’s good clinical judgement, they are known as “defensive medicine”, such as ordering tests and 
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treatments, undertaking procedures and referring to specialists more than necessary, primarily to 
protect the doctor from liability and complaints, but as not to be beneficial to patient care. As many 
as 96% of doctors in high risk specialties in the USA reported practising defensively (Studdert et 
al., 2005), and 78% in a UK study (Ortashi et al., 2013). 
Avoiding certain procedures was another aspect found in Nash (2010), such as no longer 
practising obstetrics or other high risk procedures, and seeing every patient as a potential litigant. 
Another worrying finding was that only 26% said they now relate empathically to patients. 
Participants in my study likewise began to avoid certain patients, especially those with similar 
presentations as the complainant, or responded differently to those patients they did not like. 
Bourne (Bourne et al., 2016) found that doctors in their study began to practice more defensively, 
were practising “poorer medicine”, and engaged in “hedging behaviour”, which relates to avoidance 
of certain procedures and high-risk patients. The significant impact on the doctor-patient 
relationship was also a worrying aspect of changes that occur (Cunningham, 2004a). Several other 
studies have noted that defensive medicine is a common reaction to the fear or reality of being 
involved in a medico-legal matter, and they paint a similar picture (Charles, 1984; Ennis & Vincent, 
1994; Verdhuis, 1994; Summerton, 1995; Jain & Ogden, 1999; Nash et al., 2009). 
Two issues come to mind here: one is that the fact of a complaint has power. It can influence not 
only how one sees him- or herself as a doctor of worth, but it can lead to significant changes to 
how one practises, and not all of such changes are of benefit to the patient. The other is that the 
objective of a complaints system, to protect the public by identifying instances of unsafe care, is 
perhaps missing the mark if it inadvertently causes further harm. Finally, a complaint has the power 
to make a doctor feel that the system has identified the “shocking thing that they’ve done, but it 
doesn’t mean their whole life is shocking; but at least at the time it must feel to them like that’s the 
case” (DiT2). 
Conclusion 
This thesis did not set out to advocate for those who feel unjustly done by, although there are 
many doctors who feel this is the case. Their voices can be heard through such publications as 
Ann Daniel’s (1998) book Scapegoats for a profession: Uncovering procedural injustice, or the 
activities of the recently formed group of disaffected health professionals, the Health Professionals 
Australia Reform Association (HPARA)104 which advocates for the reform of health care regulation, 
and justice for all health practitioners. Nevertheless, this study shows that there is a space in how 
the best interests of the public are protected that has not adequately taken account of how the 
complaints process, as it has been conceived and administered, affects those who are deemed to 
be a threat to the public. 
                                                          
104 //: www.hpara.org.au/ 
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While there is a growing recognition that regulatory processes do impact on those caught up in 
them, and that they can be stressful, the onus has largely been on the individual to take care of 
themselves. The participants in this study have shown what it is actually like and what it is about 
the process that has affected them. These provide some important clues as to how it could be 
different so it does not have such damaging and lasting effects. 
The history of regulation showed that regulatory processes had to respond to the changing face of 
health care, which brought new threats to safety at a time when public awareness coincided with 
rising expectations of accountability. Transition from self-regulation to externally imposed systems 
for the governance of health service systems has seen the imposition on the health professions to 
comply with those external processes. Pressure on the former social contract meant that the terms 
of this contract needed to be renegotiated, and efforts to do so have been demonstrated through 
the “new professionalism”, the revision of Codes of Conduct that take greater account of patients’ 
interests, and the ever-tightening activities of the regulators to oblige health practitioners to 
behave. Promotion of confidence in the health system and in the regulators has been at the 
forefront of the message to the public, in order to restore the trust that for the past decades has 
been under threat by a wary public suspicious that yet another bungle or scandal meant that the 
health practitioners were not worthy of the trust once taken for granted, and that the regulators 
were not doing their job. 
Public confidence had to be restored by improving patient safety, and also by identifying how 
things go wrong. Complaints-handling was partly intended to “create an effective bridge, at a 
national policy level, between the complaints management system and the quality management 
system” (Hsieh, 2011)105. This would explain the emphasis on systemic reforms in the health 
system and preventive measures which would become the foundation for the risk-based approach 
of protecting the public. This would be at the expense of addressing individual grievances, 
although as Carney (Carney et al., 2016) points out, the focus of some complaint systems is on 
resolution, while others have both regulatory and prosecutorial functions, as does the HCCC, in a 
co-regulatory arrangement. 
This risk-based approach has exerted pressure on the individual professionals to explain 
themselves in the context of an environment that is perceived as assuming they may be in the 
wrong. What this does not achieve is a restoration of trust in the individual doctor-patient 
relationship. As Allsop (1994, p. 178) observed from her study, each party to a dispute has a 
different perspective, having interpreted what happened from their own view of the experience. 
“For complainants, by the time a letter is written a threshold of intolerance has been passed and 
the doctor-patient relationship is likely to have been broken. … Equally doctors, once faced with 
such an eventuality, will wish also to be heard.” What then happens is that the complainant’s 
                                                          
105 Hsieu, S. (2011). Health complaints handling systems: A comparison between Britain, Australia and Taiwan. Health 
Services Management Research, 24(2), in Carney et al. (2016). 
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version is interpreted by the complaints-handler in terms of the public interest it may or may not 
represent, and the response is mediated through a legal process that addresses those public 
interest concerns. Neither party is truly being heard. This recalls my earlier understanding, based 
on the findings, that what is missing is the expression of the doctors’ personal response to a 
complaint, and the meaning this has for their personal and professional identity. This is the silent 
narrative to which the title of this chapter refers, and this is what is at the heart of their moral 
anguish. What the participants of this study showed, through their powerful and candid testimonies, 
was that the process of dealing with complaints is distressing, and that aspects of it contribute to a 
sense of guilt and shame, that they feel blameworthy even if they are not, and that they are less 
than the doctors they believed themselves to be. 
Cunningham questions whether having a complaint improves the delivery of patient care, and there 
have been several indications that if anything, it has a negative effect in terms of defensive 
behaviour, and impacts on their health, which in turn affects their ability to practise safely: 
Some effect is expected following a complaint. The profession’s regulatory processes are intended 
to ensure doctors do change their practices. However, the change is expected to be positive, to 
remedy dangerous or disrespectful care, and to ensure that future patients benefit from the 
process. The study suggests there is doubt as to whether these expected benefits actually accrue 
(Cunningham & Dovey, 2000, p. 467). 
Vincent’s (1994) study of why people sue doctors likewise doubts if litigation has any beneficial 
effects on standards of care. What the process does achieve is reduced goodwill towards patients 
(Cunningham, 2004), loss of joy (Riley, 2004; Cunningham 2004a), and all the other impacts that 
have been so eloquently expressed by the other studies which sit beside my own. 
It could therefore be argued that to reduce adverse impacts and to achieve improvements in the 
quality of care, an educational process into the experience may reduce the possibility of defensive 
practice becoming normalised. This could be achieved through a more collaborative approach 
between the profession and complaints authorities (Cunningham & Dovey, 2006). Cunningham 
(2015) also recommends that there be a reflective process, one that is currently missing in the 
complaints process, as the “opportunity for careful structured reflection allowing learning and 
change” (Cunningham, 2015, p. 29), which would be a role for the professions. The other aspect is 
to ameliorate the distress, in order to assist doctors regain a sense of emotional equilibrium while 
undergoing the process (Charles, 2001). This can be achieved by enhancing knowledge of what is 
already available, that doctors be generally more aware of the potential impact of complaints and 
that they be encouraged to seek help from the outset. In addition, the simple question “whom have 
you told”, asked by those advising a doctor in trouble, is a useful signal to how they may travel, and 
how to intervene in order to “guide them towards support”. At the least, pastoral care is necessary 
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to support doctors during the process, and to prevent long-term emotional consequences 
(Cunningham, 2015). 
The difficulty for doctors in this regulatory environment is that professional regulation is perceived 
as discipline and sanction, whereas the regulators see there is a positive correlation between their 
interventions and the safety and quality of care (Quick, 2011, p. 5). In regulation, therefore, he said 
it is not reasonable to expect total compliance, that the pursuit of perfection is not possible, and 
that the focus should be on “governing rather than erasing” the gap between expectations and 
performance. Unfortunately for most doctors who come under the net of disciplinary processes, the 
perception of punitive intent is common. Regulating doctors is perceived to be designed around the 
assumption that all doctors are potentially at risk and surveillance is necessary to prevent calamity. 
As a consequence, there is an underlying fear of trouble, of being sued or complained about if they 
do not measure up and they will be regarded as one of “the bad guys”. The complex process of 
regulation, to McGivern (2010, p. 606) is thus: 
Spectacular regulation focuses on rare but high profile cases of malpractice, which 
tarnishes the reputation of doctors and suggest that more regulation is needed, rather 
than its impact on the day-to-day practice of the “invisible majority” who have never 
been found guilty of medical malpractice. 
But most doctors are not “bad guys”, and even if they have complaints, it does not mean they are 
bad or that it is acceptable that they should suffer morbid anxiety and distress. As DiT3 said, after 
he had resigned: 
If knowing that other reasonable people can have complaints as well, it kind of 
neutralised it to a certain extent but it also made me think, you know, in terms of 
practising, if we go through this really quite dreadful emotional angst every time there’s 
a complaint and it’s happening to all of these people, why the hell do I want to remain 
in clinical practice (DiT3)? 
The challenge is how to prevent the process from even causing a doctor to think like this (unless 
there are good reasons why they should no longer be doctors). 
In summary, a complaint casts a shadow of doubt over a doctor’s practice. Most have said that 
they still harbour such doubts, even if a complaint was not substantiated. Being a “good doctor”, 
and being seen to be good, is important to doctors. Being accused of not being a good doctor is 
very threatening, and they find that recovery is very hard, even years later. It is not sufficient to 
blame the individual for not being resilient or not coping, because there are factors outside of their 
control but that are inside of the control of regulatory authorities that add stress and uncertainty to 
an already confronting event such as receiving a complaint. What many doctors need is validation 
that the profession (colleagues, peers, team members, administrators, managers) will not rush to 
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judge, will acknowledge that the process is stressful and that they may need some human 
understanding and empathy, even if they are guilty or are suspected of being so. Most doctors are 
good or at least good enough. Even if they are not, how can the process better contribute to their 
recovery instead of diminishing them further106? 
Limitations 
The study was based on a small group of self-selected few doctors. They had their reasons for 
participating, which was to speak about what it was like. Those who wanted this to serve to 
advocate for their quest for justice were not interviewed as this was not the purpose of the study. 
Nor were the otherwise disaffected not interested in having their voice heard, or those who were 
not bothered about having a complaint, or who had nothing to say. Being a small group, no 
inferences could be drawn about patterns emerging from demographic groups, such as more 
mature, experienced doctors being more reflective, or that younger ones were who felt they had 
more to learn. No effort was made to draw out fine distinctions of this nature, nor whether gender 
makes a difference, or type of specialty. Such information would be very useful, and suggests 
further research. 
The other limitation was that although it was tempting to offer suggested changes in the system, 
other than presenting the drawbacks, frustrations, confusions and delays in the bureaucratic 
process itself, it is for the administrators of these procedures to give thought to how they may 
better communicate with respondents and to address these problems without compromising 
fairness and the public interest. The incommensurability between law and medicine has been 
referred to, with their different language and culture, as well as the notion that the process is very 
legalistic and alien to medicine, and perceived to be adversarial. Procedures in other jurisdictions 
can be less daunting, and therapeutic jurisprudence (Wexler, 2000) is one such approach that may 
suit the resolution of many disputes in health care that would avoid the punitive flavour of existing 
processes. However, space does not allow such deliberations, nor the limits of my own experience 
in pursuing such options. It took a Royal Commission to bring about fundamental change. All I can 
do is present some very powerful accounts of what being complained about is like, and what it 
means, to provide greater insight into why it hurts so much.  
                                                          
106 From author’s address to the Australasian Doctors Health Conference, 25 October 2017. 
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Epilogue: a Personal Perspective 
This thesis has identified some aspects of the complaints process that have been shown to 
contribute either directly or indirectly to doctors’ distress. The two key findings reveal that the 
process is perceived as unfair, and that the threat to moral legitimacy is the foundation of doctors’ 
fear, distress and consternation. These findings suggest the reasons are intangible, existential 
responses to a system that digs at the fibre of what makes a doctor who they are. The value of a 
narrative approach in being able to identify these reasons, and the factors that led to these 
conclusions while undertaking this study, cannot be underestimated. Such issues have implications 
for change, not only in the process itself, but in the foundational principles on which the process 
operates. This is not to suggest that there should not be a complaints system, nor that it is not 
necessary. History showed us very clearly that these presumptions are now a given. 
Legal history has also demonstrated how the law responds to changing circumstances, community 
values and expectations, and political imperatives. Such changes may shed light on how current 
systems and institutions are functioning, giving us pause to reflect on their adequacy or 
appropriateness and whether they meet changing expectations. The recent inquiries into financial 
institutions and child sexual abuse by the clergy are examples of how identified problems that have 
a significant impact on the community need to be examined and remedied. In this way, my thesis 
showed how the Chelmsford Private Hospital judicial inquiry was instrumental in identifying major 
structural problems in health care governance and lack of accountability of the medical profession, 
and how these problems may be remedied. As a consequence of this latter, an institution (the 
HCCC in NSW, and equivalents in the other states) was created that would deal with complaints as 
both a window into problems in the health system and an avenue for the resolution of personal 
grievances. It was created on the basis of a model deemed appropriate at the time of its 
instigation. Originally envisaged by Justice Slattery, who oversaw the inquiry, that the NSW body 
would be a sub-division of the Supreme Court, but after much debate about its purpose and who it 
was serving (the public interest or as an advocacy service for members of the public), it was almost 
inevitable that it would have a strong legal base that echoed the language and procedures of 
existing legal processes. For an individual to be brought before such an authority with its new-
found powers was the source of much consternation, as it continues to be. 
This study has been a reminder that the consternation has not gone away and has brought back 
into the spotlight what has been known for these past decades, that complaints processes may 
cause harm to those complained about. This is set against the recent reporting of the unacceptable 
loss of doctors to suicide due to the unsustainable pressures that many endure. Some of these 
pressures are due either directly or indirectly to involvement in a medico-legal matter, an event 
which for some may mean loss of their career, and certainly threats to reputation. The language of 
the medico-legal world is not that of medicine, where failure can mean catastrophe and is therefore 
not part of the lexicon. “Failure” in the medico-legal world means a breach of a rule, a regulation, a 
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code, a failure of judgement, a failure to be good enough by established standards. It is a 
retrospective examination of what has passed, and is assessed and judged by those who were not 
there. 
This is at the heart of the consternation. Doctors fear they will not be believed, that they must 
defend themselves, for the very nature of alleging a failure of some sort sets the tone of what is to 
follow. They perceive this process as adversarial. To allege a failure, shortcoming, mistake or 
deficiency, leads to the natural desire to defend oneself. This leads to many of the behaviours 
described by the experts, which they then need to be able to manage in order to assist. It does not 
suggest a spirit of resolution, but how to come out unscathed and unblemished. Yet the legal 
process denies it is adversarial, asserting that it is inquisitorial, that it is educational and 
restorative. Few participants acknowledged any of these applied to their own experience, albeit 
that all agreed a complaints process is necessary. What doctors also perceive is that the process 
is taken out of their control. This may be to protect their interests, but there is a sense that they 
cannot tell their story without it being manipulated, and the parts of the story that matter most to 
them are carefully put to silence. These are the personal and human reactions to an event, or to 
the complaint itself. This they must deal with on their own. An astute adviser, such as those whom I 
interviewed as experts, will recognise these reactions and if they appear as “obstacles”, then they 
are dealt with before the real business of defence can begin. Such a question as what do you fear 
most seems simple, but it could open up a conversation that means someone has heard and 
acknowledged the human reaction, as does whom have you told as opening up a conversation 
about deeper feelings of shame, stigma and loss of reputation, or career and livelihood, which are 
the common responses participants spoke about, and that have been identified by previous 
researchers. 
This suggests that to minimise distress, doctors not only need medico-legal advice, but that the 
personal reaction to receiving a complaint, to the limbo state while the process takes its course and 
to the last stage of finalisation, need some acknowledgement and timely intervention, where it is 
needed. Not all doctors need this attention, nor want it, but many do, or they suffer in silence, 
bewilderment and perhaps distress. Whose responsibility should this be? As we know it is more 
common than not for doctors to avoid seeking professional help, we should not leave it to them to 
recognise and act on their own symptoms. Lawyers and medico-legal advisers are not trained to 
provide psychological support, nor would this be appropriate. But those simple words, as above, 
may be sufficient to bring to the fore what may be needed to provide more holistic support to 
doctors during this anxious event, and for a protocol to be developed to take over from there, 
depending on the response. 
The other aspect is how to aim for restoration to one’s normal competent self. The process then 
also needs to provide an opportunity for reflection in a non-judgemental way to appraise the event 
and their practice. If the shame of alleged failure gets in the way of restoration by being judged, or 
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judging oneself through the norms or standards of practice, then it can impede the learning 
opportunity provided by such appraisal. Therefore, the objective of the process to be educative is 
curtailed and replaced by defensive practice, which in itself is counterproductive. 
The question asked in the thesis was does it matter? I argued that it does. The question we can 
now ask is should it be different?  And then, if so, how can it be different? I do not wish to imply 
that the authorities are not aware of these issues, or that they do not care. In fact, many changes 
have been introduced to lessen the focus on investigations and more onto enabling those less 
serious matters to be resolved more expeditiously, to acknowledge that the process may be 
stressful and to encourage doctors to seek support. Greater emphasis has been placed on doctors’ 
health in general, and resources to support such services are available. The medical insurers are 
well aware of the personal impacts and aim to educate and support doctors through the process. 
However, the onus still resides with the individual to look after themselves, to learn to be resilient, 
to cope. My view is that the system should not be so threatening as to lead doctors into this state 
of mind in the first place. 
There is another dimension that is missing from the picture. This is the moral dimension that was 
discussed in the thesis. Threats to reputation are real, as are the shame and stigma associated 
with complaints. These are the key reasons doctors do not seek support, tell others, or obtain 
professional help if they need it. Doctors need to feel validated that they are worthy, and that they 
remain worthy in spite of an allegation that they are not. While they are afforded procedural 
fairness, this is only the beginning, for it does not mean they feel the process is just, that they will 
be heard nor that anyone will be really listening. They feel the process is weighted towards the 
rights of complainants, and that the system assumes they are guilty until they can prove otherwise. 
They lose control over their professional life and future, until they can win it back, a process that is 
mediated by the lawyers. This is why it feels adversarial, and being in such a dependant position is 
not a comfortable place for a doctor who needs to feel in charge, to be confident to assume 
leadership and to exercise sound judgement. Given this system, it is essential that such defence 
and support be provided, since too many doctors have fallen over the edge from attempting to 
navigate the process on their own. 
Validation, acceptance, collegiality are all essential to one’s personal and professional wellbeing. 
When this is threatened, it can be the source of much distress. Therefore, the system and those 
within it need to be better balanced and less judgemental. To judge a person by one mistake 
negates the good they have done. It needs to help a doctor hang on to that good or to return to a 
time when their vision for an exceptional and fulfilling future may return to them. This is 
compromised when all the focus is on the wrongdoing, a prolonged and tortuous wait as the 
process unravels itself towards a conclusion. These are the elements of the process that 
participants perceive to be “unfair”. 
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The suggested improvements identified in the chapter “How could it be different” are a guide to 
what can be done within the system to mitigate the harm. I suggest that these be used to identify 
the basis for another conversation, this one with the regulators, as to what could make a critical 
difference to a doctor’s survival. These can be listed as: 
Style of communication, being less bureaucratic and being more informative about the basis 
for decisions; 
Being more informative in general about the process, given many have the impression that 
complaints are being assessed not by their peers but by non-medical administrative staff, 
and so have little trust in the decision-making process; 
Timeframes for assessment decisions and key steps in this process need to be better 
articulated to remove some of the uncertainty; 
Timeframes for doctors to respond are often unrealistic when access to documents and 
records is delayed or denied, or due to the complexity of a matter requiring significant time to 
construct a considered response; 
Dealing with less significant complaints more expeditiously, and explaining why they must be 
dealt with. 
I would add that communication could not only advise respondents to seek advice from their 
medical indemnity insurers but could forewarn doctors that the process may be stressful, that it 
may take some time and make suggestions about self-care. When a matter is finalised, letters 
generally acknowledge that the process may have been stressful, but this is often perceived as 
patronising and tokenistic. It is like telling someone that we know we have hurt you, but we accept 
no responsibility for having done so. 
While the regulator AHPRA believes in transparency and that it will enhance trust if the public has 
the right to know about doctors who have been disciplined or who have conditions, this adds 
significantly to doctors’ distress and sense of unfairness. It adds to the sense of guilt to a wrong-
doing, which may not have been a wrongdoing at all. The public does not have “insider knowledge” 
of how the disciplinary process works and will therefore have a biased view based on the fact of a 
complaint and its outcome, without having the contextual background. Therefore, doctors’ 
perceptions that their reputations are at stake are understandable, and they have no right of reply 
to this public disclosure. This aspect needs to be reconsidered so it provides a more balanced view 
to the public. 
Summary 
I was asked to provide my own perspectives of what needs to change in order to prevent or 
minimise the damage caused by the receipt of a complaint. The first point is that hurt doctors may 
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harm patients, which compromises the aim of protecting the public by having a complaints system. 
It is not sufficient to advise doctors to look after themselves or seek professional help as it is akin 
to holding them responsible for not coping or not being resilient enough. The second point 
therefore is to identify what can be changed to prevent the hurt in the first place. This thesis 
provides several areas where the process could be improved to minimise the factors that 
contribute to distress and anxiety. 
The third is to reconsider the very principles on which the process was constructed: an adversarial 
approach that is perceived to assume guilt by its very nature that must be proven otherwise. If we 
fail an exam, we are not guilty of failing an exam; but if we make a mistake, why are we guilty of 
doing so. We may do better next time if we understand it better, but this process is not about 
learning, it is about blame. This is very damaging, because it establishes a dualistic frame of mind 
that evokes such values as unworthiness, blamefulness, badness, incompetence, or just not being 
good enough, which can be generalised to a doctor’s whole image of themselves. Such values are 
antithetical to the values instilled in a doctor’s professionalism, such values being the groundwork 
for everything a doctor aspires to be and is trained for. Somewhere in the process, somewhere in a 
doctor’s life, there needs to be a way of restoring one’s sense of worth and value, for a doctor to be 
restored to their sense of equilibrium in order to continue as a fully functioning, competent doctor, 
not the diminished one that this process leaves many in a state of being. These are conversations 
that need to be had, that I alone cannot provide the answer for. The principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence may provide some of the answers to a way forward, as will the demonstration of 
greater empathy and kindness. 
Lastly, while this thesis is about medical practitioners, the same principles apply to any other 
professionals who have been called to account for their actions, particularly those in the helping 
professions – dentists, psychologists, veterinarians, physiotherapists, nurses, paramedics, and all 
the other allied health professionals – as well as the lawyers, engineers, architects, police and so 
on. Most of such people do not set out to cause harm, but to use their skills and expertise to help 
people and society. Doctors need support in dealing with the more challenging aspects of their 
work, and the opportunity to learn from mistakes and make improvements when they need to, but 
do not need blame for not coping when they cry or fall to pieces. 
 
Elizabeth van Ekert 
9 April 2019 
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Appendices 
Appendix One 
Doctors’ experience of complaints against them 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
(1) What is this study about? 
 
This research study is about understanding doctors’ experience of complaints against 
them, and about the effectiveness of any support obtained during the complaints process. 
The results will be used to inform complaints-handling bodies and AHPRA, providers of 
support services, the Colleges and the medical defence organisations about the impact of 
complaints from the doctors’ perspective. The knowledge will also contribute to a greater 
understanding of the nature and impact of the regulatory environment on the profession, 
so that medical educators and curriculum developers may better prepare student and 
junior doctors for what may lie ahead. 
 
You have been invited to participate in this study because your experience of complaints 
will provide a valuable contribution to understanding why doctors respond as they do. 
This Participant Information Statement tells you about the research study. Knowing what 
is involved will help you decide if you want to take part in the research. Please read this 
sheet carefully and ask questions about anything that you don’t understand or want to 
know more about. 
 
Participation in this research study is voluntary. So it is up to you whether you wish to 
take part or not. 
 
By giving your consent to take part in this study you are telling us that you: 
 Understand what you have read 
 Agree to take part in the research study as outlined below 
 Agree to the use of your personal information as described. 
 
You may keep this Participant Information Statement. 
 
(2) Who is running the study? 
 
The study is being conducted by Elizabeth van Ekert as the basis for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at the Centre for Values, Ethics and Law in Medicine, Faculty of 
Medicine, The University of Sydney. This will take place under the supervision of Dr 
Claire Hooker, senior lecturer, Centre for Values, Ethics and Law in Medicine, Faculty of 
Medicine, The University of Sydney. 
 
Auxiliary supervision is being provided by: 
 A/Professor Ian Kerridge, Associate Professor in Bioethics, Centre for Values, 
Ethics and Law in Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, The University of Sydney 
 Professor Garry Walter, Professor Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, The 
University of Sydney 
 Professor Cameron Stewart, Professor of health, Law and Ethics, Sydney Law 
School, The University of Sydney 
 Dr Jennifer Fleming, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Centre for Values, Ethics 
and Law in Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, The University of Sydney. 
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(3) What will the study involve for me? 
The study will build on previous studies concerning the adverse impact of medico-legal 
matters on many doctors’ health and wellbeing and aims to understand the reasons why 
there is an adverse impact. 
 
You will participate in a face-to-face interview with the researcher that will be conducted 
at a venue, time and date to suit your convenience and comfort as we are mindful that 
you may wish to keep this confidential. 
 
All that we ask is that you have undergone the experience of at least one complaint 
against you, that is now closed, and that you will be happy to talk about your experience. 
The interview will not be focused on the complaint itself nor on its outcome but on your 
personal experience of the process including any support you may have received. If your 
matter went to a formal hearing, the researcher will not access the decision unless you 
think it may add to an understanding of your experience. This will be discussed with you 
before or during the interview. 
 
The interview will be audio-taped and transcribed. If any identifying details are 
inadvertently included in the tape, they will be removed from the data before it is 
analysed. The transcriber will have signed a confidentiality agreement prior to having 
access to the data. 
 
(4) How much of my time will the study take? 
The interview will take from 60 to 90 minutes of your time but in preparation for the 
interview, it will be helpful if you reflect on your experience. 
 
(5) Who can take part in the study 
In this phase of the study, only doctors who are currently practising or recently retired, 
and who have experienced at least one complaint against them, may participate. This 
may be a complaint to a complaints body or AHPRA, or a claim for compensation. The 
complaint must have been finalised and if it went to a formal hearing, any appeals period 
must have elapsed. This latter stipulation is to protect doctors against the remote chance 
of discoverability while a matter remains open. 
 
(6) Do I have to be in the study? Can I withdraw from the study once I've started? 
Being in this study is completely voluntary and you do not have to take part. Your 
decision whether to participate will not affect your current or future relationship with the 
researchers or anyone else at The University of Sydney. 
 
If you decide to take part in the study and then change your mind later, you are free to 
withdraw at any time. You can do this by informing the researcher, Ms Elizabeth van 
Ekert, on 0401997537 or elizabeth.vanekert@sydney.edu.au. 
 
You may refuse to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer during the 
interview. 
 
You will also be free to stop the interview at any time, and proceed after a break or at 
another time, or withdraw completely. If the latter, we will not collect any more information 
from you. Any recordings will be erased and the information you have provided will be 
removed from our study records and will not be included in the study results. 
  
(7) Are there any risks or costs associated with being in the study? 
Aside from giving up your time, we do not expect there to be major risks or costs 
associated with taking part in this study. However, you need to be aware of the following: 
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Emotional risks 
There is a chance that memories may be stirred up that may not have been pleasant, or 
that were quite distressing. If you are hesitating now about this, you may wish to discuss 
this further with Ms van Ekert. Alternatively, the medical defence organisations have been 
informed that the study is being conducted, so you may wish to speak with your medico-
legal adviser. [Name of MDO] has also nominated [name of contact person] as liaison 
between the researcher and [Name of MDO] members, and she is willing to discuss any 
concerns participants may have about the study. 
 
If during the interview you feel unnerved or distressed, we may break for a moment or 
resume on another occasion. On the other hand, if you wish to withdraw at any time, you 
may do so with no consequence. If you wish to stop the interview altogether, the audio-
recording tape will be erased and any other information you have provided will not be 
included in the study. 
 
At the end of this information sheet, there is a list of support services you may wish to 
contact before, during or after your participation in this study. 
 
Disclosure of illegal activity 
You need to be aware that if you are engaged in illegal activity, the researcher may be 
under an obligation to notify the authorities. The most likely activity that may come up 
during an interview relates to the acquisition, possession and/or use of illegal substances 
or illegally obtained substances. 
 
If you think this may apply to you, you have the choice of (a) declining to participate (b) 
being aware that during the interview it is important that you do not reveal any information 
that may oblige the researcher to inform the authorities. This is not to say that you should 
not talk about your coping strategies during the interview, as information about these will 
be most welcome, but be aware that you should not provide details of potentially 
indictable offences. If this inadvertently occurs during the interview, the interview will be 
stopped and the tape turned off, while the researcher discusses with you the 
consequences of proceeding with this part of the interview. 
 
Potential for concern about “impairment” 
The researcher is not a clinician and is therefore under no legal obligation to notify 
AHPRA if she becomes aware that you as a participant may be using alcohol or drugs to 
the extent that your wellbeing and that of your patients may be at risk. Nevertheless, she 
may feel a moral obligation to exercise her duty of care towards you and your patients. 
Accordingly, she will use her judgement as to whether to proceed with the interview. She 
will at all times discuss this with you and speak with you about obtaining appropriate 
support. This discussion would not take place while the tape is running, and the interview 
will only continue by mutual agreement. 
 
(8) Are there any benefits associated with being in the study? 
While there are no tangible benefits of participating in this study, you will have the 
knowledge that you are making a substantial contribution to the profession’s 
understanding of the impact of complaints. 
 
Much is known about complainants: who they are, their motivations for complaining, and 
their expectations of the complaints process. But little is known about doctors’ real 
experience and perceptions. Your contribution will be invaluable in adding to this 
knowledge, which will be used to help mitigate any adverse effects in others. 
 
(9) What will happen to information about me that is collected during the study? 
Material that includes personal information about you (name, address, contact details, 
type of practice), records of conversations with you, emails and correspondence will be 
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kept in a file that only the research team can have access to. This information will be 
used to communicate with you as necessary, and some de-identified demographic data 
may be referred to in the analysis. The latter may refer to your specialty or type of 
practice but will not in any way identify you. 
 
Actual data collected will be in the form of written notes taken by the researcher, and an 
audio-recording and transcript of the interview. The transcript of the interview will only be 
known by a unique participant number. The transcript will be prepared by the researcher, 
so no third party will be able to associate you with the data collected in the interview. 
 
Following analysis of the data, storage will be in the Medical Faculty storage facility. 
Materials collected will be kept for seven years, and will be de-identified, except for the 
consent form that you will have signed prior to your participation. The materials will then 
be shredded and recordings will be destroyed. The data will not be used in future 
research projects, nor will it be submitted to any data sharing resource. 
 
The findings from the study will be published in the medical literature and as a doctoral 
thesis. The researcher has also undertaken to provide a report of the finding to relevant 
organisations including the medical defence organisations, AHPRA, the State Medical 
Councils, BeyondBlue, the Australasian Doctors Health Network and the Medical 
Benevolent Association. The medical press will be informed of the study outcomes and 
the researcher will be available for interviews, forums and conference presentations to 
discuss the implications of the findings. At no time will information that could reveal your 
identity be disclosed. 
 
By providing your consent, you are agreeing to us collecting personal information about 
you for the purposes of this research study. Your information will only be used for the 
purposes outlined in this Participant Information Statement, unless you consent 
otherwise. 
 
Your information will be stored securely and your identity and information will be kept 
strictly confidential, except as required by law. Study findings may be published, but you 
will not be individually identifiable in these publications. 
 
(10) Can I tell other people about the study? 
Yes, you are welcome to tell other people about the study. 
 
(11) What if I would like further information about the study? 
When you have read this information, Elizabeth van Ekert will be available to discuss it 
with you further and answer any questions you may have. If you would like to know more 
at any stage during the study, please feel free to contact her on 0401997537 or 
elizabth.vanekert@sydney.edu.au. 
 
(12) Will I be told the results of the study? 
You have a right to receive feedback about the overall results of this study. You can tell 
us that you wish to receive feedback in the form of a summary of findings by ticking the 
box on the consent form, and providing your mailing address. You will receive this 
feedback after the study is finished. 
 
(13) What if I have a complaint or any concerns about the study? 
Research involving humans in Australia is reviewed by an independent group of people 
called a Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). The ethical aspects of this study 
(Protocol Number 2014/611) have been approved by the HREC of The University of 
Sydney, Approval Number 1139150. As part of this process, we have agreed to carry out 
the study according to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 
 259 | P a g e  
(2007). This statement has been developed to protect people who agree to take part in 
research studies. 
 
If you are concerned about the way this study is being conducted or you wish to make a 
complaint to someone independent from the study, please contact the university using 
the details outlined below. Please quote the study title and protocol number. 
 
The Manager, Ethics Administration, The University of Sydney: 
 Telephone: +61 2 8627 8176 
 Email: ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au 
 Fax: +61 2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep. 
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SUPPORT SERVICES 
1. Australasian Doctors Health Network www.adhn.org.au has contact details for 
specific services in each state, as well as links to useful resources. These services 
can provide advice about dealing with anxiety, depression or distress, and also about 
drug and alcohol problems, family or workplace difficulties. For urgent assistance 
from a doctors’ health advisory service in your state: 
(1) Australian Capital Territory: 02 6270 5410 
(2) New South Wales: 02 9437 6552 
(3) Northern Territory: 02 9437 6552 
(4) Queensland: 07 3833 4352 
(5) South Australia: 08 8366 0250 
(6) Tasmania: 1300 853 338 
(7) Victoria: 1300 853 338 
(8) Western Australia: 08 9321 3098 
 
2. BeyondBlue: phone 1300 22 4636 for 24/7 crisis support 
 
3. Lifeline: phone 13 11 44 for 24/7 crisis support 
 
4. If you are an employee and your organisation has contracted an employment 
assistance program www.employeeassistanceprogramme.com.au, you are entitled to 
free and counselling confidential services 
 
5. The AMA in your state 
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Appendix Two 
Doctors’ experience of complaints against them 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
(14) What is this study about? 
You are invited to take part in a research study about understanding doctors’ experience 
of complaints against them, and about the effectiveness of any support obtained during 
the complaints process. The results will be used to inform complaints-handling bodies 
and AHPRA, providers of support services, the Colleges and the medical defence 
organisations about the impact of complaints from the doctors’ perspective. The 
knowledge will also contribute to a greater understanding of the nature and impact of the 
regulatory environment on the profession, so that medical educators and curriculum 
developers may better prepare student and junior doctors for what may lie ahead. 
 
You have been invited to participate in this study because your experience in supporting 
doctors will provide a valuable contribution to understanding why doctors respond as they 
do. This Participant Information Statement tells you about the research study. Knowing 
what is involved will help you decide if you want to take part in the research. Please read 
this sheet carefully and ask questions about anything that you don’t understand or want 
to know more about. 
 
Participation in this research study is voluntary. So it is up to you whether you wish to 
take part or not. 
 
By giving your consent to take part in this study, you are telling us that you: 
 Understand what you have read 
 Agree to take part in the research study as outlined below 
 Agree to the use of your personal information as described. 
 
You may keep this Participant Information Statement. 
 
(15) Who is running the study? 
The study is being conducted by Elizabeth van Ekert as the basis for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at the Centre for Values, Ethics and Law in Medicine, Faculty of 
Medicine, The University of Sydney. This will take place under the supervision of Dr 
Claire Hooker, senior lecturer, Centre for Values, Ethics and Law in Medicine, Faculty of 
Medicine, The University of Sydney. 
 
Auxiliary supervision is being provided by: 
 A/Professor Ian Kerridge, Associate Professor in Bioethics, Centre for Values, 
Ethics and Law in Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, The University of Sydney 
 Professor Garry Walter, Professor Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, The 
University of Sydney 
 Professor Cameron Stewart, Professor of Health, Law and Ethics, Sydney Law 
School, The University of Sydney 
 Dr Jennifer Fleming, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Centre for Values, Ethics 
and Law in Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, The University of Sydney. 
 
(16) What will the study involve for me? 
The study will build on previous studies concerning the adverse impact of medico-legal 
matters on many doctors’ health and wellbeing and aims to understand the reasons why 
this may be. Previous studies have also found that many doctors are reticent to seek 
support during or after the complaints process. As a doctor who has provided 
professional support or advice to doctors who have undergone this experience, we are 
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interested in your perceptions of what doctors experience, the impact of the complaints 
process and how the experience may have changed doctors’ practice and identity. 
 
You will participate in a face-to-face interview with the researcher that will be conducted 
at a venue, time and date to suit your convenience. The interview will be semi-structured, 
asking questions that draw on your experience and observations. 
 
The interview will be audio-taped and professionally transcribed. If any identifying details 
are inadvertently included in the tape, they will be removed from the data before it is 
analysed. 
 
(17) How much of my time will the study take? 
The interview will take from 60 to 90 minutes of your time. 
 
(18) Who can take part in the study? 
The study will be conducted in phases: 
i. Doctors such as yourself who have provided professional support or advice to 
doctors who have been complained about 
ii. Doctors with experience of at least one complaint 
iii. The final phase invites participants from Phase One to a second interview to review 
the preliminary findings from Phase Two. 
 
As a participant in Phase One, you will be one of 4-5 doctors with relevant experience of 
assisting doctors who have been the subject of complaints. 
 
(19) Do I have to be in the study? Can I withdraw from the study once I've started? 
Being in this study is completely voluntary and you do not have to take part. Your 
decision whether to participate will not affect your current or future relationship with the 
researchers or anyone else at The University of Sydney. 
 
If you decide to take part in the study and then change your mind later, you are free to 
withdraw at any time. You can do this by informing the researcher, Ms Elizabeth van 
Ekert, on 0401997537 or elizabeth.vanekert@sydney.edu.au 
 
You will be free to stop the interview at any time. Unless you say that you want us to 
keep them, any recordings will be erased and the information you have provided will not 
be included in the study results. You may also refuse to answer any questions that you 
do not wish to answer during the interview. 
 
If you decide to withdraw from the study, we will not collect any more information from 
you. Please let us know at the time when you withdraw what you would like us to do with 
the information we have collected about you up to that point. If you wish, your information 
will be removed from our study records and will not be included in the study results, up to 
the point that we have analysed and published the results. 
 
(20) Are there any risks or costs associated with being in the study? 
Aside from giving up your time, we do not expect that there will be any risks or costs 
associated with taking part in this study. 
 
(21) Are there any benefits associated with being in the study? 
While there are no tangible benefits of participating in this study, you will have the 
knowledge that you are making a substantial contribution to the profession’s 
understanding of the impact of complaints. 
 
Much is known about complainants: who they are, their motivations for complaining, and 
their expectations of the complaints process. But little is known about doctors’ real 
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experience and perceptions. Your contribution will be invaluable in adding to this 
knowledge, which will be used to help mitigate any adverse effects in others. 
 
(22) What will happen to information about me that is collected during the study? 
Material that includes personal information about you (name, address, contact details, 
type of practice), records of conversations with you, emails and correspondence will be 
kept in a file that only the research team can have access to. This information will be 
used to communicate with you as necessary, and some demographic data may be 
referred to in the analysis. The latter may refer to your specialty or type of practice but will 
not in any way identify you. 
 
Actual data collected will be in the form of written notes taken by the researcher, and an 
audio-recording and transcript of the interview. The transcript of the interview will only be 
known by a unique participant number. The transcript will be prepared by the researcher, 
so no third party will be able to associate you with the data collected in the interview. 
 
Following analysis of the data, storage will be in the Medical Faculty storage facility. 
Materials collected will be kept for seven years, and will be de-identified, except for the 
consent form that you will have signed prior to your participation. The materials will then 
be shredded and recordings will be destroyed. The data will not be used in future 
research projects, nor will it be submitted to any data sharing resource. 
 
The findings from the study will be published in the medical literature and as a doctoral 
thesis. The researcher has also undertaken to provide a report of the finding to relevant 
organisations including the medical defence organisations, AHPRA, the State Medical 
Councils, BeyondBlue, the Australasian Doctors Health Network and the Medical 
Benevolent Association. The medical press will be informed of the study outcomes and 
the researcher will be available for interviews, forums and conference presentations to 
discuss the implications of the findings. At no time will information that could reveal your 
identity be disclosed. 
 
By providing your consent, you are agreeing to us collecting personal information about 
you for the purposes of this research study. Your information will only be used for the 
purposes outlined in this Participant Information Statement, unless you consent 
otherwise. 
 
Your information will be stored securely and your identity/information will be kept strictly 
confidential, except as required by law. Study findings may be published, but you will not 
be individually identifiable in these publications. 
 
(23) Can I tell other people about the study? 
Yes, you are welcome to tell other people about the study. 
 
(24) What if I would like further information about the study? 
When you have read this information, Elizabeth van Ekert will be available to discuss it 
with you further and answer any questions you may have. If you would like to know more 
at any stage during the study, please feel free to contact her on 0401997537 or 
elizabeth.vanekert@sydney.edu.au 
 
(25) Will I be told the results of the study? 
You have a right to receive feedback about the overall results of this study. You can tell 
us that you wish to receive feedback in the form of a summary of findings by ticking the 
box on the consent form, and providing your mailing address. You will receive this 
feedback after the study is finished. 
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(26) What if I have a complaint or any concerns about the study? 
Research involving humans in Australia is reviewed by an independent group of people 
called a Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). The ethical aspects of this study 
have been approved by the HREC of The University of Sydney, Approval Number 
1139150. As part of this process, we have agreed to carry out the study according to the 
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). This statement has 
been developed to protect people who agree to take part in research studies. 
 
If you are concerned about the way this study is being conducted or you wish to make a 
complaint to someone independent from the study, please contact the university using 
the details outlined below. Please quote the study title and protocol number. 
 
The Manager, Ethics Administration, The University of Sydney: 
 Telephone: +61 2 8627 8176 
 Email: ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au 
 Fax: +61 2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) 
 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep 
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Appendix Three 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
 
I, ................................................................................... [PRINT NAME], agree to take part in this 
research study. In giving my consent I state that: 
 
 I understand the purpose of the study, what I will be asked to do, and any risks/benefits 
involved. 
 
 I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been able to discuss my 
involvement in the study with the researcher if I wished to do so. 
 
 The researcher, Elizabeth van Ekert, has answered any questions that I had about the 
study and I am happy with the answers. 
 
 I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary and I do not have to take part. 
My decision whether to be in the study will not affect my relationship with the researchers or 
anyone else at The University of Sydney, now or in the future. 
 
 I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
 I understand that I may stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, and that 
unless I indicate otherwise, any recordings will then be erased and the information provided 
will not be included in the study. I also understand that I may refuse to answer any 
questions I don’t wish to answer. 
 
 I understand that the results of this study may be published, and that publications will not 
contain my name or any identifiable information about me. 
 
 I understand that personal information about me that is collected over the course of this 
project will be stored securely and will only be used for purposes that I have agreed to. I 
understand that information about me will only be told to others with my permission, except 
as required by law. The instances which may oblige the researcher to breach confidentiality 
include: 
 
o Where the researcher believes there is significant risk of harm to me or another 
person 
 
o When ordered by a court of law, although I understand that the University will do its 
upmost to protect my privacy 
 
o Where the researcher believes I may be guilty of a criminal offence. 
 
 
I consent to:  
 
 Audio-recording   YES  NO  
 
 Being contacted about future studies  YES  NO  
 
 
Would you like to receive feedback about the overall results of this study? 
    YES  NO  
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If you answered YES, please indicate your preferred form of feedback and address: 
 
 Postal: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 Email: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
................................................................... 
Signature 
 
 
 
……………...................................................... 
PRINT name 
 
 
................................................................... 
Date 
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Appendix Four 
Doctors’ experience of complaints against them 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
 
I, ................................................................................... [PRINT NAME], agree to take part in this 
research study. 
 
In giving my consent, I state that: 
 
 I understand the purpose of the study, what I will be asked to do, and any risks/benefits 
involved. 
 
 I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been able to discuss my 
involvement in the study with the researchers if I wished to do so. 
 
 The researchers have answered any questions that I had about the study and I am happy 
with the answers. 
 
 I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary and I do not have to take part. 
My decision whether to be in the study will not affect my relationship with the researchers or 
anyone else at the University of Sydney now or in the future. 
 
 I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
 I understand that I may stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, and that 
unless I indicate otherwise any recordings will then be erased and the information provided 
will not be included in the study. I also understand that I may refuse to answer any 
questions I don’t wish to answer. 
 
 I understand that personal information about me that is collected over the course of this 
project will be stored securely and will only be used for purposes that I have agreed to. I 
understand that information about me will only be told to others with my permission, except 
as required by law. 
 
 I understand that the results of this study may be published, and that publications will not 
contain my name or any identifiable information about me. 
 
I consent to: 
 
 Audio-recording   YES  NO  
 
 Being contacted about future studies  YES  NO  
 
Would you like to receive feedback about the overall results of this study? 
    YES  NO  
If you answered YES, please indicate your preferred form of feedback and address: 
 
 Postal: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
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 Email: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
................................................................... 
Signature 
 
 
 
 ... ................................................................... 
PRINT name 
 
 
.................................................................... 
Date 
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Appendix Five 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
DiT Identifier Date of interview Location  
DiT1 19 January 2015 NSW city, in workplace 
DiT2 23 January 2015 Interstate regional, at home 
DiT3 22 October 2015 Interstate city, in public area 
DiT4 24 March 2015 NSW regional, at home 
DiT5 24 June 2015 NSW city, at home 
DiT6 25 May 2015 Interstate, regional, at home 
DiT7 26 February 2015 Interstate city, at home 
DiT8 25 May 2015 Interstate city, at home 
DiT9 15 September 2015 NSW city, at home 
DiT10 14 November 2015 NSW city, on university campus 
DiT11 27 February 2015 Interstate, regional, in workplace 
DiT12 21 November 2015 Interstate, city, in public area 
DiT13 21 November 2015 Interstate, city, in public area 
DiT14 13 November 2015 NSW city, on university campus 
DiT15 2 February 2016 NSW city, on university campus 
DiT16 12 April 2016 NSW city, in public area 
DiT17 19 April 2016 NSW city, at home 
 
Experts  Date of interview Location  
EI1 14 December 2014 NSW, workplace  
EI2 16 February 2015 NSW, workplace 
EI3 28 January 2015 NSW, workplace 
EI4 21 August 2015 NSW, workplace 
EI5 26 May 2015 Interstate, workplace 
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Appendix Six 
Interview questions for Phase 2 
 
Doctors’ experience of complaints against them 
 
Introduction 
 
1. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study, which, as we have spoken about, aims at 
gathering your perceptions of the complaints process and of your own personal experience of 
having a complaint. We would like to know if you obtained any support, what that was and 
whether it made a difference. 
2. We are not concerned about the complaint itself, what it was about, whom it was from or what 
the outcome was. However, if it helps in your account of your experience, you may certainly 
mention talk about it, though please do not use names or other details that may identify parties 
to the complaint. If such details are inadvertently mentioned, they will be erased from the 
record of this interview. 
3. If you wish to pause at any time, you may. If you wish to discontinue, you are free to do so. 
4. Do you agree to the interview being recorded? This will ensure we have an accurate record 
and will enable me to listen and engage with you freely. 
5. I would also like to remind you of the advice provided in the Information Sheet and Consent 
form relating to disclosure of illegal activity. Do you recall reading this warning, and do you 
have any questions about it? 
6. Do you have any other questions before we start? 
 
The interview 
 
Introductory questions 
[this is to warm up the interviewee and to obtain a brief profile of the nature of their practice] 
 
Can you tell me a little about yourself as a doctor? 
 
How long have you been practising and in what speciality? 
 
Where do you practise? (in a hospital, solo, group, partnership, community-based, etc.) 
 
The complaint and you 
Can you tell me about your experience of the complaint process? 
 
What will follow depends on the response of the interviewee to the flow of the conversation. The 
aim is to have the doctor give their own account of what it was like to receive a complaint, such as: 
 
What happened when you first received a complaint? What did you think of the complaint itself: 
can you recall the patient and issues they were complaining about? 
 
What did you do next? What were your feelings at that time? 
 
Did you tell anyone about it? How did you feel about telling them? What did you think they may 
say? What do you think they may have thought about you? 
 
What did you understand you had to do about the complaint: did the letter explain this? Did you 
feel you had to comply with the instructions set out in that letter? 
 
Did you inform your MDO? Did they give you advice on what to do? Did this advice make sense to 
you? 
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Can you tell me about how you were feeling at this point of time, after it became “official”? How did 
this feeling change once the “process” took charge of what you had to do? 
 
Support 
Did you obtain any formal or informal support during the process? 
 
Can you tell me more about the support you received? 
 
Did you at any point seek out any professional support? Can you tell me about this? (e.g., 
professional psychological, GP, EAP, supervisor or senior colleague, medical adviser at MDO, 
doctors’ health advisory service, BeyondBlue, etc.) Did you find this helpful? What was helpful 
about it? What could have been better handled? Why do you say this? 
 
If you did not have professional support, did you speak to anyone else about it? Did this make a 
difference? 
 
Did you seek any other source of information that may help you? (e.g., online resource, literature). 
Can you tell me more about this? Did this encourage or help you in any way? 
 
Changes to you and your practice 
Did anything change about you or your practice during the course of the complaint-handling 
process? Can you tell me more about this? (e.g., behavioural change, changes in practice). What 
about after it was all over: did anything change then? 
 
Did the complaint or the process itself make any difference to how you felt about your patients? 
(e.g., trust) Or about your colleagues? 
 
Impact on your perception of medicine 
Now I would like for us to take a step back in time: When you first went into medicine, what did you 
think it would be like? Has this attitude changed with experience? 
 
Has having a complaint added to this change? 
 
Has the experience changed your feelings about being a doctor in any way? Can you elaborate? 
 
Impact on others’ perceptions of you 
If others around you know of this complaint, such as your family, friends, colleagues, has their 
attitude towards you changed in any way that you are aware of? What do you attribute this to? 
 
Perceptions of the whole process 
Overall, looking back, can you describe how you feel about the whole process? How do you think 
you were treated by the system? 
 
How could the process have been improved for you? 
 
Closing 
We are coming to the end of the interview now. Is there anything you would like to add or clarify? 
 
Are you clear about what will happen next? [transcribing, de-identifying any personal details, 
analysis, write-up, publication; access to findings; how confidential information will be stored] 
 
[Assurance that if anything has disturbed them as a result of their participation, they may call me or 
speak with their adviser at their MDO or other professional. There is also the list of support 
services tuned in to the special needs of doctors, provided in the Information sheet (if they do not 
still have it, I will have another list on hand to give them.)] 
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You may feel welcome to keep in touch if you wish about progress with the study. 
 
Thank you again for your assistance with this study. Knowing how much this has affected you, your 
participation and candid opinions are very much appreciated. I wish you well in your practice. 
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Appendix Seven 
Phase one Interview questions 
 
Doctors’ experience of complaints against them 
 
Introduction 
1. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study, which, as we have spoken about, aims 
at gathering your perceptions of the complaints process and how it impacts on doctors 
whom you have worked with to provide support. 
2. Do you agree to the interview being recorded? This will ensure we have an accurate record 
and will enable me to listen and engage with you more freely. 
3. I can assure you that your identity will not be revealed and any information obtained from you 
or about you will be held in a secure place. 
4. Do you have any questions before we start? 
 
The interview 
 
Introductory questions 
[this is to warm up the interviewee and to obtain a brief profile of the nature of their practice and the 
doctor-to-doctor/patient relationship] 
 
Can you tell me a little about your role as a doctor providing support to doctors? 
 
How do you usually undertake these encounters (e.g., by telephone, face-to-face or some other 
method)? How would you describe the relationship you have with these doctors? (e.g., is there a 
pattern; does the service involve one-off contact); is it a normal doctor-patient therapeutic 
relationship or is it more of a colleague-to-colleague relationship?) 
 
Does this make a difference as to your expectations of their ‘treatment’? Do you think these 
doctors have different expectations of you than your usual patients? If so, what do you attribute this 
to? 
 
How did you assume this role? What proportion of your current practice involves supporting 
doctors? 
 
How do doctors generally come to you: through word of mouth, or by referral? Who refers them 
and how do they know about the service you provide? 
 
Why are they referred to you? 
 
What do you think motivates them to contact you? 
 
The study and your perceptions 
You have been describing this aspect of your practice and your involvement with doctors who need 
your support and advice. 
 
What I am interested in is your perceptions of what, in general, these doctors go through when 
dealing with a complaint and the official process of managing the complaint by the authorities. If 
you wish to provide examples, please go ahead, though I would request that you do not use names 
or identify them in any way. 
 
1. Experience of complaints 
 
You have been doing this work for X years now. Do you have any comments on how complaints 
impact on doctors’ health and wellbeing? 
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There has been some research that indicates that doctors are affected by complaints against them 
more than other professionals of a similar level of status and complexity (e.g., engineers, lawyers: 
ref Clode, 2004). Do you have any views about why this may be so? What is it about doctors that 
they are affected more than others, as a generality? 
 
From doctors’ accounts, have you found that doctors’ perceptions of themselves as people and as 
professionals have changed since being complained about? Can you elaborate? 
 
Have any doctors talked to you about how they may have changed the way they practise? If so, in 
what way? Do you have any views as to why they may have done this? 
 
2. Obtaining support 
 
BeyondBlue conducted a large study of about 14 000 doctors in 2013 about the mental health of 
doctors in Australia. What was observed was that doctors are generally reticent about seeking 
support when they are in trouble over any aspect of their lives. The reasons include stigma, 
embarrassment, fear of losing their job or advancement, while junior doctors are worried about not 
being passed, being victimised, being ashamed. As a doctor who has provided professional 
support to doctors, what are the characteristics of these doctors that have motivated them to seek 
out your service? 
 
(Shame, stigma, personality, being caught out) 
 
3. The complaints process 
 
Would you like to talk about your impressions of how the complaints process impacts on doctors? 
 
Do you think complaints could be handled differently, being mindful of the fact that people will 
always complain, and have the right to do so, as well as there being statutory bodies established to 
protect the public and maintain standards of the profession? If you were in a position to do so, what 
recommendations would you have for those organisations that handle complaints or that assist 
doctors with their complaints (e.g., complaints commissions, Medical Board/AHPRA, other 
regulatory bodies, and the MDOs). 
 
Reflections 
 
Do you find that you identify with some doctors? Or some whom you have little sympathy for, or 
who may even annoy you? Can you elaborate? 
 
Do you have any other observations you would like to share with me? Or have any questions or 
suggestions? 
 
Closing 
 
We are coming to the end of the interview now. Is there anything you would like to add or clarify? 
 
Are you clear about what will happen next? [transcribing, de-identifying any personal details, 
analysis, write-up, publication; access to findings; how confidential information will be stored] 
 
Would you like to participate in the final phase of this study? This would mean re-visiting some of 
these topics but also reflecting on the results we will have obtained after interviewing a number of 
doctors. It may be interesting to compare their responses to your impressions. 
 
You may prefer to let me know at a later date. If you wish to do so, I will contact you again closer to 
the time to make arrangements. As it is another integral component of the study with a delay of 
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several months between phases, this will involve my sending you further information and asking for 
your consent again. 
 
Please be assured that you are welcome to keep in touch if you wish about the progress with the 
study, or if you have any other thoughts you may wish to share. 
 
Thank you again for your assistance with this study. 
 
If you wish to contact me: 
 
Phone: 0401997537 or 0290363432 
 
Email:  elizabeth.vanekert@sydney.edu.au 
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Appendix Eight 
CIVIL LIABILITY ACT 2002 - Section 5O 
Standard of care for professionals 
(1) A person practising a profession ("a professional") does not incur a liability in 
negligence arising from the provision ofa professional service if it is established that 
the professional acted in a manner that (at the time the service was provided) was 
widely accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as competent professional 
practice. 
(2) However, peer professional opinion cannot be relied on for the purposes of this 
section if the court considers that the opinion is irrational. 
(3) The fact that there are differing peer professional opinions widely accepted in 
Australia concerning a matter does not prevent any one or more (or all) of those 
opinions being relied on for the purposes of this section. 
(4) Peer professional opinion does not have to be universally accepted to be considered 
widely accepted. 
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Appendix Nine 
HEALTH PRACTITIONER REGULATION NATIONAL LAW (NSW) - SECT 144 
Grounds for complaint about registered health practitioner [NSW] 
144 Grounds for complaint about registered health practitioner [NSW] 
The following complaints may be made about a registered health practitioner-- 
(a) A complaint the practitioner has, either in this jurisdiction or elsewhere, been 
convicted of or made the subject of a criminal finding for an offence. 
(b) A complaint the practitioner has been guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or 
professional misconduct. 
(c) A complaint the practitioner is not competent to practise the practitioner's profession. 
(d) A complaint the practitioner has an impairment. 
(e) A complaint the practitioner is otherwise not a suitable person to hold registration in 
the practitioner's profession. 
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Appendix Ten 
PRESENTATIONS 
1. The silent narrative: Doctors’ experience of complaints against them. Conversation, Centre 
for Values Ethics and Law in Medicine (VELiM): with A/Professor Louise Nash. 14 
September 2014. 
2. The silent narrative: Doctors’ experience of complaints against them. Conversation, Centre 
for Values Ethics and Law in Medicine (VELiM). 27 August 2015. 
3. Is protecting the public harming doctors? Australasian Doctors Health Conference, 
Melbourne. October 2015 
4. Dealing with complaints against doctors. Guest lecturer Korean medical students program. 
Centre for Values Ethics and Law in Medicine (VELiM). 6 January 2016. 
5. Doctors in trouble: The hidden cost of protecting the public. Guest lecture, Bioethics post-
graduate program. Sydney Law School. 28 April 2016. 
6. Doctors in trouble: The hidden cost of protecting the public: A work in progress. Presenter, 
Narrative Inquiry Research Group. 27 June 2016. 
7. Exploring the hidden cost of protecting the public through law and regulation. Conversation, 
VELiM. 12 September 2016. 
8. Doctors in trouble: Hidden costs of protecting the public. International Association of Medical 
Regulatory Authorities, Melbourne. 22 September 2016. 
9. Sticky ethical problems. Guest speaker, Sydney Health Ethics: Qualitative Research post-
graduate program. 27 April 2017. 
10. Sticky ethical problems. Guest speaker, Sydney Health Ethics: Qualitative Research post-
graduate program. 7 August 2017. 
11. Doctors in trouble: Doctors’ experiences of complaints against them. Australasian Doctors 
Health Conference, Sydney. 15 September 2017. 
